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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Leave Nothing to the Imagination: 
Global Forms of Atrocity After 1945 
by 
 
Deborah Michelle Donig 
Doctor of Philosophy in English Literature 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2017 
Professor Jennifer A. Sharpe, Chair 
 
 “Leave Nothing to the Imagination: Global Forms of Atrocity After 1945” argues that in 
the wake of the Nuremberg trials of 1945-1946, through the Eichmann trial in 1961, concern 
about how to establish evidence for atrocity becomes the major preoccupation for 
legal representations of human rights violations. I trace how legal discourse becomes dependent 
on literary modes of representation in order to substantiate the reality of large-scale violence and 
human suffering in the context of post-1945 human rights legislation. I argue that at key 
moments, legal arguments turn to fictions and figurations in their attempts to establish the facts 
of atrocity. Since fiction can create narrative cohesion that the facts themselves cannot support, 
legal attempts at redress borrow from the imaginative possibilities of fictional techniques for 
making atrocity legible. Figuration, moreover, fortifies unstable evidence by enlisting facts from 
other contexts through a logic of resemblance. Herein, I investigate how the dynamic between 
factual, fictional, and figurative modes of establishing evidence migrates from its epicenter in 
	 iii 
post-1945 Europe to diverse geographical spaces and geopolitical contexts, where it takes on 
internationally recognizable markings of atrocity. I look at the intersections between these 
geographical and geopolitical sites of atrocity, examining the way they borrow, refer to, and 
complicate one another, and I identify how these aesthetic exchanges constitute attempts to 
establish evidence in cases where empirical evidence lacks. I look at how the literature of 
atrocity after 1945 comes to center around this concern about proving the reality of atrocity, and 
how this happens simultaneously as atrocity becomes an increasingly international concern, 
subject to new international human rights legislation. 
This dissertation stands at the intersection of three interdisciplinary conversations: first, 
how human rights defines a concept of universal personhood; second, comparative genocide 
studies and, more broadly, comparative atrocity; and third, the nature of evidence in law and 
literature. The central literary figures that this project engages include Kurt Vonnegut, Antjie 
Krog, M. NourbeSe Philip, Paul Celan, and Indra Sinha; the central theorists I engage include 
Hannah Arendt, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Derrida.  
The case studies I include trace out a global trajectory of a discourse of human rights, 
alongside concern about establishing evidence for human rights violations. In each chapter, I pair 
literary texts with archival sources, in order to identify how texts in each of these categories 
maneuver between factual and figurative terms. The formal category that has determined my 
grouping of primary texts is the category of “legal testimony.”  
My first chapter, “Factuality on Trial: The “Real” Eichmann, The Authenticity of 
Atrocity, and the Evidence of Evil,” examines the Eichmann trials in 1961 and Hannah Arendt’s 
coverage of the trials in her landmark thesis, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Thesis on the Banality of 
Evil. This chapter focuses on the Holocaust as a new archetype of atrocity in which the idea of 
	 iv 
“authentic” representation of atrocity becomes unstable. I chronicle a turning point in the concept 
of legal evidence as it relates to and is used to establish the reality of atrocity 
My next chapter, “Fictions of Evidence: Reconciling Truth in Country of My Skull,” 
examines the South African Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings of 1996-1997. The 
TRC self-consciously fashioned itself against the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, and did so in 
front of a global audience. In in the context of the TRC, truth becomes fragmented, and 
reconciliation requires fictions to supplement those fragments. I examine a particular piece of 
testimony from Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull to illustrate how legal truth in the TRC 
hearings may be governed by fictions. I show how at the core of the TRC, the concept of 
evidence itself is located in a specifically literary imaginary.   
My third chapter, “Seeing Double in Animal’s People: Local Toxins, Global Toxicity and 
the Universal Bhopal,” turns to industrial disaster of 1984 in India caused by an American 
multinational corporation. Bhopal showcases the challenges of providing evidence for and 
addressing local mass suffering in that global context. Focusing on Indra Sinha’s Animal’s 
People, my chapter examines how this atrocity in Bhopal veers between authenticating itself as 
atrocity by evidencing its universality, borrowing from facts and stylizations of antecedent 
atrocity to put Bhopal within the legislative purview of International Human Rights, and 
simultaneously evidencing its uniqueness, thus taking it outside of the global economy.  
My fourth chapter, “Textimony: Zong! and the Poetics of Evidence” pushes my argument 
into poetic form. M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong!, a collection of language poetry, is what the author 
calls an “untelling.” It “untells” the 1781 slave massacre aboard the ship, an atrocity followed by 
an egregious legal case that framed the atrocity as a property compensation claim pressed by the 
slave owners. Zong! uses the aesthetic conventions developed by a specifically post-1945 mode 
	 v 
of representing atrocity, and a contemporary mode of thinking about human rights and atrocity, 
and projects these conventions onto a historical event of atrocity—the transatlantic slave trade—
that may stand both at the gateway of modern globalization, and as an archetype of atrocity. I 
consider the politics of comparative memory in a globalized legal context, and the 
representational and political consequences of a comparative approach to memory that may 
become competitive.  
My research intervenes into the discourses of contemporary international human rights 
concerns, policy development, and the discursive development of moral pedagogy addressing the 
lessons and the legacy of global atrocity for future responses and ethical import. My intervention 
into these conversations seeks to understand how, in the context of post-1945 human rights, 
which I will argue is inherently comparative, modes and methodologies of comparison typically 
associated with literary discourse—analogy, figuration, and metaphor—alongside fictions 
themselves, become forms of evidence, and how they come to mobilize some of the great human 
rights projects of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Leave Nothing to the Imagination: 
Global Forms of Atrocity After 1945 
 
I. The Collapse of Evidence 
On June 7, 1961, the poet and fiction author Yehiel Dinur, better known by the pen name 
Ka-Tstetnik 135633, rose to testify against the infamous Nazi villain, Adolf Eichmann.1 In the 
witness box, with the forces of international justice, the press, and the global public watching, 
the former Auschwitz prisoner, famous for writing about the camps in ways that blurred the line 
between fact and fantasy, collapsed—mid-sentence. More than a failure of words, the witness 
was “not able to continue his evidence,” as the Attorney General put it. Something about the type 
of atrocity described within this testimony seemed beyond knowing, certainly beyond telling, 
beyond what could be provided by the form of legal proof recognized by the arena of the court.2  
The prosecution for Eichmann called Dinur to the stand knowing he was no ordinary 
witness. By the time that the Eichmann trials commenced in May of 1960, Dinur had authored a 
copious body of literature, some, as with his 1955 The House of Dolls, represented thinly veiled 
representations of grotesque life in the death camps, some, like his 1946 Salamandra (translated 
into English both as Salamander and as Sunrise Over Hell), proposed highly figural evocations 
and metaphors for an experience that for him seemed to have no literal corollary, no 
correspondence with empirical terms. Ka-Tsetnik was at once called to “evidence Auschwitz,” as 
the Attorney General proposed, with a “general description” of literal testimony, and 
simultaneously called to testify because of his well-known stature as a progenitor of a quickly 																																																								
1 Dinur’s name is spelled variously “Dinur,” Dinoor, and “De-Nur.” “De-Nur” is itself a pen name (he was born 
Yehiel Feiner); it is a figurative Aramaic term that means “of the fire,” and references the poet’s experience in 
Auschwitz. 
 
2 “The State of Israel versus Adolf Eichmann.” Vol. 3, Session 68 (7 June,1961). 
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growing body of what might be considered literary testimony.3 Galvanized by Eichmann’s 
capture, publishers in 1961 printed new editions and translations of Ka-Tsetnik’s work, while 
audiences in Israel and across a global public read his descriptions of life in a Nazi death camp, 
what he referred to as “another planet.”4 A generation of readers across the globe came to know 
and understand the reality of that “planet” called Auschwitz, not through the facts of his 
testimonial witness, but rather in the literary terms Ka-Tstetnik provided as fictions and 
figurations.  
The authenticity of Ka-Tstetnik’s testimony in the arena of the court, its urgency, and 
indeed the persuasive power it offered as witness against Eichmann, lay altogether outside of the 
empirical sphere of verifiable evidence. Rather, Ka-Testnik’s witness offered proof of 
Eichmann’s crimes and the severity of the Holocaust experience through a specifically literary 
mode. More than his testimony, the evidence in his texts—the literature itself—was understood 
to bear witness, even when the witness himself could not. Indeed, the literature bore witness 
perhaps precisely because the testimony of the witness could not be sustained—because the 
witness “could not continue his evidence.” When the means of providing evidence collapsed, 
literature provided the court a form of proof beyond what the witness could himself evidence in 
factual testimony. In fact, we might even say that the literature was itself the point of the witness; 
Ka-Tsetnik’s testimony was beside that literary point, there to verify that which had already 
circulated within the currency of imagination forged through literary production. Literary texts 
stood as a form of evidence for suffering that seemed otherwise to evade the type of proof 
provided within the protocols of the court. While the facts of atrocity evaded judicial forms of 
																																																								
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Ibid. 
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proof, fictions and figurations offered possibilities of verifiability, witness, and narrative 
cohesion that the legal modes of establishing factuality could not provide.  
Leave Nothing to the Imagination argues that in the wake of the Nuremberg trials of 
1945-1946, through the Eichmann trial in 1961, concern about how to establish evidence for 
atrocity becomes the major preoccupation for legal representations of human rights violations. I 
trace how legal discourse becomes dependent on literary modes of representation in order to 
substantiate the reality of large-scale violence and human suffering in the context of post-1945 
human rights legislation. I demonstrate that at key moments, legal arguments turn to fictions and 
figurations in their attempts to establish the facts of atrocity. Since fiction can create narrative 
cohesion that the facts themselves cannot support, legal attempts at redress borrow from the 
imaginative possibilities of fictional techniques for making atrocity legible. Figuration, 
moreover, fortifies unstable evidence by enlisting facts from other contexts through a logic of 
resemblance. Herein, I investigate how the dynamic between factual, fictional, and figurative 
modes of establishing evidence migrates from its epicenter in post-1945 Europe to diverse 
geographical spaces and geopolitical contexts, where it takes on internationally recognizable 
markings of atrocity. I look at the intersections between these geographical and geopolitical sites 
of atrocity, examining the way they borrow, refer to, and complicate one another, and I identify 
how these aesthetic exchanges constitute attempts to establish evidence in cases where empirical 
evidence lacks. I look at how the literature of atrocity after 1945 comes to center around this 
concern about proving the reality of atrocity, and how this happens simultaneously as atrocity 
becomes an increasingly international concern, subject to new international human rights 
legislation.   
	 4 
Considering the centrality of evidence across the forms of knowledge converged in 
establishing the reality of atrocity past—legal, literary, historical, archival—one might ask the 
following questions: how does evidence achieve its central status as the distinctive problem of 
the atrocity story? Concurrently, what makes evidence a specific concern of—and a specific 
challenge for—these discourses, such that the anxiety of evidence becomes not only an element 
of the discourse for these texts, but also a distinct signal that marks a text as one claiming to 
represent atrocity? How does the idea of a “world literature,” and a cultural code for atrocity 
circulating globally within literary representations of it, change and inflect the direction of 
universal human rights, the idea of what it means to represent atrocity, and finally, what it means 
to take part in a world literature? 
To answer this question, I turn to texts seem to oscillate between factuality and 
fictionality in their attempt to authenticate the reality of the atrocities they describe. I find that 
literary content becomes a form of evidence when empirical evidence lacks; moreover, I propose 
that as the literature of atrocity concretizes into a codex, literary forms, and frequently literary 
content, become vested with the force of evidence. Finally, I trace the ways in which these texts 
not only reference and respond to, but actually intercept and reroute the flow of the legal 
processes negotiating post-atrocity justice, and the projects that respond to human rights 
violations. Thus, I engage with the dynamic interaction between a body of world literature 
written about atrocity, and the ongoing project of universal human rights.   
My project stands at the intersection of three interdisciplinary conversations: first, how 
human rights defines a concept of universal personhood; second, comparative genocide studies 
and more broadly comparative atrocity; and third, the nature of evidence in law and literature. 
My intervention into these conversations seeks to understand how, in the context of post-1945 
	 5 
human rights, which I will argue is inherently comparative, modes and methodologies of 
comparison typically associated with literary discourse—analogy, figuration, and metaphor—
alongside fictions themselves, become forms of evidence, and how they come to mobilize some 
of the great human rights projects of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The central literary 
figures this project engages include Kurt Vonnegut, Antjie Krog, M. NourbeSe Philip, Paul 
Celan, and Indra Sinha; the central theorists I engage include Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gayatri Spivak, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida. The formal category 
that has determined my grouping of primary texts is the category of “legal testimony,” especially 
in its engagement with evidence. From the origins of this discourse in the trials following the 
Holocaust, I investigate the global path that this discourse takes, including the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the development of legal discourse around environmental 
and ecological disaster in Bhopal, India, the rise of international court procedures and the 
limitations of international courts to address atrocity perpetrated by non-state actors, including 
corporations, and finally, retroactive applications of post-1945 human rights discourse onto pre-
1945 atrocities, specifically the transatlantic slave trade. My research intervenes into 
contemporary international human rights concerns, policy development, and the discursive 
development of moral pedagogy addressing the lessons and the legacy of global atrocity for 
future responses and ethical import. I specifically consider the status of eye-witness testimony as 
evidence in fiction; the status of legal concepts of evidence in substantiating the reality of 
atrocity; and the discourse of universal human rights and comparative atrocity in a global circuit.  
II. Authentic Atrocity and Literary Credibility 
Leave Nothing to the Imagination demonstrates that a post-1945 body of literature 
describing atrocity negotiates between factuality and literary forms of fictions and figurations, 
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and that frequently, legal arguments engage these forms as evidence, enlisting literary content in 
modes of proof. I examine the way in which the problem of evidence becomes entangled with 
the facts and the fictions of atrocity for the cases of this study. In the context of post-1945 
atrocity, critics have pointed to testimony as a form that comes under a particular duress when 
required to serve as evidence for a type of suffering frequently said to be unimaginable, 
ineffable, or beyond the scales of both language and normal moral judgment. Tasked with 
establishing “proof” of atrocity, testimony must negotiate between the language of factuality and 
figural language. On the one hand, factuality may establish a literal truth but may fail to impart 
its significance. On the other hand, figural language may provide a better account of the 
witness’s lived experience, but such figural accounts, in their departure from the factual 
epistemology of “the real” may jeopardize the documentary authenticity of the testimonial form, 
whose authority derives from its truth function, its capacity to confirm and to fortify the court’s 
empirical reconstruction of a state of affairs as they transpired in the past. James E. Young 
argues that for the testimonial writing of atrocity, the significance of textuality depends on its 
referentiality, the link between the writer as a “true” objective being, writing as a trace of that 
“true” being, and experience as a “true” fact.5 Thus, the aesthetic of such writing is entirely 
bound up with its factuality, its aim to establish authenticity in each of these three courts. Since 
the facts of atrocity may be on their own incredible, the greater the need to generate credibility, 
the greater the impulse to assert its authenticity by insisting on the authenticity of the speaker as 
a witness. What could more persuasively authenticate the authority of a speaker than the claim “I 
was there?”6 Evidence, in this case, serves not only to corroborate the facts of testimony but also 
																																																								
5 James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988). 
 
6 It is worth observing that during President Obama’s 2009 visit to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, he 
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as traces of the “reality” of the experience itself. In the case of the Holocaust, perhaps the first of 
the modern atrocities to be projected onto the global stage, producing authenticity may have a 
special value. That value is directly related to the requirement of extending the scope of evidence 
to an international audience, with no preexisting model or conceptual form for understanding 
what had taken place. 
But as evidence of atrocity, testimony of such suffering is not just beholden to reporting 
on the factuality of the event—that is to say, to collecting and to archiving evidence. These 
accounts may also be beholden to establishing actuality—a state which attends to describing, 
explaining, and constellating facts into a coherent account of what has happened. Since atrocity 
is de facto an extraordinary state of affairs, denoting suffering and violations uncommon to 
ordinary lived experience, it is not enough for evidence to establish the reality of the suffering 
that has passed; such evidence emphatically seeks to establish the experience of suffering as a 
“legitimate” atrocity by proving the extremity, the exceptional nature, of such an experience. 
Thus, evidencing the reality of such an experience requires maneuvering between a form of 
proof grounded in establishing empirical facts, and a form of proof that foregrounds the limits of 
factuality to provide adequate evidence for atrocity. In this sense, evidencing atrocity occurs in 
an intermediary space between the logic of fact and reality on the one hand, and the logic of 
fiction and figuration on the other. In the judicial sphere, testifying to atrocity as a verifiable 																																																																																																																																																																																		
encountered a photograph of Wiesel, which is visible and on display at the memorial site there. Wiesel, who 
accompanied Obama on the visit, addressed Obama and described his father’s death in the camp as follows: “He 
became sick, weak, and I was there. I was there when he suffered. I was there when he asked for help, for water. I 
was there to receive his last words, but I was not there when he called for me, although we were on the same block, 
he on the upper bed and I on the lower bed. He called my name, and I was too afraid to move. All of us were. And 
then he died. I was there, but I was not there.” Wiesel’s comments foreground his experience, linking his narration 
of the past to the photograph at the site, to the dead father who cannot bear witness—because, the comment 
suggests—Wiesel has marked off his documentary authority, located in an empirical presence—from a metaphorical 
presence, the sense in which he was “not there.” The phrase, “I was not there” thus serves to underscore the 
literalness of the phrase “I was there,” augmenting the sense of documentary authority that links the speaker 
addressing Obama to the photograph of the speaker as he was during the event.  See “Obama Visits the Buchenwald 
Concentration Camp” ABC News, June 5 2009.  
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historical account requires not only that testimony serve to substantiate the evidence, to “show” 
things as they really were by way of descriptive discourse, but also that it produces coherent and 
plausible logic explaining how the elements of evidence relate to one another—in other words, 
imposing a semantic and narrative logic of connection between pieces of evidence, analyzing 
that evidence, and marking its significance for those actors affected by it. 
This means that the aim of testimonial evidence is, broadly speaking, to interpret the 
evidence and in many cases, to ascribe moral value to it, to identify its significance for a larger 
historiographical project, and to enlist it in producing a causal argument that may be utilized for 
political leverage, conceptualization, or other hermeneutic endeavors that would introduce and 
integrate the experience of atrocity into a conceptual scheme available to those who have not 
experienced it. More immediately, providing a sense of an event’s actuality based on the 
evidence means to describe, to an audience or reader, what the experience was like—a task that 
as Elie Wiesel puts it is futile when he writes, “[y]ou, who have never lived under a sky of blood, 
will never know what it is like.”7 Wiesel’s comment is telling; in its attempt to straddle this 
duality of factuality versus actuality, the implied form of objectivity provided by evidence versus 
the implied type of description provided by witness, it collapses; the demands of both cannot 
simultaneously be met. Wiesel’s statement abandons literal language and factual description in 
favor of interpretation, only to find that interpretation, here given in the form of figurative 
language, undermines the need to establish the objective facts of documentation.  
Wiesel is obviously correct in proclaiming that those who have not witnessed the 
atrocities of the Holocaust cannot measure the experience against our own, but his impulse 
toward metaphor in the phrase “under a sky of blood” already belies the interplay between the 
logic of factual language and the logic of figural language; words must both portray an 																																																								
7 Elie Wiesel, “Why I Write: Making No Become Yes,” New York Times Book Review, April 1985, 13. 
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“unnatural” state of affairs to the “normal world,” and thus must rely on figuration, and yet must 
also serve to ground that inconceivable world in reality, so as to endow the writing with its 
evidentiary function. In this case, then, the language of witness, attempting to reproduce the 
authenticity of the experience, is torn between the logic that undergirds factuality and the 
circumstances of objective evidence-based claims, and a logic that belongs to fictionality, and 
more specifically, to conceptual and subjective claims, the world as it seemed.   
Most critics have kept the conversation about this rupture to discussing it specifically as a 
problem of language’s lack, as the gap, often described as an absence or silence, in which 
language falters in its ability to identify and capture the quality and the extent of a horrific 
experience said to be “beyond words.”8 For example, David Patterson, in The Shriek of Silence: 
A Phenomenology of the Holocaust Novel describes this type of rupture found in the Holocaust 
novel as “an endeavor to fetch the word from silence and restore it to meaning.”9 Like Patterson, 
Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub, in their Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis and History, describe the crisis in such testimony as “the ‘gaping, vertiginous 
black hole’ of the experience of the trauma.”10 Yet in noting the particular strain of this writing 
when it is put to the tests of legal verifiability, I find that when these scholarly conversations 
about the crisis of testimony foreground language’s lack, it is not that language, in its 
representational capacity lacks the words to describe atrocity, but rather that those words cannot 
serve their evidentiary function. Certainly, the Holocaust has been put into words, has been 																																																								
8 See Theodor Adorno, Sidra Ezrahi, Alvin Rosenfeld, David Roskies. Even Wiesel will refer to the Holocaust by 
euphemism, rendering the term “Holocaust” itself unspeakable. 
 
9 David Patterson, The Shriek of Silence: A Phenomenology of the Holocaust Novel (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 
1992). 
10 Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History 
(New York: Routledge, Inc., 1992), 64. 
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represented, has been imagined. What, then, is beyond words, beyond the imaginative capacity 
of them? Language, I find, is particularly strained by the demands of evidence, the burden put 
upon language as a form of proof, a mode of proof that collapses when the status of factual 
information cannot logically enable the facts themselves to authenticate the reality they seek to 
document. Rather than factual logic, the form of logical coherence required for such proof turns 
to form and to fiction’s engagement with the requirements of establishing reality authenticity, 
and evidential credibility.  
Testimony, thus, does not serve either simply a memorial function, or an evidentiary 
function, but it also conflates the authenticity of testimony with the work of reification. In the 
case of atrocity, testimony no longer serves just as a mode of factual verification, but also the 
production of making real. If testimony involves the complex interaction of speaking truth and 
corroborating evidence so as to provide narrative with the sheen of veracity under the law, it 
would appear that in post-1945 atrocity, this aim of testimony equally serves the need to 
authenticate in the sense of “making real,” endowing memory with a materialist or verbal form 
that can be entertained and treated as facts.11 More than documenting the factuality or the 
authority of the experience, the author of testimony may engage in self-authentication—an 
authenticity that, under the rubric of legal reckoning with atrocity, is saturated with both factual 
privilege and moral authority.12  
																																																								
11 See Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford UP 1985), 4. 
 
12 The Wilkomirski case is a critical example here: Wilkomirski published a fraudulent memoir that described, in 
great detail, the author’s vividly brutal experiences in the camps at the hand of the Nazis. Wilkomirski’s account 
stands out for its exceptional lingering on horrific psychological and physical traumas suffered by the author. The 
text was promoted by Oprah’s book club and read widely for its vivid descriptions and for its unflinching 
willingness to recount those memories robustly for a public audience. Wilkomirski was lauded for his work and was 
granted a considerable stature as a moral authority, until it was revealed that Wilkomirski had never been in the 
camps, had never been brutalized by the Nazis, had never witnessed the atrocity, and had made his story up. The 
public outcry over the discovery that Wilkomirski’s memoire was in fact a fiction exemplifies the way in which, in 
the case of atrocity, believability and authenticity may be linked to the degree of brutality given by the narration, 
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In this sense, fiction about atrocity posits a potential threat to the stability of atrocity’s 
factuality. Figurative or imaginative representations would seem, in an arena within which 
documentary authority and veracity hold privileged positions, not only lesser in stature and 
authority, but also as a direct strike at the factuality that survivors of atrocity work so hard to 
establish in the first place. The artificially constructed verisimilitude of fiction may, as Daniel 
Schwartz describes, allow for “transmuting facts in the crucible of art,” but it also foregrounds 
the aesthetics and imaginative forms of atrocity as facts unto themselves, perhaps displacing the 
factuality of the content.13 Fictional renderings also suggest that the experience of those who 
underwent the force of the terror as real events may not necessarily have a privileged access to 
representing, describing, or rendering intelligible—morally, aesthetically, historically, or 
discursively—the facts of the very event they witnessed. Fiction may widen the gap between 
factuality and actuality, in that actuality—how an experience may have seemed belongs to the 
domain of the latter, whereas documentary testimony is bound to the former.14 
III. Global Figures of Justice and the World Court 
In order to understand the foundations of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a specific discourse concerned with universalisms, and in order to qualify what was 
distinct and new about the UNDHR and the legal campaign for human rights launched in the 
post-1945 moment, we need to momentarily step back in time to the first moments of a new 
international legal order in which the concept of the “universal” as a moral, legal, and historical 																																																																																																																																																																																		
that the authenticity of both may be mutually constitutive. See Binjamin Wilkomirski Fragments: Memories of a 
Childhood, 1939-1948 (New York: Schocken Books, 1997).  
 
13 Daniel R. Schwarz, Imagining the Holocaust (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 32.  
 
14 See James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust, 61.“The difference between fictional and nonfictional 
“documentary narratives” of the Holocaust may not be between degrees of actual evidential authority, but between 
the ontological sources of this sense of authority: one is retrieved and one is constructed wholly within the text as 
part of the text’s fiction.” 
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conceptual category first emerged. Joseph Slaughter, tracing the UNDHR and the discourse of 
human rights through the form of the Bildungsroman, makes the case for universal human rights 
as the “sociopolitical stipend of nineteenth century realism.”15 He writes that  
The assumptions about that subject shared by normative human rights law and the 
idealist Bildungsroman manifest themselves in a common conceptual vocabulary, 
humanist social vision, and narrative grammar of free and full human personality 
development. Human rights and the Bildungsroman are mutually enabling 
fictions: each projects an image of the human personality that ratifies the other's 
vision of the ideal relations between individual and society.”16 
  
Upendra Baxi links the politics of universal human rights with the colonial endeavor to 
determine a coherent form of “human” through exclusions; Baxi argues that “[O]nly those beings 
were to be regarded as “human” who were possessed of the capacity for reason and autonomous 
moral will.”17 Pointing to the political philosophies and moral discourse of the late 17th century 
through the 18th century, he finds that “[t]he notion of universality invokes not merely new 
version of essentialism about human nature but also the notion of meta-narrative: global stories 
about power and struggles against power,” and questions whether the essential concept of a 
“universal” set of human rights is not simply another “totalizing” practice, a master narrative in 
another form.18 Paul Lauren illustrates the interpolative nature of universalization and human 
rights in the late 18th century, arguing that imperial conquest enabled both the conceptual rise of 
universal human rights, and simultaneously the rise of deep violations of the human rights 
possessed by those considered sub-human, namely indigenous persons and slaves. While 
																																																								
15 Joseph R. Slaughter, “Enabling Fictions and Novel Subjects: The ‘Bildungsroman’ and International Human 
Rights Law,” PMLA 121.5 (Oct. 2006): 1407. 
 
16 Ibid, 1407. 
 
17 Upendra Baxi, “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights,” Transnational Law & Contemporary 
Problems (Fall 1998): 133. 
 
18 Ibid, 134. 
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increased travel and exploration allowed many of those compelled to conceive of a universal 
code of human rights to learn and apprehend an “other” beyond national, cultural, and political 
borders, the very rationale for such travel—enslavement, imperialism, and political 
domination—frequently undercut the conceptual endeavor. The avenues that enabled the moral 
and philosophical foundations human rights were often deeply immoral avenues in practices that 
were exploitative in intention and in consequence, and which essentially required a de-
humanized view of groups and persons when encountered.19 
The conceptual move in human rights that Lauren observes co-emerged with the a 
philosophical and literary maneuver in thinking about the universality of judgment, ethics, and 
its applicability as legal legislation. When Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel borrowed the term 
Weltgericht from Friedrich Schiller, it was an attempt on his part to give a proper name for the 
idea of a “final judgment,” from the position of “another world,” to imagine a type of moral 
rightness and purpose so absolute that it can exist in universal totality without contradiction. 
“Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,” wrote Schiller in 1786, in a poetic phrase that 
captivated Hegel: the history of the world is that of world justice, that of final justice. 
Weltgericht, for Hegel, intoned a center of secularly moral gravity in which a universal man, 
rather than an omniscient God, acts with “a rightness of which is intrinsic to itself.”20 Hegel 
envisioned a system of world history that would enclose all of human events, in which all 
histories across time, and all places in the world would be included, composing a historical 
narrative that could conceive of itself in totality, produce comprehensive meaning and the sort of 																																																								
19 Paul Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1998), 34-35. 
 
20 See Walter Kaufmann, Debating the Political Philosophy of Hegel, (New York: Routledge Press, 2010), 23; Carlo 
Ginzburg “The Judge and the Historian” in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the 
Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 293. 
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coherence only possible within a closed system. He postulated that such a history would make 
possible an equally comprehensive moral and legal system, which would be able to judge and fit 
within a single moral code all of human action, and all relevant ethical imperatives required to 
govern. The German word itself contains the idea of an ethical universalism, one that remains 
independent of the contingencies of space and time. The compound noun, a fusion of the words 
“Welt,” (world) and “Gericht” (law), broken down into individual components, articulates the 
concept of “World Justice.” More directly, it conjures up the concept of World Rightness, and 
provides the idea of a “world’s court of justice,” or a “final judgment.”  
In Hegel’s use of the term, he expresses and reproduces the same sense that Kant before 
him invoked his classical categorical imperative, “Ich soll niemals anders verfahren als so, dass 
ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz warden”— Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a 
universal law.21 In its most literal translation, Kant’s categorical imperative emphasizes the 
concept of the world in totality as the necessary domain in which justice must be realized: “I 
shall never do otherwise than that maxim which I could also will to become a universal law.” 
Kant’s famous maxim, the major touchstone of modern ethical thought, implies an ethic 
dependent on the idea of a globalized legal code. The idea of a “universal imperative” is 
underwritten by a code of conduct whose tenable character depends on the belief in a “whole” 
world, a world made whole by the idea of a universal law governing it. If Kant’s statement does 
not necessarily imply the reality of such a universal code, it does presuppose its possibility, a 
possible world so necessary for the ethical imagination that, in Kant’s view, it would be a 
																																																								
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1987), 386. 
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violation to behave in a way that would threaten the reality, continuity, and perpetuity of such a 
world.22  
In fact, the growing idea of a "universal" moral code, as conceived of by Kant's new 
ethical system of universal ethics, has a correlate in law: in the idea of whether or not evidence 
could be similarly governed by universal moral and rational principles. Both Kant’s and Hegel’s 
ethical and legal imagination is grounded in this sense of world-building, imagining a world of 
universality, and more specifically, of universal reason, of congruence of that rational 
consciousness across space and time, independent of nation or individuality. As an ethical 
philosophy, the idea of Weltgericht necessarily stands as a center of gravity for the legal 
philosophy of universal human rights; the very idea of a global codex of outlining the principles 
by which to define the basic and essential prerogatives immanent to all human beings necessarily 
anticipates a legal structure that stretches across the boundaries of nations and temporalities, 
independent even of discrete human judgment.  
Readers might be familiar with this premise of post-Enlightenment thought. Indeed, a 
number of thinkers at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century were 
making similar critical and conceptual moves toward conceiving of the world as newly 
connected and its governing principles newly recognizable. Across the Atlantic from Kant and 
Hegel, on American soil, Thomas Jefferson proposed his case for universal human rights by 																																																								
22 As Hannah Arendt wrote in Eichmann in Jerusalem, Eichmann declared "with great emphasis that he had lived his 
whole life ... according to a Kantian definition of duty." Arendt considered this so "incomprehensible on the face of 
it" that it confirmed her sense that he wasn't really thinking at all, just mouthing accepted formulae, thereby 
establishing his banality. Judge Raveh indeed had asked Eichmann whether he thought he had really lived according 
to the categorical imperative during the war. Eichmann acknowledged he did not "live entirely according to it, 
although I would like to do so." Deborah Lipstadt, in her book on the trial, takes this as evidence that evil is 
not banal, but is in fact self-aware. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 
(London: Penguin Ltd, 2011), 136; Deborah Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial, (New York: Schocken, 2011); and “The 
State of Israel versus Adolf Eichmann” (Session 105, 20 July, 1961). 
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referencing “the laws of Nature and Nature’s God,” and immortalized his case with the words 
“all men are created equal…endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,” the 
cornerstone of the American Declaration of Independence, which in turn inspired the ideology of 
the French Revolution, which restated the case that “The rights of man are invariable like justice, 
eternal like reason; they apply to all times and all countries…Let us follow the example of the 
United States: they have set a great example in the new hemisphere; let us give one to the 
universe.”23  
The source of this new sense of globalization, as many scholars have pointed out, was in 
no small way related to the routes of what might be considered a formative global atrocity—the 
transatlantic connections that routed the globe newly, forged through the slave trade, an atrocity 
of immense human rights violations that preceded—and perhaps inspired—contemporary 
thinking about universal human rights. Back on the distant American shores, Frederick Douglass, 
who began his long career as an abolitionist by denouncing the American Constitution for 
legalizing slavery, pivoted his argument to propose that the Constitution itself, as a venerated 
codex of American legal values, itself made slavery illegal; Douglass then made a critical 
conceptual maneuver to propose that slavery’s inequalities could be metaphorically extended to 
all inequalities, and that the fight for equal rights for African Americans ought to be universally 
extended under this logic, and that such a fight implicitly included extending equal rights to 
Chinese immigrants, to women, and to a “universal” human form. Free Coloreds in Haiti and 
Haitian slaves, in what was then called Saint Dominique, demanded equal rights and revolted 
against their white French slavers, while Thomas Paine drew up his Rights of Man, which 
proposed the term “human rights” and launched a formal discourse about how a newly global 
world might practice such a legal and ethical concept. Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the 																																																								
23 See Paul Lauren The Evolution of International Human Rights, 17-20. 
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Rights of Woman made the case for a codified inclusion of women in the domain of the rights of 
man. As with Kant and Hegel, Douglass and Wollstonecraft saw that a new sense of world 
history, in which discrete and distant parts of the globe shared a common pulse, required an 
interactive and responsive understanding of universal moral, universal legal standards, and 
universally applicable human rights, available anywhere, to human beings everywhere.  
IV. Global Rotations: The New Weltgericht 
What, then, was new in the post 1945 sense of an international world order, bound by a 
commitment to the Universal Human Rights Charter, was the global imagination not only of a 
universal human rights standard, but of a magnitude and extremity of cruelty that for the first 
time existed contemporaneously and simultaneously within the global imaginary. Due to the 
proliferation of horrific images of atrocity that circulated across the world, new visual 
technologies, and new forms of media that enabled such information and images to circulate with 
greater ease than in previous times, people anywhere and everywhere saw, read, and learned in 
graphic detail about the cruelties of the Nazi regime, acts of violence so horrendous as to have 
newly “outraged the conscience of mankind.”24 Such images were available both to civilian 
populations and to a newly formally united body of united nations, and a sense of moral duty to 
respond and address such suffering escalated into a legal demand to do so. This shift in visibility 
and legal responsibility marked a radical distinction from previous events of extreme suffering, 
which, as Lauren points out “suffered…from a very serious practical problem of accurate and 
timely information.” He explains that before the proliferation of such exact and fast-paced 
media, “even those highly motivated to advance international human rights could take no action 
unless they could obtain news about the plight of others beyond their own borders, either by 																																																								
24 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” UN General Assembly, Article 1.3.1. 
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traveling themselves to different locations or by securing news of exploitation, conquest, 
massacre, or other abuses in sufficient time to relieve suffering.”25 Thus, for past events, 
sufficient knowledge of the state and condition of suffering was unavailable, since the flow of 
such information could be easily suppressed, controlled, or blocked. As Lauren observes, 
“[g]iven the limitations of technology in an age before steamships, telegraphs, mass-circulation 
newspapers, popular novels, and photographs, such information simply could not be accurately 
or rapidly transmitted.”26 And it was unlikely to be corroborated, evidenced, proven, and capable 
of being traced back to the individual agents responsible for such suffering, such that these 
agents could be held legally responsible within juridical institutions.  
What was new in the wake of the Second World War was not the concept of universal 
human rights, but rather the evidence of absolute human rights violations, the global availability 
of, the global resonance of, that evidence, and the ability to determinatively locate responsible 
individuals and to allocate criminal punishment for abuses.27 Such global availability of evidence 
was due, in large part, to the very public, very global Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, which put 
these human rights violations on a global stage, and which later led to formal legislative codes 
legally binding a group of United Nations to responding to future instances of such violations. To 
that end, the introduction of newly formed media circuits that allowed global access to such 																																																								
25 Paul Lauren The Evolution of International Human Rights, 41. 
 
26 Ibid, 34. 
 
27 And even with this new technology, the flow of media documenting the worst of the Nazi crimes was halted, due 
to the Iron Curtain. Timothy Snyder points out that “The American and British soldiers who liberated the dying 
inmates from camps in Germany believed that they had discovered the horrors of Nazism. The images their 
photographers and cameramen captured of the corpses and the living skeletons at Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald 
seemed to convey the worst crimes of Hitler. As Jews and Poles of Warsaw knew, and as Vasily Grossman and the 
Red Army Soldiers knew, this was far from the truth. The worst was in the ruins of Warsaw, or the fields of 
Treblinka, or the marshes of Belarus, or the pit of Babi Yar.” The collapse of the Iron Curtain allowed these images 
to circulate newly after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, enabling scholars to newly investigate evidence that had 
previously been unavailable, I would argue and may in part be responsible for the “memory boom” of the 1990s. See 
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 312. 
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evidence coincided with the introduction of new legal arenas responsible for raising, aggregating, 
and interpreting that evidence. Dramatized on a global stage, the trials set a new globally 
available precedent for imagining, evidencing, and adjudicating atrocity. 
 The concept of globalized legal standards and the rise of the international court has 
become the subject of a growing body of scholarship in the humanities concerned with the aims, 
consequences, and problems with a globalized understanding of both the human and of rights, 
independent of local context, from Joseph Slaughter’s inquiry into the genealogy of 
contemporary human rights philosophy and its correspondence to the development of the 
bildungsroman, to Karen Alter’s overview of the modern International Criminal Court system. 
Weltgericht, the high moral court envisioned by Hegel, suggests a law that is circumambient in 
entirety, a law both of the world in entirety, and one above the worldly sphere. Such a form of 
law exists as an ideal, but it is an ideal that has, in the second half of the 20th Century and the 21st 
Century, been made real as a circumambient institution embodied by the International Criminal 
Courts. The modern purview of the United Nations is its authority to hold parties everywhere on 
the globe responsible to a national code of Human Rights. The mandate and legitimacy of the 
new circuit of international law and the constitutional courts drafted in the wake of a globalized 
legal system draws expressly from its moral authority, the understanding that it “sid[es] with 
issues of concern to the people,” observes Alter.28 She argues that “[t]he shift to the terminology 
of “international law,” (from the prior term, “The Law of Nations”), signals “a shift in the nature 
of international law and acceptable moral discourse, away from a contractual conception of 
international law toward a non-Austinian rule of law conception where law exists beyond the 
																																																								
28 Karen Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2014), 334. 
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confines of the nation state and where law generates legal obligations for nation-states.”29 Gary 
Bass argues that the idea of the international court as an arbiter of moral standards puts pressures 
on states to abide by those standards or, in the words of the 19th century Southern slaveholder he 
quotes, risk “rendering [violators] hateful in the eyes of the world—with a view to a general 
crusade against us and our institutions.”30  
 Meanwhile, Samantha Power’s study of genocide in A Problem from Hell: America and 
the Age of Genocide argues that rather than encouraging the international community to respond 
to atrocity, a template for detecting human rights transgressions inhibits response, because 
nothing can quite compare to the established form closely enough.31 Rather than reifying mass 
suffering as an authentic Human Rights violation, figuration serves to keep an atrocity from 
becoming “real” in the legal sphere. Despite the ongoing movements, the proliferation of human 
rights agendas, activist movements, and monitoring organizations, and the growth of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) infrastructure, the growth of the rhetorical force demanded 
by human rights seems proportionally inverse to the political interventions that actually respond 
to human rights violations. Thus, a system of universal human rights, ideally aimed at preventing 
human rights abuses, often ends up with the international community’s inertia or inaction, 
particularly in spaces already ignored or underrepresented within the international community, 
peoples and groups who often lack political contacts or representation. The evidence supplied by 																																																								
29 Ibid, 402. 
 
30 In fact, Bass cites the campaign against the slave trade as “the root of all modern rights activism,” its opposition 
the source through which the very concept of weltgericht, the foundational instance of a global campaign for a world 
standard, a commitment to a uniform ethical standard that centered on universal antislavery and international 
antislavery law, a commitment that was genuinely drawn from and centered on an ethical position The moral wrong 
that traveled across global circuits produced the very concept of a universal ethical obligation to be enforced and 
regulated by global law. See Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 17-19, 93. 
 
31 See Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Harper Collins), 503-
507. 
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Power’s case studies shows that term “universal” may imply the globe entire, but in reality it 
frequently means “Western,” and references a tradition of thinking and formal procedure 
determined by and manufactured in the West, to be exported and to and imposed upon the 
developing world, particularly the Global South, at the discretion and whims of the West.  
Such universalism also introduces and compresses the complex dynamic of comparative 
suffering, as a byproduct of standardizing human rights and violations of them. Comparative 
suffering can easily become competitive suffering, and in such a competition, suffering in the 
Global South tends to lose the battle for representational space and authenticity. In a 1996 article 
published in the popular newspaper Cape Times right as the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission had started its proceedings, the South African critic Hermann 
Giliomee wrote: 
President Mandela called apartheid…a ‘terrible injustice against South Africa and 
its people.’ Why not be content with this? Why apply a term like 'crime against 
humanity' to apartheid which [has its origin] in conflicts on the European 
continent? Apartheid can and should be condemned in its own terms. It could be 
that the book simply reflects a colonial inferiority complex, but there is in fact a 
political subtext behind all the frantic efforts to 'prove' that the National Party and 
the Afrikaner Broederbond were influenced by the Nazi party, and that apartheid 
was an atrocity of the Nazi kind.32   
 
Giliomee’s comment highlights a central tension built into the South African TRC 
process, as well as a major tension in the globalization of human rights. On one hand, a global 
definition of human rights serves as an objective arbiter through which evidence of violations of 
those rights may be measured. On the other hand, Giliomee critiques a conceptual model of 
human rights redress that relies on figuring successive atrocities within the paradigm of the 
European atrocity as the “realest” atrocity. Equating the violation of apartheid to the violations in 
																																																								
32 Hermann Giliomee. “Asmal Offers No Fresh View; No Ground-Breaking Synthesis of Truth,” Cape Times, 23 
October 1996.  
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Europe renders the South African experience but an imitation of a European experience of pain. 
His argument points out that a system of universal human rights that relies on recognizing human 
rights violations only if they are demonstrable similar to the forms of human rights violations 
established by the largely Western (European and American) governing protocols can hardly be 
considered “universal.”  
Giliomee is not just making a case that comparison poses a problem that does not allow 
Apartheid to “be condemned on its own terms;” he moreover argues that there is a “political 
subtext behind all the frantic efforts to ‘prove’ that the National Party and the Afrikaner 
Broederbond were influenced by the Nazi party, and that that apartheid was an atrocity of the 
Nazi kind.33 I have doubled the emphasis Gillomee already places on the word “prove,” because 
it directs our attention to the sense in which, within the sphere of globalized atrocity, human 
rights violations in South Africa become “evidence” of atrocity by “proving” that the South 
African violation is like the Nazi violation. Thus, within this complex, evidence of the South 
African atrocity is not evidence for violations under apartheid itself, but rather evidence for the 
resemblance of those violations to the violations that occurred in Europe in the 1940s. The idea 
of evidence, as such, is not to prove the reality of apartheid’s brutality, but to prove that African 
pain is as real as European pain, the African crime as severe as the crimes that took place on 
European soil. As we will see, this concept of evidence as negotiating and grounding the “truth” 
of the South African experience vis-à-vis a globalized setting, will play into the complex nature 
of evidence that emerges in the TRC process. 
 
 																																																								
33 Emphasis, mine. 
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V. The Art of Universal Human Rights and the Politics of World Literature Post-1945 
The Nazi crimes, as a form of totalized, absolute destruction paired with a totalizing, 
universal war, brought to light a new understanding of an absolute world, as well as an absolute 
need for world justice. Timothy Snyder argues that the “Final Solution” was “not a step in a 
logical plan so much as an element in an aesthetic vision,” a vision in which “people can be 
killed in large numbers…because leaders such as Stalin and Hitler can imagine a world without 
kulaks, or without Jews, and then make the real world conform, if only imperfectly, to their 
visions.”34 Images of destruction that seemed as absolute as the vision out of which such 
destruction came, as well as an image of evil in the Nazi atrocities that seemed equally absolute, 
prompted the international community to renew its commitment to, and its authentication of, a 
universal code of human rights, newly understood to possess an absolute moral authority; human 
rights was as much a moral language as a legal code, an “aesthetic vision” as much as a matter of 
institutional practice. The international community was, moreover, newly unified, forged as the 
consequence of two world wars that reinforced the interconnecting and the unfied global 
involvement of independent nations, and the need to establish international protocols of justice 
governing this new global order that, for the foreseeable future, would be accountable to 
injustices anywhere and everywhere. 
The need for the new Human Rights movement, in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions, to identify, designate, and authenticate a new term for this particular form of 
atrocity underscores the gravity of the need to speak the concept of such atrocity in aesthetic 
terms, as a form that could be intelligible across such a community, within conceptual and legal 
terms understood to be part of creating and reinforcing this new world order, with its new moral 
and legal language. Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer whose family had been wiped out by the Nazis 																																																								
34 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Stalin and Hitler, 386-388. 
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and who had become a galvanizing force in the proceedings, coined the term "genocide,” in part 
to break with existing terms in language, to signify a break with any previously known reality. A 
new term would mark an extremity of atrocity for the purposes of intervention through 
International Law. He composed this new term by combining the Greek “getto,” meaning “race” 
or “tribe,” with the Latin “tide,” which derives from “caedre,” killing. Lemkin’s strategy in 
choosing a new term aimed to both depart from existing terms—barbarity, atrocity, crime all had 
been laden with their use previous historical events—and to bring into language a new 
association, that signified an event without likeness, that connoted only the unprecedented and 
specific crimes of the Nazis.35 For the American and European audiences, the concept of this 
specifically Western, urban mass murder of civilians had not yet a term in language, was not yet 
an identifiable concept.36 Thus, each entry into the database of testimony and evidence 
represented a contribution to the attempt to authenticate not only the reality of the event, but the 
reality of the concept of genocide itself, of an atrocity perpetrated within this particular schema.37  
Lemkin’s definition effectively formalized the Holocaust as a paradigmatic atrocity, in an 
historical moment in which the international community was itself concretizing into a form, as 
well as a formal body whose duty was to unite in response to global atrocities. Since the 
International Genocide Conventions and the Universal Human Rights Charter took the model of 																																																								
35 See Samantha Power’s The Problem From Hell: American in the Age of Genocide, (81-90). 
 
36 There is an important emphasis on the specification “American” and “European” here. Of course, the Americas 
and the European nations had their own histories of mass murder that historians would retroactively classify as 
genocidal. My claim is that the production of naming terminology and classification was part of producing its 
authentication. The specificity of “Western” is further important in the case of the Holocaust, as with the 
construction of the Berlin wall and the division of Germany into Soviet and Western territories, the concept of the 
event as “genocide” (rather than political conflict between Fascist and Communist Forces) was a historical 
construction that belonged exclusively to the West. 
 
37 Raphael Lemkin would create the term “genocide” in the context of the International Tribunal following the 
Holocaust, thus speaking into being for the first time the extent of the Nazi mass murder. Of course, the Holocaust 
was not the first genocide. It was, however, the first genocide to be identified as such, thus authenticating the 
concept of genocide and allowing it to retroactively describe and schematize antecedent events fitting its description. 
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the Holocaust as a formative exemplar of the violations to which the international community 
committed itself to response, establishing resemblance between a subsequent atrocity and the 
Nazi atrocities became an essential task for those seeking representation and redress post-1945. 
The international community’s commitment to the moral language of universal human rights 
helped to promote the idea of the Nazi experience as a universal experience, one whose form 
could be made available to articulate and to measure the subsequent particular experiences of 
atrocity that might occur elsewhere around the globe, across a diverse geopolitical terrain. The 
aim in generating a universal charter of human rights was to forge out of the Holocaust a 
universally recognizable idiom, to take a particular instance of human rights abuses and to 
repurpose it as a universally recognizable form, addressed by the universal moral language of 
human rights. 
In effect, the legacy of this endeavor may be one of continuous failure. On the contrary, 
far from enabling the international community to recognize human rights abuses and demanding 
a global response to them, the specific instance of this form has tended to disable political 
response, as the international community deliberates the particularities of these abuses and their 
dissonance with the 1945 model. Moreover, since the model of atrocity and human rights 
violations that make an instance of violence legible to the international community was 
developed based on an episode in Western History, the postcolonial spaces that are often already 
underrepresented within and underserved by these international conventions face the additional 
challenge of translating their experiences of suffering into the form of suffering derived from 
Western history. An organized international legal community—whose ears are theoretically open 
to the cries of universal suffering—has, in actuality, been trained only recognize only the 
particular refrains articulated within the Nazi form. Thus, universal human rights, ideally aimed 
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at creating a common moral language across a diverse geopolitical and geographical range, has 
often ended up ignoring suffering that cannot make itself legible in these terms.  
VI. Figuration’s Features, Failures, and Factual Endeavors 
When the voices that seek to articulate the facts of their experiences of human rights 
abuses cannot be heard, fictions and figurations take on a new significance in making such 
atrocity legible. These literary forms stress similitude, actuality, rather than factuality, and 
aesthetic coherence rather than empirical coherence. To this end, I show how, in the context of 
contemporary human rights violations, the substance of art compensates for that which the 
substance of evidence cannot provide.38 I examine how modes of articulation traditionally 
associated with a literary aesthetic, modes of comparison, articulation, interpretation and 
recognition provided by figurative language, analogy, and metaphor, become critical to 
evidencing atrocity for these representations as they pursue their claim to recognition and redress 
on the terrain of international human rights law.  
 I argue that the literature of atrocity seeks to fulfill an evidentiary function; as we saw 
with Ka-Tsetnik, the literary content generated by the author in and of itself seemed to 
substantiate evidence that the witness himself failed to provide. But as these texts continue to 
circulate, with their fictional representation and stylized figures of representation, the strategy of 
figuration itself—metaphors, analogies, and refrains of identification—may become a strategy 
for evidencing atrocity, by way of analogical, rather than empirical, logic of proof. In my case 
studies, the literary works and the figures of atrocity generated within them by a cohort of 
witnesses cum writers established a reality of atrocity establish figures of atrocity that become as 
real, if not more so, for the contemporary imaginary than any of the facts of these atrocity 																																																								
38 I would argue that this logic is in part what led to the right of the production of art as a universal and inalienable 
right protected specifically by Article 19 of the Human Rights Charter. 
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themselves.39 I find that such literature begins to serve as a form of evidence to atrocity; 
moreover, beyond providing a way of evidencing such experiences through form, the literature 
of evidence offered a logic through which to interpret the evidence of atrocity. Thus, I look at 
the legacy of literary texts, and the methodologies of reading these stylized representations as 
the methods of interpreting evidence of atrocity undergoes transformation post-1945.  
While the texts that represent atrocity speak immediately to the experience of extreme 
suffering, testifying—at times with an explicit evidentiary function—to a particular experience 
of suffering, these codified representations continue to circulate within and resonate throughout a 
global body of texts, as metaphors or figures. Dislodged from specific experiences and re-
contextualized within a new historical and geopolitical context, these figures enable new 
occasions of suffering to become universally legible for a global audience, and universally 
available for a world literature of texts that seek to represent subsequent local atrocities for a 
global readership. In this way, these texts endure and circulate as testimony precisely in spite of 
their anchor in facts; what perhaps began as testimony grounded in factual experience has 
endured in afterlives characterized by metaphoricity.  
Leave Nothing to the Imagination examines how a global body of texts—a world 
literature of atrocity—becomes a form of evidence that may be cited, referenced, figured, and 
embedded as evidence, and that may be used to identify an atrocity that lacks the capacity to 
“prove” its status as an atrocity. In so doing, I ask how, and to what consequence, this may 
coincide with the development of a world court, a universal code of human rights, and global 
legal structure for evaluating and codifying the terms of international address in the case of 
atrocity. Hans-Georg Gadamer famously images world history as “the great dark book, the 																																																								
39 See Daniel Schwartz Imagining the Holocaust (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).  
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collected work of the human spirit, written in languages of the past, whose text it is our task to 
understand.”40 The image is evocative: here, world history is given coherence through the form 
of a text, and textuality is itself made coherent through the “written languages of the past.” But 
unlike world history itself, the work of which is to promote an interpretation or understanding of 
the past, Gadamer figures world history as a free-floating sea of intermingling language, which is 
our task—that is to say, the task of the reader who might interpret what has been written, rather 
than the interpretive task of the historian who might write it—to understand and make legible.  
For Gadamer, and for the history of global atrocity, understanding is an ethical venture—
it is, as he says, our task. In the chapters that follow, I ask how the concept of a world justice, or 
more properly, a world injustice, and the concept of history itself, may be cumulatively lodged in 
such a “great dark book,” and what sort of forms take shape in such a book, written as the 
accumulation of the “languages of the past.” 
VII. Case Studies 
My first chapter, “Factuality on Trial: The “Real” Eichmann, The Authenticity of 
Atrocity, and the Evidence of Evil,” examines the Eichmann trials in 1961 and Hannah Arendt’s 
coverage of the trials in her landmark thesis, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Thesis on the Banality of 
Evil. This chapter focuses on the Holocaust as a new archetype of atrocity in which the idea of 
“authentic” representation of atrocity becomes unstable. I chronicle a turning point in the concept 
of legal evidence as it relates to and is used to establish the reality of atrocity. In the wake of the 
Nuremberg trials that began in 1945, through the Eichmann trials in 1961 and Hannah Arendt’s 
coverage of the trials in her landmark thesis, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Thesis on the Banality of 
Evil, the discourse of "authenticity" became central to representing atrocity; yet the concept of 																																																								
40 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 178. 
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"authenticity" itself became contested, torn between the demands of literary representation on the 
one hand, and legal representation on the other. Using current research on Eichmann alongside 
my own extensive archival investigation into Arendt and Eichmann’s papers, I show how 
confusion between aesthetic and legal forms of evidence lead Arendt, who grounded her 
understanding of atrocity in factuality, to misinterpret Eichmann, mistaking his fictions for 
factual testimony. I juxtapose Arendt’s version of the “real” Eichmann with Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 
character, Walter Campbell Jr., who bears an uncanny resemblance to Eichmann in Mother 
Night, published months before Arendt’s thesis. Doubling the historical figure of Eichmann in 
self-aware fictional representation, Mother Night oscillates between fictional and factual 
discourse in its attempt to locate an authentic representation of atrocity. 
My next chapter, “Fictions of Evidence: Reconciling Truth in Country of My Skull,” 
examines the South African Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings of 1996-1997. The 
TRC self-consciously fashioned itself against the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, and did so in 
front of a global audience. The TRC sought to “paint the most complete picture, a full truth of 
the abuses,” yet “truth” in the context of the TRC becomes fragmented, and reconciliation 
requires fictions to supplement those fragments. In Krog’s epic text, the murders of Richard and 
Irene Motasi take up less than fifteen pages of her book, which spans the two years of her 
reportage and over four hundred pages of Amnesty Hearing testimony. This chapter reconstructs 
the path that the facts of the Motasi murders take, and the subsequent transformation of those 
facts into fictional forms, notably John Miles’s 1991 novel Kroniek Uit Die Doofpot. The 
murders, perpetrated by the South African Police Force in 1987, were not unusual in an era of 
apartheid killings, yet the testimony of the killers inexplicably punctures Antjie Krog’s text, and 
causes it to pivot from factual reportage into fictional speculation. I examine this particular piece 
	 30 
of testimony from Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull to illustrate how legal truth in the TRC 
hearings may be governed by fictions. I argue that by the time that the 1996 Amnesty Hearings 
finally heard the evidence on this case of extrajudicial killings, the testimony provided for it by 
witnesses and supporting evidence could not be understood as facts apart from antecedent 
fictions that had circulated about it in the South African public eye. Using archival evidence into 
the murders and the fictions generated about them, this essay reconstructs a moment in the TRC 
hearings in which “truth” becomes a property of fiction—and in which fiction becomes the 
central stimulant for commissioning the truth. I propose that in so doing, the concept of evidence 
itself in the context of the South African pursuit of national reconciliation may ultimately be 
located in a specifically literary imaginary, in globally circulating fictions rather than in national 
fact. Finally, this research establishes the central impact that this case, and the fictional 
renderings of it, had on not only the interpretation but in the very production of evidence in the 
TRC proceedings, and moreover traces the consequences of that impact as the South African 
truth commission model becomes a global form, informing subsequent attempts to both 
determine the status of evidence in the context of atrocity, and to use it in order to barter post-
atrocity justice across an international terrain.   
My third chapter, “Seeing Double in Animal’s People: Local Toxins, Global Toxicity and 
the Universal Bhopal,” turns to industrial disaster of 1984 in India caused by an American 
multinational corporation. Bhopal showcases the challenges of providing evidence for and 
addressing local mass suffering in that global context. Focusing on Indra Sinha’s Animal’s 
People, my chapter examines how this atrocity in Bhopal veers between authenticating itself as 
atrocity by evidencing its universality, borrowing from facts and stylizations of antecedent 
atrocity to put Bhopal within the legislative purview of International Human Rights, and 
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simultaneously evidencing its uniqueness, thus taking it outside of the global economy. I explore 
the way in which the fallout of global atrocity as in Bhopal intersects with debates about the 
efficacy of comparative analyses of atrocity. In Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People, we see how the 
necessary abstractions of universal human rights may end up ignoring the lived reality of local, 
particular suffering, and how globalization itself may be complicit in some of the most severe 
local human rights violations of the 20th century. Universalizing suffering as a globally 
recognizable form may allow such distant suffering to be rendered visible by the global public; it 
may also occlude the complicity of that very public in such suffering. Moreover, the forms of 
international law designed to hold parties accountable for such local suffering may paradoxically 
allow these actors to evade accountability within the legal spheres of local jurisdiction.  
My fourth chapter, “Textimony: Zong! and the Poetics of Evidence” pushes my argument 
into poetic form. M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong!, a collection of language poetry, is what the author 
calls an “untelling.” It “untells” the 1781 slave massacre aboard the ship, an atrocity followed by 
an egregious legal case that framed the atrocity as a property compensation claim pressed by the 
slave owners. Zong! uses the aesthetic conventions developed by a specifically post-1945 mode 
of representing atrocity, and a contemporary mode of thinking about human rights and atrocity, 
and projects these conventions onto a historical event of atrocity—the transatlantic slave trade—
that may stand both at the gateway of modern globalization, and an archetype of atrocity. An 
inscription from Paul Celan, a Holocaust survivor whose poetry is known for its simultaneous 
instance on both factual and figurative language, appears at the dead center of the text. The 
reference, “No one bears witness for the witness,” brings the discourse of this review full circle: 
this iconic poetic fragment is about the limits of witness testimony to evidence an experience. 
Zong! recycles this reference to retroactively figure the massacre as an atrocity by linking the 
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transatlantic slave trade of the 18th century to the Nazi brutalities of the 20th century—Celan’s 
poetics become a way of articulating an experience of suffering that the evidence of the massacre 
itself occludes. Yet if the Holocaust serves as a mode of articulation in Zong!, and if, more 
broadly, the Holocaust has become a figure that inflects claims of suffering and claims for justice 
on behalf of the victims of black slavery, it also becomes a point of disarticulation, as 
comparative memory becomes competitive, each claim of atrocity jostling for space and primacy 
within a limited economy of attention to such suffering. Thus, I show how the figure of the 
Holocaust oscillates, as a comparative form, between providing a mode of articulation on the one 
hand, and perhaps overwriting possible articulations on the other. I consider the politics of 
comparative memory in a globalized legal context, and the representational and political 
consequences of a comparative approach to memory that may become competitive.  
To this point, across these chapters we will see post-1945 20th and 21st Century 
representations of suffering, particularly in postcolonial contexts, engage the precedent of the 
Holocaust as evidence substantiating suffering, only to subvert it or to challenge its primacy. One 
could read M. NourbeSe Philip’s invocation of Paul Celan as an attempt to provide an anchor for 
the unstable narrative of the Zong massacre, but one could also read it as a challenge to the 
primacy of Celan’s iconic work, provincializing his text in order to foreground the suffering of 
the transatlantic slave trade. This comparative element has become itself a convention of the 
form; when Toni Morrison famously dedicated her epic 1987 novel, Beloved, to the “Sixty 
Million and More” the referent “Sixty Million” is a clear reverberation of the familiar figure of 
six million.41 But the “and more” places the two points of memory into more than comparative 
																																																								
41 Examples abound; the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC figures and moralizes the dangers of racism and 
bigotry and specifically connects those lessons to the history of slavery and the American Jim Crow Laws, a form 
that repeats in Holocaust museums across the country, perhaps most significantly at the capaciously titled “Museum 
of Tolerance” in Los Angeles, a museum curated to conflate and unify histories of intolerance under the Holocaust 
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terms; the reference is competitive, a form of keeping score of suffering through the scope of 
numbers. For Morrison, it is clear who has won the competition.  
Trans-historical references to atrocities from across both time and place become central 
to the architecture of these texts as they establish their claims to recognition as forms of atrocity. 
Celan makes a second appearance, at the heart of Antjie Krog’s report on the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Hearings in Country of My Skull. Therein, Krog cites Celan to similar 
effect; there, amidst the testimony evidencing the brutal past of South African Apartheid, Krog 
injects a lyrical fragment that mirror imaged the chilling refrain of Celan’s iconic poem “Death 
Fugue.” “Der Tod is ein Meister aus Deutschland,” Krog’s text reads, reproducing Celan’s 
words in the original German. But then the poem, as rendered in Krog’s narrative, takes a sharp 
turn away from Europe and toward the African continent: “Death is a master from Africa—his 
eyes are blue,” it reads.42 The line is subtly transformed, from Celan’s “master from Germany” to 
Krog’s “master from Africa,” the substitute inserted without skipping a poetic beat. 
Meanwhile,figures of the enduring legacy of Vietnamese suffering in the wake of American 
military presence in Vietnam, and references to Saddam Hussein’s campaign against the Kurds 
in Halabja form Indra Sinha’s interpretation and representation of suffering in Bhopal in 
Animal’s People.43  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
as a palimpsestic metaphor. Beloved, to the “Sixty Million and More” (xii), the referent “Sixty Million” is a clear 
reverberation of the familiar figure of six million; Beloved ends with the self-cancelling assertion that even if such 
tales can be imagined, they perhaps ought not to be told. See Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York: Vintage Press, 
2007), xii. 
42 Antjie Krog Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New 
York: Random House LLC, 2007), 310-312. Emphasis, mine. 
 
43 See Indra Sinha, Animals People (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2007); "Chemicals for War and 
Chemicals for Peace: Poison Gas in Bhopal, India, and Halabja, Kurdistan, Iraq," Social Justice 41.1-2 (2015): 125-
145. 
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A reference to Celan’s figurative accounts of the Holocaust experience, to chemical 
warfare in Vietnam or Halabja, to the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by a 
representation seeking to capture the reality of a secondary atrocity, allows an audience to 
calibrate such suffering. Effectively, these intertextual links forge and fortify the reality of 
suffering that has been, perhaps, less solidly lodged in the global imaginary as an event of 
atrocity warranting address and response. Yet the significance of such reference, from one text 
speaking of suffering to another representation of suffering, located in a vastly disparate 
historical climate of suffering is as much political as such intertextuality is representational. 
Those who exalt the power of metaphor to represent otherwise inaccessible or abstract suffering 
cite metaphor’s powerful ability to “make us see” the reality of otherwise occluded pain, often 
made inert by the facts alone. Yet those who tend to exalt the power of metaphor to evidence 
represent extreme suffering are often the first to decry appropriations of the “their” atrocity as a 
metaphor to figure the pain of others. For example, in a sequence of cacophonous metaphors, 
Elizabeth Costello, the lead character of J.M. Coetzee’s metafictional novel, The Lives of 
Animals, publicly proposes the “familiar comparison between the murdered Jews of Europe and 
slaughtered cattle,” that “Jews died like cattle, therefore cattle die like Jews,” She thus incites the 
wrath of a Jewish poet, whose provenance is conceptual language, and who presumably will 
agree to the representation of Jewish suffering through metaphorical conception, but will not 
concede that the portability of the Jewish experience as itself a figure for suffering.44   
For atrocities in already marginalized spaces, in postcolonial locations, or for persons and 
groups already lacking the political capital to have their suffering heard and recognized by the 
global community, intertextual and trans-historical borrowing may enable these texts to 																																																								
44 J.M. Coetzee The Lives of Animals (New York: Random House, 2001), 49. 
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aggregate an international audience, and thus the possibility of intervention by an international 
legislative body committed to respond to human rights violations under the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). However, the borrower may find that attempts to gain 
political capital through intertextuality casts an attempt to properly represent an instance of 
suffering into the lender’s debt; enabling such resonance may result in a secondary experience of 
suffering remaining an imitation of a primary experience. Thus, despite Michael Rothberg’s 
hopeful proposal that memory need not be competitive, a “zero-sum game,” and that “attention 
to memory’s multidirectionality suggests a more supple social logic” in which historical 
connectivity can produce mutual understanding, a global circulation of suffering in figurative 
terms, may, as with universal human rights, enable the production of master narratives and forms 
that may ultimately suppress the voices of those suffering, who already exist at the margins.45  
I conclude by opening up lines of further inquiry that need to be addressed, about the 
value, the efficacy, and the ethics of comparative study in the case of atrocity. My chapters move 
toward addressing the nature of comparative atrocity, as a method of analysis, a strategy for legal 
response, and an ethic. In the context of atrocity, comparative approaches may be at the center of 
the legislative conceptual, and literary architecture, but such comparison raises methodological 
and ethical questions. Once a universal form of atrocity has been established, and once it 
proliferates globally to allow similar events previously processed by international law to inform 
responses to new instances of atrocity, comparability becomes the ultimate arbiter for 
establishing the reality of an atrocity as an experience.46  
																																																								
45 See Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009), 5-11. 
 
46 See Olaoluwa Olusanya: Rethinking Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 
2007). 
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Claiming that conventions of atrocity forged within literary contexts serve as a commerce 
of exchange, through which the articulation of a painful experience may be made globally 
recognizable, may allow for the development of a global community of engagement and 
understanding, of acknowledgment and response to suffering. It may also flatten out the critical 
differences between the diverse range of experiences characterized by pain and suffering. The 
availability of familiar global figures of atrocity, ideally meant to give representation to 
suffering, may end up drowning out these same voices, absorbing them into the cacophonous 
voice of cliché, familiar forms to be passed over and dismissed, as all too-familiar forms. Thus, I 
end with an inquiry about the place and the efficacy of literature and literary technologies as 
forms of imagining in the discourse of comparative atrocity.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Factuality on Trial: The “Real” Eichmann,  
The Authenticity of Atrocity, and the Evidence of Evil 
 
 
This chapter concentrates on Kurt Vonnegut’s 1961 novel Mother Night and its relationship to 
the Eichmann capture in 1960, the trial that began in 1961, and Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the 
trial in the New Yorker, in the essays that ultimately became her seminal work, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil. I take up the relationship between the understanding 
of Eichmann and his crimes that began to concretize between the publication of his memoirs by 
Life magazine in November of 1960, and the figure of Eichmann that emerged during the trial in 
Jerusalem that began in 1961. These trials—and Adolf Eichmann at their center—became a 
cultural shorthand for a problem in understanding and speaking about the Holocaust itself. That 
specific understanding, I argue, is grounded in an investment in producing “authenticity.” 
Focusing on the Eichmann trial, Arendt’s factual report on it, alongside fictional and literary 
stylizations of Eichmann as a figure, I examine the nature of “authenticity” in the representation 
of atrocity. I analyze how testimony makes a claim to authenticity by asserting its factual basis, 
and I observe how fictional and figurative forms probe the nature of factuality and evidence, 
making a claim to authenticity, through aesthetic invention. Herein, I will discuss the specific 
obligations and investments of literary criticism and theory in discussing the literature of 
atrocity, and I will trace movement of the discourse on this subject from 1945-present, and from 
its specialized localization in Holocaust discourse to its expansion as a mode of thinking and 
connecting subsequent atrocities across the globe. 
 I begin by providing a brief portrait of the novel’s concern with authenticity. I then move 
into an overview of the relationship between the novel and its historical grounding in the 
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Eichmann trials. I discuss the significance of the Eichmann trials, and the emergence of 
Eichmann as a figure in which concerns about authenticity take shape and constellation. I 
proceed with an evaluation of Arendt’s thesis, which becomes the most important critique in 
establishing the cultural resonance of the trial and establishing both the form of Holocaust 
testimony and the figure of Eichmann as cultural iconography and foundational political 
groundwork on which a bulk of Holocaust scholarship is based.1 Looking specifically at her 
characterization of Eichmann, I show that Arendt’s thesis depends on an assumed authenticity in 
Eichmann’s testimony and an assumed asymmetrical inauthentic nature of the proceedings and 
conditions governing the trial. Arendt saw the trial as a dramatic staging of Holocaust survivor 
witness testimony, a recital of painful and horrific memories that aimed to document the atrocity 
and to put it on a world stage, submitting the event in graphic detail for global observation. For 
Arendt, the trial was as much an aesthetic performance as an attempt to establish the facts. As an 
empirical process in pursuit of evidence, it was, to be sure, in part, an attempt by the Jerusalem 
court to use Eichmann’s self-explanations under oath as evidence to ground historical 
argumentation about the nature of the Nazi scheme. But it was also in large part a dramatization 
meant to authenticate the reality of the Holocaust, to reify and legitimize the mandate of the State 
of Israel and the decision by the United Nations to establish, with international approval 
following the Nazi genocide, a Jewish state. The trial was thus, for Arendt, an orchestrated 
dramatization that mixed factuality with figural stylization, a process whose aesthetic 
compromised the authenticity of the pursuit for the pursuit of a political ambition. Enlisting 																																																								
1 The impact of Arendt’s work set the foundation for a discourse on post-1945 evil. Landmark works in Holocaust 
Studies, such as Christopher Browning’s 1992 Ordinary Men are indebted to Arendt’s work; her thesis is the 
cornerstone for a debate between “Intentionalism” and “Functionalism,” which characterized the major debate of the 
in the 1980s-1990s. Behavioral Studies has seized upon Arendt’s study of Eichmann in order to develop a discourse 
on evil; Philip Limbardo takes Arendt’s thesis as the proposition on which he bases the famous “Stanford Prison 
Experiment.” Furthermore, Arendt’s thesis conceived of and anticipated the concept of corporate complicity, the 
capacity of structural and bureaucratic violence made possible by the development of corporate operations. As we 
will see, impact of her study of Eichmann is traceable to the 1984 atrocity in Bhopal, the object of my third chapter.  
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recent scholarship on Eichmann, I demonstrate an inconsistency in Arendt’s thought, between 
her characterization of the trial’s inauthenticity, the court itself dramatic spectacle, and 
Eichmann’s testimony as veracious evidence. I argue that this inconsistency leads Arendt to 
misinterpret the evidence she uses to propose the “banality” of his evil, and to thus erroneously 
draw her iconic moral and political narrative about the Nazi regime’s supposed banality based on 
this narrative. What Arendt’s authenticity error represents, and what it puts into motion as her 
thesis becomes a centrally embedded reference in thinking about the nature and production of the 
modern perpetrator of atrocity, is a fundamental dissonance in the nature of authenticity in the 
context of documenting and conceiving of atrocity. 
After I consider the form of testimony itself and its relationship to metafiction, I then 
discuss the quality of authenticity, and its relationship to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s novel, Mother 
Night, published synchronously with Arendt’s report. Vonnegut’s novel undermines the 
dichotomy between figurative stylization and fictional invention on the one hand, and factual 
evidence on the other, by positing that testimony can be a form of “pretending,” that the 
production of truth-telling coexists with a process of self-conscious fashioning. I engage Mother 
Night as a novel that swerves between the demands of testimony, which it identifies with a type 
of truth telling that cannot finally provide a moral arbiter, and the demands of narrative fiction, 
which, according to the novel are “enough to make [one] lie, and to lie without seeing any harm 
in it.”2 If I am correct in identifying the Eichmann trials as a moment where the dominant tropes 
of Holocaust discourse begin to foment, during which the scholarship on Holocaust testimony 
emerges as a discourse of authenticity, Mother Night may mark and identify the movement from 
a discourse of atrocity centrally preoccupied with factuality, to one preoccupied with the 
authenticity of fictional forms.  																																																								
2 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night (New York: Random House, Inc., 1996), ix. 
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Since this dissertation examines representations and cultural iconography generated by a 
historical event, I focus my analysis on the way in which the trial, and particularly Eichmann’s 
testimony delivered in it, impacts discourse and carries cultural cache. I attend especially to the 
way in which Eichmann and the Jerusalem proceedings are later treated by critics, scholars, 
writers, and other media outlets. I investigate the way in which the trial, and Eichmann as the key 
witness in the trial, become figures for thinking about the authenticity of testimony, specifically 
the nature of speaking truth and writing fiction. 
As self-conscious fiction, Vonnegut’s novel refashions these questions of authenticity 
into a representational problem that deals with the broader problem of how a post-1945 
understanding of atrocity coordinates the logical connection between evidence and testimony 
after 1945. Vonnegut’s interest in how evidence, testimony, and authenticity may come into 
tension with narrative, representation, and a particularly literary logic can be further explored by 
examining how this particular syncretism of factuality and fictionality respond to and understand 
the way in which law reckons with and archives atrocity. 
I. The “Real” Eichmann: Between Data and Concept 
Q.  
 In 1957 you also said the following—pay attention: "No, I have no 
regrets at all, and I am not eating humble pie at all. In the four 
months during which you have recorded the whole matter, during which 
you have endeavoured to refresh my memory, a great deal has been 
refreshed...it would be too easy, and I could perfectly reasonably, 
for the sake of current opinion, play a role as if a Saul had turned 
into a Paul. But I must tell you that I cannot do that, because I am 
not prepared to, because my innermost being refuses to say that we did 
something wrong. No - I must tell you quite honestly that if, of the 
10.3 million Jews shown by Korherr, as we now know, we had killed 10.3 
million, then I would be satisfied and I would say all right, we have 
destroyed an enemy." 
 
Is that what you said? 
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Eichmann:  
 No, I did not say that, I did not say that at all. That has been 
patched together from a mixture of fact and fiction. But there is one 
thing I did say: Regrets do not do any good, regretting things is 
pointless, regrets are for little children. What is more important is 
to try and find ways and means of making such events impossible in the 
future. That was the general tone of the conversation.3 
(Testimony of Adolf Eichmann, Session 96, 1961) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
By all accounts, the Eichmann trial that began in April of 1961 and lasted until June of 
1962 was a trial of absolutes, in which neither truth nor moral judgment could exist in fragments 
or parts. The law, wrote Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers, was “simply not equipped to deal, on a 
human, political level with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond goodness 
or virtue.” Calling the Nazi violations “beyond crime” might have been Arendt’s way of 
underscoring the gravity and degree of criminality executed by the Nazi regime, but the 
hyperbole warrants a closer look, for it is anchored in a claim not just about the enormity of the 
crime but also its complement: the limits of legal intelligibility to handle and interpret the facts 
that compose this type and degree of violation.4 The reply she received from Jaspers is telling. 
He chided Arendt with the critique that “[t]he way you do express it, you’ve almost taken the 
path of poetry.”5 That is to say, for Jaspers, Arendt’s attempt to describe atrocity has sought to 
shift the terms of interpretation and assessment from the type of empirical judgment of legal 
responsibility offered by a judicial forum, to a form of evaluation that qualifies moral 
responsibility, a type of trial that interprets not only evidentiary facts, but also admits and 
assesses moral facts. 
																																																								
3 “The State of Israel versus Adolf Eichmann.” Israeli State Archives, Vol. 4, Session 96 (13 July,1961). 
 
5 “Letter from Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, 19 October 1946.” See Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, 
Correspondence 1926-1969 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992), 46. 
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Thus, on the one hand, Arendt’s comments give us a form of the law that is ill-equipped 
to assess the criminality of atrocity because something about this atrocity seems to exceed the 
form of law, even the form of law developed to deal with antecedent atrocities.6 On the other 
hand, we are made aware of the danger of creating figurative concepts out of real experiences; 
Jaspers’s critique perhaps even implies his concern that Arendt has started to turn the course of 
human events into a schema of conceptual, even metaphysical morality. Poetry and law are two 
systems of interpretation that may oppose one another, yet which stake competitive claims to 
authentic representation of atrocity. Legal justice turns atrocity into a state of affairs that may be 
submitted to and apprehended within the scope of comprehensible human action. Poetic 
judgment, meanwhile, would compensate for a perceived limit in the law to render the event 
intelligible and to articulate an adequate interpretation, a judgment predicated on achieving a 
figural truth, moderated through aesthetic stylization and dramatization.  
What is it about the nature of this atrocity that, in Arendt’s view, the court does not 
assess, and what exclusions might representation, interpretation, and arbitration through this 
sense of “poetry” equally neglect? The answer, I argue, is the quality of “authenticity.” To ask 
what the court cannot assess is to postulate a question about how, in an arena of international 
human rights law developed and honed to process and respond to the greatest degrees of human 
suffering, we can calibrate and determine what evidence is, what authenticity even means, in the 
context of extreme suffering, such as is found in crimes of atrocity. To pursue this line of 
thinking, I here juxtapose the portrait of Eichmann Arendt drafts in her factual report for on 
																																																								
6 Antecedent atrocities, pre-Holocaust, certainly grappled with concern about how to treat mass suffering. However, 
they do not display a pronounced belief that such atrocities are innately beyond the scope of law. See, for example, 
the WWI protocols on International Law, or the Abolitionist legal movement, which were developed to address 19th 
Century and early 20th Century atrocity, but which many thinkers, in the wake of the Holocaust, found insufficient 
for the form of violence represented by the Holocaust, exemplified by the claim by the UN in 1945 that the 
Holocaust warranted and required new terminologies, legal codes, and legislation. 
	 43 
Eichmann’s trial, in her thesis Eichmann in Jerusalem, against Kurt Vonnegut’s fictional Mother 
Night, which features a fictionalized rendering of Eichmann, an aesthetic counterpoint to the 
factual Eichmann, and which Vonnegut published in 1961, the same year as Arendt’s report on 
the trials. While Arendt seeks to get to the bottom of Eichmann’s “true” character, to substantiate 
Eichmann’s crimes with historical explanation, and to explore the composition and nature of 
“true” evil, Mother Night lies between fact and fiction, historical data and fictional fashioning. 
The novel is a fiction about a set of historical facts; it follows a character who, like Eichmann, is 
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity and set to stand trial by an international 
court. The fiction undertakes the process of self-fashioning, and posing as a memoir, it claims to 
be geared toward producing and revealing objective facts, which can be “add[ed] to [the] 
archives of Nazi villainy.”7  
Arendt’s factual report, an attempt to render a factual account of a legal process that was 
itself designed to procure facts and assign moral judgment, ultimately finds that factual 
accounting cannot itself authenticate the reality of the past. More troublingly, neither the court of 
law nor the factual account can render authentic judgment about that past. Meanwhile, 
Vonnegut’s memoir designs a complex web of interlocking fictions, each fiction provided with 
the appearance of authenticity until revealed as yet another fiction. Thus, I argue that ultimately, 
in the context of a post-atrocity attempt to determine and assess the facts of atrocity—and to do 
so with moral judgment and purpose—the production of such bottomless fictionality, in which 
authenticity is, seemingly, mere appearance rather than an essential characteristic, may itself 
produce a type of authentic factuality. Fiction, then, may thus enable a form of aesthetic 
interpretation that evades an attempt to document, authenticate, and pass moral judgment on the 
facts of atrocity.  																																																								
7 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night, 1. 
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II. Knowing Eichmann Through Arendt 
The series of articles Hannah Arendt wrote for the New Yorker, covering the Eichmann 
trial held in Jerusalem in 1961, famously characterized the event as above all else “spectacle.” It 
was, Arendt wrote, a “show trial under the influence of the prosecutor’s love of showmanship.” 
For Arendt, the spectacle was unnecessary to the process of establishing a form of proof that was 
already immanent; the facts of the trial, she saw, were already well-known. After all, the 
audience (mostly aging survivors and European immigrants) “knew by heart all there was to 
know…[it] certainly did not need this trial to draw their own conclusions.”8 For this audience, 
the “evidence” considered in the trial was the force of history on their bodies, and the memory of 
the event writ large in the collective Jewish consciousness.  
It was also unclear what Eichmann was meant to testify to, what his evidence would 
supply. As Amy Hungerford writes, 
[i]f genocide is, as Senator Jacob Javits remarked in 1997, “murder and more,” we 
were challenged after World War II to specify and codify what that “more” might 
be…the question of what exactly one must be guilty of to be guilty of genocide 
hunted the trial throughout and preoccupies Arendt’s analysis of it. Did Eichmann 
need to be sadistic, to have taken life with his own hands and with pleasure, in 
order to be guilty of genocide? While the premise of the Israeli trial suggests not, 
suggests instead that cultural destruction defined the crime and thus justified a 
Jewish trial, the prosecutor’s and many witnesses’ efforts to cast Eichmann as a 
sadist indicates otherwise. Somehow, it seemed, Eichmann must be guilty of the 
kinds of acts we have always called murderous in order to be guilty of genocide.9  
 
Hungerford, quoting Javits, shows the tension between the legal process to which Eichmann’s 
trial was presumably in service, and the cosmological concerns immanent in Arendt’s report, 
concerns that were heightened for Arendt precisely because a report on the trial’s pursuit could 
																																																								
8 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 8. 
 
9 Amy Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 7.  
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not address them. If anything, Arendt’s thesis turns away from the court’s assessment of the 
evidence of Eichmann’s guilt. Rather, the core of Arendt’s analysis finally lands on the idea that 
logic, and in particular a linguistic based logic, had something to do with the “and more,” a 
phrase suggestive in its unwillingness to put into concrete terms what that might be, the 
suggestion of excess incapable of being rendered into political rhetoric, that there might not be 
words that would finally contain an adequate definition. Rather, she hinted that spectacle of the 
trial stood to prove something else entirely; it was an occasion, she implied (to the ire of the 
Israeli and Jewish American publics) to justify Jewish nationalism.10 
Moreover, for Arendt, Eichmann’s trial of 1961 may have been explicitly tied to and an 
occasion for an attempt to authenticate the Jewish state, but it was also linked to a second 
nationalistic global landmark: the 1961 division of East and West Germany. Against the 
backdrop of the trial taking place in Jerusalem, a trial aimed at solidifying the Israeli state and 
developing cohesive nationalism amongst its members, Arendt read and collected daily reports 
of the concretizing division between East and West Germany, a division that moreover 
confirmed the growing mandate of international jurisdiction over Germany, US and Russian 
forces occupying a formally sovereign state.11 Under Adenauer, Germany underwent a process of 
"de-Nazification." The reason for de-Nazification was essentially the recognition that the bulk of 
the German nation probably had some criminal guilt, if not directly, then as accessories to the 
crime—of mass murder. For this reason, ideological reconditioning, it was thought, alongside the 
removal of the major criminals, would essentially bleach an entirely complicit nation of 
																																																								
10 See Arendt, The Banality of Evil, 4-6. 
 
11 “Trial Notes by Arendt and background documents, 1942-1962, Series Adolf Eichmann File, 1938-1968.” The 
Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress. 
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justifiable criminality and return it to neutral morality such that it could rejoin the international 
community. 
Juxtaposed to the daily gruesome accounts of witness entered as evidence in the 
Eichmann trials, Arendt saw that the process of de-Nazification could only be achieved if the 
immorality and criminality of the entire nation, which she viewed as true, could be shifted onto 
key figureheads such as Eichmann. In her notes, Arendt recalls that the facts of witness she heard 
as testimony at the trial were, as she wrote: 
difficult to live with, something that takes the breath away and makes [them] 
speechless...they have all too frequently yielded to the obvious attempt to translate 
their speechlessness into whatever expressions or emotions were close at hand, all 
of them inadequate, with the result that today the whole story is usually told in 
terms of sentiments which need not even be cheap in themselves to sentimentalize 
and cheapen the story...this distinction between the speechless horror, in which 
one learns nothing that could be directly communicated, and the not at all horrible 
but often very disgusting experiences where people's conduct is open to normal 
judgment and where the question of morals and ethics arises.12 
 
The trial itself may be a “spectacle,” that "cheapens the story" because it foregrounds its own 
form as an aesthetic object and a specifically narrative form of art, one championed by 
Aristotalian aesthetics. It was a process consumed with concern for establishing unity of action, 
place, and time, aesthetic concerns that require a singular character as the center around which 
dramatic action revolves and unfolds. Like a neoclassical drama, the structure through which the 
court determines guilt or innocence of a defendant can only recognize that guilt or innocence as 
it pertains to individual agents, and it can thus only evaluate their morality within this form. 
Legal judgment, Arendt argues, is not equipped to deal with the Nazi crimes because it relies on 
these conventional standards, a concept of the unity of character and the authenticity of the 
singular agent, the individual, or even the unified nation. What Arendt saw in the Nazi crimes is 
a crime exceeded these unities, and a type of criminality beyond the concept of individual 																																																								
12 Ibid. 
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agency, national coherence, temporal and spatial cohesion that the court can fit into the formal 
requirements for legal judgment. For Arendt, the court, and by extension the concept of legal 
ethics, banalized the crime precisely by insisting on these unities, by locating legal guilt within 
the sphere of individual criminality, and within the concept of an individual as justifiably guilty 
for crimes that exceed and explode the concept of the individual. The “banality of evil,” Arendt 
writes in her notes, is markedly different from what she calls “commonplace,” for banality has 
“[n]o roots, [is] not rooted in evil motives or urges or strength of temptation (human nature) or 
Evil…Richard III etc.” Rather, for Arendt, banality is “[d]oing as everybody else did,” “being 
swept away by the judgment of others and…never giving the matter much thought.” They 
essence of Arendt’s concept of Eichmann’s “banality” is precisely that it is both plotless and 
agent-less.13 What is banalized, and what thus becomes unspeakable, for Arendt, is not the 
violence itself, but the treatment of the crime within the conventions of the law, atrocity 
dissolved and compartmentalized into facts that can never add up to the grotesque reality of the 
whole.  
More specifically, banality in this case means the lack of a singular agent, the shift from 
the judgment of the accused to the judgment of others, the term that Arendt, in her notes on the 
trial. The dependence on the judgment of others as what motivated Eichmann’s crimes is what 
Arendt finds both evil and banal, an engine of evil with no locus, no reason, no authentic core 
but rather what she calls a reflective consciousness, a consciousness that, like a postmodern hall 
of mirrors, cannot distinguish between the a self and its doubles. Arendt characterizes Eichmann 
as a “reflective consciousness whose actions and utterances are the outcomes of, also the 
																																																								
13 “Hofstra College Discussion Notes 2/18/1964,” Essays and Lectures, Eichmann, Adolf, Lectures, Various 
Venues, 1962-1964. The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress. 
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response to, what he understands his situation to be.”14 Thus, rather than attempting to assess, 
beyond reasonable doubt, the facts of Eichmann’s guilt, the trial sought to “come to terms with it 
in juridical form, its insistence to pretend these new-fangled murderers are no bit different from 
ordinary ones and acted out of the same motives, is only one though perhaps in the long run the 
most fateful, consequence of this new state of affairs.” 15 It sought to reestablish both the concept 
of an authentic and individuated agent, a singular individual who was capable of “reflective 
consciousness,” and the concept of traditional translation of moral judgment into legal judgment. 
Finally, the trial strove to reestablish the reality and reliability of facts. “A fact,” Arendt wrote, 
“is not a fact because it is a piece of information, whatever that might mean, but because it is a 
recognizable part of a scheme of interpretation into which it fits.16 For Arendt, the aim and the 
design of the proceedings never was to establish the factuality of Eichmann’s crimes but rather to 
reassert the stability of factuality itself, to justify factuality as a plausible scheme of 
interpretation.  
Perhaps owing to the popularity of Arendt’s account of the trial, and her characterization 
of Eichmann as a figure representing a new form of evil perpetrated without motive or cause, 
Eichmann became cultural shorthand for an aporia in interpretation, a failure logical and ethical 
processing. Such a failure of rational thinking was one that Arendt saw represented in 
Eichmann’s very language, his speech on the witness stand. Arendt characterized what she saw 
as Eichmann’s inability to conceptualize his acts and his role in producing the mass murder of 
Jews under the Nazi rule in any logical scheme as immoral, an ethical violation as well as acts 																																																								
14 “Trial Notes and Background Documents, 1942-1962,” The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, Note 
32797. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 “Trial Notes and Background Documents, 1942-1962,” The Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress, Note 
033024. 
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that logically led to extraordinary violence, suffering, and horrific atrocity. Namely, Arendt was 
disturbed by his inability to process what in literary terms we might call a “plot” of his own 
making, the logical relationship of cause and effect, the connection between his “banal” orders 
and their horrific outcomes. She saw that disconnect captured as a conundrum in the very 
language in which he narrated his testimony, and she then saw his testimony as a blueprint for 
his thinking.  
For Arendt, this testimony was notable for the way in which Eichmann, in giving it, 
compulsively garbled his own language, such that “[t]he longer one listened…the more obvious 
it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an ability to think, namely, to 
think from the standpoint of someone else.”17 Arendt’s logic here bears careful analysis: in her 
assessment, the linguistic characteristics of Eichmann’s testimony stand in for and are indicative 
of a logical failure in Eichmann’s thinking. In her analysis, the language of Eichmann’s 
testimony in recalling and explaining the event, is filled with logical inconsistencies and belies a 
cognitive system-error in the logic of Eichmann’s thought process. Arendt’s analysis hinges on 
two key assumptions: first, that the trial was in fact a dramatization aimed at featuring and 
authorizing the facts of Jewish suffering during the Nazi atrocity; second, that “it was essential 
that one take [Eichmann] seriously.”18 Eichmann may not have been, for Arendt, a reliable 
witness. And he certainly was not, despite the trial’s significance as an attempt to record and 
document historical fact, a historian, nor his testimony accurate history (she notes, with some 
irony, that his writings show “an extraordinarily faulty memory).19 But he had to be, for Arendt’s 
																																																								
17 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 2006), 
49. 
 
18 Ibid, 54. 
 
19 Ibid.  
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analysis, incapable of “becoming aware of anything like ‘inconsistencies’ in the very testimony 
he provided;” Eichmann, in Arendt’s thesis, had to be unaware of his testimony’s logical failure.  
But Eichmann’s speech was hardly an authentic record of his thinking. And while a 
judge, or a historian and a philosopher like Arendt, must assume the witness’s veracity, a trial—
any trial—is of course by definition a performance, one in which competing narratives, that of 
the defense and that of the prosecution, vie not for the most authentic version of truth, but rather 
for the most compelling and convincing argument. Eichmann’s testimony, as an arm of his 
defense, was far less interested in earnest representation than in finding any possible means 
through which the defense could avoid the immanent guilty verdict that active war crimes 
implied, and which carried the death penalty. In a courtroom setting, testimony can be true, or it 
can be false, and the test that testimony must stand is that of truth that supports existing 
evidence, or falsities that can be proven to be false because it contradicts other evidence. But the 
legal system cannot identify or synthesize the kind of lies meant to disguise a moral truth, and it 
cannot assess statements delivered primarily as aesthetic statements, rather than factual ones; it 
can assess factuality, but not sincerity. Meanwhile, Arendt’s philosophical understanding of 
testimony as an intensely veracious form could only synthesize Eichmann’s testimony under the 
conditions that it be understood as authentic representation, and she thus assumes that that 
Eichmann’s speech has a truth function in the first place. Viewed as transparent, and placed in 
this philosophical container, Arendt takes for granted that Eichmann’s language was to be taken 
as factual, and that his testimony was given as an authentic representation of his thinking.  
That is to say, Arendt’s critical analysis depends on a dual understanding of evidence: 
Eichmann’s testimony means one thing as it is circumscribed within the context of the law, as 
legal evidence; yet it also serves as evidence for a something quite else: a particularly aesthetic 
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case. For Arendt, the trial in Jerusalem, is art: it is a “spectacle,” a “show trial,” dramatically—
perhaps melodramatically—staged as a dramatic form, a performance of aesthetic mastery. Yet 
paradoxically, at the center of that “drama,” lies Eichmann’s testimony, which Arendt somehow 
sees as untouched by dramatization: the “facts” around which orbited the synthetic performance 
of the trial. For Arendt, the trial was performance, and yet Eichmann somehow was not complicit 
in that performance as a conscious performer; Eichmann, for Arendt, remained the straight-man 
in a dramatic circus. For Arendt, Eichmann’s testimony was the authentic core of a synthetic 
process, and the spheres of performance and aesthetic production, on the one hand, and the 
authentic and empirical, on the other, are stable and coherently divided. 
Bettina Stangneth’s major intervention, in her 2014 study Eichmann Before Jerusalem, 
points tellingly at this asymmetry in Arendt’s thought when she writes that “Eichmann-in-
Jerusalem was little more than a mask,” a self-fashioning act of pretending to be a certain type of 
authentic character, performing a certain role.20 That “mask,” Stangneth argues, is what Arendt 
used as the evidence for her argument—that mask represents Eichmann’s own self-fashioning, a 
“show” self self-generated for the show trial; Eichmann in Jerusalem, on the witness stand, is 
little more than a carefully fiction, intended to redirect the interpretation of the “facts.” Arendt 
took for a fact of Eichmann’s character that fiction; thus, her argument is itself be based on a 
fictional narrative, one that took on for its own purposes the sheen of testimony. Stangneth 
argues “Eichmann acted out a new role for every stage of his life, for each new audience, and 
every new aim.”21 For Stangneth, whose focus on Eichmann is on the relationship between his 
writings, completed outside of the trial arena, vis-à-vis his testimony, Arendt “chose the method 																																																								
20 Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (New York: Knopf, 
2014), xxiii. 
 
21 Ibid.   
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of understanding that she was familiar with: repeatedly reading Eichmann’s [testimonial] words 
and conducting a detailed analysis of the person speaking and writing, on the assumption that 
someone speaks and writes only when they want to be understood.”22  
As a form, testimony implies three main characteristics about he who would deliver it: 
first, that the best testimonial narrative is the most truthful one, and to that end the most credible 
one—“the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”23 To that end, especially in light of the 
“credibility” test, testimony must agree with and be emplotted within a trajectory of other forms 
of proof presented: evidence, ulterior testimonies, case argumentation. Second, that testimony 
becomes a record of what passes as an official explanation, and that this explanation or “plot” 
corresponds to the testifier’s understanding of the events that have transpired, and that are 
presently under deliberation. Third, that it is reliable and that it has a truth value; legal testimony 
marks itself off from every day speech, even every day speech at its most earnest, with the 
ceremony that swears the witness into oath.24  
However, the form of a testimonial given by the narrator as a witness is always 
circumscribed by the arena of the court itself, an arena in which the validity of that testimony is, 																																																								
22 Ibid, 29. 
 
23 Robert A. Ferguson, “Untold Stories in the Law" in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Peter 
Brooks and Paul D. Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale UP, 1996), 85. 
 
24 While I have concentrated my analysis on the resemblance between Eichmann and Campbell, and the relationship 
between the context of the Eichmann trials that formed the historical background to the novel, Campbell’s character 
represents a constellation of several historical figures, each of which represent and contribute a particular problem 
about the nature of authenticity, logic, and speakability in the context of the Nazi atrocities. Vonnegut specifically 
mentions William Joyce as a source for the character. Joyce, British traitor who broadcast false reports of 
Germany’s military successes for the Nazis, was known by the nickname “Lord Haw-Haw.” He was tried by the 
British, who found him guilty for treason and hanged. Mother Night also references German propagandist Josef 
Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, who serves as Campbell the character. Joyce, British traitor who 
broadcast false report By drawing Campbell as a propagandist, Vonnegut fuses a form of criminality directly 
associated with Eichmann’s crimes with those attributed to Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda under Hitler. In 
this role, Goebbels turned Jews into figures that de-authenticated them as persons, and that served to authenticate the 
proposed plan of violence against them. Truth, of course, becomes another contested term for postmodern writers 
and critics. 
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on one hand authenticated by the vary nature of the speech-act, one that begins with an oath of 
truth under the pain of perjury, and on the other, one that stands to be corroborated or 
disconfirmed by the mediation of other forms of evidence, other testimonials, or challenges made 
by competing parties, arbiters, or counsel. Legal testimony is thus circumscribed by the special 
conditions awarded specifically to speech acts given within the arena of the court, separated from 
those of daily life. What is said is said under oath is said under special conditions; equally so the 
narrative that we call “testimony” is not only told but also heard under the special conditions of 
law, and the specific legal rules related to evidence, procedure, and evaluation that the law 
demands in this transaction between narrator, narrative, and judgment. If the language, the 
aesthetic, the writing, and the logic of narrating atrocity is, as I have argued bound up in an 
insistence on the factuality of the experience, so too is law a form that insists on its own 
pronouncements as objective evidentiary statements, whose interpretation must rely on 
utterances as composed of factual language. But as we see, by the time of Eichmann’s trial, the 
language of his testimony—and indeed the logic of the entire procedure involved in bringing him 
to justice—can hardly be seen in terms of an endeavor to establish factuality.  
Louis Michael Seideman finds that within the legal context, while “the rules of evidence 
are designed to let juries get at the truth,” they instead provide a particular frame that gets at a 
particular truth…if you provide another frame, you get another truth.”25 These frames, in which 
evidence may be categorized, already either attribute to it or rule out certain modes of 
explanation, interpretation, and argumentation. Seideman’s comments describe the shape-
shifting nature of evidence, in which the nature of its truth-value and truth yield depends on the 
frame imposed on it. But his comments also imply that the purpose of a trial is to play out the 																																																								
25 Louis Michael Seideman “Some Stories About Confessions and Confessions About Stories,” in Peter Brooks and 
Paul D. Gewirtz, 164.  
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process whereby competing frames are produced to explain a series of events, causes, effects, 
testimonies, and pieces of evidence. While the aim of the judge and the jury is to determine 
which frame is most appropriate for the evidence, the aim of the trial itself is to enable as many 
frames as possible to coexist within its form, producing a climate in which a given “verdict” 
affirms the validity of one frame above all others. 
Seideman’s claim about the legal process of evaluating evidence might be revelatory, 
even shocking to legal scholars. Law, after all, depends on the pursuit of one “true” truth, which 
can exist beyond reasonable doubt—that is to say, exists as a sole, unquestionable reconstruction 
of what really happened, rather than an interpretation among other interpretations. But his 
observations would be nothing new to postmodernists, who fundamentally find that such 
“frames” or “forms” represent only one form of emplotment among a multitude of possibilities 
for emplotment. In fact, the postmodern feature of metafiction deals precisely with the concept of 
competing frames which I have quoted above, sounds strikingly similar to Ursula Heise’s 
characterization of metafiction, which she describes as: 
allow[ing] one to reflect on the possibility of different and perhaps alternative 
histories to frame the present, which themselves have or be evaluated with critical 
distance. Whether the historicization of contemporary posthistory that has been 
proposed…does justice to its object can only be judged with such a distance—
among others, that of time.26  
 
The concept of a “narrator as witness” would seem to be the position occupied by the 
giver of testimony; thus authenticity would seem, in this view, to lie in the verification of the 
giver-of-testimony, the capacity of language to cohere with a reality that may be verified by 
evidence. In fact, however, the form of a testimonial given by the narrator as a witness is always 
circumscribed by the arena of the court itself, an arena in which the validity of that testimony is, 																																																								
26 Ursula K. Heise Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative, and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 74. 
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on the one hand authenticated by the vary nature of the speech-act, one that begins with an oath 
of truth under the pain of perjury, and one that stands to be corroborated or disconfirmed by the 
mediation of other forms of evidence, other testimonials, or challenges made by competing 
parties, arbiters, or counsel. As a relative to the confessional mode, testimony bears the stamp of 
sincerity, of an authorized special confrontation by a witness, to be witnessed by third arbitrating 
parties.27 But unlike confession, which is ultimately liable to self-judgment and self-
authentication, testimony must honor an underlying factual basis, not only for credibility’s 
purpose but also because its authority is ultimately stabilized and reinforced, or conversely 
undercut by external verification.28 For Giorgio Agamben, witness testimony “always 
presupposes something—a fact, a thing, or a word—that preexists him and whose reality and 
force must be validated or certified…an essential duality in which an insufficiency or incapacity 
is completed or made valid.”29  
In the case of the Holocaust, that insufficiency may be the incapacity of any factual 
account of the event, to authenticate an exhaustive causal explanation for the event, and more 
disconcertingly, to provide a moral framework in which justice may be accurately served. Facts 
may chronicle a sequence of events, or plot them, but they cannot authenticate the discourse of 
concepts (such as intention, ideology, and ultimately a totalizing and cosmological explanation 
for genocide) undergirding and driving the brutality of them, concepts that, in the context of the 																																																								
27 See Peter Brooks “Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature,” in Peter Brooks and Paul D. 
Gewirtz, 121. 
 
28 According to Agamben, testimony’s authority “depends not on a factual truth, a conformity between something 
said and a fact or between memory and what happened, but rather on the immemorial relation between the unsayable 
and the sayable, between the outside and the inside of language. The authority of the witness consists in his capacity 
to speak solely in the name of an incapacity to speak—that is, in his or her being a subject.” See Giorgio Agamben, 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York:  
Zone Books, 2000), 158. 
 
29 Ibid, 150. 
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Holocaust, become as real as the violent actions foisted onto the bodies of the victims in their 
name.30 Documentation and verification does not equate to, or result in, authoritative causal 
explanation or, in the case of retributive justice, just desert. 
When it comes to testimony about atrocity, critics have noted the tendency for this form 
to signpost its authenticity by way of what James E. Young calls a “documentary authority.”31 
Since the facts of atrocity may be on their own incredible, the greater the need to generate 
credibility, the greater the impulse to assert its authenticity by insisting on the authenticity of the 
speaker as a witness. What could more persuasively authenticate the authority of a speaker than 
the claim “I was there?” Evidence, in this case, serves not only to corroborate the facts of 
testimony but also as traces of the “reality” of the experience itself, the reality and the 
authenticity of the speaker narrating the experience is itself reification of the testimonial 
narrative’s authenticity. Testimony, thus, does the work of reification; more than a mode of 
factual verification, it also takes on the task of making real, endowing memory with a materialist 
or verbal form that can be entertained and treated as facts. More than documenting the factuality 
or the authority of the experience, the author of testimony may engage in self-authentication—an 
authenticity that, under the rubric of legal reckoning with atrocity, is saturated with both factual 
privilege and moral authority.  
																																																								
30 In fact, this ambiguity lies right at the origins of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg’s definition of criminal 
responsibility. In Judge Robert H. Jackson’s notes considering the nature of criminal offense at Nuremberg, the 
participants failed to present proper guidelines for establishing mens rea (the threshold of evidence by which a 
perpetrator possesses sufficient knowledge or intention of wrongdoing) the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing 
that constitutes part of a crime, as opposed to the action or conduct of the accused). Roger S. Clark writes “Nobody 
in London asked about the necessary mens rea. Was knowledge of the facts enough? Knowledge of illegality? Or 
was some kind of intent required? Nor did anyone delineate the appropriate actus reus. The Tribunal, as we shall 
see, seems to have ducked a precise answer to these questions also.” See Roger S. Clark “Nuremberg and the Crime 
Against Peace,” Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 527.6 (2007): 530.  
 
31 James Edward Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences  
of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988), 50-72. 
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In the case of Eichmann, it is never quite clear when he wants to “be understood,” and it 
is never quite clear what is fact, what is aesthetic stylization for the purpose of beguilement, and 
what is fiction, even in the circumscribed arena of the court, a space in which utterances are 
assumed to be factual. And, moreover, what if Eichmann, in his “factually privileged” 
testimony—a form we expect to be transparently authentic—did not speak with the expository 
attempt to “be understood” but rather in code, with the aim of self-fashioning? Is it possible that 
we can see his testimony not as an account of his actions, or even an explanation of them as 
Eichmann professed them to be, in pursuit of a “clear, objective outcome,” (and thus a 
transparent window into historical events or into the logic and thoughts of the historical actor), 
but rather as a consciously crafted fiction. Under these conditions, could testimony be an attempt 
to disguise a systematic mode of thinking, precisely by claiming to be an unthinking module of a 
corrupted system, “after all only a ‘tiny cog’ in the machinery of the Final Solution” (as Arendt 
decided)?32 When Eichmann argued that he “is not guilty before the law, and before [his] own 
conscience; and with me the people who were my subordinates during the war…[we] were 
all…little cogs in the machine of the Head Office for Reich Security, and thus, during the war, 
little cogs in the great drivetrain of the murdering motor: war,” did he believe, as the fictional 
Eichmann in Mother Night seems to believe, that “he had invented his own trite defense, though 
a nation of ninety some-odd million had made the same defense before him,” or had he, as 
Stangneth argues, actually read the defense statements composed by perpetrators who testified 
before he was asked to submit his own testimony, statements that were in global circulation?33 
Were Eichmann’s witness statements authentic or were they copies, reproduced in form to craft a 
																																																								
32 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Thesis on the Banality of Evil, 341. 
 
33 Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem, 298. 
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defensive strategy for the purpose of his trial? What in Eichmann’s testimony is “authentic,” and 
what is but a cliché, copy, mimetically reproduced rehearsals of the testimony submitted by those 
who had gone before him at Nuremburg, remade as an imitative self-fashioning performance for 
the judges and the global public, including Arendt?  
Stangneth asks: “To what extent…was the Eichmann phenomenon shaped by his talent 
for self-dramatization?” and cites two significant features of Eichmann’s character: first, a 
scrupulous and dedicated interest in rhetoric, in persuasive and theatrical speaking and writing; 
second, a chameleon-like capacity to shape his speech and behavior as self-serving to each 
audience and aim.34 For Stangneth, Eichmann’s testimony 
bear[s] witness to only one thing with any reliability, and that is the thought 
process involved in any kind of writing, whether it proclaims truth or lies. A lie 
still has to be set on a foundation of what the writer believes to be the truth. The 
new historical fact to be discovered in interpreting Eichmann’s writing—his self-
representation and his falsification of history—is his thought itself.35  
 
As a key witness to “the event,” Eichmann’s testimony posited himself as an opportunity for 
historians, along with the judges at the trial, to identify critical evidence in his testimony, and to 
thus answer questions that only grew more vexed as Holocaust scholarship, historical accounts, 
explanations, and archives grew in size, scope, and complexity. What this strategy did not take 
into account, however, was the possibility that Eichmann might have had other motives in mind 
guiding his defense, and other reasons than contributing factual information for narrating and 
interpreting the facts of his past. It further did not take into account Eichmann’s relationship to 
those facts, which by 1960 could hardly be described as personal recollections, retrospective 
views of an experience over a decade and a half earlier. For in the decade and a half between the 
end of the war, Eichmann’s escape out of Germany, through Bavaria, and finally to Argentina, 																																																								
34 Ibid, xvii. 
 
35 Ibid, 338.   
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Eichmann avidly read about himself, in newspaper articles, history books, and the reports that 
emerged out of Germany. Eichmann was quite aware of how history had fashioned him, the way 
that he had been placed into discourse and been interpreted within the context of Holocaust 
history. The story Eichmann told in his testimony was less a personal history than a feedback 
loop of personal recollections filtered through and framed by historical data, each synchronously 
contributing to a structural system of feedback loops, in which Eichmann, as a historical figure, 
used evidence data generated already about him to compose the image of himself constituted by 
his testimony, then feeding back that newly constructed image into the historical data.  
When he appeared as a witness on the stand, Eichmann claimed that he had “been obliged 
to witness,” the Nazi evils, a stance that at once cast him as a crucial witness to the system, and 
at the same time cast him outside the system, apart from it, engaged in an outsider’s critique 
rather than critically engaged in its operations. This is critical to Eichmann’s self-dramatization. 
In his writings, titled “The Others Spoke, Now I Want to Speak” and dated 1956-1960, 
Eichmann claims that this “record” aims to depict “the truth,” “the way things took place” by 
describing that truth in “sober and factual” writing for the purpose of providing historians “a 
rounded and truthful picture.” But as a “factual account,” that “truth,” argues Eichmann, cannot 
contain questions of his guilt. In order for the facts to carry his objective testimony, Eichmann 
cannot entertain what he saw as “subjective” concerns about his own complicity.36 Thus, 
Eichmann presents himself, as Stangneth argues in Eichmann Before Jerusalem, as an 
“irrefutable key witness,” whose testimony is necessary to reconstruct the facts, while 
simultaneously editing his own role in producing the historical circumstances out of the 
narrative, placing himself at once within and outside the “plot” of the testimony—an author 																																																								
36 As quoted by Stangneth, in Eichmann Before Jerusalem, 349-350. 
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whose script erases the trace of the hand writing it.37 Any understanding of Eichmann’s 
testimony as a veracious form further did not take into account Eichmann’s relationship to those 
facts, which by 1960 could hardly be described as personal recollections, retrospective views of 
an experience over a decade and a half earlier. For in the decade and a half between the end of 
the war, Eichmann’s escape, first from his name (first taking on the identity of a low ranking 
officer, Adolf Karl Barth while a POW in Ulm and Weiden/Oberpfalz, then went under the 
assumed name “Otto Eckmann,” identifying himself as a SS Unterstrumführer named Otto 
Eckmann, to Otto Heninger), then through his flight out of Germany, through Bavaria, to 
Argentina, Eichmann avidly read about himself, in newspaper articles, history books, and the 
reports that emerged out of Germany; Eichmann was quite aware of how history had fashioned 
him, the way that he had been placed into discourse and been interpreted within the context of 
Holocaust history.38 In preparation for his trial, Eichmann too read up on Holocaust “facts” and 
on the plots historians had crafted out of them, on the various explanations, evidence 
interpretations, and justifications already known both to scholars and to those interpreting his 
testimony in Jerusalem. 
Thus, while Eichmann’s testimony was understood by scholars and philosophers as an 
opportunity to explain the gaps in such texts, Eichmann could read those texts from his 
privileged perch on the inside, identifying the gaps in facts and misunderstandings of facts, 
logical errors and miscalculations in historical arguments about those facts, precisely because he 
was both inscribed within those texts, and his actions part of the movement of that history, and 
also simultaneously in possession of a retrospective position outside the historical narrative. 																																																								
37 Ibid.  
 
38 In fact, Eichmann read, and quoted repeatedly in his trial, Der SS Staat (The SS State), a work published by Eugen 
Kogon based on the Buchenwald Report, as well as Der Urteil von Nuremburg (The Nuremburg Judgment), which 
detailed the testimony heard and the judgments meted at Nuremburg, published in 1946. Ibid, 119. 
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Eichmann prepared his testimony with tactical self-fashioning in mind, knowing not only the 
factuality of his case but also positioning himself to exploit gaps in historical knowledge or 
explanations. In Eichmann’s possession, these historical “facts” thus became subject to his 
capacity to re-logic them in service of the narrative he built in constructing his testimony for the 
Jerusalem judges. He moreover versed himself in the defenses employed by his peers, who had 
stood trial in West Germany years before his capture in Argentina.39 Eichmann’s testimony is 
less text than a self-aware intertext that mixes genres and forms, exploiting the content of 
historical explanations and scholarly explanations at the beginning of their codifications into the 
backbone of Holocaust scholarship, and recombining them into a distinctly postmodern aesthetic, 
into a form of “nesting narrative,” an narrative embedded in, alluding to, and commenting on its 
frame. 
I am suggesting here that to view Eichmann’s testimony in Jerusalem as the candid 
record of his thoughts, or as a record evidencing his character would be to mistake the authentic 
Eichmann for who he pretended to be, the fictional self he created and performed in the legal 
proceedings against him. Eichmann understood the way in which he had already been interpreted 
and used that interpretation against the data that the court provided of him, apprehended what he 
had come to symbolize in Holocaust discourse. He could anticipate the logic of prosecution to 
which he would be subjected. Thus, he could manipulate the discursive frame that had formed 
around him. 
III. Allegories of Eichmann 
By the early 1960s, not only had Eichmann’s trial become highly symbolic, but the man 
himself had become a figure for a particularly vexed problem about language and its authenticity 																																																								
39 Ibid, 537. 
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within the context of the law. As Eichmann himself put it, “[m]y name became a symbol.”40 That 
symbolism implied more than the incomprehensibility of imagining the atrocity itself; it implied 
a sense that moral thought, and the form of moral judgment that relied on the systems, structures, 
and existing philosophies to arrive at ethical justice, were not compatible with the nature and 
category of moral logic. As the trial gained public attention on the global stage, figurative 
Eichmanns started popping up in literary forms. The name itself became a signifier for a specific 
form of dissimulation in which signifier and signified broke down and in which aesthetic form 
disavows its own content. Anne Sexton’s 1966 poem, “Live” begins with a line that seems 
outside of the poem, which reads “Live or die, but don’t poison everything…” an elliptical 
byline that trails off into the abyss of a poem that opens in the aftermath of violence. Amid an 
imagined scene that intermixes the highly symbolist inner life of the speaker with an experience 
of violence in the external world that lacks symbolic meaning or order, the speaker proclaims, “I 
am not what I expected. Not an Eichmann.”41 What does it mean for the speaker to be, 
unexpectedly, “Not an Eichmann,” and why does the speaker expect to be “an Eichmann” in the 
first place? The speaker describes herself as a “sort of human statement” in a stanza that 
progressively sees the speaker come apart, separating the self between a seemingly inner self of 
content and a bodily self of form. 
I kept right on going on,  
a sort of human statement,  
lugging myself as if  
I were a sawed-off body  
in the trunk, the steamer trunk.  
This became perjury of the soul.  
 
																																																								
40 Ibid, 141.  
 
41 Anne Sexton, “Live” Live or Die (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1966), 116. 
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As a “human statement,” the speaker invokes a sense of representation; she speaks for a 
universal “human,” which may take on a stable and universally symbolic meaning. But thus 
universalized, the speaker finds herself “lugging myself as if/ I were a sawed-off body;” the outer 
self appears as a burden to be lugged along. The speaker seems pulled between the world of 
“human statements,” the world of language which may re-present the material world in signs, 
and the material world, here imaged as heavy, excessively bogged down with the weight of an 
empirical reality to which the “human statement” is tethered. Bound to that material world, the 
speaker’s attempt to remake it, to “[keep] right on going on” as a “human statement” (an the 
impulse toward remaking that world in symbolic and metaphorical terms) turns into “perjury of 
the soul,” the contents of an inner conceptual self compromised by and unfaithful to a truthful 
and material form. In the poem’s broader context, which is the experience of global violence, the 
poem links the concept of a “human statement,” the representation of atrocity and specifically 
reportage, with a “perjure of the soul,” a charge against the capacity of language to correspond 
with and to authenticate the empirical reality of atrocity.  
Sexton’s speaker would seem to identify “perjury” as the type of inauthenticity of 
representation that literary texts and their critics speak about when they claim atrocity’s 
exceptional status as beyond language. The poem strives toward the representation of atrocity 
against the shortcomings it knows language to possess; therein, Eichmann represents the damage 
to representation itself. Eichmann here represents a point of confusion between the language of 
evidence and testimony and the language of poetics. If literary language—fiction and poetics—is 
released from the obligations of factual and evidential truth required by ordinary circumstances 
	 64 
in order to be seen as valid truth, the Eichmann figure in the poem misuses language and 
attempts to pass symbolic language off as evidential language.42 
Eichmann’s profile appears again in Allen Ginsberg’s “Angkor Wat.” The poem, 
composed in Cambodia in 1963, converges continents and eras of atrocity, the speaker 
proclaiming: 
everywhere is my own Rhodesia  
for Mysterious Choose Up Sides and Die  
like a "Man”43 
 
while citing an “analyst,” a distant surveyor of  the spectacle “chasing a story,” who says "I got 
the Eichmann syndrome." In Ginsberg’s poem, the “Eichmann syndrome” conflates the “red face 
of logistics,” the dutiful adherence to authentic representation, with reportage, the “newsweekly” 
(as the poem terms it) accounts that document atrocity. Like Sexton’s Eichmann, Ginsberg’s 
“Eichmann syndrome” is a symptom of a logical malady: a mode of representation torn between 
its function “speaking truth,” documenting what the speaker can empirically authenticate, and a 
language following a logic of poetic figuration. For the poem, Eichmann stands for the way in 
which, in the case of representing atrocity, evidential testimony no longer maintains its an ideal 
																																																								
42 Sexton’s poem “After Auschwitz” represents an even greater exaggeration of this tension. Offering an image of 
death’s “banality,” a characterization deeply associated with Arendt’s description of the Nazi organizational logic 
following her observations of Eichmann’s trial, Sexton’s speaker describes a personified death that “looks on with a 
casual eye/ and scratches his anus.” The poem culminates with a dictum that reads:  
 
Let man never again raise his teacup. 
Let man never again write a book. 
Let man never again put on his shoe. 
Let man never again raise his eyes,  
on a soft July night. 
 
and ends with the plea “I beg the Lord not to hear,” setting up a tension between the speaker’s wish to use poetic 
language to offer a form of testimony and sentencing directed toward a moral court, and the simultaneously wanting 
to keep such language outside of divine judgment. See Ann Sexton, “After Auschwitz,” The Awful Rowing Toward 
God (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1971). 
 
43 Allen Ginsberg, Selected Poems 1947-1995 (New York: Harper Collins, 2001). 
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documentary function, and instead becomes purely aesthetic, serving only as a type of fiction 
among other fictions.  
In a similar vein, Michael Hamburger’s 1962 poem “In a Cold Season” begins with a 
portrait of the Eichmann trial itself; it opens with the chilling image of an unnamed “he,” a 
cipher for a referent that cannot be put into the words of the poem. This “he” is but a nameless 
pronoun, figured but not quite formed into a subject. Rather, the figure substitutes for a subject 
that never appears; “he” is only language. The “he” caged in word is a figure of speech, yet so 
too is it a figure that represents unspeakability, a figure that represents a crime so vast as to be 
beyond words, perhaps beyond figures.44 The speaker recalls Eichmann on stand, delivering his 
testimony behind the pane of glass that separated him from his audience, described by the poem 
as follows: 
Words cannot reach him in his prison of words 
Whose words killed men because those men were words 
Women and children who to him were numbers 
And still are numbers though reiterated 
Launching into air to circle out of hearing 
And drop unseen, their metal shells not broken.45 
 
Here, Eichmann is immediately recognizable; there is no need to call him out by name. He is less 
data than concept, an interesting inversion of the poem’s reference to “numbers,” which 
conceptually stand in for the enormity of his crime, which remains both “unseen” and “out of 
hearing,” beyond both conceptual and verbal fashioning. When Eichmann’s name finally appears 
in the second stanza, it does so in the context of “carbon copies,” of “memorandum,” which may 
become “a monument in kind.” That monument is in turn described further as a “testimonial;” 
the material page itself, “carbon copies” and “memorandum,” becomes proof of the event. This 
																																																								
44 That is also to say, beyond poetry. 
 
45 Michael Hamburger, “In a Cold Season," in Ownerless Earth: New Selected Poems (New York: Dutton, 1973). 
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metonymy transfers the locus of authenticity onto the materiality of the imitative object; if the 
court cannot fully articulate the link between Eichmann as a “civil servant, (retired)” and his 
crimes, it can document the objective reality of the page and the signs, words and numbers that 
appear on it, that reproduce that reality in the materiality of language impressed on the page. If 
the reality of his crimes cannot be comprehended, it may be given conviction by that which 
appears perceivable on the page, which exists as an objectively authentic fact. “Vocabulary,” the 
words that appear as black scribbles on white pages, serve as evidence for crimes that are, the 
poem implies, beyond the page, beyond what the page could possibly hold. 
IV. The Aesthetics of Authenticity  
When Doris Lessing wrote her review of Vonnegut’s Mother Night for the New York 
Times in 1973, she wrote that the work made a particular form of “nonsense of the little 
categories, the unnatural divisions into “‘real’ literature and the rest.”46 Lessing points out that 
Mother Night considers potential for facts and fictions to intermingle, in ways that confound the 
boundaries between not only art and mere spectacle, but also between aesthetic invention and 
“the rest,” or a reality grounded in evidentiary fact. Like the historical Eichmann, the fictional 
Campbell has been charged by a post-Holocaust tribunal for crimes against humanity. 
Campbell’s account begins with his recruitment at the start of the war to work with the Nazi 
publicity machine in order to further the American war effort. Campbell’s memoir—
circumscribed by notes from its editor, one Kurt Vonnegut Jr.—claims that under the Nazi front, 
the character worked in the service of American wartime intelligence. His mission involved 
transmitting top-secret coded information from lower-downs in Berlin to higher-ups in 
Washington throughout the war. Here, the veracity of testimony comes under fire, not only 																																																								
46 Doris Lessing, "Vonnegut's Responsibility [a Review of Mother Night," The Critical Response to Kurt Vonnegut. 
The New York Times Book Review, ed. Leonard Mustazza (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 45-47. 
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because of a split between what has transpired (Campbell’s crimes) and what they mean (are 
they spy activities in disguise as crimes, or are they crimes?) but also because the very reality of 
that testimony is so obviously signposted as belonging to the world of fiction. The testimonial, a 
form that foregrounds itself as a conduit for truth, is here used to undermine such claims to 
reality even as it proceeds along its formal conventions. Moreover, as a form that makes claims 
to the real, material, and substantial world, the testimonial form is put under pressure, for the 
novel self-reflexively obfuscates the relationship to reality of he who would provide the 
testimony. 
For Jerome Klinkowitz, Campbell’s problem in identifying authentic self has a direct 
connection to art—specifically to the verbal arts. Klinkowitz observes that as a spy, Campbell 
“acts out an Ionesco drama as he broadcasts vital secrets to the Allies in coded gestures he 
cannot understand.”47 For Campbell, espionage is a task he agrees to undertake because of its 
artistic and dramatic appeal; he imagines himself the focal character in a juicy spy novel of his 
own creation, only to discover that the narrative he believes himself to be living, indeed 
scripting, is quite different from the one he has in fact transmitted. He has latched on to an 
aesthetic of truth, but he has lost its plot. In Klinkowitz’s reading, the central concern of the 
novel is the concept of selfhood in the age of autonomy; Mother Night marks a turn away from 
the romantic idea that art represents a pure and inviolate domain, in which the self can seek 
refuge. He writes, 
[h]ow has the modern world come to be such a chamber of horrors? Where lies the 
cause for the loss of the self? Vonnegut answers that the very cause may be found in 
the traditional notion of the inviolate self. Because men have abandoned all else and 
have selfishly fled to their selves as the romantic center of the universe, when the self 
collapses everything, quite literally is lost.48 																																																								
47 Jerome Klinkowitz, The Vonnegut Effect (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 40. 
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Klinkowitz foregrounds the sense that the novel gives of a literary and conceptual shift in the 
romantic “self” of art, a coherent self that can be organized into a unitary self and thus harbored 
against the entropic forces of life, and the modern “self” of art. In Vonnegut’s fiction, art no 
longer represents this safe haven from the chaos of life, thus nothing remains finally, 
unequivocally “true.” Following Klinkowitz’s thematic reading of Mother Night, as a foray into 
a broader study concerning Vonnegut’s literary technique, Philip Tew implicates the novel in a 
historical context. For Tew, that loss of self is deeply embedded in the experience of World War 
II, which “typifies [the experience] of many fellow Americans, contiguous with that of 
Vonnegut’s generation of men whose early adulthood was shaped by these historical forces. 
[Campbell] was just on the wrong side…the novel combines elements of black humor, a certain 
bleak madness of “criminals against humanity” with “all the stuff of middle class life.” Tew, 
who very much reads Vonnegut through Arendt, understands the “crime” that Campbell 
struggles with as directly related to the banality on which the novel concentrates its content—
jettisoning images of atrocity and marginalizing the horrors of war in favor of “the quotidian, the 
banalities of the Nazi era: ping pong competitions and [Campbell] drinking with his friend, 
Heinz.”49 That banality thus becomes horrific, for in the absence of representation of atrocity the 
novel evokes the Nazi strategy of “indifference…a fluctuating topography that attempts to 
conceal the underlying evil.”50 Campbell’s coded transmissions, his activities as a spy, and the 
novel’s own formal ambivalence about what is truth, and what is fiction thus echoes and 
reproduces the very mechanism of Nazi evil itself, one made ever more insidious by the novel’s 
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equivocation about Campbell’s actual guilt. Comparing Campbell’s suicide, which ends the 1961 
novel, to Eichmann’s execution on May 31, 1962, Tew observes that Campbell will never be put 
to external moral examination and judgment, and asks “[d]oes this leave Vonnegut in 
equivocation, finding in Campbell only acquiescence, a moral vacuum, one that albeit risks an 
inevitability of conflict? Can one risk being relativistic about horrors such as those perpetrated 
by the Nazis? Is Vonnegut’s only the conclusion that the contingency of evil derives from human 
nature itself, thriving in the banality encouraged by repressive ideologies?”51  
In a sense, Tew and Klinkowitz are asking the same question from two different angles. 
Klinkowitz’s examination of the novel through a lens concerned with Vonnegut’s fictional 
technique (which he identifies as a specific type of ironic black humor that characterizes 
Vonnegut’s writing) wants to know whether in Vonnegut’s fiction the integral, inviolate self can 
survive the violations of structure—and whether art can similarly withstand the damage done to 
it in its appropriation by Nazi culture. Tew, in his historicist view, wants to understand how 
moral culpability operates when the meaning of one’s actions are entirely dependent on the 
frame or structure in which they are placed; thus “Campbell struggles with the implications of 
his actions, contemplating whether his undercover role exonerates him from his political and 
social engagement with Nazism.”52  
 We might move Tew and Klinkowitz’s questions about the relationship between the 
content of one’s actions and their interpretation through form to the mechanisms involved in 
understanding fiction’s logic broadly speaking. For literary critics and scholars concerned with 
the logical status of fiction, questions of authenticity invariably arise in the context of fictionality 
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and verisimilitude, and the relationship of both to form and content. The critical debates about 
authenticity in the literary context are generally split between a) semantic concerns (e.g. the 
semantic interpretations available for understanding logical expressions in literary fictions), and 
b) logical concerns about fiction (e.g. the reality of fictional statements that cannot be held 
accountable to the constraints of verification).53 What counts as “true” in narrative, then, is not 
verifiable fact but the degree of authentication bestowed upon them by the narrator and by the 
form in which narrative takes place.54 In the case of first-person narration, authenticity is 
produced out of the authority of the narrator as a witness, what Lubomir Doležel calls the “Ich-
narrator,” one who experiences the events of narrative and/or mediates knowledge about the 
experiences of others.55 
Testimony, then, (as narrative scholars and literary critics understand it) does not serve 
either simply a memorial function, or an evidentiary function, but behaves in the form of the Ich-
narrator. It conflates the authenticity of witness with the work of reification; testimony no longer 
serves just as a mode of factual verification, but also the production of making real. If testimony 
involves the complex interaction of speaking truth and corroborating evidence so as to provide 
narrative with the sheen of veracity under the law, it would appear that in post-1945 atrocity, this 
aim of testimony equally serves the need to authenticate in the sense of “making real,” endowing 																																																								
53 According to J.L. Austin’s seminal work on the philosophy of language, literary statements belong to one of the 
three categories of sentences that cannot be assigned truth-value. “When it is a formula in a calculus: when it is a 
performatory utterance: when it is a value-judgment: when it is a definition: when it is part of a work of fiction-there 
are many such suggested answers. It is simply not the business of such utterances to ‘correspond to the facts’ (and 
even genuine statements have other businesses besides that of so corresponding)” See J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, 
and D. R. Cousin. "Symposium: Truth." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes (1950): 
125. 
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memory with a materialist or verbal form that can be entertained and treated as facts. More than 
documenting the factuality or the authority of the experience, the author of testimony may 
engage in self-authentication—an authenticity that, under the rubric of legal reckoning with 
atrocity, is saturated with both factual privilege and moral authority.  
In this sense, fiction about atrocity posits a potential threat to the stability of atrocity’s 
factuality. Figurative or imaginative representations would seem, in an arena within which 
documentary authority and veracity hold privileged positions, not only lesser in stature and 
authority, but also as a direct strike at the factuality that survivors of atrocity work so hard to 
establish in the first place. The artificially constructed verisimilitude of fiction may, as Daniel 
Schwartz describes, allow for “transmuting facts in the crucible of art,” but it also foregrounds 
the aesthetics and imaginative forms of atrocity as facts unto themselves, perhaps displacing the 
factuality of the content.56 Fictional renderings also suggest that the experience of those who 
underwent the force of the terror as real events may not necessarily have a privileged access to 
representing, describing, or rendering intelligible—morally, aesthetically, historically, or 
discursively—the facts of the very event they witnessed. Fiction may widen the gap between 
factuality and actuality, in that actuality—how an experience may have seemed belongs to the 
domain of the latter, whereas documentary testimony is bound to the former.57 
  In this sense, Mother Night is a thought experiment of sorts: what if all of Eichmann’s 
actions stood as they were, but the motives ascribed to him could be divided from all the rest of 
the facts, the inner self fictionalized, reinvented as art so as to fundamentally change the nature 																																																								
56 Daniel R. Schwarz, Imagining the Holocaust (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 32. 
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of his character? What if Eichmann’s “support,” all of these actions and decisions still had the 
catastrophic impact that they did have, and the only thing altered was his motives, the 
authenticity of his intent? Would it make any difference? Would it absolve him morally? Would 
it have vindicated him the court of law that condemned him in 1961? Would it make his 
character more palatable? Would altering Eichmann’s narrative change his character for us?58 
Despite the novel’s own ambivalence on these questions, Vonnegut seemed definitive in 
his thinking about what moral judgment ought to be conferred upon this fictional creation. 
“Howard W. Campbell, Jr. was an authentically bad man,” said Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. in a 1980 
interview with Charles Reilly. “He drew a pistol target for the S.S. which took the form of a Jew 
with a hook nose, he…I could go on…”59 Authentically is a key term here; authenticity belongs 
to the language not only of validity, credibility and certitude, but it also belongs to a discourse 
bears the trace of its origins in the rhetoric of evidence, law, and legal force.60 In Mother Night, a 
novel composed of the fictionally framed “true” confessions of Howard W. Campbell, Jr., the 
authenticity attributed to the rhetoric of evidence and law stands in stark juxtaposition to the 
aesthetic of art, cast as beguiling artifice.  
While law and testimony may govern and assess content by providing it a form and thus 
identifying a way of verifying it under the terms of authenticity, it is not equipped to negotiate 
the authenticity of something like the novel’s claim that “lies told for the sake of artistic effect,” 
which, according to the novel’s “Editor,” “can be, in a sense, the most beguiling forms of 
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truth.”61 That art may be both “beguiling” and “lies” highlights the position that art may be a 
form of counterfeiting content. Art, it suggests, may provide not simply aesthetic interpretation 
but may also produce seductive deceptions meant to lead us away from truth. The a statement 
folds in on itself, for it not only collapses the distinction between fact and fiction and its 
supposed correlates, truth and lies, but also leaves the status of aesthetic representation as a mode 
of establishing credibility unclear. Is artistic truth credible or is it beguiling? If art is a “beguiling 
truth,” is art a conterfeit claiming a level of authenticity and authority using aesthetic means 
while concealing its artifice, or does art unveil a truth that the facts, on which the art is based, 
themselves conceal? How does art produce claims to authentic factuality, and how may factuality 
take the form of art? In Mother Night, the question is particularly vexed as it appears not only as 
a narrative “opinion,” but also because it appears within one of two frames circumscribing the 
narrative itself. Standing at the outer limit of the text, the “Editor’s Note” is allegedly composed 
by a figure who has been tasked with preparing Campbell’s memoirs for publication. The 
“Editor’s Note” posits itself as a mechanism for revision and hypermediation, a participant in the 
same sphere of reality inhabited by Campbell’s fictional narrative.  
As a governing frame for Campbell’s “true confessions,” the “Editor’s Note” that stands 
at the threshold of the text reiterates an understanding of art as old as Plato’s mistrust: that 
poetry, a metonym for aesthetic representation writ large, is to be feared, for it cannot be held 
accountable to logical reasoning the central modes of investigation that allow us to seek out and 
conceive of truth. That art may be both “beguiling” and “lies,” as the Editor’s Note warns, 
highlights the novel’s sensibility about the authenticity of aesthetic forms. Art, it proposes, may 
be but an imitation of the authentic world, a form that counterfeits the content of that world. Art 
is not simply aesthetic interpretation but rather seductive deceptions meant to lead us away from 																																																								
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truth.62 Aesthetic invention, or the authority of form, edits and governs any given reality, 
mediating and shaping its meaning so that we cannot but see “the real” outside of the 
orchestrations of artistic reality; our reality is governed by the fictions that circulate within our 
spheres of reference and that become reference points or screens for an apparent reality. Fictions, 
essentially, become guiding forms that shape and interpret factual content.  
In fact, Mother Night is a novel that generates fictional facts and factual fictions, one that 
presents beguiling truths, and one that constantly conflates logical and empirical demonstration 
on the one hand, and artistic composition on the other. The world that Mother Night imagines 
and portrays, both that of the Jerusalem court and that of Nazi Germany, equally conflate 
content, the facts, and forms of encoding it so that facts and fictions cannot be distinguished from 
one another. In the novel, the heightened sense of fictionality, or more properly, aesthetic 
production, seems to articulate something about Campbell’s case as incompatible with a 
hermeneutics of factuality. Reading Campbell’s narrative is impossible within this interpretive 
frame; there is something about it that is unintelligible to a factual reading, particularly the type 
of strict factuality that the law might apprehend. Yet while a factual assessment of the narrative 
cannot access this intellibiligity, a reading informed by metafictional practices and assumptions, 
a mode of interpretation sensitive to this kind of conflation between factuality and fictionality, is 
equipped to make sense of such a form. The circumscribed textual world seems, moreover, 																																																								
62 Thus the “Editor” joins a long tradition of literary commentators that authors, from the 18th century Defoe to the 
first postmodernists, use this duality of factual and fictional frames in order to create an effect of fiction’s authentic 
factuality. Defoe’s tradition of nesting the semblance of factuality within a fictional form aimed to blur the 
distinction between the constructedness of fiction, the product of authorial invention, and the “reality” of the world, 
such that the content of fiction seemed endowed with the material properties of the real. The innovation of 
postmodernism to this tradition was to invert its affect; rather than purporting to have the fictional inventions of the 
author seem real, postmodern metafiction casts doubt on the reality of the real itself. What is at stake for Vonnegut 
is not the reality or the unreality of the fictional world, but the essential ways in which the empirical reality of the 
real is governed by fictions and aesthetic invention. Mother Night certainly both invites us to imagine along with it 
and demands that we recognize our inability to get beyond “those pages.” Yet it does not so much expose the 
fabricated nature of its own verisimilar construction (as in classic postmodern metafiction), or to provide its content 
with the sheen of the real (as in the 18th century tradition of Defoe), as much as it shows the way in which aesthetic 
invention acts as an editor to any given content. 
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capable of not just understanding such content but also judging it. More specifically, the textual 
reading can identify not only the transgressions that are against the “factual” code of law, but 
also the transgressions that are against the figure of the legal code, thus providing an ethical 
assessment to a crime that the law cannot decode, and a moral judgment that the legal arena 
cannot pronounce.  
V. Vonnegut’s Eichmann and His Doubles  
In the world of the novel, which opens in the court’s Jerusalem jail, the character stands 
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and self-professed “crimes against himself.”63 
What are these “crimes against himself,” and how do they differ, in both legal and conceptual 
schemes, from the charges Campbell awaits in a “fair trial for [his] war crimes” brought by the 
court for crimes against humanity?64 We know what Campbell’s crimes against humanity are, 
and why he has been brought to testify. The character stands accused of serving as a Nazi 
propagandist, whose rhetoric—fictions about the Jewish threat to German society that 
Campbell’s character popularized—served to incite and legitimate the atrocities committed by 
otherwise ordinary Germans. The evidence? A wealth of testimony against Campbell’s character, 
no testimony in favor of it, and Campbell’s own archive, “recordings of the worst of my 
broadcasts…[so] the most pitiless witness against me will be myself.”65 It seems that Campbell 
too ultimately finds himself an “authentically bad man,” a judgment that affirms Vonnegut’s 
own, and a self-judgment that reproduces the Jerusalem court’s conviction of Eichmann, who 
appears in the novel as Campbell’s double. In fact, Campbell’s self-conviction replays, in 
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inverse, Eichmann’s conviction by the Jerusalem court; Eichmann, insisting on his innocence, is 
found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging by the judgment determined by a court of law. 
Meanwhile, Campbell, who has received evidence that would procure his innocence within the 
arena of the court, hangs himself at the conclusion of narrating his own story, his suicide a poetic 
conclusion to his own memoir, that completes the novel’s form of aesthetic coherence. 
The figure of Eichmann serves as a counterpoint around which Campbell develops a 
sense of his own authenticity; the dissonance between Eichmann and Campbell provides 
Campbell with the essential characteristics of his moral self-constitution. Eichmann, in his 
defense, argued that his role in the Final Solution was “an accident,” that he was but a vessel, the 
selected form and not the content of criminal perpetrator, that another German could have easily 
taken his place, that they all Germans were potentially his doubles, and that as such, he shared a 
collective guilt in which “where all, or almost all, are guilty, nobody is.” Arendt, writing in a 
voice she imagined for the Jerusalem judges, has them address Eichmann with the following: 
“We are concerned here only with what you did, and not with the possible noncriminal nature of 
your inner life and of your motives or with the criminal potentialities of those around you.”66 
Law withdraws its judgment from the “potentiality” of crime to its “actuality,” terms Arendt uses 
to contrast Eichmann’s possible doubles in ordinary Germans, and the “real Eichmann,” only to 
recommit itself to passing a judgment that ultimately issues forth from a determination of 
Eichmann’s inner character, that he “carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of 
mass murder…of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a 
number of other nations…[thus] no member of the human race, can be expected to share the 
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earth with you,” thus concluding that “this is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.”67 
Conversely, Campbell writes that unlike his former colleague, Adolf Eichmann, who he believes 
“cannot distinguish between right and wrong,” he is guilty of not only legal but also a moral 
transgression that belong squarely to him authentically and him alone, one that essentially 
amounts to self-betrayal. For Campbell,  
My case is different. I always know when I tell a lie, am capable of imagining the 
cruel consequences of anybody’s believing my lies, know cruelty is wrong. I 
could no more lie without noticing it than I could unknowingly pass a kidney 
stone.68  
 
When Campbell ends his confessions with a self-conviction and hanging himself, for what he 
insists are “crimes against himself,” he does so the night before his trial is supposed to begin and 
before his case can go to court.69 He will turn what would have been testimony into confessions 
to be stored in the “archive of Nazi villainy;” yet the conviction by which he sentences himself to 
death is not for the Nazi villainy for which he is to stand trial. Rather, the text renders a 
conviction based on Campbell’s own judgment against himself, for crimes committed against 
himself. It is a judgment not only outside the sphere of legal adjudication but also formed outside 
the sphere of testimony and judicial evaluation.  
Why does conviction lie outside of authenticating legal forms? Perhaps because legal 
assessment lies in authenticating evidence and interpreting facts, while Campbell’s guiltiness 
cannot be deduced by empirical analysis, nor by the logical cohesion of his testimony with the 
evidence, but rather in his own manipulation of form and its relationship to content. In this case, 
figuration—the constellation of objective content and imaginative fashioning—governs the 																																																								
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relationship between facts and a conceptual assessment of them, and in so doing, fails to render 
rational judgment. Campbell may have aided the Allies by broadcasting coded information as 
content in the form of Nazi discourse, but in creating a self-fiction, the form, what Campbell 
“pretended” to be, may have overtaken the content, or an inner, inviolate self, the fictional 
production becoming thus authentic content in its own right. 
When the Editor writes that “risk[ing] the opinion that for the sake of artistic effect—in 
the theater, for instance, and in Campbell’s confessions, perhaps—can be, in a higher sense the 
most beguiling forms of truth,” the editor is suggesting that art may provide an alternative to 
empirical truth that may prove more authentic than reality. The note suggests that the 
hermeneutics of art and poetics may be better equipped than law to assess and evaluate 
Campbell’s case.70 But why, then, should that truth, given by art, be thus “beguiling,” deceptive, 
inauthentic? Does fiction tread where empiricism cannot, authenticating an experience that may 
be beyond logical demonstration? Or, does fictionalization, specifically that belonging to verbal 
composition, rather serve as a mode by which the world of words may absolve itself from the all-
too-real impacts and traces it leaves on the real world? Legal morality may be ill-equipped to 
deal with the form of self-content that Campbell possesses, a “brilliant interpretation of a Nazi, 
inside and out” that eclipses, overrides, and ultimately erases the “authentic” self.71 Yet the 
modes of aesthetic production may be equally irrelevant to assessing such character, since 
Campbell’s character provides a model for the precise form of verisimilitude, the illusion of an 
authentic reproduction of reality to which documentary and historical realism employed and 
valued as the predominant mode of representing atrocity. Campbell, an artist, a poet, and a 
playwright by training, and a Nazi propagandist by trade, has set out to write a memoir testifying 																																																								
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to his innocence, prepared to disclose the “true” and authentic story of his time during the war. 
The narrative documentation he provides therein is a testimony that counters all of the public 
evidence against him, specifically Campbell’s own virulent anti-Semitic speeches, writings, and 
public persona. Campbell’s vicious rhetoric, we learn, is responsible for inspiring the German 
nation to commit its genocide against the Jews. Words, specifically words spoken and intended 
to be understood as fictional language, have become all too real, cannot be distinguished from 
the language of fact; the aesthetic of factuality and fictionality, once merged, cannot be 
differentiated, cleaved into separate spheres of logical interpretation.  
VI. Authenticity, Testimony, and Morality 
 That metafiction might serve as a method for investigating this schema, of authenticity, 
authority, and the veracity of testimony about atrocity, might come as no surprise. For Michel 
Foucault, postmodern writing aims “not [at] the exalted emotion s related to the act of 
composition or the insertion of the subject into language. Rather, it is primarily concerned with 
creating an opening where the writing subject endlessly disappears."72 Foucault references 
postmodern literature broadly here, but tellingly, the specific example he enlists as evidence for 
his analysis is Beckett whose writing is a foundational force in the development of postmodern 
metafiction, and whose writing specifically aimed and, as Foucault puts it “slights our customary 
attention to the finished product.”73 The particular case of historical metafiction “blurs any sense 
of genuine distinction or authentic historicity” of facts, as Heise argues, since the narrative 
content of the fictional world is always subject to having its constructedness revealed, its “facts” 
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exposed as fictions. But it also destabilizes the hierarchy of authenticity, in which testimony, as 
the most veracious of forms, is the most authoritative or the most authentic construction. 
This may at the root have to do with the double-voicedness of metafiction, in which the 
“narrator as witness” is always subject to having his or her legitimacy cut down by the frame that 
circumscribes it. Linda Hutcheon notes “[t]he assumption seems to be that authenticity of 
experience and expression are somehow incompatible with double-voicing,” pointing out that 
such “double voicing” frequently shows up in the modalities of irony and humor, both signature 
Vonnegut moves. Vonnegut’s approach in Mother Night embraces both within the metafictional 
frame, multiplying the levels at which authenticity may come under fire, but the layered frames 
of narrative undercut the narrative’s sheen of credibility most severely, for authenticity is the 
discourse of realism. Metafiction’s affect, which is to reveal the constructedness of any narrative 
posing as “real,” dislodges testimony from its claim to mimetic construction of things as they 
were in a past state—which is, if an acknowledged impossibility, the standard to which 
testimony aspires.74   
Mother Night is essentially about the possibilities for finding the appropriate frame, or 
any frame, for evaluating and understanding the authenticity of evidence. The veracity of the 
“facts” of Campbell’s actions are not in portrayed dubiously by the text: the narrative gives an 
unambiguous account of Campbell’s actions, his work as an American spy whose work, with all 
intents and purposes, was aimed to assist the Americans against the Nazis, and the narrative 
gives us no reason to question the validity or reliability of that narrative, as subjective as it may 
be. It does not dispute these actions, asserted as factual, also stood at the center of the Nazi 
project’s cultural success. Rather, the novel puts to question the extent to which any factual 																																																								
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account can on its own speak to, testify to, and compose a singular and cohesive reality. For the 
novel, each frame is little more than a carefully fiction, intended to redirect the interpretation of 
the “facts.” 
Mother Night is prefaced not only by an “Editor’s Note,” but also an “Introduction,” 
penned by a creator who remains unnamed, written in Iowa City and dated 1966. It is a second 
frame to the text that, like the “Editor’s Note,” appears as a speech act grounded in factuality. 
Like Campbell’s confessions, given in lieu of formal testimony, the “Introduction” foregrounds 
its status as a factual speech act, an assertion that undermines the status of Campbell’s story as 
factual. The author of the Introduction begins by writing that Campbell’s story is “the only story 
of mine whose moral I know;” at once, even as we are told that Campbell’s story is his factual 
statement, we are also told that it belongs to the compositions of another author, and that it is 
“story.”75 Campbell’s testimony is framed by spheres of introductions by editors and authorial 
voices whose remarks serve to circumscribe the literary and the fictional content with a 
perspective that exceeds and overlooks it.  
Moreover, if testimony, as a frame, asks us to heed, attend to, and evaluate the extent to 
which the content of language and illocutions corresponds to a past or present state of physical 
existence, an evaluation of that content for the purpose of discerning a “moral” belongs to an 
entirely different logic. We might categorize the first under the rubric of “evidence,” and commit 
its validity to the crucible of verification, while we might classify the second under the rubric of 
narrative logic.76 As the term “moral” implies, this form of narrative logic belongs to an entirely 
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different order, and the validity of its discourse cannot be determined through the normal 
requirements we demand of illocutions, in which words must correlate to the world. The concept 
of the “marvelous moral,” an assertion that precedes Campbell’s testimony, should alert us to the 
tension that the novel builds between facts and figures: morals are not derived from factual 
information but from the logic superimposed over them by argumentative or narrative frames. 
Here, the moral presents itself at the outermost edge of that frame; it is the first sentence, it 
circumscribes the testimony held within it. Why must this “moral” exist at the boundary of the 
testimony, and not within it? Because, I would argue, the novel is itself about the contact points, 
tensions, and struggles for authority between speaking truth and writing fiction.77 Real events, 
and “real” evidence, neither possess, nor do they offer themselves as “morals,” a term which 
belong to the language of tropology rather than factuality. Rather, morality belongs to a distinctly 
narrative logic, and in particular fictional discourse that serves the purpose of imposing moral 
judgment.78 Testimony, a form of factuality cannot contain morals, it requires an editor—which 
law calls a judge—to treat, interpret, and assign ethical value to it.79  
																																																								
77 Habermas usefully distinguishes between “Expressions which refer to the truth value of utterances (not of 
statements) according to the prototype of 'to claim' and 'to dispute' form the dimension of being and appearance 
(assure, confirm, deny, certify, testify, doubt, question…imply an intended consensus on that which really is, as 
distinct from that which subjectively only appears to be (the propositional content),” and morals, “what is and what 
ought to be. Expressions which refer to the normative status of rules according to the prototype of 'to prescribe' and 
'to follow' form the dimension of the 'ought' (order, obey, allow, demand, refuse, resist, recommend, advise, warn, 
oblige, violate, call to account, etc.)…This presupposes the differentiation between valid rules, which are 
intentionally followed, and regularities of observable events, which can be stated empirically. See Jürgen Habermas, 
"Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," Inquiry 13.1-4 (1970): 371. 
 
78 In fact, Hayden White argues that it may be impossible to narrativize without moralizing. For White, this becomes 
In fact, Hayden White argues that it may be impossible to narrativize without moralizing. For White, this becomes 
the central distinction between the logic of factuality, things as they can exist objectively, and the logic of actuality, 
things as they seem to exist. See Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” 
Critical Inquiry 7.1, (Autumn, 1980): 5-27. 
 
79  Alan Dershowitz asks: “Why, after all, would the editor of the narrative—who is called a judge in our legal 
system—allow the jury to hear evidence of alleged abuse in the first chapter unless it resulted in murder by the third 
chapter?” Dershowitz further argues that “As a matter of historical reality, there has been precious little justice in the 
history of the world. Most Nazis, even hands-on perpetrators of genocide, lived good lives after the war; many 
Holocaust survivors did not. There is absolutely no empirical correlation between righteousness and reward or 
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That moral, according to the author of the introduction, reads as follows: “We are what 
we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.”80 The author is very 
careful to mark himself distinctly as not pretending; the rest of the introduction proceeds to 
evidence the author’s “personal experience with Nazi monkey business,” a strategy of 
documentary authority that lays out a protocol in which “story,” “pretending,” fiction” and the 
morals that they distill lie perpendicular to “personal experience,” described as a series of real 
events—notably the firebombing of Dresden, which the author details without imposing 
judgment; the narration ends with the offering that “[i]f I’d been born in Germany, I suppose I 
would have been a Nazi, bopping Jews and gypsies and Poles” (a logic that curiously parallel’s 
Eichmann’s own defense).81 
In fact, the documentary authority asserted by the author the Introduction, which appears 
as a “real” counterpoint to the fiction it prefaces, may be an inverse of the very documentary 
authority that diarists and memoirists use to confer the documentary authority onto their writing. 
This inversion produces the effect of “phenomenological beguilement…ensnar[ing] [the reader] 
in the all-encompassing fiction of the discourse itself, mistaking the historical force of this 
discourse for the historical facts it purports to document,” as Young writes.82 When these 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
unrighteousness and punishment. Indeed, it is precisely because of that lack of correlation—the factual untruth of 
the narrative of justice—that human beings have been driven to create another narrative, one that cannot be proved 
or disproved. That is, of course, the narrative of Heaven and Hell, of punishment and reward in the world to come. 
By creating this narrative of faith, we can insist that virtue is rewarded and vice punished, if not here on earth than 
somewhere else, where we can never apply the tests of empirical truth or falsity. Because the narrative of justice 
cannot be observed here on earth, we create an unobservable world where we can simply declare that the narrative 
of justice will come true.” See Alan Derschowitz, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative” in Peter Brooks and Paul D. 
Gewirtz, 101-103. 
 
80 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night, v. 
 
81 The section concludes with the infamous “So it goes,” a signature Vonnegut line that appears throughout 
Slaughterhouse Five, Vonnegut’s metafictional portrait of the firebombing of Dresden, a refrain that appears in 
Vonnegut’s work to describe an event while withholding moral judgment about it. 
 
82 James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust, 62. 
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commentators make their status as “real” unclear, they make the distinction between factuality 
and fictionality itself unclear. They provide the illusion that the world of fiction, composed of 
words whose authenticity is subject to narrative verification, and the material world, in which 
words authenticate and correspond to objects, are interchangeable, and that their modes of 
verification are similar.83 Words, in other words, seem as real as the empirical facts they claim to 
point toward; in a space where it is unclear whether words refer to real things or to made up, 
imaginary, or false, things, material things themselves—and the facts that purport to describe 
them—can in turn, appear to be fictional.  
VII. Counterfeit Selves 
Campbell is essentially a man whose words seem simultaneously bound to both “pretend” 
and “real” referents. Like Hamburger’s figure of Eichmann, he is a man of words; a man of 
propaganda, of plots and not substance, who like Eichmann not only used words as weapons, but 
also “capable of imaging the cruel consequences of anybody’s believing [his] lies, and was able 
to create a reality out of his lies.”84 Campbell is also far too aware of the “real” impact of his 
words, taken literally despite his articulation of them as code, signifiers referring to something 
other than their sign. Campbell may have intended his words as performance, he writes that he 
“had hoped, as a broadcaster, to be merely ludicrous.”85 But the arena in which acts of atrocity 
occur and are interpreted may be one that cannot distinguish between the authenticity of fact and 
and fiction’s own claim to authenticity. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
 
83 As metafiction shows, this strategy, which may serve to provide a diary or memoir its documentary force may 
equally be used to endow fictional content with factual form, using the implied correspondence of words with 
objects to create an objective reality out of words. 
 
84 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night, 166. 
 
85 Ibid, 184. 
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If the character and his testimony are inauthentic, that lack of authenticity, then, does not 
lie in the evidence against his him, but rather in a problem of coherence in the relationship 
between evidence and the narrative, between data and the attempt to fashion it into a familiar 
form of conceptual cohesion. When Howard W. Campbell Jr. writes the words “I think that 
tonight is the night I will hang Howard W. Campbell, Jr. for crimes against himself,” thus ending 
his confessions before he can be put to trial, he does so under the belief that he is about to be “a 
free man again, to wander where [he] please[s]” the prospect he finds “nauseating.”86  
The term that the character uses to describe the prospect of a court finding him innocent 
is worth noting; Campbell writes that the prospect is “nauseating,” an affect not just of unease 
but rather one that points acutely to a sense of self-sickness, one that represents a particular kind 
of inner turbulence that involves a sense of the self revolting against its own internal structure, 
the feeling of inner instability, the body revolting against its own form. Campbell may have been 
just pretending to be a Nazi, but that pretending results in a fundamental instability within the 
self. Masking an inner self in an outward form, Campbell fashions an inauthentic outer form in a 
world that cannot distinguish between surface meaning and depth, authenticity and counterfeit, a 
world in which the boundaries between fact and fiction, form and content, are transgressed, their 
substance unevenly and indistinguishably recombined in patchwork. Mother Night is that 
patchwork, a novel that generates fictional facts and factual fictions, one that presents beguiling 
truths, and one that constantly conflates logical and empirical demonstration on the one hand, 
and artistic composition on the other. The world that Mother Night imagines and portrays, both 
that of the Jerusalem court and that of Nazi Germany, equally conflate content, the facts, and 
forms of encoding it so that facts and fictions cannot be distinguished from one another. The 																																																								
86 Ibid, 267. 
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institution of the court, as a legal arbiter, is not equipped to negotiate the authenticity of 
something like the novel’s claim that “lies told for the sake of artistic effect,” which, according 
to the novel’s “Editor,” “can be, in a sense, the most beguiling forms of truth.”87 Something 
about Campbell’s case is unintelligible to the law, transgresses a moral code that the law can 
neither decode nor pronounce.  
Campbell’s suicide in the Jerusalem jail, as he awaits trial for his crimes, ends the novel, 
arriving not only at the end of his story, but also at the limits of self-understanding and evidential 
judgment, imposing a type of moral justice and suggesting a type of adjudicative narrative logic 
that evades the analytic frame provided by a court of law. There is a form of condemnation 
immanent within this private confession and subjective narrative that could not be made 
intelligible in the form of public testimony and objective evidence. The language in the assertion 
that “I think that tonight is the night I will hang Howard W. Campbell, Jr. for crimes against 
himself” may pinpoint this type of unintelligibility; four iterations of Campbell’s self-identity 
collide, and compete as the narrative’s authentic self: the “I” that thinks, the “I” that acts as 
executioner, the Howard W. Campbell Jr. that hangs as perpetrator, and the final “himself” who 
stands as victim.  
This line of self-conviction is one of three such curiously worded statements of self-
identity that appear as plot points in the novel, in which Campbell speaks of himself as a third 
party, split off from the narrative authority. The first appears in the memoir’s introduction, in 
which Campbell, writing that introduction, “rededicate[s] [the book] to Howard W. Campbell, 
Jr., a man who served evil too openly and good too secretly, the crime of his times.”88 The 
																																																								
87 Ibid, x. 
 
88 Ibid, xiii. 
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second time occurs close to the middle, in which Campbell explains that sends out 
correspondence by mail, he tells us “simply to demonstrate to myself that there really was such a 
person as me.”89 The conviction to suicide, phrased as “I think that tonight is the night I will 
hang Howard W. Campbell, Jr. for crimes against himself” is the culmination of an ongoing 
attempt to locate an authentic self, and to synchronize form and content, to converge the 
performed self with the “authentic” self.90 It is a task that eludes the forms of assessment enabled 
by law, a task that eluded Arendt’s ability to interpret Eichmann’s testimony. But the task may 
also elude the capacities of narrative plot. There are, perhaps, too many iterations of Howard W. 
Campbell Jr. for one authentic story or one authentic self, a problem toward which that the 
character’s statement gestures in the evocative splitting off of the “I” that writes the utterance, 
the “I” that will commit the killing, and the victim, Howard W. Campbell Jr., curiously estranged 
from both. The word that Campbell cannot write is “myself;” in the case of Howard W. 
Campbell Jr. his “true” selfhood, the objective self composed of facts, is torn from its conceptual 
anchor and more specifically, to an internal narrative logic. Whereas legal judgment would admit 
the first, it would acquit him of the latter, a judgment that would leave Howard W. Campbell, Jr., 
as he writes “a free man.”  Myself is the term of mirroring, inversion, self-reflection. It is, like 
Ann Sexton’s speaker, 
																																																								
89 Ibid, 58. 
 
90 Campbell’s poetry, included in the memoir as the contents of Campbell’s “found” archive, underscore this point. 
They are composed in German and transcribed by the “Editor” into English. (Ibid, 124). One reads: 
 
  Here lies Howard Campbell’s essence 
  Freed from his body’s noisome nuisance. 
  His body, empty, prowls the earth, 
  Earning what a body’s worth. 
  If his body and his essence remain apart,    
  Burn his body, but spare this, his heart.  
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a sort of human statement,  
lugging myself as if  
I were a sawed-off body  
in the trunk, the steamer trunk.  
This became perjury of the soul.91  
 
Myself is the point of view at which self becomes knowable as a form, as an narrating subject as 
a form split off from its object of narrative content, the “I.” 
In Vonnegut’s ending, we find an almost inverted mirror to Arendt’s Eichmann portrait. 
Howard W. Campbell Jr. may not be able to write the word “myself,” but he does find that 
mirror, an inverted sense of himself as a form that appears, cryptically in the form of Eichmann, 
an uncanny double. As Campbell tells it, 
 We didn't recognize each other, and the guards had to introduce us.  
Eichmann was writing the story of his life, just as I am now writing the story of 
my life. That chinless old plucked buzzard, with six million murders to explain 
away, gave me a saintly smile. He was sweetly interested in his work, in me, in 
the guards in the prison, in everybody. He beamed at me, and he said,  
“I’m not mad at anybody…Life is divided up into phases,” he said. “each 
one is very different from the others, and you have to be able to recognize what is 
expected of you in  each phase. That’s the secret to successful living…I’m a 
writer now.” he said. “I never thought I’d be a writer.” 
 “May I ask you a personal question?” I said. 
     
“Certainly,” he said benignly. “That’s the phase I’m in now. This is the 
time for thinking and answering. Ask whatever you’d like.”  
“Do you feel that you’re guilty of murdering six million Jews?”  
I said.  
 “Absolutely not,” said the architect of Auschwitz, the introducer of 
convertor belts into crematoria, the greatest customer in the world for the gas 
called Cycklon-B.92 
 
On the same page: 
 
       The more I think about Eichmann and me, the more I think that he should 
be sent to the hospital, and that I am the sort of person for whom punishments by 
fair, just men were devised. 																																																								
91 Ann Sexton, “Live.” 
 
92 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night, 166.  
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   As a friend of the court that will try Eichmann, I offer my opinion  
that Eichmann cannot distinguish between right and wrong—that not only right 
and wrong, but truth and falsehood, hope and despair, beauty and ugliness, 
kindness and cruelty, comedy and tragedy, are all processed by Eichmann’s mind 
indiscriminately, like birdshot through a bugle. 
   My case is different. I always know when I tell a lie, am capable of  
 imagining the cruel consequences of anybody’s believing my lies, know   
 cruelty is wrong. I could no more lie without noticing it than I could  
 unknowingly pass a kidney stone.93 
 
Are Campbell and Eichmann mirror images of one another, Campbell a fictional form of 
Eichmann? Is Eichmann the reflexive form of the word “myself” that Campbell cannot speak, the 
figure that Arendt cannot locate within the ethical or legal system? Eichmann, encountered in 
prison while preparing his testimony and writing his life story, may present Campbell—and the 
novel—with an uncanny representation of its own form. Eichmann becomes a figure for 
unspeakability, exists a sphere where (As Hamburger’s poem suggests) “words cannot reach 
him” or, (as in Sexton’s poem) words fictionalize the reality they describe, and the atrocity he 
represents is one in which language is said to strip that reality of its authenticity. The legacy of 
Eichmann that Arendt left demonstrates this tear in representation, in which words cannot reach 
their subject, in which words counterfeit reality, in which form cannot encompass its content, in 
which authenticity is to be found in fiction. If this represents one form in which the authenticity 
of language collapses, Campbell may give us its inverse—atrocity represented not as a reality 
that words cannot reach, but that words have themselves created, words spoken as counterfeit 
become all too authentic.   
Years after the conclusion of the trial, Arendt came back to her thesis. In a lecture titled 
“Truth and Politics,” delivered to a group of graduate students at the University of Chicago in 
1963, Arendt addressed the group with the following admission. “Since this is an academic 
gathering,” she began “ I feel obliged to tell you on which points I changed my mind.”  																																																								
93 Ibid. 
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I was, I think, the first person who spoke of "organized guilt"--the complicity no 
one who had been living there could escape. I did not foresee that so many real 
criminals would go unpunished; I also rather underestimated the actual number of 
those directly implicated...The Eichmann trial as well as other literature now 
coming out in Germany…makes me think that I overestimated the impact of 
ideology not upon the system--which was of an overwhelming logicality, 
everything followed from the ideology if you took it seriously--but upon the 
individual. And with the individual we dealt here.  
 
She continued,  
 
On the banality of evil: I spoke against radical evil (Kant): This has been 
misunderstood for good reasons: It goes against our whole tradition where Lucifer 
is a fallen archangel...against our belief of the demonic nature of evil...What did I 
mean by it? NOT that evil is commonplace: Commonplace is what frequently 
happens, something can be banal even if it does not happen frequently. To be 
sure, the way Eichmann spoke was perhaps also commonplace (though I doubt it), 
but it was banal in the sense of a hair-raising superficiality. I meant: Evil is not 
only not radical, has no roots, it is a surface phenomenon, and for this reason it is 
so infectious. It can spread over the whole world like a fungus and lay it waste 
precisely because it is not rooted anywhere. This makes it so difficult to think 
about: I called it thought and speech defying, because thought tries to reach the 
roots to go into some depth.94  
 
Vonnegut’s world of fictions, of surfaces and artifice, is a world of words that proclaims 
everything as surface. That fiction, built of receding realities, where words defer facts rather than 
name them, may get to the heart of that evil than the facts themselves ever may.
																																																								
94 Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” Essays and Lectures, Eichmann, Adolf, Lectures, Various Venues, 1962-
1964. The Hannah Arendt Archive, Library of Congress. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Fictions of Evidence: Reconciling Truth in Antjie Krog’s  
Country of My Skull 
 
 
This chapter investigates the dialectical relationship between facts and fictions during the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings that took place between 1994-
1996. I focus my inquiry on Antjie Krog’s canonical Country of My Skull—a genre-bending 
work that is part journalistic report, part poetry, part travelogue, part memoir, and part fiction. In 
my last chapter, we saw Mother Night seek a form for expressing the authenticity of atrocity, 
identifying how testimony, in the case of atrocity, vexes concern about the authenticity of legal 
and literary representation, and how this concern about authenticity set a tone for the 
representation of truth in the context 20th and 21st century atrocity. We also saw how attempts to 
evidence the reality of atrocity, in both Vonnegut’s fictional novel and in Arendt’s factual 
account, strained to encompass factuality and figurative modes when evaluating and assessing 
evidence in the context of atrocity.  
In legal discourse, establishing the reality of mass atrocity becomes a problem reflected 
in both literary and legal representations, for although material evidence can establish the facts of 
atrocity, the reality of atrocity exceeds that representation. The TRC process, as a unique and 
perhaps unprecedented project of building not only a new nation but also a new model of a 
nation under international scrutiny, was also about establishing the reality of the South African 
apartheid past, creating a unified truth about that past for the nation for the purpose of 
reconciliation. Paradoxically, in the context of Antjie Krog’s narrative about the TRC process, 
Country of My Skull, establishing truth also means allowing for with the impossibility of 
reconciliation—a basic feature of traditional narrative form—to coexist with truth. In writing 
	 92 
about the atrocity of apartheid and the TRC testimony that sought to evidence and document this 
terrible historical reality, Krog will, like Vonnegut and Arendt, blur the median strip between 
fact and fiction. While Vonnegut’s fictional novel seeks to ground factuality by anchoring its 
fictional content in terms of factual forms, and while Arendt will seek to ground a factual 
interpretation in an arena of dramatic spectacle, Krog, working in terms of a purportedly 
journalistic medium, will self consciously mark her factual reporting as “factions,” not quite fact, 
not quite fiction, a mark that signifies the impossibility of reconciliation in both national and 
narrative terms, the impossibility of knowing both the scope and the reality of the apartheid 
government, and the impossibility of recovering “the truth” from victims who cannot testify. In 
this chapter, we will see testimony swerve between representing private truths, and producing 
national fictions in the development of the new, and newly reconciled, South African state in the 
wake of apartheid.  
Tracking the TRC process as it hears the kaleidoscopic array of testimony, Krog insists 
on documenting the “reality” of the TRC process in entirety, as the TRC process itself seeks to 
document the “reality” of apartheid. In the TRC’s endeavor it sought to “paint the most complete 
picture of the abuses that occurred between March 1, 1960, and May 10, 1994.”1 “Full truth” 
here serves as a means by which the “totality” can be reconstructed and wholeness can be 
restored from fragments. As a formal attribute, wholeness implies closure, totality, and narrative 
cohesion. As a characteristic of content, completion implies a full range of evidence, the analytic 
ideal, held by both legal and historical studies, for assessing evidence and administering justice. 
Yet Krog continuously reaches outside of the documentary code and the legal code of 
documentary authority in order to speak to and represent the experience. In this way, the text 																																																								
1 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New 
York: Random House LLC, 2007), xii. 
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recombines the authority of her memories, along with the authority implied by the form of 
testimony, with strands of poetry, fiction, and self-reflexive aesthetic stylization, all of which 
assert their own authoritative possession of evidence. As a reporter tasked with documenting the 
event for international broadcast, Krog hovers between the impulse to craft “story,” and the 
implicit resistance of “fact” to such selection and arrangement. 
Factual testimony, as it is therein given in the sphere of the court, is spliced with, and 
embedded in Krog’s own memories, reflections, anxieties, and self-reflexive artistic stylizations. 
In the TRC process, “testimony” constituted an attempt to document the world of apartheid 
through terms that would be as “true” as possible. As transcriptions of this testimony appear in 
Krog’s text, they are interpreted in terms of their service to “the country,” or the national 
collective. The truth of these testimonies lies in the capacity for them to be wrangled, perhaps 
reconciled, into nationally generative cohesion. Yet in Country of My Skull, this sense of 
testimony, as it is in service of national cohesion, cohabitates with the conscious stylizations of 
her “skull,” which may seek narrative or aesthetic cohesion that cannot be reconciled with the 
aims of cohesion demanded by “the country.” Both “country” and “skull,” seek reconciliation of 
sorts; yet national reconciliation may be at odds with the requirements of processing within the 
individual consciousness of “the skull,” which may rely on a form of proof given by narrative 
reconciliation.  
I look at Country of My Skull as a text concerned with the place that evidence serves in 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s missive. I argue that such evidence is perhaps 
irreconcilably split, fragmented between its need to serve and substantiate a truth for the 
“country,” or the whole, and a truth for the “skull,” the individual, a fragment of the whole. 
Drawing a parallel between the idea of the TRC as a negotiation between its role on the global 
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stage and its obligation to a specifically national context, and the idea of Krog’s text as a 
negotiation between its role as an attempt to furnish proof about “the world” and its obligation to 
a specifically textual cohesion, I look at evidence itself as split between serving the empirical 
ends of national legal judgment, and literary ends.  
In my approach, I examine one particular piece of testimony from Country of My Skull to 
illustrate how legal truth in the TRC hearings may be governed by the literary technologies of 
fiction and figuration. The murders of Richard and Irene Motasi, and the fragment of testimony 
about those murders that Krog reprints in her text, represent a instance in the history of South 
African apartheid and its post-apartheid process of reckoning that both constellates and uniquely 
reproduces fundamental questions of evidence in the case of atrocity, and in the TRC’s attempt 
to substantiate the reality of apartheid as an atrocity. In Krog’s epic text, the Motasi murders take 
up less than fifteen pages of her book, which spans the two years of her reportage and over four 
hundred pages of Amnesty Hearing testimony.2 The Motasi assassinations, perpetrated by the 
South African Police Force in 1987, were not unusual in an era of apartheid killings. Yet, 
seemingly without explanation, the testimony of the killers punctures Antjie Krog’s text, and 
causes it to peculiarly pivot from factual reportage into fictional speculation.  
Herein, I trace the way in which the narrative of the Motasi case emerged as a literary 
fiction far before it became a legal fact. I will argue that the specific facts of the Motasi murders, 
that this particular historical reality, is itself located at the intersection of fictionality and 
factuality. I show how this radically unique case not only echoes and represents concerns about 
the relationship between fact and fiction in Krog’s text, but also how this case made factuality 
and fictionality central to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself. The 
facts of this murder revealed in the 1996 Amnesty Hearing testimony—and, as I will show, the 																																																								
2 Ibid, 113-118. 
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fictions about those deaths that spiraled out into the national imaginary before the hearings, 
between Motasi’s death in 1987 and the TRC proceedings that began in 1996—reveal a complex 
web of interrelationships between not only fiction and fact, but also literature and testimony, in 
which the formation of aesthetic invention and the collection and production of empirical 
evidence become inseparably intertwined. And the testimony in which those facts appear, I 
show, are governed by—indeed entirely made possible through—literary fictions and a growing 
understanding internationally of atrocity as interconnected through fictional representations in 
global circulation. Krog’s text gives way to fictional speculation at the point of the Motasi case 
because it cannot but know the facts of the testimony but for the way they have been filtered 
through the fictions that precede it. 
Using archival evidence from the TRC archives, from the files documenting the 
Vlakplaas secret police assassinations—including facts of the Motasi murders—and interviews 
with key South African legal and literary figures, I reconstruct the path that the facts of these 
murders take as they become evidence used in the TRC hearings. I show how in the years before 
the TRC testimony of the Motasi killings came to light, the facts of the murder undergo critical 
transformations into fictional forms, including John Miles’s 1991 Afrikaans novel Kroniek Uit 
Die Doofpot, which was followed by television broadcast, and subsequent film adaptations that 
represented the murders in fictionalized and aesthetic terms. I argue that by the time that the 
1996 Amnesty Hearings finally heard the evidence on this case of extrajudicial killings, the 
testimony provided for the case by witnesses and supporting evidence could not be understood as 
facts apart from antecedent fictions that had circulated about it in the South African public eye. 
Enlisting archival evidence into the murders and the fictions generated about them, this chapter 
reconstructs a moment in the TRC hearings in which “truth” becomes a property of fiction—and 
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in which fiction becomes the central stimulant for commissioning the truth.  
Moreover, I identify the Motasi murders as a fundamental event that not only reflected, 
but indeed produced a historical breakthrough in the legislation governing the manners and 
possibilities for establishing evidence in the TRC proceedings. Ultimately, as my research 
reveals, the fallout of the Motasi murders case resulted in the landmark establishment of the 
Goldstone Commission, the 1991 act that mandated investigation of, and ultimately produced 
evidence for, acts of public violence implicating the South African police. The evidence gathered 
in this mandate, I show, was what ultimately forced criminal perpetrators to agree to testify 
under the conditions of amnesty; pressured by the evidence in government possession through 
this act, perpetrators of South African apartheid violence were caught between admitting guilt in 
an amnesty bargain, or subjection to criminal proceedings. Using archival evidence and 
interviews with key figures in the pre-TRC movement for human rights and central actors in the 
TRC amnesty hearings, I place the Motasi murders, and the literary fictions generated about 
them, as the pivotal events that initiated the protocols for collecting and establishing evidence for 
the violent and criminal human rights violations of the apartheid government, without which the 
TRC amnesty procedure, and its afterlife as a global model for post-atrocity justice--would have 
been impossible. Tracing the way in which the facts of the Motasi case were imagined—
fictionalized and stylized—in the public eye far before it could have been encountered as legal 
evidence, the Motasi murder case aggregates the fundamental questions about the relationship 
between legal and literary forms of proof that, I argue, lie at the center of the TRC. At the core of 
this case, evidence emerges as a constellation of facts, fictions, and figures, a configuration in 
which imaginative fictions and stylized figures, invented forms based on the empirical facts of 
	 97 
the murder, feed and inform the TRC’s attempt to render legal judgment, and to establish the 
truth.  
Finally, this chapter examines this phenomenon in the context of the new South Africa 
emerging out of atrocity, self-conscious of the way in which the TRC process of birthing a new 
nation would be watched, monitored, and scrutinized on the world stage, as a potential new form 
of nation building and the restoration of human rights in the wake of governmentally sanctioned 
atrocity. In this chapter, I establish the central impact that this case, and the fictional renderings 
of it, had on not only the interpretation but in the very production of evidence in the TRC 
proceedings, and I moreover trace the consequences of that impact as the South African truth 
commission model becomes a global form, informing subsequent attempts to barter post-atrocity 
justice across an international terrain.   
Who was Richard Motasi, what led to his death, and why does this testimony become a 
particularly significant point of rupture in Krog’s text? In answering these questions, this essay 
chronicles a turning point in the conditions of evidence, truth, and reconciliation in Krog’s text—
and perhaps in the South African TRC amnesty hearings itself. The testimony provided by the 
assassins hired to murder Richard Motasi was the first access the country and the court had to the 
facts of the murder, but the narrative of the Motasi murder has a much longer and complicated 
history in the national context—a history that was largely the product of literary invention, and 
more specifically, the result of literary interpretations in circulation, first within the South 
African national public, and later across an international terrain.  
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I. The Matter of Murder3 
On the night of 30 November, 1987, four members of the South African Police Force 
arrived at the home of Richard and Irene Motasi in Soweto.4 The four men, a group of assassins 
on orders from the South African apartheid government, entered the house, cloaked in dark 
clothing and wearing rolled up balaclavas that showed their faces. Richard Motasi was out, and 
Irene answered the door. The men held Irene Motasi captive in her bedroom while they waited 
for Richard Motasi to return.5 Upon Richard Motasi’s return, they surprised him at his front door, 
attacked him, dragged him inside, strangled him, and then, smothering his face with a pillow to 
silence the shots, and fatally shot him with an AK-47 assault rifle.6 One of the assassins then 
returned to the bedroom to brutally murder Irene, ordering her into the bed, covering her in her 
																																																								
3 I would like to acknowledge that this chapter bears the contributions of many. Thank you to the Bluma-Appel 
Travel Research Award and the Grace M. Hunt Research Fellowship Foundations, which generously supplied funds 
for me to go to South Africa and conduct this research. Thank you to the Skirball Museum Fellowship Foundation; 
the Berger Endowed Fellowship Foundation; and the UCLA Graduate Fellowship Division for granting me funds 
and time to pursue this research. A special thanks goes to the South African Historical Archives, the South African 
Broadcasting Commission, and the South African National Archives for their generous and eager support of my 
work, and to the many in these organizations who responded to my many inquiries and generously researched and 
collected material on my behalf. Most significantly, thank you to Brian Currin, Hans Pienaar, and the many others 
who were willing to meet and speak with me about the facts of the case and the fictions generated about them, who 
contributed their time, their knowledge, and their dedication to this project, and who remain committed to fighting 
injustice anywhere and everywhere with their words, and who have dedicated their time to keeping alive the 
memories of Richard and Irene Motasi. 
 
4 The surname “Motasi” is spelled differently across a number of different documents. At various times, it appears 
as “Motasi,”  “Mutasi,” “Motase,” and “Mutase.” Antjie Krog’s spelling is “Mutase.” The testimonial transcripts 
provided by the T”RC and the majority of archival documents, newspaper articles, and subsequent scholarship 
largely uses the “Motasi” spelling. Tshidiso Motasi, the young son of Richard and Irene, spells his name “Motasi,” 
as does Brian Currin, who represented Richard Motasi up until his death. I am using their spelling as my reference 
point, and will, for that reason, use the “Motasi” spelling herein. One might make a case for the way in which the 
mutability of the name—its flexibility to language and its easy slide into the terms of silence itself, namely 
muteness—become a suggestively, even as they correspond to “real” facts, and “real” people. 
5 “Testimony of Jacques Hechter” Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, Pretoria/Gauteng. (29/10/96) South 
African Broadcasting Commission Archives. 
 
6 “Testimony of Paul Van Vuuren” Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, Pretoria/Gauteng. (29/10/96) South 
African Broadcasting Commmission Archives. 
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bed sheets, and then executing her. They left the Motasi’s young child, Tshidiso, alone with the 
corpses, crying, to be discovered the morning after by neighbors.7 
On the face of it, the case, although grotesque, does not seem to be unusually so; a 
common act of violence an era full of uncommonly calculated government sponsored atrocity. 
When, in 1996, the testimony by the killers was broadcast on live television and radio reports by 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the violent description of the murders 
was perversely indistinct from the thousands of atrocities committed under—indeed often 
orchestrated by—the apartheid regime. Taken within those hearings, the case is but one small 
episode in a long narrative in the epic history of apartheid atrocity.  
Yet as I have already suggested, something about this case breaks the narrative flow of 
Antjie Krog’s iconic Country of My Skull, in her chronicle of her experience as a journalist 
covering the Amnesty Hearings for the South African Broadcasting Commission. While the 
Motasi murders take up less than fifteen pages of her book, which spans the two years of her 
reportage and over four hundred pages of Amnesty Hearing testimony, the impact of the case on 
the narrative is profound: as Krog begins to recount the testimony detailing the Motasi murders, 
her narrative sharply veers from the facts of the murder, and instead begins to imagine it in terms 
of fictions.  
In Country of My Skull, when Krog returns from the hearings, in which the killers have 
delivered their testimony on the murders in front of the court, she describes opening the file on 
the Motasi case to ask whether “the narratives about the Motasi killings are not true, but simply 
spectacles for an occasion.”8 As she delves into the archive of “spectacle,” Krog, absorbed in the 
																																																								
7 Staff Writer, “Husband and Wife Murdered in Soweto,” Daily Sowetan Report, 1 December 1987. 
 
8 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 103. 
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voices recorded on the taped TRC testimony of the killers, finds herself suddenly interrupted by 
another voice, a fictional double who appears to her as a “disparaging voice inside…[her] 
head.”9 The fictional intrusion, a second voice inside Krog’s skull, disrupts Krog’s inner 
monologue to chastise her for imagining the facts of the Motasi killing in terms that are not 
factual bur rather distinctly aesthetic. The fictional adversary, who is and is not Krog, ironically 
accuses her of shaping the murders into fictional terms, attempting to give these deaths a 
metaphorical meaning, transforming the facts into figures, the material of fictional imagining, 
and conceptual abstractions. This imagined interlocutor, a sort of conscientious guardian of facts 
that exists in tandem with Krog’s aesthetic consciousness, stakes out the Motasi murder 
testimony as the stage for a debate about the ethics of aesthetic invention—and perhaps the 
ethics of literary study itself—in the case of atrocity. “What’s the point of all this ‘textual 
reading?” the textual voice protests. It continues: 
You’re just neutralizing the story of the death of Richard and Irene Motasi. 
You’re wrenching the heart out of the horror. You can live comfortably with the 
details once they’ve acquired no more than academic relevance…Take this thing 
about the pillows, then. ‘Here’s the motif, class.’ It’s a literary trick. 
 
Krog argues back:  
 
Doesn’t it bring something important to the surface? The image of the Motasis, 
butchered under soft pillows and fluffy blankets, says so much about the brutality 
of the crime. And at the same time, it explodes a whole series of clichés—like the 
white fear of being killed in your bed, or the idea of living with your head in the 
clouds—under a sweetly scented pillow.10  
  
The point of the fictional disparaging voice is to ask about and call attention to the legitimacy of 
fictionalization, of representing and interpreting atrocity in aesthetic terms. The voice may be in 
Krog’s skull, but it represents a national—indeed international—concern about ethics of 
																																																								
9 Ibid, 112.  
 
10 Ibid. 
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representing the pain and the very real suffering of others through figural abstractions and 
clichéd figures of aggregate and obvious symbolic significance, so overt and looming as 
metaphors as to perhaps obscure the shock of the very real murders of Richard and Irene Motasi. 
The voice interrupts the production of narrative and the representation of these murders, rendered 
in literary terms, to evoke a concern at the epicenter of contemporary debates about imagining 
representing the reality of atrocity. As Krog argues in response to her fictional double, the 
imagined interlocutor—whose articulations are the province and possibility of her own aesthetic 
invention—she defends her representational choice. She proposes that understanding the murders 
in their figurative significance, and exporting the details from the individual crime, enables her to 
get at larger truths: the national meaning, and perhaps the global import, of the brutal South 
African past.  
And yet, that fictional voice is allowed to argue its case against fictionalization even as 
Krog defends her right to figuration and fictionalization. Krog injects a voice of dissent to this 
interpretive mode to counter her own with a caution against the ambitions of fiction, the 
tendency of fictionalization to override the radical horror of facts with theories about them that 
are of specifically “academic relevance” at best, fetishistic and untrue to the experience of the 
victims at worst, readings that overwrite the experiences of the victims and obscures point of 
view, replacing them with with aesthetic inventions.  
The moment puts into exceptionally sharp focus a central instability of the text itself, the 
TRC process itself, and the representational problems of atrocity writ large. Tasked with 
documenting the event for international broadcast, Krog hovers between the mandate to 
document and to transmit a strictly factual report, and the impulse to create, to craft “story.” That 
negotiation, between the demands of truth and the demands of fiction, has become a central 
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intrigue for scholarship; both for criticism on Krog’s book, and for a broad array of political 
theory, legal inquiry, and humanistic investigation on the TRC.11 And as we may discover, the 
TRC proceedings may reflect the same tendency, negotiating between an attempt to “make the 
past thinkable…the world [sic] habitable,” and accumulating facts that may ultimately lead to 
irresolution rather than reconciliation.12 But what is it about the very specific facts of the Motasi 
murders, the very localized reality of Richard and Irene Motasi’s deaths, which provokes this 
debate in the first place?13 If the concern voiced by this fictional interlocutor is a concern about 
maintaining the factual reality of the individual murders, what is it about this case that compels 
Krog to turn from factual evidence into an interpretation of it distinctly drawn from the terms of 
aesthetic invention and literary stylization? What about this moment in Krog’s text causes it to 
waver between truth, or evidentiary fact, and other ways of knowing, or judging, and of writing, 
the truth?  
 
 
 																																																								
11 For example, see Shane Graham’s "The Truth Commission and Post-apartheid Literature in South Africa," or 
Mark Sanders, Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a Truth Commission. Interestingly, 
Sanders’s article on Krog opens with this quote from Krog, but does not examine the immediate context of the 
Motasi murders which become the occasion for Krog’s turn to fiction. Shane Graham, "The Truth Commission and 
Post-apartheid Literature in South Africa," Research in African Literatures 34.1 (2003): 11-30. Mark Sanders, 
Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a Truth Commission (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007). 
 
Sanders returns to this question more specifically with regard to Krog’s work in "Truth, Telling, Questioning: The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Antjie Krog's Country of my Skull, and Literature after Apartheid," MFS 
Modern Fiction Studies 46.1 (2000): 13-41.  
 
12 Concerns about the compatibility of Truth and Reconciliation abound in the scholarship on the TRC. See 
Nomfundo Walaza, “Reconciling With Partial Truths: An Assessment of the Dilemmas Posed by the Reconciliation 
Process in South Africa,” Smith Studies in Social Work 73.2 (2003): 189-204. 
 
13 On the complex relationship in transitional justice, between local justice and global law, see Laurel Fletcher, 
Harvey M., Weinstein, Patrick Vinck, and Phuong M. Pham “Stay the Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take 
Priority?” Localizing Transitional Justice: Justice Interventions and Local Priorities After Mass Violence, ed. 
Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010). 
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II. The Evidence of Literature, and the Literature of Evidence 
“I am appealing to you personally. Reaffirm your rejection of apartheid. It is crucifying us; it is 
destroying our language; it is degrading a once heroic nation into the lepers of the world. 
Remove the burden of the curse of a transgression against mankind from the backs of our 
children and grandchildren…should you fail in this God-given task, then one day we shall surely 
end up with a Nuremberg,” 
    -Anton Rupert, “Letter to P.W. Botha, 1986”14 
 
“If words are not about real things and do not cause real things to happen, then what is the good 
of them?” 
    -Stephen Watson “Poetry in South Africa Today”15 
 
In laying out some theoretical background at the start, I want to explore the relationship 
between “facts” and “story,” and the status of “facts” in “story.” Here, I will investigate the 
enigmatic nature of evidence in atrocity, and the procedure by which the facts of an event of 
atrocity become evidence of that atrocity. As we know from postmodernism and contemporary 
scholarship on the impossibility of purely objective thought, facts, like all seemingly objective 
knowledge, are contingent upon and tethered to an inescapable subjectivity, are always 
positional. However, at first glance, “evidence” seems to be the most stable, and the most 
substantive, of qualities that can be gleaned from any experience. Unlike the production of 
aesthetic or narrative form, which involves recruiting a subjective agent that determines the 
presentation of facts, and is thus malleable, vulnerable to manipulation, and contingent upon 
representational choices, the procurement of the product of facts that we call “evidence” seems 
to be objective in nature, immanent in character. We may have the privilege of “selection and 
arrangement,” to enlist Hayden White’s classic description of tropology, but facts are facts, 
answerable to an external empirical reality apart and outside of the way they are specifically 
																																																								
14 Quoted in Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 348. 
 
15 Stephen Watson, “Poetry in South Africa Today,” World Literature Today 64.1 (Winter, 1990):14. 
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arranged or as they may be embedded within a form or aesthetic constellation.16 They are, as 
critics from John Searle to Carlo Ginzburg have argued, decidedly the opposite of fictions, which 
are structures in which elements of content, as they compose the whole, are only answerable to 
the enclosed whole of the text.17 To be sure, the possibilities for interpreting evidence, that is, 
deciding what multiple pieces of evidence taken together mean, may be multiple, but they are not 
infinite; rather, they are limited and grounded into a finite reality.  
As an arena dedicated to assessing facts for the purpose of judgment, law exists in a 
space in which evidence plays the integral part of resolving crisis into such terms of judgment. 
The concept of evidence, and the practice of framing “natural” facts into evidence in favor of a 
claim is the basic procedure of every trial. In her essay on the relationship between facts and 
evidence, Lorraine Daston calls evidence “facts…in potentia: mustered in an argument, deduced 
from a theory, or simply arranged in a pattern [in order to] help with the work of proof and 
disproof.” Facts and evidence, she argues, belong to different categories; facts are “inert,” 
resisting interpretation, while evidence is the result of “facts [that] point beyond themselves and 
their sheer, brute thingness to states of affairs to which we have no direct access.” Testimony, for 
Daston, is factual when it is “not feigned with the intention of persuading.”18 Arnold Davidson 
progresses this line of thinking in considering the meaning of evidence in context of the justice, 
arguing that legal evidence is specifically designed and treated so as to be “in the service of 																																																								
16 See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978). 
 
17 See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1973), 5; Also see Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Questions of 
Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
243-274; and John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” New Literary History 6.2 (Winter, 1975): 
319 -332. 
 
18 Lorraine Daston, “Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe,” in Questions of  
Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
423. 
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establishing a just verdict,”19 a contrast, he argues, to either the regulative ideals of scientific or 
historical forms of evidence, relevant for securing a “truthful” account of events.  
In his essay “The Judge and the Historian,” Carlo Ginzburg provides a fundamentally 
paradoxical portrait of the current state of understanding about the nature of evidence. On the 
one hand, he characterizes the current approach to evidence by critics as a backlash against a 
long tradition of positivism, which approached evidence as a “transparent medium—an open 
window that gives us direct access to reality.” In contradistinction, contemporary criticism, he 
argues, is characterized by dealing with evidence as a “wall.” In the current critical moment, the 
hermeneutics of suspicion swings against the theoretical naïveté of the positivists to find 
evidence a block that “precludes any access to reality.” As such, this critical mode assumes that 
evidence always means something other than it seems, is a coded sign whose apparent 
significance hides its “true” meaning. Within this critical model, evidence always refers to 
something outside, other, hidden. On the other hand, Ginzburg finds that contemporary 
interpretive modes take up the “fashionable injunction to study reality as a text.” For Ginzburg, 
this is a problem. Why? Because what Ginzburg has in mind in the idea of “study[ing] reality as 
a text” is the new critical definition of close reading, a system of interpretation that depends on 
reading each fragment of evidence as it corresponds to other fragments of evidence within a 
closed narrative system. To read reality as a text thus for Ginzburg means to read reality 
“without a reference to extratextual realities.” For Ginzburg, in order for evidence to have “true” 
																																																								
19 Arnold Davidson, “Renewal of Historiography,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion 
Across the Disciplines, ed. James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry Harootunian, 306. 
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meaning, it must be verifiable by and must correspond to signs outside of an enclosed system of 
references.20 
Certainly then, empirical evidence stands starkly in contrast to literary evidence, which, 
as Barthes famously described it, 
at least it attempts to ‘let it be understood’ that it does not say everything; this 
allusion…inscribes within its system of signs the signature of its plentitude: like 
the face, the text becomes expressive (let us say that it signifies its expressivity), 
endowed with an interiority whose supposed depth compensates for the 
parsimony of its plural. At its discreet urging, we want to ask the classic text: 
What are you thinking about? but the text, wilier than all those who try to escape 
by answering: about nothing, does not reply, giving meaning its last closure: 
suspension.21 
 
Barthes’s stance gets to the center of New Criticism’s famous claim that, as Cleanth Brooks and 
Robert Penn Warren portrayed it, puts interpretation of the text solely within the realm of its 
“dramatic context”—conjuring it as if it were on a stage.22 Such “staging” requires the reader to 
“suspend disbelief,” excusing the text of its fidelity to any externally verifiable reality so that the 
text’s status as a coherent reality is only answerable to itself.23 It creates mutually exclusive 
arenas of closure: the determinate totality of the circumscribed stage, with a unified and 
delimited dramatic operating system, and the external world outside the stage, which operates 
under its own laws and conventions, separate from the stage. It depends on an understanding of 
“world” and “stage” as fundamentally and systematically apart. Since the author of the text and 
his or her intentions are indeterminate, evidence is both entirely constricted—delimited to what 
exists on the page—and infinite, the dynamic interchange (“readerly” as Barthes would later 																																																								
20 Carlo Ginzburg, “The Judge and the Historian,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across 
the Disciplines, ed. James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry Harootunian, 295.  
 
21 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), 217. 
 
22 Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry (New York: Holt Press,1950). 
 
23 See John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” 321. 
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imagine it) between the content and the chains of metonymic associations and linkages 
manufactured by the reader’s impulse to “end, to fill, to join, to unify,” and to thus to overcome 
the “vacuum” of the text.24 The aim of “readerly” interaction is in a sense to imagine, through the 
interaction between reader and text, the possibility of dynamic change within the static content 
of the page, to enter into the closed system of the text, and thus to arrive at new textual invention. 
Close reading, thus, is beholden to understanding of a dual understanding about textual evidence: 
that it is inherently constricted and delimited by the text’s form, and that it is infinite, has the 
capacity to be remade under the pressure of a new reader’s eye. 
 Brooks figures his formulation of the hermetically sealed world of the text, impenetrable 
by the pressures of external veracity, through the metaphor of the stage. Yet his formulation of 
the text as such under critical interpretive mode of close reading has a legal, rather than a literary 
or aesthetic genealogy. In his landmark work, he links the text with the figure of the law, and 
more specifically, he figures the textual object in the conceptual terms of legal evidence. “To use 
a metaphor drawn from the law courts,” he writes, “ ‘evidence outside the poem’ is always 
secondhand (or even hearsay) evidence as compared with the evidence presented by the text 
itself. Such a position seems to me not in the least unreasonable.”25 For Brooks, the “law courts” 
present a platform not unlike his metaphorical stage; statements made outside of the contained 
world of the court, and outside of the processes and contingencies of formal legal protocol, are 
“hearsay”—that is, they cannot stand up to nor be held up to testimony’s code of verification. 
The court itself is a stage, and the meaning of the declarations that appear within its 
circumscribed context are illocutionary acts that are contingent upon the specific conventions 
																																																								
24 Roland Barthes, S/Z, 105. 
 
25 Cleanth Brooks, “The New Criticism,” The Sewanee Review 87. 4 (Fall, 1979): 600. 
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and conditions that apply therein.   
 Brooks’s metaphorical alliance, which places proper interpretation of the text at once in 
terms of a dramatic setting, that of the secluded stage, and simultaneously as sequestered within 
a formal legal context, relies heavily on the idea that both the drama on the stage, and the case in 
the courtroom, exist as wholes in totality. The radical premise of his concept of textual 
interpretation is the same radical premise held by the juridical process itself: that whatever facts 
are presented as evidence within the sphere of the court may be not only be brought to bear on all 
other facts presented as evidence, but that they represent the sum of interpretable facts. In 
assessing evidence, the court operates under the convention that all relevant and available facts 
have been present and accounted for, presented and articulated, and that interpretation, which in 
the legal setting is called judgment, must only assess that which appears in the sphere of the 
court. Law, as Peter Brooks points out, “seems to treat stories as if they were interchangeable 
and unproblematically related to “the facts” that they recount, whereas in truth the telling is 
crucial to the establishment of the facts—to what law wants to use as evidence in the 
establishment of guilt or innocence of persons.”26 “The telling” is, inherently, driven by the 
court’s function as a judicial forum: the duty of the law is to determination, to the essential idea 
that the evidence will inevitably present a knowable and discoverable whole that will allow the 
court to arrive at and dispense judgment. 
But in the case of atrocity, as we have seen with Eichmann’s trial, the court becomes 
rather unlike Brooks’s stage; rather, it become a theater on which the central dramatic action is 
invisible. For ineffable atrocity, the most severe evidence proving atrocity is perhaps the absence 
of evidence, the shrillness of what could not be presented, imagined, spoken. Thus, the dramatic 
setting of atrocity stages the limits of how much testimony could be recited in a public forum 																																																								
26 Peter Brooks, Enigmas of Identity, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011), 8. 
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before the content of that testimony broke down, approached the limits of revealing truth. 
Therein, witness testimony tests how much such witness may tell of profane crimes in tension 
with how much it could refuse to speak its content before such testimony became too “obscene,” 
for them to speak, before (like Yehiel Dinur rising to testify against Eichmann), the witnesses 
would be rendered “not able to continue [their] evidence,” Obscene here is a critical term, one 
that itself renders the idea of the stage as a site of wholeness moot. The term carries within it the 
idea of something that is against or in the way of the stage: the ob-scène. As with literary 
representations, in the case of legal interventions into atrocity, evidence, and the lack of 
evidence, lies at the core of establishing the reality of the event, processing it through 
international legislative channels, and ultimately conferring upon it historical, political, 
representational, and iconographic meaning in perpetuity. What, then, is evidence in the context 
of atrocity, when the most critical knowledge may lie “offstage,” so obscene as to reside outside 
the range of what may be recuperated of an experience? How is the concept of “evidence” 
doubly strained in this context by the task of narrative representation, where an irrecoverable 
experience must be integrated into the wholeness of a text in which it is bound?  
In fact, the tension between evidence, as an aesthetic demand, a necessity for imaginative 
coherence and wholeness, and evidence as a product of “realist” factuality, which in the case of 
atrocity may imply a type of irreconcilable fragmentation, may be a tension inherent to the TRC 
process itself. Wai Chee Dimock argues that in the case of punitive pursuits, law’s purview is 
“the quantification, supervision, and utilization of pain;” thus, evidence serves as a way to prove 
the reality of that pain, its causal origins, and ultimately, to put those causal origins up to moral 
judgment.27 But in the literature of atrocity, evidence of pain—an experience that Elaine Scarry 																																																								
27 Wai-Chee Dimock, Residues of Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press 1997), 
152. 
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has characterized as beyond language, one that destroys language—may exist exactly in the 
space where evidence lacks, may lie at the point of incoherence, unquantifiability. It may 
interfere with narrative cohesion, and may consist of the very substance that the text cannot make 
“real” through descriptive language.28 In the next section, I review the legal conditions and the 
narrative conditions for interpreting evidence in order to assess and reconcile the whole, before 
moving to an analysis of amnesty as a particular legal process of interpreting evidence in order to 
repair a national whole. 
III. The Architecture of Amnesty: The Whole Truth, and the Truth About Wholeness 
 
The concept of truth is central to Krog’s text, and the subject of much of its critical 
reception. Shane Graham reads Krog’s work as demonstrating the complex negotiation between 
fidelity to memory and fidelity to objective reality.29 Mark Sanders asks whether, in the context 
of a search for truth, “a reflection on the literary [may] help us to reflect upon the activities of the 
commission.” He further asks: “[d]oes the response of literature to the Commission’s work, and 
to its engagement with literature, help us to elucidate such questions?”30 These critical responses 
question the TRC’s objective in identifying “truth.” The scholarship here generally agrees that 
the idea of “truth,” in the context of the TRC’s attempt to address the falsities, cover-ups, and 
deceptions of the apartheid era, is a corrective attempt to counter the damage done by apartheid. 
Apartheid, critics have argued, split the nation on racial lines not only by enacting legal and 
social policies of partition, but also by splitting the country’s legal reality off into fragments, an 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
 
28 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford UP, 1985), 21. 
 
29 Shane Graham, "The Truth Commission and Postapartheid Literature in South Africa," Research in African 
Literatures 34.1 (2003): 11-30.  
 
30 Mark Sanders, “Truth, Telling, Questioning: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Antjie Krog's Country of 
My Skull, and Literature after Apartheid,” MFS Modern Fiction Studies 46.1 (2000): 13. 
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evident serenity on the surface laid over a treacherous mechanism of violence and force operated 
by law enforcement. Under apartheid, the national status quo was dependent on this second 
buried truth to maintain the serene surface. Krog, quoting the testimony of Dirk Coetzee, the 
commander of the covert South African Secret Police, transcribes his statement that “[a]mongst 
ourselves…we developed our own body language. The wink of an eye, the nod of a head, could 
spell someone’s ends.” Of the South African Secret Police Force’s activities, she writes that 
“orders were given orally, one to one. No diaries, no written reports.”31 The TRC process was an 
attempt to uncover that truth, and to integrate these fragments so that they could be reconciled 
into one national truth. The TRC challenged the secrecy, the deception, and the lies of the 
apartheid state in order to rehabilitate meaning and revivify a polluted language. 
The aim behind the South African Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, which 
took place from April 1996-July 1998, was to bring the obscenities that occurred during the 
apartheid regime to the stage: a dramatic platform to be scrutinized by both national and 
international publics. Seventeen commissioners oversaw the national legal process, from its 
construction to the publication of a final report delivered to President Nelson Mandela in 
October, 1998.32 The TRC sought to “paint the most complete picture, a full truth, of the abuses” 
that took place during the time apartheid was in effect.33 In a heightened awareness of wanting to 
break with international precedent, the idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a 
redress to state sponsored atrocity was a deliberate and self-conscious response by the newly 
formed South African government, headed by Nelson Mandela and the ANC, to the precedent of 																																																								
31 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 79. 
 
32 See Nomfundo Walaza: “Reconciling With Partial Truths: An Assessment of the Dilemmas Posed by the 
Reconciliation Process in South Africa,” 191. 
 
33 “Report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Introduction,” National TRC Report to the Public, 1998. 
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the Nuremberg and the Tokyo war trials. The TRC self-consciously fashioned itself against the 
Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, and did so in front of a global audience.  
Testimony, in the context of these antecedent trials, had three basic purposes: first, to 
convict under international criminal law, and to punish, those responsible for orchestrating and 
carrying out brutality; second, to restore peace and national coherence and to mark a decisive 
ending point to the atrocities, inaugurating a new governance; and third, to establish a record of 
the “truth” that would be historically, morally, and pedagogically useful. In the case of extreme 
atrocity, any punishment, the judges felt, was inadequate to the crime. Thus, judgment in those 
trials sought a way out of the problem of having no adequate legal frame for the crime by 
moving out of the realm of Kantian “punishment’ logic of just deserts, and into the realm of 
establishing pedagogical significance of “truth.” Teaching history’s lessons, they felt, was a 
necessary step to reinstating national order.34  
The decision to mark the end of apartheid and to attempt reconciliation through a Truth 
and Reconciliation Amnesty Process rather than a Nuremberg-like tribunal was far from 
inevitable. For those who considered apartheid a state of violations that constituted a “Crimes 
Against Humanity,” the precedent for addressing such a past was the form of tribunal law that 
Nuremburg put onto the world stage as a global model for redress. This global model, developed 
in the West, had become an assumed ideal as a punctuation point that signaled the end of a state 
of atrocity, and as a mode of transitional justice, a way of moving forward after atrocity, 
bartering the past of brutality for the production of a future state of return to peace.  
The precedent set by the trials about how to secure peace in the wake of atrocity, then 
possesses two historical genealogies. One essentially belongs to criminal law, driven by the 																																																								
34 See Lawrence Douglas, “History, Memory and Crimes Against Humanity: A Response to Todorov,” 
Salmagundi128/129 (Fall 2000-Winter 2001): 320-326. 
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pursuit of justice through accountability, punishment and compensation. The other belongs to a 
conceptual understanding about human rights. If the foundational premise of human rights 
legislation was that human beings anywhere inherently possessed the same rights everywhere, 
violations of the rights of humans in one place implied the marginality of that group of persons 
from the category of the human. Part of the aim in the South African TRC process was, in light 
of this new understanding about the significance of human rights violations as a mode of 
marginalization, to recuperate those who had been marginalized, and to hear and inscribe the 
testimony from and about the human rights violations visited upon those who had been 
marginalized, into the center of the new national text. Thus, the amnesty hearings sought out and 
centrally focused on creating a portrait of apartheid that included as many testimonies as 
possible, to paint as full of a portrait as possible of the human rights violations that had occurred.  
Moreover, the apartheid government’s activities and its abuses had been thoroughly 
characterized by secrecy and deception. The machinery of the apartheid government depended 
on falsifying and destroying records, particularly those pertaining to the most severe of its 
atrocities.35 The idea of a process steeped in the pursuit of testimony, and driven by the 
production of a nationally recognized and officially sanctioned record of full truth and disclosure 
thus offered a corrective to this institutionalized deception and the possibility of recovery and 
restoration. Testimony from perpetrators that revealed what had been hidden and kept secret, and 
forms that that allowed for the telling of stories that had been lost or suppressed, would allow the 
loved ones of the victims some reconciliation of the gaps in their own knowledge about the past. 
Publishing the report as public record also reified the evidence contained in it, making it 
																																																								
35 Copious documentation was produced—including fictionalized accounts—and the police and military recorded all 
apartheid government activities faithfully. At the end of apartheid, the military and police simply burned about 90% 
of it. Terry Bell quoted eyewitnesses on weeks of smoke columns above army HQ in Pretoria, and called it an 
“Auschwitz of paper.”  
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impossible to claim that such abuses were fictional, were anything but an empirical reality. In so 
doing, it both publically reaffirmed the reality of a private experience of pain, and it concretized, 
through what the TRC called “window cases,” the major tropes, patterns, and formative images 
of the experience of apartheid.36 
However, there were many critics who resisted the idea that the crimes that had taken 
place in Africa ought to be measured against and spoken through the ideal of a universal human 
rights, especially one that had its origins on the European continent that had developed and 
codified a human rights ideal while simultaneously violating that ideal in grotesque practices on 
the African continent, in its treatment of black subjects under colonial rule. More specifically, 
the decision to pursue a new model of transitional justice also had to do with a backlash against 
the idea of blankly applying a mode of justice developed in the West, with its ideological 
premises and concepts of justice, onto the new African state. The architects of the new state felt 
strongly that demarcating the past of apartheid from the future of the new “Rainbow Nation” was 
bound up in conceptually relocating the new South Africa within the framework of justice that 
would be specifically African, and that justice would be brokered on African terms rather than 
European.  
This negotiation between local and global, specific and universal forms of justice was 
particularly complex, given the global prominence of the new South African state. In 
deliberating and determining the structure of the TRC, and in deciding to proceed with a new 
model of transitional justice that broke with a canonized antecedent global form, South Africa 
was at once exceedingly engaged in a local project, while simultaneously self-aware that it was 
on a global stage, fastidiously observed by a global audience. The commission was moreover 																																																								
36 Paul Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa and Beyond (London: Routledge Press, 2011), 24. 
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aware that in proceeding in this new direction, and in producing this new model, it was building 
a model for other postcolonial contexts, in newly emerging states in Africa and around the world 
emerging out of colonial rule, to use in forging new national governances. As Paul Gready puts 
it, in the time during which the TRC proceedings were active, South Africa saw itself as “an 
exemplar of a new global compact [of] political transition [that] paved the way for majoritarian 
democracy and elections around the world.”37  
Indeed, since that time, TRC commissions have “gone global,” with the TRC serving as a 
model for transitional justice, or, more cynically, an “industry.” The ostensible success of the 
South African model of transitional justice has propelled the model into an international model 
for a geographically diverse set of spaces seeking to transition between a past of violence toward 
a hopefully viable future, leveraging a TRC process toward the remaking of the public sphere 
through developing a shared national memory, an articulated commitment to human rights, and a 
participatory legal process that is visible to, and developed with the participation of, the national 
collective. At the same time, TRC commissions have gone global because they have, in a sense, 
become a genre, a standardized form. Since the South African TRC was so prominently featured 
on a global stage, featuring charismatic leaders (The newly elected President Nelson Mandela, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu) and iconic plot points, it stood as a process driven by the essential 
components of dramatic narrative: key heroes and their causes, a unity of plot, and a unity of 
place and action that was reinforced by the idea of national coalition and reunification—and, of 
course, reconciliation.  
Significantly, the major players in the South African TRC pronounced and insisted that 
the process was to be a specifically “African” narrative, with a specifically African form of 
justice, with a specifically African sense of purpose (Ubuntu), orchestrated and overseen by 																																																								
37 Ibid,1. 
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Africans judging Africans, the South African TRC proposes itself as a specifically non-Western 
process. For postcolonial states seeking to negotiate not only a past of violence, but also a past of 
violence caused by the globalizing impulse of imperialism, developing a formal legal process 
outside of the European form of judgment to assess and adjudicate atrocity—particularly one that 
would emerge in opposition to a European form of post-atrocity justice—was of prime 
significance. One reason that the South African TRC became a model that could “go global” was 
that it represented a way of resisting the pressure of a specifically European legal model that had 
sought to globalize a European legal sensibility, one that had in the past dominated the globe. 
In a 1996 article published in the popular newspaper Cape Times right as the TRC had 
started its proceedings, critic Hermann Giliomee wrote: 
President Mandela called apartheid…a ‘terrible injustice against South Africa and 
its people.’ Why not be content with this? Why apply a term like 'crime against 
humanity' to apartheid which [has its origin] in conflicts on the European 
continent? Apartheid can and should be condemned in its own terms. It could be 
that the book simply reflects a colonial inferiority complex, but there is in fact a 
political subtext behind all the frantic efforts to 'prove' that the National Party and 
the Afrikaner Broederbond were influenced by the Nazi party, and that apartheid 
was an atrocity of the Nazi kind.38   
 
Giliomee’s comment highlights a central tension built into the South African TRC 
process, as well as a major tension in the globalization of human rights. On one hand, a global 
definition of human rights serves as an objective arbiter through which evidence of violations of 
those rights may be measured. On the other hand, Giliomee’s comment critiques a conceptual 
model of human rights redress that limits South African’s ability to articulate itself within it to 
the role of a respondent. Equating the violation of apartheid to the violations in Europe renders 
the South African experience but an imitation of a European experience of pain. But Giliomee is 
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not just making a case that comparison poses a problem that does not allow apartheid to “be 
condemned on its own terms;” he also argues that there is a “political subtext behind all the 
frantic efforts to ‘prove’ that the National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond were influenced 
by the Nazi party, and that that apartheid was an atrocity of the Nazi kind.39 I have doubled the 
emphasis Giliomee already places on the word “prove,” because it directs our attention to the 
sense in which, within the sphere of globalized atrocity, human rights violations in South Africa 
become “evidence” of atrocity by “proving” that the South African violation is like the Nazi 
violation. Thus, within this complex, evidence of South African atrocity is not evidence for 
violations under apartheid itself, but rather evidence for the resemblance of those violations to 
the violations that occurred in Europe in the 1940s. The idea of evidence, as such, is not to prove 
the reality of apartheid’s brutality, but to prove that African pain is as real as European pain. As 
we will see, this concept of evidence as negotiating and grounding the “truth” of the South 
African experience vis-à-vis a globalized setting, will play into the complex nature of evidence 
that emerges in the TRC process. In the new South African postcolonial state the legacy of 
apartheid, with its signature architecture that operated in deceit, manipulation of facts, and 
falsification of records, the terms of establishing “truth” turn on the idea that both facts and 
evidence mislead and are unstable, and that narrative may be false. Thus, in the context of South 
Africa, the attempts to establish evidence are constantly in tension with an uncertainty about the 
correspondence between narrative and evidence, fact and fiction. 
Indeed, the problem of evidence in the context of determining the human rights violations 
under apartheid was a significant force in determining the TRC’s form, and its decision to focus 
on a specifically national report as the output of the process. Establishing the empirical reality of 
the violations in South Africa was imperative, specifically as it was informed by the need to 																																																								
39 The double emphasis on “prove,” rendered above in italics, is mine. 
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prove the “reality” of South African pain on its own terms, within its own circumference and 
turf. But practical and logical problems intervened into the process of collecting and producing 
material evidence. Finding and using empirical evidence for the majority of the violations that 
occurred under apartheid was virtually an impossible endeavor. For one thing, evidence 
collection in criminal contexts is costly, time consuming, and objectively difficult. For another, 
since the apartheid government operated largely in secrecy, and often informally, few records of 
the abuses remained. Bodies buried in mass graves, burned, or submitted for anonymous burial 
all over the country made obtaining physical evidence of the crimes almost impossible, and the 
magnitude, length of time, and scope of crimes so vast as to overwhelm the TRC commission at 
the prospect of collecting the full range of evidence. Finally, the new government was equipped 
neither with the funds nor the institutional architecture to oversee such an endeavor, nor to verify 
through external evidence the range of testimony from witnesses—21,000 statements from 
victims, bystanders, and perpetrators, 2,000 of which were heard publicly—or the more than 
8,000 amnesty applications it received.40  
Thus, the commission operated primarily through testimony, as witness accounts stood 
out as the means available for the ends of proceeding with reconciliation (and the most expedient 
strategy for getting the engine of regime change and national reconstitution going). The idea of 
evidence in the TRC mainly was constituted by the concept that words themselves were 
responsible for and capable of recreating the reality, that the words of the victims would recreate 
and fill in the space left absent by the missing objects and material forms of evidence.41 In the 
next section, I outline a philosophical tradition of wholeness and fragmentation in order to 																																																								
40 See “South Africa: 22nd Annual Human Rights. Report Submitted to Congress,” U.S. St. 316 1997. 
 
41 See Emily McCarthy, “South Africa’s Amnesty Project: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?,” 
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 3.183 (1998): 229. 
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provide a theoretical orientation for thinking about the relationship between the missing objects 
and the attempt to recreate the whole and to produce coherence through the fragments left behind 
by missing objects and absences. 
IV. Reconciling the Fragment: At the Intersection of Aesthetics and Politics 
 The idea that empiricism and the power of logic of reason can overcome the fragmented 
and unknowable state of the world of objects belongs to a venerated philosophical tradition 
originating in Kant’s concept of the sublime. Kant saw the “colossal” magnitude of the natural 
world as immeasurable, beyond the ability of “our imagination [to] comprehend it within one 
whole.”42 Judgment, for Kant, was impossible under these circumstances. The world, says Kant, 
is conceptually too large for the rational mind to judge it; he writes that “even to think the 
infinite as a whole indicates a mental power that surpasses any standard of sense.”43 But if the 
world is incomprehensible as a whole, it is made intelligible by “aesthetic estimation of 
magnitude,” an estimation of the world that Kant explicitly ties to the possibility of artistic 
stylization.44 Aesthetic estimation provides the possibility of judgment; although the act of 
estimation “arises from the imagination’s inadequacy,” it also shows the triumph of reason over 
the incomprehensible infinite world, and thus reasserts the capacity of the human mind to reason, 
a term that Kant not insignificantly uses interchangeably herein with the phrase “aesthetic 
judgment.”45  
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43 Ibid, 111. 
 
44 Ibid, 112. 
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Kant’s most notable philosophical heir on this point is Friedrich Schlegel, whose 
Philosophical Fragments centrally argues that directly representing the whole or the totality is 
impossible; presenting any reality requires an aesthetic of fragmentation, where fragments are 
themselves considered as wholes in potentia. Since reality can only be expressed as a fragment, 
it exists not as a fractured and split-off piece of the whole, but as a whole in itself, which is both 
absolute and also contains in its form a “mixture [that] weaves together extremely heterogeneous 
components.” This form of fragmentation, with the fragment as itself a composite whole, 
represents for Schlegel an ethical ideal.46  
Kant, Schlegel, and their Romanticist peers understood the fragment in relationship to 
infinitude as delineating an explanation of the sublime; the horror in realizing the infinite and 
incomprehensible character of the natural world. The sense of shock and awe at its magnitude 
would, in the Romanticist tradition, prompt terror that could only be overcome by human reason, 
the rational mind sublimating the world’s infinitude which could contain the chaos of infinitude 
through the triumph of reason. The philosophical and aesthetic schema developed to govern the 
finite subject’s relationship to the infinite, developed by the Romanticists to provide a framework 
and an aesthetic of that which could neither be contained nor fully represented gained new  
traction in the theological and philosophical approach to the Holocaust, whose mass scope, 
global reach in representation through media circuits, and the seemingly infinite degree of mass 
depravity seemed itself a form of infinitude. Keeping with the tradition of the sublime, scholars, 
historians, writers, artists, and critics tasked with guiding interpretations the scale of an event 
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seemed to escape the capacity of understanding offered by either human reason or aesthetic 
judgment turned to this framework.47  
Maurice Blanchot represents a classical and significant example: Blanchot repurposes the 
tradition of the sublime in the context of atrocity in his The Writing of Disaster. In a post-atrocity 
moment, the reality of the world and the capacity of language to describe the world fragmented 
by the Nazi crimes, Blanchot writes that “Writing is per se already (it is still) violence: the 
rupture there is in each fragment, the break, the splitting, the tearing of the shred—acute 
singularity, steely point…we can only let fragmentary writing write if language, having 
exhausted its power of negation, its force of affirmation, retains or sustains Knowledge at rest.”48 
Blanchot’s project is steeped in his belief that atrocity ruins language and wrecks the possibility 
of creating coherent knowledge; thus, his text is an attempt to imagine a conceptual form for 
properly talking about disaster. But his comment that the fragment frees language from “its 
power of negation, its force of affirmation,” suggests that his concern about writing belongs 
specifically to the relationship between language and an empirical reality. For Blanchot, in the 
context of writing atrocity, representation of the whole within the fragment, or representation of 
the infinite world by the finite text is no longer bound to realism, or representing a rational or an 
objective truth. The obligation of language to the “power of negation” or “force of affirmation” 
is an obligation to reproducing in language the empirical reality of the world. Freed from this 
tether, language is unbound from factual verification, a description of any external state, and 
obligated only to figural discourse, descriptions derived from a subjective state. Since the state of 																																																								
47 It is plausible that one of the guiding forces in placing the aesthetic of the sublime, the fragment, and the 
Romanticist tradition of Holocaust interpretation came from an institutional commitment to Romanticist ideology; 
some of the founding scholars of the Holocaust tradition of scholarship were trained Romanticists; writers, such as 
Paul Celan and Primo Levi were versed in Romantic literature as a perspectival and formal tradition whose 
impression bears on their work. 
 
48 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 47. 
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the post-atrocity world according to Blanchot is unnatural, the reality of that world 
inconceivable, language cannot portray this “unnatural” state of affairs by appealing to the 
natural world, and thus cannot fulfill the evidentiary function of writing. Thus, torn from any 
anchor in literalism or realism, language becomes purely figural. We will see this concept in 
action as we explore in the relationship between this turn toward the aesthetics of figural 
language within the context of fragmentation and atrocity, and the politics of literature under the 
conditions of atrocity in South Africa. 
V. Fragments of Testimony and the Whole Truth in the TRC 
Krog’s text, and its difficulty with the concept of evidence, incorporates this negotiation 
of infinitude and fragmentation. This dynamic is present and observable in the scope of the text 
itself; it is, moreover, evidenced in her treatment of the TRC Process. The text reproduces a rift 
in the concept of evidence inherent to the TRC process itself. As an event that reaches toward 
“truth,” the TRC’s ambition with regard to evidence is oriented toward factuality; its duty lies in 
its fidelity to representing, as factually and in terms as materially “real” as possible, the 
substance of the content. Yet as an event that reaches toward “reconciliation,” the TRC must 
maneuver evidence toward the production of wholeness, that is to say, negotiate it into formal 
coherence and alignment. Such reconciliation is both formal and political. It is formal in the way 
in which creating a unified portrait out of the discrete episodes of its abuses was aimed at 
creating both a coherent historical record of apartheid, its broad patterns, practices, and legacy, 
for pedagogical and legislative purposes. It is, moreover, aimed at creating a moral parable, and 
as a moral parable, which must direct episodes, information, and action toward a central moral 
point, descriptions or fragments that do not cohere or perhaps conflict with that moral point must 
be either reworked in order to make them so integrated, or dismissed. It is also political, in the 
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sense that the project of creating a cohesive portrait of apartheid was a reflection of the TRC’s 
purpose as a conduit of transitional justice to create a “whole” South African nation in the wake 
of apartheid’s fragmentation.  
This mandate for wholeness, and the drive to enlist all the fragmented testimonials of 
experience under apartheid in the project of achieving cohesion, may require that certain types of 
testimony become iconographic, reconstituted so as to reinforce national identities, and other 
parts unhearable, perhaps unspeakable, without a form or a place to speak itself within the 
narrative whole as the TRC narrative comes to represent national identity. Gready points to the 
iconic images generated by the TRC hearings. Media broadcast repeatedly showed the images 
that would become signatures for the process, distilling its complexity to a few core images: the 
victim as an older weeping black woman, the perpetrator as angry white Afrikaans man, the 
thousands of aggregated in to the figure of a dead brutalized young black man.49  
These iconic images helped to secure the place of the TRC in the minds of the South 
African population, and also made the event internationally portable. Simplifying the complexity 
through these distilled images rendered it legible for a global audience observing it from outside 
the national arena. However, it also placed limits on the range of narratives that could legibly be 
understood within the narrative that the TRC created for itself. Testimonies that provided content 
that was dissimilar to, or even oppositional to the often simplistic sketches and silhouettes 
provided by the TRC’s iconography were rendered mute, unintelligible and untranslatable. 
Equally so, the elements of complexity within testimonies that could not be used to reinforce the 
logic of the TRC’s narrative form were dismissed. To the degree that this occurred, giving one’s 
testimony in the context of the TRC meant giving one’s narrative of experience over to being 																																																								
49 Paul Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa and Beyond, 67. 
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remade and repurposed within the national narrative, thus losing control of its meaning and 
significance. As such testimony became the content of a narrative that extended into the history 
of global human rights, and outward into the discourse of international human rights law. 
Testimony again had to bend to new formal conventions, the requirements of legal language 
which, as Gready writes, “transform local idioms of victims into universal professional 
languages of complaint and restitution”50 The right to speak testimony, a property the TRC 
defined as an individual right, grates against the right to frame the content of its meaning and 
control its form, a national right held by both the TRC national(istic) project. Krog’s own 
journalistic and narrative endeavor—a tension between not only content and form but also the 
individual and the national, even global synthesis of evidence and narrative production. Let us 
now return to the Motasis to see how these tensions play out in this case.   
VI. The Matter of Facts 
Richard Motasi was born in 1953, and grew up in a rural area of the Transvaal (now part 
of the Gauteng Province) in central South Africa. He was born into a South Africa that was 
rapidly ossifying into the institutional structures of apartheid. In 1948, the Afrikaner National 
party had run on, and had subsequently won, the national election on a campaign promising to 
keep the separation of the white minority from the black majority instituted by colonialism, and 
to concretize the separation into formal law; two years later, the elected government passed laws 
against miscegenation across races and legislated classification of all citizens by race. In 1958, 
the newly elected Prime Minister Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd formalized apartheid as a national 
governing framework built on racial separation. The South African Police force stood as a pillar 
at the center of the apartheid regime’s architecture. Driven by fear of an uprising by the black 
majority, and driven to paranoia by the visibility and turbulence of the postcolonial revolutions 																																																								
50 Ibid. 77. 
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in motion across the African continent and within the post-World War II order, the South African 
police force was charged with hypervigilance. In particular, the South African government feared 
inner revolution inspired by, and aided by, the African nationalistic freedom fighters around its 
borders, in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other movements fighting against colonial rule. In 
1979, Commander Dirk Coetzee established the Vlakplaas base as a station where the Security 
Police would routinely torture and kill kidnapped anti-Apartheid activists. The Vlakplaas unit, as 
this group of covert and elite government endorsed assassins were called, routinely executed 
political opponents, authorized to do so by commanding orders given by Coetzee and Colonel 
Eugene de Kock.51  
On June 16 1976, the Soweto riots, also known as the Revolt of the Children, erupted. 
The protestors, mostly young students in the Soweto township, were met by an armed police 
force that aggressively brutalized the crowd with force that deliberately aimed to not overpower 
but to kill the unarmed masses. The riots resulted in the death of over of the protesters, and 
brought on a new and escalated sense of racial conflict.52 In 1977, the SAP kidnapped, 
imprisoned, and brutally murdered the black intellectual and activist Stephen Biko, whose 
outspoken leadership, specifically his eloquent public speeches had made him an icon within 
South African black communities and an ally of liberal whites. The SAP claimed Biko’s death as 
a suicide; recovery of his corpse by Donald Woods and Hellen Zille, allies in the anti-apartheid 
movement, revealed the evidence of governmentally sponsored murder that the SAP had covered 
up. Two weeks after Biko’s death, a magistrate assigned to the case ruled that evidence against 
the SAP laid bare by the marks on Biko’s corpse was insufficient; charges could not be leveraged 																																																								
51 Patrick Lawrence, “Unmasking the ‘Third Force,’ Africa Report 40.2 (March 1, 1995): 41-53. 
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against the officers as there was no eyewitness testimony to serve as proper evidence. The 
attorney general dropped the case.53 In May of 1985, three members of the Port Elizabeth Black 
Civic Organisation (known as the Pebco Three) disappeared; the Amnesty Hearings for the case, 
held ten years later, would recount how they had been beaten with metal pipes, tortured, and 
strangled while police officials had drinks and ate braaied meat.54 On 1 December, 1986 the SAP 
gunned down Dr. Fabian Ribeiro and his wife, Florence, who had both become outspoken critics 
of force’s brutality, and who had been collecting evidence of its violent activities to spread 
nationally and to send overseas.55  
Richard Motasi joined the South African Police force (SAP) in 1973. It was a time of 
heightened tension within the SAP; the recent escalation of racial tensions and police brutality 
resulted in the increasing visibility of police suppression of the black population. Combined with 
suspicion within the black population of secret police violence, external tensions led to growing 
mistrust between black and white officers within the police force; white officers feared mutiny 
and sabotage from their black colleagues, many of who closely knew the victims of this police 
brutality. Equally, black policemen became newly aware of their precarious position, negotiating 
between black and white hostilities—their police position made them not quite part of the black 
collective, allied against the SAP, while they were well aware that they were far removed from 
and were considered by their white colleagues to be not quite equal to (indeed, not remotely 
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equal to) the white officers with whom they served. Black police were caught between systems 
of stringent institutional and racial classifications.56 
Yet despite these tensions, by all accounts, Richard Motasi loved being a policeman. The 
work secured him steady wages and allowed him to live comfortably with his wife, Irene, and 
their son, Tshidiso; the job allowed him security and professional distinction. He was proud of 
his profession, a hard worker who had distinguished himself by winning several awards 
recognizing his contributions to the force. He was promoted to the rank of Sergeant on merit, 
without having to write an examination—an unusual and remarkable achievement.57 He was 
black, and under apartheid law he endured discrimination under the very laws he helped to 
enforce. But he saw himself primarily as, and acted as, an arm of the apartheid regime, and he 
faithfully carried out its orders and performed his duties within the force; he would have been 
considered an enemy, not an ally, of the liberation movement.58  
On 8 September, 1984, Richard Motasi was assaulted by a white superior, Colonel Van 
Zyl, while at work at the training college where he was stationed in Hammanskraal, in the North 
Transavaal (now the Gauteng) province near Johannesburg. Van Zyl’s assault was both verbal 
and physical; in the account Motasi later submitted as evidence, he claimed that Van Zyl began 
shouting at him in Afrikaans, saying “You kaffer, we are struggling with you because you are so 
stupid and we are still struggling with you and I should have killed you long ago,” before striking 
Motasi on his left ear with an open hand, a blow that felled Motasi to the floor.59 The physical 
blow echoed and reinforced the verbal blow; the word “kaffer,” the offensive Afrikaans racial 																																																								
56 “Brian Currin, Interview with Deb Donig, Johannesburg, 19 September 2016.” 
 
57 “Testimony of Col. Jabulani Sebulela,” South African Broadcasting Commission Archives, (Ep. 386:32, 1996). 
 
58 “Brian Currin, Interview with Deb Donig, Johannesburg, 19 September 2016.” 
 
59 Hans Pienaar “Special Report: To Die For Justice,” Tribute. 8.1 (1996): 42-45.  
 
	 128 
slur for black people, signified not only Van Zyl’s abasement of Motasi, but also Van Zyl’s 
disregard for the law; despite the common use of the phrase during Apartheid, the term was 
made legally actionable in South Africa in 1976 by the crimen injuria doctorate, which 
criminalized "the unlawful, intentional and serious violation of the dignity of another."60 Van Zyl 
then, Motasi documented in his report, “hit [him] with his clenched fist on the left side of [his] 
head slightly above the left ear. [Motasi] then fell on top of [Van Zyl] in the tin truck and [Van 
Zyl] kicked [his] with his shoed foot on [his] buttocks.”61 The assault was violent enough to 
severely injure Motasi’s eardrum, causing him continued and unrelenting pain in his ear, 
requiring five separate operations which were all unsuccessful, and leaving him with a constant 
ringing in his head, and ultimately total deafness in his left ear.62  
Assaults against black police officers by white superiors in the SAP were not uncommon. 
What made Motasi’s case radically unusual was decision, following the assault, to file an official 
complaint against Van Zyl, and to continue to pursue legal justice against Van Zyl and the SAP, 
as well as medical compensation for his injuries. Directly after the assault, Motasi filed an initial 
complaint with the Temba Police Station in Bophuthatswana territory. He sought and 
documented medical treatment for his injured ear, and continued to pursue the case. When the 
SAP flat-out denied Motasi’s claim, he hired a lawyer who began collecting medical records and 
investigating the SAP’s activities. Soon after, the SAP seized Motasi’s medical records and 
deliberately doctored them to erase evidence of injury; it moreover coerced Motasi’s colleagues 
to provide eye-witness statements that reversed the narrative, and claimed Motasi had assaulted 																																																								
60 J.R.L. Milton, “Surv. S. African I.” Annual Survey of South African Law (1983): 374-393.  
 
61 Hans Pienaar “Special Report: To Die For Justice,” 44. 
 
62 Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, Pretoria/Gauteng. “Testimony of Mrs. Hlabangane.” South African 
Broadcasting Commission Archives.  
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Van Zyl. The police force proceeded to fire Motasi, charge him with insubordination, humiliate 
him publicly, and force him to pay fines for insubordination to the police force.63 
Motasi, indignant with the treatment and determined to seek justice in the formal venue 
of the court, continued to press his suit. The State Attorney, to whom he was entitled as a 
policeman involved in a civil suit, refused to take Motasi’s case, telling Motasi that the conflict 
between he and the Colonel was a “personal matter,” and further stating that the State Attorney’s 
office would assist Van Zyl in his defense against Motasi.64 With the aid of a human rights 
lawyer Motasi subsequently enlisted, Motasi persistently returned to the police force, demanding 
not only compensation—R 10,000 in damages (the equivalent of about $4,500 at the time)—but 
also that his name be cleared, the wrongs against him brought to light, and that Van Zyl be held 
accountable for his actions. He persisted in pressing his suit, which included a claim for 
disability grants, his suspended wages, a pension, and Van Zyl’s accountability, for three years 
after the initial assault. He did so even as the SAP harassed him and manipulated the evidence of 
the case, charging Motasi for their legal fees and expert witness testimony from medical 
specialists. In turn, the SAP began manufacturing a file of evidence on Motasi, alleging that he 
had become a suspect for involvement in anti-apartheid activities, had been aiding rebels, and 
had assumed a role in cross border operations, as a courier to Zimbabwe terrorist forces. The 
SAP enlisted the South African Security Branch of the police force in Pretoria, headed by Flip 
Loots and Paul van Vuuren, to mark Motasi as a suspect who was providing “very damaging 
information” to Zimbabwe security forces.65 On 27 August 1987, Colonel Van Zyl was officially 
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served with Motasi’s intent to prosecute. Shortly after, Loots and van Vuuren were “ordered to 
eliminate” Motasi.66  
Enlisting the askari assassin Joe Mamasela and Captain Jacques Hechter, Loots and van 
Vuuren drove to Motasi’s house on the night of 30 November, 1987. They arrived at the Motasi 
home and murdered the couple. The report that appeared in print in the Daily Sowetan, titled 
“Husband and Wife Murdered in Soweto,” recounted the following scene: Motasi’s car outside 
the house, a box of Kentucky Fried Chicken by the front door, blood-drenched bodies in two 
rooms of the house, and a crying child.”67 A post-mortem report records that the first bullet fired 
at Motasi was shot “about one metre or more with the appearance of a high-velocity bullet, such 
as AK-47,” the second much closer, “and possibly with a different caliber than No. 1.”68 In the 
testimony provided by Irene Motasi’s mother, Mrs. Hlabangane, she recounts finding Richard’s 
body on the floor, the morning after the murders. Pieces of his skull and his brain, she testified, 
were on the floor. He had been shot, she testified, in his left ear—ironically, the same ear that 
had received the blow from Van Zyl three years before. Irene’s body was found in the back 
bedroom, under white sheets that had been soaked in her blood.69 
VII. The Matter of Fiction  
 Immediately after the Motasi murders, rumors that their deaths had been organized police 
killings circulated amongst human rights groups and within the black population. “What was 																																																								
66 Robert Brand, “Murdered Sergeant ‘Was ANC Agent,’ “The Star, March 4, 1997. 
 
67 “Husband and Wife Murdered in Soweto,” The Daily Sowetan, December 1, 1987. 
 
68 Hans Pienaar, “To Die For Justice,” 44. 
 
69 Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, Pretoria/Gauteng. “Testimony of Mrs. Hlabangane, Examination by 
Advs. Currin and Du Plessis.” Krog’s text cites this detail as one that counters the attempt by the Truth Commission 
examiners  (whom she tellingly calls “narrators”) to “[walk] a fine line between providing enough detail to impress 
the legal teams and avoiding the more gruesome details for the sake of the [Motasi] family.” In contrast, she 
observes, “Irene Mutase’s mother graphically described how something white protruded from Mutase’s ear after he 
was killed.” Also see Antji Krog, Country of My Skull, 107. 
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new,” when the case came to examination during the 1996 TRC amnesty hearings, observed 
Brian Currin, who examined the killers as they delivered their testimony before the truth 
commission in 1996, “was the detail… how they knocked on the door, how the guy sort of put a 
pillow from a cushion from the couch if I remember correctly on his ear.” He continued with the 
remark that, “[w]hat was shocking, what of course was ironic was that he was shot in the ear, 
that was damaged in the assault. Why would that be?”70 
There are several features of the case that make it noteworthy in the context of 
investigating the relationship between narrative, evidence, and law, and thus make Krog’s 
engagement with this case in a particularly vexed point of exploration about the relationship 
between form and content, fact and fiction, literary and empirical evidence. First, there is 
Richard Motasi’s position within law enforcement, a trained employee of the SAP designed to 
reinforce and secure the structured racial boundaries of division decreed by apartheid legislation. 
Motasi is situated both within the system of law, part of its structure, and also outside of it, the 
target of the very policy for which he acts as an agent. Second, there is the chronological 
progression of Motasi’s case, situated in the context of the Soweto riots against the 
implementation of Afrikaans in black schools and the slaughter that ensued, and Biko’s murder, 
followed by the police cover-up and the court’s unwillingness to read the signs left on Biko’s 
body as meaningful evidence in pursuit of justice. Both instances highlight specific injustices 
enacted on black bodies, not only thus depriving the black population of the possibility of 
dialogical exchange, but also brutalizing the South African black community because of its 
potential to enunciate the truth about this violence and injustice. Both are also acts of violence 
that bear particularly on issues of articulation, what can be said, raid, or signified. The mandate 																																																								
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for instructional Afrikaans and the murder of Stephen Biko aimed to keep critical black voices 
out of the national discourse. Both the Soweto massacre and the police and judicial conspiracy to 
deprive Biko’s body of possibility as evidence sought to erase the voices that would testify to the 
government perpetrated atrocity.  
Third, there is Motasi’s experience of assault, and his subsequent plaintiff quest for 
justice, unusual given his race and his rank within the SAP, his decision to formally pursue his 
cause within the context of the law, and the subsequent systematic attempt by the SAP to erase 
the record of Motasi’s experience. Motasi’s vigilant documentation of his suffering through the 
structure and the institution of the law is met by the SAP’s systematic erasure of it; each of 
Mootasi’s attempts to document the evidence of his case as victim results in the SAP overwriting 
this narrative with its own inverted record, which further implicates Motasi as perpetrator.  
Fourth, there is the continued tension between the legal system and the concept of justice, 
here arched against one another rather than symbiotic. Nowhere is this made more clear than the 
statement Motasi himself made over a year before his death. In a letter to his lawyer, he wrote: 
“If it happened that I am killed, please know that it will be my stand in fighting for my rights and 
justice.”71 Motasi’s statement contains a paradox. At once, he doggedly operates under the basic 
assumption is that he should have the same right to justice as a white man, and that despite the 
national state of governance as apartheid, the judicial system court exists as a system apart, a 
whole unto itself. Simultaneously, in so doing under the stipulation “if it happened that I am 
killed,” Motasi implicitly acknowledges that in the totality of South Africa’s systemic racism, 
such law enforcement would be complicit shutting down Motasi’s stance for rights and justice 
within it. Motasi’s statement then evidences an ambivalence between his belief in the reality of 
his own civil rights, and his understanding of them as a legal fiction. 																																																								
71 Recorded in Hans Pienaar, “Special Report: To Die For Justice,” 109. 
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Finally, there is the exaggerated symbolism and figurative potential of the facts of the 
event themselves. Nowhere is this clearer than in Currin’s comment, that, “[w]hat was shocking, 
what of course was ironic was that he was shot in the ear, that was damaged in the assault.”  The 
facts of the murder are “shocking,” not just as proof of violence, but because of what he 
identifies as irony within those facts; specifically, in irony in the symmetry between the blow 
from Van Zyl that had launched Motasi to seek justice, and the blow by the assassins that had 
ended his life as a result of his decision to seek justice. Irony appears when the facts start to stand 
in for concepts, when facts begin to slide into figurative territory. Irony, in aesthetic terms, refers 
to the chasm between a surface meaning and a second subterranean meaning; detecting irony 
requires the suspension of judgment dictated by a primary perception such that a secondary 
meaning, contradictory and oppositional to the ostensible primary and surface meaning, is 
understood to be true. In Currin’s statement, the surface meaning in Motasi’s killing would be 
that the facts themselves were neutral, or at least without the intension of providing the symbolic 
meaning that result from the exquisite symmetry of them. “Life,” as Alan Dershowitz says, “is 
not a dramatic narrative;” the gun that appears on stage in Chekhov’s Act I only reappears to be 
discharged in Act III when the action involved is staged, which is to say, fictional.72 Reality is 
not, in other words, understood to be “part of a purposive universe,” in which symbolisms 
govern. What Currin finds ironic, then, is that the reality of Motasi’s life seems to follow the 
rules of a symbolic, that is to say, narrative, order. The facts that fatally govern his life seem to 
possess, seemingly without any intention driving them to be so, a surplus of meaning, the kind of 
which we only typically find in fictions and figurations. That sense of innate symmetry and 
figural meanings seems to stand in ironic opposition to what would seem to qualify as objective 																																																								
72 Alan Dershowitz, “Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative,” in Peter Brooks and Paul D. Gewirtz, 99-105.  
 
	 134 
truth, which is to say, that by seeming to possess an innate sense of structure between individual 
facts, the reality seems hardly the objective content of “pure truth,” and rather governed instead 
by a type of conscious arrangement into what art might make of it.73 In fact, his life seems to 
imitate art, the natural world bending to the protocols of the representational world; the facts 
themselves seem totally lacking in the naiveté that facts ought to have prior to their configuration 
into narrative; rather they compulsively swerve toward a figural system; they appear as though 
they were the content of a predetermined plot, flush with meaning, endowed with hyper-
symbolic excess. The observation points to the astonishing way in which the basic facts of the 
matter seem already inclined toward the disposition of fiction and aesthetic symmetry, the type 
of material that “brings something to the surface,” to use Krog’s terms.  
The essential substance and structure of the facts do, in fact, seem highly figural and 
oversaturated with metaphorical meaning—the deep irony of a black man committed to justice, 
working within an apartheid system of systemic injustice toward black men, ultimately 
fictionalized by the system as a political opponent that system and then killed by that system; the 
symmetry in the way in which Motasi’s fight against injustice done to him was both ignited and 
extinguished with blows to the ear; the ongoing motif of silence made out of Motasi’s very literal 
deafness, an injury sustained physically that becomes an overreaching act of epistemic violence; 
the shrouded figure of the silent murdered black woman in the background, whose voice appears 
nowhere in the evidence and documentation, who lies dead in a dark corner room, covered in 																																																								
73 For Hayden White, the tradition of historical writing derives from a rejection of “excessive use of figurative 
language as a means of representing and explaining the processes of the world.” In contrast, the historian’s language 
“had to be as austere as that reason which directed him in his search for the truth about the past, literal, therefore, 
rather than figurative in its representation of the world.” He quotes Voltaire, who writes that “Ardent imagination, 
passion, desire—frequently deceived—produce the figurative style. We do not admit it into history, for too many 
metaphor are hurtful, not only to perspicuity, but also to truth, by saying more or less than the thing itself.” (As 
White shows, figuration in “truthful” accounts became cause for skepticism about the reality of the accounts that 
enlisted them, “[p]oetry, myth, legend, fable—none of these was conceived to have real value as historical 
evidence.” See Hayden White Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 53.  
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blood-soaked white sheets; the young black orphan, left alone with the corpses of his parents in 
the wreckage of a night of violence, who must then navigate an uncertain future. 
There is a second suggestion in Currin’s comment about the irony in the fatal bullet that 
killed Motasi striking his ear, a blow that ends Motasi’s life and brings the violent episode 
narrative, which was ignited with a blow to the same ear, full circle. Currin’s question “Why 
would that be?” implies the impulse to harness facts into the substance of narrative, to leverage 
the technologies typically understood to be the purview of fiction so as to endow the facts of 
Motasi’s life and his death with meaning and morals. But Currin’s comment disturbingly also 
suggests that the killers themselves may have been thinking metaphorically; the fatal shot in the 
ear may intone as dramatic irony structuring and providing narrative symmetry after the fact, but 
it may have also, Currin suggests, provided the sensibility that led the killers, as actors, to act as 
they did. The drive to produce narrative coherence, we are warned, is not in and of itself an 
ethical act; the killers may have themselves been driven to act as they did through a metaphorical 
imagination, toward an ends that they conceived to be narrative.  
If the facts alone seem to warrant the figural treatment that Krog provides them, there is 
a second specifically literary history that precipitated Krog’s fictional treatment of them. In 
1987, Hans Pienaar, an anti-apartheid journalist, had embarked upon a mission to bring 
awareness of the violent actions of the police death squads, as he calls them, to the South African 
national consciousness. He describes how, in 1986, he had been asked to join the board of the 
anti-apartheid Afrikaans publishing house Taurus, which was set up to publish literary works by 
banned Afrikaans writers. In the wake of the Motasi murders, a leading South African Human 
Rights activist and lawyer, the same Brian Currin who would later examine the killers as they 
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delivered their testimony at the TRC gave Pienaar the files of his client’s suit against the South 
African Police Force—the files of one Richard Motasi.74 Pienaar describes how, 
[a]t that stage little was known about the apartheid death squads - they were just 
rumours. Soon after my discovery, however, the first exposes began appearing in 
the alternative press, both in Afrikaans and English. You can imagine that the 
focus was more on the high-profile revelations of the murders of political 
activists. The Motasi case tended to go on the back burner, especially since it 
involved a black policeman, and black policemen were seen as turncoats and 
apartheid stooges and were often targets of action by the ANC and others—many 
were killed. The evidence was also not so clear as in the whistleblowing stuff 
elsewhere. 
 
According to Pienaar, the decision about what to do with the facts of the case was split between 
those who advocated for a literary rendering as a political move, and those who wanted to 
publicize the killing more immediately, as factual reportage. The decision was hotly debated; 
journalists at the anti-apartheid weekly Vrye Weekblad (Free Weekly) wanted to publicize the 
evidence it had from Currin speculating about the Motasi case as an extrajudicial murder by the 
South African police, while Taurus, a politically engaged publishing house that was run by and 
published anti-apartheid writers and thinkers, insisted that the revelations be put on hold until the 
fictional novel, which was aimed at arousing the consciousness of what Pienaar calls the “literary 
classes,” was published. Pienaar describes the strategy as an attempt to reach these political 
readers who “believed apartheid was merely a well-intentioned policy gone wrong.”75 Pienaar 
writes, 
…Taurus felt that the case of the Motasis should be turned into a novel, which 
when it appeared won several prizes and was made into a TV movie by [a] close 																																																								
74 Interestingly, during the TRC amnesty hearings, Currin goes on record saying that he gave the files to John Miles, 
the author of Kroniek uit die Doofpot. In our conversation, he told me that he did not know how the journalist Hans 
Pienaar had gotten hold of the Motasi case files; he recalled giving the file over to the fiction writer. Given the line 
of inquiry this essay pursues, it is not insignificant that the facts of how the novel itself originated are split, between 
the journalist’s claim that the facts were given over for non-fictional treatment, and a second claim, rendered by the 
lawyer and the legal testimony, that the facts were given over to a fictional writer to be turned into a novel. 
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friend Etienne de Villiers. It is regarded as a classic and can be credited with 
finally persuading many Afrikaans speakers that the apartheid government was 
indeed evil and perverse, and apartheid was not just a case of the failure of well-
meaning developmental policies.76 
 
Hitting back against a censorship law aimed at keeping the violence of the South African 
apartheid state silent, Taurus decided to enlist an Afrikaans writer named John Miles to write a 
novel titled Kroniek uit die Doofpot, later translated in English under the title Deafening Silence, 
which Taurus published in 1991. 
The Afrikaans title Kroniek uit die Doofpot, translates to “Chronicles of Deafness” or, 
more literally, “Chronicles of Silence.”77 The published English translation “Deafening Silence,” 
puts the stress on the violence done to Moleko’s body, replicating the physical violence with an 
epistemic violence, the violence of erasure. The sense provided by the original Afrikaans title, in 
its convergence of the idea of both silence, and of a form of writing that is “chronicle”—
decidedly not narrative, that which stops short of being narrative—foregrounds the act of telling 
itself, the tension between modes of factual conceptualization. A narrative, explains Hayden 
White, “is a symbol, mediating between different universes of meaning by “configuring” the 
dialectic of their relationship in an image [that is] nothing less than narrative itself, that 
“configuration of events reported in the chronicle by the revelation of their ‘plot like’ nature.” 
What White means is that unlike the chronicle, which consists of listing facts without 
explanation, narrative “construes a whole out of scattered events.”78 In a chronicle, there is no 
narrative whole, for there is no principle of culmination or resolution; the chronicle consists of 
facts without symbolism, and more significantly, as White argues, “is marked by a failure to 																																																								
76 Ibid. On the condition of South African writing in the age of censorship, see Stephen Watson, “Poetry in South 
Africa Today,” 14-19. 
 
77 Translation, mine. Doofpot is also the Afrikaans word for “pressure cooker,” providing the sense of distress to the 
situation described, and the tension of facts densely compressed into a narrative container.  
78 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 5. 
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achieve narrative closure…it leaves things unresolved, or rather, it leaves them unresolved in a 
storylike way.”79 He goes on to explain that the chronicle “does not so much conclude as simply 
terminate; typically it lacks closure, that summing up of the ‘meaning’ of the chain of events 
with which it deals…[it] typically promises closure but does not provide it.”80 For Miles, that 
lack of resolution, narrative closure, and story totality is itself a type of deafness; chronicling 
Motasi’s deafness means recognizing a certain inarticulate mass within the evidence that cannot 
be woven together as story, a story itself of the impossibility of a narrative totality. 
Thus, while the factual content of events may have seemed to possess, immanently, the 
figurative qualities of a fiction, in fact, five years before the TRC amnesty hearings began—five 
years before Krog heard the factual evidence on this case in front of the commission—those facts 
had already become a nationally acclaimed narrative, rendered in fictional terms. Kroniek uit die 
Doofpot—which translates into English most literally as “Chronicles of Silence”—is a 
metafictional Roman à clef of sorts, featuring a thinly veiled figure of Richard Motasi (therein 
called “Moleko”) who shares Richard Motasi’s biographical background, his victimization, and 
ultimately his fate, alongside that of his wife, a fictionalized version of Irene therein called 
“Busisiwe,” or “Busi.” Miles’s text is keenly self-aware of its status as historical fiction; the 
author creates a character who is a double of himself, and self-consciously recreates the process 
of narrative inscription, weaving together “fragments of evidence” brought to him, a “jumble of 
files stuffed into a large yellow plastic supermarket bag.” The writer, haunted by his suspicion 
that “there was little chance those facts would ever appear in leather-bound legal judgments, 
turns instead to fiction as a mode of documentation, employing  what this fictional author figure 
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calls “fragments of evidence such as a laymen would gather about his own case” with the aim of 
“making something out of all this.”81  
Miles’s novel was well received. It won the CNA Award in 1991, and the prestigious M-
Net and Helgaard Steyn Awards in 1992. As Taurus had intended, it was read and widely 
discussed in Afrikaans-speaking literary circles, and was later adapted for television and 
serialized for a broad national audience by an international media tycoon with Afrikaaner 
origins. When the novel was translated into English in 1996, reviewer Thengani Ngwenya of the 
University of Durban-WestviIIe’s English Department noted that: 
[t]extual self-reflexivity, authorial intervention and constant changes in narrative 
point of view are not simply a manifestation of Miles' fascination with 
postmodernist narrative strategies, but a realistic demonstration of the difficulties 
facing a writer who attempts to paint a relatively well-rounded portrait of a man 
whose life-story can only be gleaned from police records, lawyers' files and 
uncertain oral testimonies… perhaps these are the most effective narrative 
strategies to capture the uncertainty, indeterminacy and fragmentation that 
characterised Moleko's brief and unhappy life as policeman in the turbulent 
1980s.82  
 
The review explicitly connects the problem of knowing the reality of Motasi’s character and his 
life, given the fragmented, impossibly indeterminate state of available evidence, with a problem 
of narrative form, the unclear relationship between the ontological statuses of fictional and 
factual discourses. The essential aesthetic of that narrative is its fragmentation, its uncertainty, 
and its negotiation between the attempt of the author “to make something out of all this,” to craft 
story, and yet to simultaneously restrain himself to the chronicle form, to document as closely as 
possible the objective reality of facts.83 Writing about Motasi’s murder, for Miles, meant 
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negotiating between necessary authorial invention, telling of the truth through fictionalization, 
and the danger of so fictionalizing a history besotted with systematic attempts by authority to 
fictionalize the truth. For those who read the book, saw the television series or the film, or who 
heard of the murder as it circulated in the national and international imaginary, the Motasi’s 
murders thus became themselves a metaphor for the state of narrative in South Africa. A 
narrative of national literary prominence, it not only seized upon and captured an already 
existing sense of instability between fact and fiction, but also amplified and broadcasted this 
sensibility, making such a sensibility a nationally recognized and self-evident truth about the 
state of truth and fiction under apartheid. 
In rendering a metafictional telling of the events leading to Motasi’s murder, Miles’s 
narrative swerves between two fundamentally oppositional perspectives. On one hand, the 
account is narrated through the eyes of the fictionalized author, who has set out to track down 
“Moleko’s” story through the traces, evidence, and clues left in the wake of his death. The 
authorial character, a fictionalized double for the writer himself, narrates himself going through 
grocery bags filled with documents from Moleko’s court case, hunting down medical records, 
and interviewing neighbors, family, and Molkeo’s lawyer. On the other hand, Miles’s text 
departs radically from any realistic or possible point of vie that could be tethered to a material set 
of evidentiary facts. The novel concludes by imagining the narrative unfolding Moleko’s 
perspective itself—right up to the point of the murder. The authorial perspective occupies a 
position at the outskirts of both discourse and the enclosed fictional world, signaling the 
boundary between imagined and empirical realities, detailing a point of view that is pure 
spectacle, one that could only be speculative. In so doing, the text highlights not only the 
complicated negotiation between one “true” available empirical reality—the capacity to factually 
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reconstruct the past through the residual evidence, thus creating a narrative fiction, and a second 
“true” empirical reality that is unavailable, the reality that belongs to Moleko/ Motasi alone, and 
can only be imagined—and is thus inherently fictional.  
 The final pages of Miles’s novel highlight the extremity of this dualism in perspective, 
between closeness and distance, fictionality and factuality. In the closing pages, Miles imagines 
Moleko in the final moments leading up to his death, facing his assassins. Providing Moleko 
words unclearly marked as inner or outer dialogue, the narrative attributes the following text to 
Moleko: “Speak up! I’m deaf, you know. Afrikaans, Zulu, a sigh in Sotho (what? who?)” before 
noting, “Look there, see how that man takes out bullets to load them into death…it stays dark.”84 
The perspective is an impossible one, recounting in retrospect, with the intimacy of first person, 
the final moments of a man whose perspective has been obliterated and thus cannot retrospect. It 
is also a moment of crisis about language; between the command to “speak up,” the recalling of 
deafness and the demand for articulation of the crime across African languages, the text gives us 
a moment where descriptive language is both called for and broken off; language is not only 
cacophonous, “Afrikaans, Zulu, a sigh in Sotho,” but also withheld, inaccessible.  
This textual moment is juxtaposed with an image of “The writer…sitting with his eyes 
shut…Was it because he knew too much and might spill the beans?”85 If the writer knows too 
much, it is precisely because the evidence for his recreation is too little. The sentence warrants a 
close and pressured review; the writer’s recreation is here cast as the act of aesthetic invention, 
the act of aesthetic invention processed through a type of judgment aimed at the desire for a 
Kantian-like idea of wholeness that would overcome the despair of fragmentation, the terror of 
the unknowable.  “Knowing,” in this case, equates to imagining, stylizing, and re-presenting a 																																																								
84 Ibid, 290. 
 
85 Ibid, 291. 
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possibility that cannot be known, recognizing that attempts to provide a sense of cohesive 
wholeness, in this case, can only result in further fragmentation of rational explanation and 
coherent configuration. The “too much” is a reference to the evidence that will not add up to an 
explanation of the whole. The most vivid and indubitable feature of Motasi’s death is the very 
imaginary figure of Moleko’s imagined death that the author creates. What then does the author 
mean by knowing “too much,” to the extent that he might “spill the beans?” Knowing “too 
much” means knowing that there are too many possibilities of what the evidence might mean to 
fix the narrative with any certainty. Having completed the text, the author fears that in so 
attempting to contain the whole within narrative form, he might reveal the very way in which the 
content is paradoxically uncontainable by the narrative form. What makes the reality of the 
fictional Moleko’s death a limit for the author figure writing it is not the terrible reality of the 
death he imagines, but rather its terrible non-reality. It is fiction of what might have happened to 
Moleko, it is the imagined Motasi, it is the infinite, and thus unlimited range of possibilities of 
what might have been Motasi’s experience of life and his death—and it is the not knowing, 
despite accruing all the evidence—that shuts the author into his own darkness at the end of the 
novel.  
 I am arguing that by 1996, the time that the amnesty hearings in South Africa began, the 
Motasi murder had become part of the national imaginary, an iconic metaphor for the darkness 
into which the South African community had been cast. South Africa had seen a reflection of 
itself as the cacophonous, a nation deaf to the evidence of a nationally circumambient atrocity, 
the open secret of apartheid that was everywhere visible, and nowhere evidenced. The Motasi 
case had become a figure for a specific form of injustice within the legal system, one that the 
system itself hid and erased. The murders had also gained national prominence as a narrative 
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about the misuses and abuses of law enforcement, abuses specifically enabled by the 
manipulation of evidence. The Motasi case had, broadly speaking, become a metaphor for not 
knowing, for the destruction of evidence, for uncertainty, for fragmentation of knowledge, and 
for the limits of evidence to reconcile a true picture of apartheid’s horrific reality. Miles’s novel 
in particular had recast the idea of a just South African legal system as a type of fiction. In the 
wake of his novel’s publication, the Motasi case had become what Gayatri Spivak might have 
called a mischmasch der kenntnisse, a cacophony of mixed narratives splashed across a multitude 
of forms and conceptual frames, symbolic of the unclear distinctions between fact and fiction, 
reality and illusion, evidence and verifiability.86 Kroniek uit die Doofpot’s metafictional narrative 
highlighted not only the tension in attempts at recovery under these circumstances, between the 
endeavor of factual and fictional re-presentation, but also underscored the radical alterity of 
Richard Motasi and his death, the extent to which under these conditions, imagining the truth of 
this atrocity might be more frightening and destabilizing than either knowing it for certain, and 
simultaneously impossible to render legible within any stable narrative fiction.  
Perhaps most significantly, I am arguing that as the Amnesty Hearings of the TRC 
churned out its findings, in its pursuit of truth through hearing and collecting testimonies, and as 
Krog began to hear these testimonies, record them, and transcribe them within the context of 
Country of My Skull, the factual account of Richard Motasi’s case, his situation and his death, 
had been overtaken by a metaphorical understanding of it and fictional rendering of it. There was 
no way for Krog, a journalist encountering the testimony in 1996, to hear the evidence given in 
the court at the Amnesty hearings as exclusively factual evidence. Instead, that testimony had 
																																																								
86 I take this term from Gayatri Spivak, who, following Marx, uses it to describe the “yet unreadable alternative 
history” of the subaltern figure in globalizing circuits. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Who Claims Alterity?,” in 
An Aesthetic Education in an Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012) 57-72, 60. 
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already become known in the terms created by nationally iconic fictions. The Motasi story, or 
fragments of it, already existed, had been split across a multiplicity of media—Miles’s novel, the 
episodic television dramatization, the Sowetan report, public speculation. The truth, that is to 
say, the empirical facts of the Motasi case, had been shot through, and indeed had become 
screened by that discourse; Miles’s novel, and the nationally broadcasted representation of 
“Moleko” had become more “real” to the South African public than the “real” Motasi ever had 
been. Years before Krog was to arrive at the TRC hearings, and years before she would hear the 
testimony recited in regard to the Motasi deaths, far before she would have encountered the 
“facts” of the murders of Richard and Irene, Krog had already prefigured them, through the 
fictionalized narrative of Tomelo John and Busi Moleko.87  
VIII. The Evidence of Fictions 
In Miles’s fictional novel, a fictional writer, who bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
author, describes how he comes by the facts he will weave into narrative form. He describes his 
contact point with the facts: a scenario in which a human rights lawyer, “Craig Byron,” turns 
over the files to him in order to have them made public as a fictional story. Craig Byron, as the 
novel describes it, had taken on Moleko’s suit against the superior who had assaulted him, 
representing Moleko in his appeals up to the point of the murder. After receiving the file from 																																																								
87 In fact, the sense of the fictionalized version of the Motasi narrative as mutably factual and fictional echoes the 
scholarship about the case.87 Miles’s fictional book was frequently cited to substantiate documentary attempts. 
Literary critic Gerrit Olivier proposed using the novel to support the “process of revealing the facts behind the many 
unresolved political crimes of the past” (Olivier qtd. in Miles). Material from Miles’s book, including the published 
novel and Miles’s materials, to which he was given access by the South African group Lawyers for Human Rights, 
Brian Currin, was used by the prosecution during the legal proceedings in the TRC amnesty process. 
 
The functional sense in which fact and fiction interpolate one another in this sort of feedback loop, as they do in 
Krog’s narrative, was already immanent to the case before it became subject to “factionalization” (Krog’s term for 
the mixed status of factuality and fictionality in Country of My Skull) in her text. Krog herself was aware of and 
intimately knowledgeable about Miles’s work; in fact, she was among the reviewers of Miles’s novel. In her review, 
she asks, “What happens when truth is more frightening than fiction?” and finds the novel a “sensitive parallel to the 
amnesty applications before the commission searching for the South African truth” (“Review: Kroniek uit die 
Doofpot” quoted. in John Miles, Deafening Silence).  
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the lawyer, the fictional author finds documents missing and muses that he will “have to change 
a great deal…invent details that aren’t there…pad out people’s opinions with my own, and hide 
my ignorance behind the smooth flow of the narrative.”88 Tasked with teasing coherence out of 
“such fragments of evidence…a jumble of files stuffed into a large yellow plastic supermarket 
bag,” the fictional author has a tough time making something out of the fragments of 
evidence.”89 It is on this shaky set of facts that the fictional author begins to build the structure of 
his fictional invention. 
When the human rights lawyer Brian Currin faced Richard Motasi’s killers in the TRC 
proceedings to hear their evidence, he too was seeking coherence in a case that was full of 
fragments and missing critical details, absences that could, up to that point in time, only be filled 
in by speculation. Yet, like Krog, Currin had already encountered the killers and the graphic 
murder they had committed, as fictional characters in Miles’s novel. But Currin had another 
connection to the case, and to the killers that preexisted both the novel and the TRC testimony: 
Currin is the character on whom “Craig Byron” is based, the very lawyer who had supplied John 
Miles with the case files and the evidence that documented Richard Motasi’s life and death. 
Currin, now an international conflict mediator, agreed to meet me at his office in the Sandton 
area of Johannesburg.  
Twenty-five years after Miles published his book, Currin—still the unmistakable 
reflection of the fictional Craig Byron, the man Miles’s novel describes as resembling his 
namesake in fact and in literary history—appears as a Byron-like figure, “an English poet…like 
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someone with a sound classical education, who reads his Homer in Greek.”90 Byron is a mirror-
image of Currin; Byron is Currin’s flipped double (whose description in the novel also recalls the 
poet of the same name), right down to the inverted initials. I caught him in between trips to the 
Basque country where he had undertaken an intense negotiation role in a Truth and 
Reconciliation Process he had engineered there, leveraging his experience in the TRC to work as 
a mediator. He agreed to an interview about the facts of the murder, a case that he described as a 
story “connected to so many things…not only Richard and Irene Motasi—though obviously 
about them—but also one piece in a big puzzle” of South African history, and the production of 
evidence in the wake of apartheid.91 
Brian Currin met Richard Motasi in 1984, shortly after Richard Motasi was assaulted by 
Van Zyl and the State Attorney refused to take the case. Motasi came to Currin, who at the time 
was well known as a human rights activist, to ask Currin to take his case and to represent him in 
his attempt to claim damages resulting from his injury and subsequent disability. Motasi asked 
Currin to help him achieve legal justice; he wanted to be treated fairly under the law. As a 
policeman, Motasi felt a strong appreciation and trust for the law to administer justice, even as he 
saw, as a black man living in apartheid South Africa, that the law systematically behaved 
unjustly. He felt gravely injured by not only the assault, but also the legal system’s calculated 
refusal to allow him shelter under its systematic and institutional provisions. Currin and Motasi 
became close; their relationship was that of attorney to client, but as a human rights figure and a 
committed anti-Apartheid activist, Currin also felt deeply for Motasi’s plight and saw the extent 
of the police aggression and intimidation.  																																																								
90 Ibid, 44. 
 
91 I am indebted to Brian Currin for this information. “Brian Currin, Interview with Deb Donig, Johannesburg, 19 
September 2016.” 
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A few months before Motasi’s death, after working for many years as a human rights 
lawyer in South Africa, Currin decided to leave his private law practice, and to found a public 
human rights organization he called Lawyers for Human Rights. He explained that he “felt that 
being an attorney and being restricted by the rules of the profession in terms of what you could 
do and what you couldn’t do,” and decided that  “the right thing to do was to become a human 
rights activist and to be able to rather work in that context.” To set up the organization, he began 
traveling internationally to raise funds.92  
He saw Motasi for the last time in November. Motasi, as Currin described him, was 
“quite desperate,” believing, at that stage, that his life was threatened. When he confronted 
Currin with his concerns, Currin reassured him that the threats he had become concerned about 
would not materialize. Currin believed that the police force would not touch Motasi. As he 
apprehended it, the police force knew that Motasi had hired Currin as his lawyer, and that as the 
police force knew that Currin was in possession of evidence that would trace back to them, any 
attack on Motasi would be obvious, easy to evidence and would threaten to expose the police 
force as perpetrators, with a clear line of evidence implicating them in any attempt to harm him.  
Moreover, the police knew that Currin had taken on another major critical client who was 
threatening to expose evidence proving the police to be behind a number of assassinations: the 
infamous police operative Dirk Coetzee, who had co-founded the secret police at Vlakplaas, and 
who himself had taken part in a number of murders before (Currin suspects) a case of improperly 
managed type II diabetes led him to fits of madness where he began speaking out internally 
against police operations. After receiving a dishonorable discharge, Coetzee had come to Currin 
for representation, delivering critical testimony that revealed all the activities of the hit squads, 
and the assassinations in which he had been involved. While the ethic of client attorney privilege 																																																								
92 Ibid.  
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made it impossible for Currin to reveal this evidence, the police knew that Currin knew the 
South African police possessed and was actively running a hit squad, and that Currin had 
evidence to prove this to be true. They understood that with Richard Motasi as his client, it 
would be obvious to Currin and provable by Currin, beyond speculation, that any attempt on 
Motasi’s life would be identified as a police assassination. That is why, Currin explained to me, 
he had told Richard Motasi not to worry about the police making good on their threats.  
Currin returned from the United States and Europe, and set up headquarters for Lawyers 
for Human Rights in an arcade located in Pretoria, right next to the police headquarters. “As a 
statement,” he told me. “To say a) we’re not afraid; and b) we’re not going to be subversive, but 
we’re going to be a Human Rights organization that is going to expose Human Rights 
violations.” He moved into the offices on the first of November in 1987. He was painting the 
walls of the office when the news of Richard Motasi’s death—reported (falsely) to the South 
African public as the assassination of an ANC terrorist—came on over the radio.  
Once apartheid had ended, and the newly formed Mandela government had prepared the 
engine of transitional justice to move into forward motion, Mandela appointed Currin to head 
what was called the “Currin Commission,” which reviewed amnesty files for South Africans who 
had been exiled or imprisoned for politically motivated anti-government activities that had 
resulted in deaths, by and large recommending the release of and granting amnesty for those 
cases, overturning the judgments rendered in 1990 and 1991 under South Africa’s indemnity 
laws, which had been created by the apartheid regime and which had previously denied amnesty 
to the applicants. Working with the Mandela government, Currin went on to become one of the 
chief architects of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, serving as examining council in the 
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amnesty hearings. It was Currin who, in 1996, publicly prosecuted the four assassins who had 
murdered Motasi in 1987.93 
IX. Arresting Testimony 
Krog’s chapter on the 1996 radio broadcasts of the Motasi murder testimony is full of 
stops and starts, of narration that cannot stick with its journalistic imperative to report the facts 
given over by the five security cops who headed the Vlakplaas force, who Krog says “have 
become more real than [her] own life.”94 Krog begins the chapter by confessing that she cannot 
close the case and leave her office for the day, for “[t]wo versions of the murder…were put 
before the committee,” the one incompatible with the other. The facts of these incompatible 
testimonies, the first by assassins Captain Jacques Hechter and corroborated by the testimony of 
Warrant Officer Paul Van Vuuren, the second by assassin Joe Mamasela, are at ends, not only in 
terms of what the witnesses who deliver them say, but also, for Krog, how they speak—the 
testimonies are divided by both factual inconsistencies and an aesthetic divide. The former, Krog 
observes, is characterized by stops, pauses, and ellipses; the latter by glibness, fluency, and 
fluidity. The first transcript, a record of Hechter’s testimony, appears in Krog’s text, and reads: 
We got out a distance from the house. We were wearing dark clothes and 
balaclavas. Mamasela’s wasn’t over his face, just rolled down low. He knocked on 
the Motasis’s’ door and asked if he [Richard] was in. We were standing around the 
corner and listening. When Mamasela told us that Richard’s wife was expecting 
him, we decided to wait for him inside. Mamasela knocked on the door again. 
When the woman opened the door, Mamasela pushed her with a gun to a back 
room, where he had to keep her from seeing us. We switched off the lights, but left 
the television on so that it seemed that someone was there. We then hid behind the 
couch. Then a vehicle arrived: his Mazda. He came to the door and found it locked. 
MOTASI was struggling with the lock when we jerked him inside. He immediately 
realized there was trouble. He struggled violently—he fought like a tiger and he 
shouted wildly. To bring him under control, I started to strangle him— 
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94 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 116. 
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The taped testimony is itself full of blockages, which Krog’s text augments by stopping the 
testimony mid-sentence, “switch[ing] the tape recorder off as Hechter says, in Afrikaans, “Et het 
hom gewurg,” (“I strangled him”) an utterance striking to Krog for the way that the “dry, 
scraping “g,” pronounced in Afrikaans with a harsh chhh, “catches in his throat.” She resumes 
the transcription, which continues as follows: 
--and Van Vuuren smothered him with a pillow over his face. He then fired four 
shots with his AK-47—the pillow was a silencer. Loots was also present and he 
accidentally hit me with the stock of his AK-47 against the arm. Then we called 
Mamasela: “Come on! We’re finished.” Just as we were walking out, we heard a 
shot from inside the house. When Mamasela joined us, we asked what the shooting 
was about. He told us that he killed the woman because she saw his face. 
It was only afterward that we learned there was a child in the house.95  
 
Several pages later, Krog supplies the testimony from Hechter’s accomplice, Paul van Vuuren. 
The testimony roughly confirms Hechter’s own, adding further texture to the “shots inside the 
house” recounted in Hechter’s statement. In van Vuuren’s version, he testifies that,  
“if I remember correctly, the woman’s head was under the blanket, or the sheet, 
but her head was covered. I told Mamasela: “You must come, we are finished”—
and then I turned around and ran out. Heard shots. When I got outside, Mamasela 
was next to me. I said “What did you do?” He told me that he shot the woman 
also because she saw his face.”96  
 
The testimony provided by Hechter and van Vuuren complement one another, their facts 
reinforce the authenticity and the stability of the testimony as a “true” account of the past. Then, 
however, right as we seem to be at the point of stabilizing the facts of the case, and bringing 
them into the accordance required for evidence (and to thus render judgment), we are confronted 
with an obstinate second and oppositional truth. For these two testimonies contradict the third 
witness statement, the testimony of Joe Mamasela. In fact, Mamasela’s testimony opposes 
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Hechter’s not only in its factuality, but in its aesthetic style. In contrast to the halting starts and 
stops of Van Vuuren’s testimony, Mamasela’s witness emerges with stark fluency, in what Krog 
calls “an unbroken stream of words,” and reads: 
I was talking to her…and then all of a sudden, Hechter came in, and when they 
were fighting with her husband, she got concerned, she was calm all the time 
because I tried as much as possible to keep her calm, but during the struggle, 
myself I was disturbed, I was perturbed, and she was uncontrollably agitated, and 
Hechter came in and said “Jy staan en gaap, hoekom maak jy nie die vrou dood?” 
([You’re standing there gaping, why don’t you kill the woman?’] Then he took 
my revolver and he ordered her to get into the bed and he shot her about four 
times in the direction of her head, I could see the body and the blood…Then he 
gave me the gun and said “Nou gaan maak die kind…gaan skiet daai kind” [Now 
go and kill…go and shoot that child.”] So I took the gun and I opened the door 
where he was sleeping and I saw this innocent little thing, and his face mirrored 
the face of my own child…I then fired two shots in the direction of the bedroom, 
where the wife lay, then I closed the door…otherwise I would be killed for 
defying an order.”97 
 
The contradiction between these testimonies, specifically over the point of who killed Irene 
Motasi, supplies what I would argue to be the central conflict of Krog’s chapter. They cannot be 
made into a singular “whole,” swerving away from one another not only in factual disagreement 
but in formal cacophony, the aesthetic difference both marking that incoherence and producing 
dissonance between witness accounts. The facts of Irene’s death, and the unwillingness of any of 
the assassins to admit killing her—are obfuscated by the collection of testimonial evidence; 
conflicting accounts on this point of the narrative hinder its cohesion as a narrative whole.  
Irene Motasi’s death in particular is the irreconcilable piece of narrative. Like the break 
in the aesthetic quality of the three killers’s speech itself, the death marks an irreconcilability in 																																																								
97 When I arrived at the South African Historical Archives to review Joe Mamasela’s testimony, I was told that the 
file with his testimony had been “embargoed,” and that it was unavailable to review. No one, including the 
archivists, could explain why; one expert in South African law believes that Mamasela’s testimony may implicate 
the ANC in several of the killings. Since Mamasela did not apply for amnesty, the criminal charges could have legal 
ramifications for the current government. Whatever the cause, Mamasela’s evidence remains beyond the range of 
current inquiry, an enduring absence in the archive and a central silence in the case. Joe Mamasela was recently 
found dead under suspicious circumstances, for reasons unrelated specifically to the Motasi case. Ibid, 109. 
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narrative form. It is the point at which narrative is pulled into crisis as the evidence cannot 
coherently be grouped into the whole. This critical point may also stand at a fundamental hole 
within the South African attempt to produce national reconciliation via personal truth. We must 
ask: why do the killers differ on this one particular point? Why will they readily and graphically 
describe and hold themselves accountable for Richard Motasi’s death, while refusing to do so in 
the case of Irene’s killing?  
Krog supplies one possibility, proposing that, while the assassins could plausibly argue 
that they were ordered, and thus politically motivated to kill Richard Motasi by superiors, “no 
one will admit to killing Irene Motasi, because no political reason could possibly exist why an 
ordinary nurse had to be killed.”98 There is, in aesthetic terms, no narrative logic that would 
explain and assimilate her death into coherent narrative form and still maintain the broader figure 
of the TRC as a coherent narrative. In political and legal terms, Krog’s statement implies that 
Irene Motasi’s death is a death for which amnesty may not apply, since amnesty, in the context 
of the TRC, assumed that those who acted violently did so in politically motivated terms, within 
the context of politically charged and directed structures of violence. Thus, Irene Mutse’s death 
is not just a fact obscured by conflicting evidence, but it is also a fact that cannot be figured into 
the TRC’s amnesty project, insofar as that project assumes that “truth” may produce a 
meaningful narrative that brings about reconciliation.99 There is no evidence that can straddle 
both the demands of “truth,” and the ambition of “reconciliation.” And thus, Irene Motasi’s death 
must remain the matter of speculation within the national imaginary, a reconciliation only 
possible if one sacrifices the ideal of “the truth.” 																																																								
98 Ibid, 111. 
 
99 See Jeanne M. Woods “Reconciling Reconciliation,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 81 
(1998): 81-127. 
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Without the capacity for the evidence to fit together as a narrative, the story cannot be 
“filed,” and the narrative itself swerves between cohesion and fragmentation. Mamasela, she 
writes, speaks in “an unbroken stream of words;” Hechter’s testimony, in contrast not only 
marked by the “dry, scraping g” [that] catches in his throat,” a point of arrested sound that 
accents the verb “gewurg” (strangle), but is actually cut off by Krog, who breaks his testimony at 
this point with a dash to “switch the tape recorder off.” The assault against Richard Motasi, at the 
point of his strangulation, self-strangulates in the retelling of it, catching twice more: it catches, 
this time in the murderer’s throat as he retells the story, again, as it is repeated on the recorded 
tape, and finally in Krog’s own the recording, repeating the rupture.100  
In the struggle between Hechter’s “strangled” testimony, arrested at the point of 
“gewurg,” and Mamasela’s streaming and uninterrupted report of Irene Motasi’s death, Krog 
finds herself at a crossroads. Something has blocked Krog from continuing her narrative of “the 
facts.” It is at this point, between Krog’s transcription of one testimony that strangles words and 
one that glides over them, that the fictional conscience, the “disparaging voice pipes up in [her] 
head,” emerges. It appears as a fictional interlocutor who accuses Krog of creating a “textual 																																																								
100 It is worth noting that in fact, while amnesty was granted to the applicants for Richard Motasi’s murder, it was 
denied by the commission for Irene’s. As Currin explains it, the entire rationale for Irene Motasi’s death rests on the 
killers’ argument that she could have seen Joe Mamasela, who was a top-secret askari killer and a double-agent, if 
she had lived, since she opened the door. The prosecution on this case argued that Irene Motasi’s death could have 
simply been avoided had they worn their balaclavas rolled down, over their faces, thus obscuring their identities; 
“The moment you let [Mamasela] into the house with a balaclava you know that you’re going to have to kill Irene as 
well. And the only reason they didn’t kill the son was because he was five years old.” The prosecution further 
argued that regardless of which of the killers was directly responsible for Irene’s death, South Africa’s constitutional 
“common purpose” law made them all collectively responsible, a line of argument suggestive in its implications for 
the responsibility of the collective South African public for the crimes of atrocity and human rights violations 
committed under the national policies of structural and institutional apartheid. 
 
If testimony, in the context of the TRC, is presumed to reveal truth, and if the aim of truthful revelation is in the 
service of reconciliation, the piecing together of fragments to produce wholeness, here testimony fragments truth, 
and provides evidence for the impossibility of wholeness. Not only will the facts not cohere into evidence, nor the 
style remain steady so as to keep the aesthetic of testimony in this case constant, but moreover, the idea that ”full 
truth” will lead to reconciliation is broken. Full truth here becomes impossible, and the court must either grant 
amnesty to perpetrators, knowing that at least one of them has borne false witness, or refuse amnesty to perpetrators, 
and thus turn away from the national project of bringing the country back together through reconciliation. 
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reading” that may, ultimately (as Krog argues to her adversary) “say something.” The voice 
arrives at this point of dense entanglement between facts and fictions, in which the Motasi 
murders, and the factual records on which they appear, become palimpsests onto which literary 
motifs and figures of conceptual truth and reconciliation may be inscribed. As Krog’s 
interpretation of the testimony swerves between journalistic documentation and poetic 
interpretation, the testimony itself hangs between the pole of aesthetic invention—in which the 
facts, reconstituted into figures, may “mean something,” and the pole of documentary impulse 
toward empirical adherence, in which the facts may well chronicle only silence, remain truths 
that cannot be reconciled into any meaningful constellation.  
What Krog’s dissenting voice describes as a “literary trick” corresponds specifically to a 
way of reading evidence that allows its interpreters to “live comfortably with the details.”101 The 
trick may be specifically a “literary” one, according to her fictional interlocutor, but it is a “trick” 
aligned with the truth commission’s commitment to reconciliation itself; like the literary reading 
that compels Krog, the necessary interpretation of the facts required by the demands of 
reconciliation require a type of narrative stylization that would necessarily reroute attention to 
figural truths, resolving that the more irreconcilable “horror” of the facts themselves be 
sublimated to moralistic and nation-affirming truths that would bridge the deep wound that 
divided perpetrator from victim in a situation that required the two groups to live together. 
Unlike the testimony delivered at the major global models for post-atrocity justice in the global 
consciousness that preceded the rise of South Africa’s truth commission paradigm (namely the 
Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials), which concentrated on delivering factual testimony for the 
purpose of criminally convicting perpetrators as well as gathering evidence, the TRC demanded 																																																								
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evidence to function as a way to “open up the truth for public scrutiny.” As Krog puts it, the 
TRC’s mandate to reconfigure the country was based in the need to “ensure…a sound moral 
basis.”102 Going the amnesty route meant fictionalizing a horrific past reality that could not, if 
inscribed in purely factual terms, be either synthesized into a nationally coherent moral about 
that past, or utilized as a process of reconciliation.103     
X. The Facts of the Fire: Fiction Aflame 
The need for factuality to submit itself to aesthetic revision may have been an imperative 
of the new South African reality, but its demands leave the world of factual documentation and 
the world of fictionalization unstably connected. While the very literal status of the Amnesty 
hearings that Krog reports become figurative, the factual content of Krog’s own world, the world 
of her text, becomes subject to literary, rather than empirical judgment. In Krog’s narrative, 
Loots’s witness and the testimony of the three other perpetrators recorded Amnesty Hearings for 
the Motasi murder is punctuated by a sudden crisis: a fire that burns down the building that 
houses the SABC, the testimony, and the records of the Amnesty Hearings. As Krog switches the 
recorder off in the middle of Hechter’s testimony, she smells something burning, and stunned, 
turns around to see “a heavy stream of smoke billowing around the corner of the passage.” The 
building, she realizes, is on fire, the air “thick with white smoke.”104  
Leaving her notes, her notebook, her laptop, her tape recorder, and the Motasi files 
behind, Krog escapes the building only with Miles’s fictional novel. Standing outside of the 
building in crisis, Krog reads Miles’s imagined account as the testimony, the records, and the 																																																								
102 Ibid, 8. 
 
103 See Lawrence Douglas, “History, Memory and Crimes Against Humanity: A Response to Todorov,” Salmagundi 
128/129 (Fall 2000 - Winter 2001): 320-326.  
 
104 Ibid, 104. 
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evidence for the case—on which Miles’s fiction is based—itself burns inside the building. The 
scene itself is factual; the records of the amnesty hearings kept by the SABC in its archives, are 
themselves broken up by a note that reads, “Note: [s]ome cassettes are missing because of fire & 
move between venues.” The note references Antjie Samuel, Krog’s married name, the name she 
used as a pen name during the trials—a signature as easily traceable to her as Moleko is to 
Motasi—to document, in evidence, the very disappearance of evidence lost in the fire. Taking 
only the fiction with her, Krog leaves the facts and the records of the case to destruction; Krog 
reads the fiction outside the building while the testimonial evidence burns within it.105  
The occurrence of the fire in the middle of this particular testimony, and its intrusion into 
Krog’s text as she writes about the Motasi case, negotiating between factual and figurative 
readings, is an empirical fact. Yet it is impossible to also not read it in figurative terms, terms 
that supplant the actuality of the event and its synchronous presence at the center of this fragment 
as a figure. Here, right in the middle of this critical moment about the empirical nature of 
factuality, is a moment of testimony going up in flames, and evidence going up in smoke—
indeed, in Krog’s terms “white smoke,” a description that in the context of this racialized history 
is almost impossible not to read figuratively.106 As Krog listens to these contradictory statements 
that cannot cohere on a critical point of evidence, in which “[e]ither Hechter or Mamasela killed 
Irene Motasi. The truth does not lie in between. There cannot be a compromise between the two 
versions,” the records of these statements, that is, the material forms that they take, burn.107  
																																																								
105 “Background: 5 Cops Amnesty Hearing: PTA, March 7, 1997.,” South African Broadcasting Commission 
Archive: TRC Transcripts.  
 
106 On the relationship of factual statements to fiction, see John R. Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional 
Discourse,” New Literary History 6.2, (Winter, 1975): 319-332. Italicized emphasis on white is mine. 
 
107 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 112. 
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Are we to give that fire, which frames the Motasi murder narrative, the same “textual 
reading” that Krog gives the Motasi murder that she hears inside that frame? As the fire takes 
hold of the structure of the collapsing building alighted, it also begins to collapse the distinction 
between Krog’s report, her interpretation of the Motasi text, and the text subject to her 
interpretation. Narrative frames crumple and implode as the fire that takes hold of the building 
and burns the records that hold the Motasi narrative becomes as figural as the meaning she 
imputes onto the Motasi murder testimony. These two fragments, separated in Krog’s text by 
different frames, merge into a whole, in which each frame is double voiced, by literality and 
figuration simultaneously; Krog’s very reality has become a text, as figurative and subject to 
aesthetic interpretation as the text of the Motasi case that she is analyzing. At this point in the 
text, it is unclear whether the action unfolding occurs in an self-enclosed text where language 
must only play by the rules of the text in which it is bound, or whether Krog’s narration is 
answerable to the material world beyond the text.  
Krog follows the transcript of Joe Mamasela’s testimony with a paragraph that begins 
with her filing a report on the fire. The language of the report is of the same factual quality as 
Mamasela’s, and reads:  
The fire in the municipal building, which broke out late yesterday afternoon, is 
still smoldering. But the hall in which the hearings of five former security 
policemen took place was apparently not touched by the blaze. National 
Intelligence personnel are still on the scene to ensure that the amnesty premises 
are sealed off. They were sent yesterday evening to retrieve sensitive and 
important documents. At this stage, it is not clear whether equipment belonging to 
the SABC or the Truth Commission was damaged by the blaze. But the fire 
department says that everything will be soaked with water and soot.108  
 
Krog’s language, like Mamasela’s, is factual. Indeed, the records of the Motasi amnesty hearings 
were “soaked with water and soot,” many of them illegible, lost, irrecoverable. The fire’s 																																																								
108 Ibid, 109. 
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intrusion into these hearing presents the narrative with a symbolic presence that cannot but be 
metaphorical, despite its factuality as a material event. As a case centrally about the problems of 
evidence and the unintelligibility of the testimony meant to substantiate its reality with evidence, 
the idea of testimony “soaked with water and soot” cannot but be interpreted figuratively, despite 
the apparent obvious reality of the event. What the fire burns is the material evidence upon 
which is written testimony to the essential impossibility of possessing empirical knowledge.  
XI. Epilogue: Evidence in the Ashes 
Krog’s mysterious fictional voice may have accused her of a “literary trick” in her 
interpretation of evidence through an aesthetic hermeneutic, but the trick may not have been 
altogether Krog’s. If Krog, in her text, treats the testimony on the Motasi murders as if it were 
the matter of fiction, the 1996 Truth and Reconciliation legal testimony itself treats Miles’s 1991 
fiction as though it were the substance of fact. In fact, the novel became a piece of evidence in 
the legal proceedings on the case. During the hearings, John Miles’s novel was referenced on no 
less than five separate accounts, by a variety of actors within the court’s arenas: in the 
examination of witnesses, by the perpetrators delivering testimony, and by the chairmen judging 
it. Examining Irene Motasi’s mother, Mrs. Hlabangane, Advocate Du Plessis inquires as to “the 
fact that there was a book written about [her] son,” to which the witness, mother of the deceased, 
replies, “A book that was written about him, by John Miles, yes, there is a book like that.” Later, 
responding to the testimony, the presiding Chairman states: 
I saw [the text] that you referred to…and I close my eyes to it because I want to 
have a clean head in this matter, in my approach. I haven't those judgments, I can 
assure you. That I would read them later obviously because they're contained in 
the bundle, but I haven't.109  
 																																																								
109 “Testimony of Mrs. Hlabangane” Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings, Pretoria/Gauteng, South African 
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Presumably, the Chairman withholds reading the fiction so as to keep facts and fictions separate; 
the comment itself underscores the powerful possibilities that fiction may, the Chairman suspect, 
possess in directing the routes of judgment.  
Perhaps the most remarkable reference to Miles’s fictional novel in the context of the 
TRC’s attempt to establish the truth from testimony comes from Brian Currin himself who, in the 
middle of the witness evidence intervenes as follows: 
Mr Chairman, sorry, Mr Chairman, maybe I could help with these  
questions. In an attempt to give publicity to this particular matter, I gave my entire 
file to John Miles many years ago and he wrote a novel which is based on these 
facts, but it is fiction. And he wrote it around this particular story, there are many 
gaps in the information that we had, there was lots of speculation and he filled in 
the gaps to make it a whole story and in that book, he talks inter alia about 
Zimbabwe, so the book in fact is written as fiction, although he does relate it very 
closely to the information he got out of my file.110 
 
Currin’s interjection warrants analysis; for here, in the context of testimony aimed at establishing 
“the truth,” multiple layers of fact and fiction converge. In a single instant in a court of law, we 
see the fluid movement of fact and fiction interpolating one another. In seeking to establish the 
facts in the context of testimony, Currin cites Miles’s fictional novel—a novel (in which Currin 
is embedded) based on Currin’s own archive of factual files the fiction. The novel, which 
contains “many gaps in the information,” which John Miles has made into a “whole story” 
through imaginative invention and speculation, becomes a source used in court to establish the 
facts. Thus, the fictional narrative not only records the past, imagining what might have 
happened, but actually takes on the role of informing—and directing—the legal attempt to 
establish and to judge what had, in fact, transpired. What the 1991 fiction had imagined and 
invented about the past ultimately became a driving force in documenting the very reality of that 
past.  																																																								
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 In fact, during the trials one of Motasi’s assassins, Flip Loots, giving his testimony in his 
plea for amnesty on the murders, states the following:  
“Mr Currin, Mr Brian Currin, showed us a book which a John Miles wrote about 
this policeman. It's a thick book about this policeman. And later there was a full 
length film made entitled: "Deadening Silence", about this policeman's career, 
which as far as my knowledge goes, it could be more times, but I know at least of 
two times that the film was shown on the SABC channels, Chairperson. This is 
the first time, the very first time that I saw that this man had rubbed shoulders 
with other people, his commanding officers, head office and the government of 
the day.111   
 
 The fictional novel here performs not only the role of evidence, but also the role of 
commissioning the evidence; it is the knowledge of the fictional novel that drives Loots to 
confess the truth.  
In fact, it was the fictional novel and the publicity it gave to Richard Motasi’s death, that 
led the killers to submit their truths to the commission; faced with a public rendering of Motasi’s 
murder that implicated them in the killing, they had to choose between either criminal 
prosecution or an application for amnesty that required them to submit to public testimony and 
examination. It was Richard Motasi’s amnesty hearing that led the killers to expose not only the 
truth of that case, but to provide the critical evidence that ultimately substantiated, for the South 
African public and for the world watching it, the full, grotesque truth of the atrocities had 
transpired within the South African Police Force under the apartheid state, a truth that burst open 
white South Africa’s fiction about the national past. 
Three decades after the murders, Richard Motasi’s life may now be remembered 
primarily through the documentation of it rendered by fictions. Yet the facts and the figures of 
his case have taken on an afterlife as a pivotal moment in the South African history of evidence. 
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The shock and devestation of the Motasi killings, alongside the assassination of Dr. Robeiro, 
another client of Currin’s, and Dr. Robeiro’s wife Florence, led Currin to set up an NGO called 
“The Independent Commission for the Investigation of Informal Oppression.” The purpose of the 
organization, Currin stated, was to “investigate every single killing or assassination that we 
became aware of, and to try to establish trends and to collect independent evidence as to what 
was happening.” He enlisted established human rights activists, including Black Sash leading 
member Sheena Duncan, Alex Boraine, an activist who would, with Currin, later become one of 
the chief architects of the TRC, Piers Pigou, a and Peter Harris, who defended the ANC’s famous 
Delmos Five. The investigation they opened gave rise to three more commissions of inquiry, 
which culminated in the “Goldstone Commission of Inquiry,” known formally as the Goldstone 
Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. It was as 
a consequence of the Goldstone Commission of inquiry that all of the evidence about the third 
force hit squads, including the assassination of Richard Motasi, was revealed in South Africa.112 
As Currin described it,  
[this case] is all central to, I suppose, my own motivation in trying to get as much 
information as I could get not only in the context of South Africa but also in the 
context of Richard Motasi. And it was as a consequence of all of those 
investigations that information came out and we could identify these individuals 
as being involved in hit squad activities--which then resulted in them applying for 
amnesty and revealing their role in the killings. They would have never have done 
it otherwise. Because if you look at the applications that went to the TRC for 
indemnity, they were all in relation to cases where they had been identified as 
culprits through the commission of inquiry that were held into third force 
activities…So it was as a consequence of all that …that that [the killers] came 
forward—they didn’t just volunteer and come forward, they came forward 
because they knew that there was evidence pending against them on this case, 
which would in turn implicate them in others. They also knew that at that stage 
that there was a change of government and that if they didn’t give evidence and 
didn’t apply for amnesty they would be prosecuted because the evidence was 																																																								
112 The evidence remained under siege throughout the process of developing the TRC. See Press Statement, 
Application: Brian Currin vs. The State President, the Minister of National Education, The Director of Archives, and 
Director General of National Intelligence Services re: Destruction of Documents, September 24, 1993.”  
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there…It was all, in some way, motivated by Richard’s death.”113 
 
South Africa knew that the world would be watching, that the TRC would be set not only 
in the national public eye, for the country to see and to come together under one common truth, 
but also on a global stage. But it could not have anticipated the resonances of the actions that 
occurred on that stage. As the SABC completed its final broadcast of its proceedings, the TRC 
was already becoming the leading model for subsequent attempts to barter post-atrocity justice, 
truth commissions replacing the existing predominant model of retributive justice set as the 
international standard in the wake of the post-Holocaust tribunals.114 Twenty years after the 
South African TRC heard the first of witness testimonies, commissions fashioned on the TRC 
continue to abound in a dizzying array of permutations, arising across a diverse geographical and 
geopolitical terrain, the world drawing from the South African national process for arbitrating 
post-atrocity justice.115 The persons involved with the process of establishing the truth about 
Richard Motasi’s murder have taken on legal roles on the global stage, influencing the direction 
of legal evidence on the global terrain.116 Richard Goldstone, for whom the commission that 
established and admitted the evidence that led to the fruition of the TRC is named, went on to 
serve as the chief prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal, and oversaw 
the examination of war criminals in the Rwandan genocide and the Yugoslavian crimes in the 
1990s. He later led a critical investigation of evidence on human rights violation in the Gaza 																																																								
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War. Brian Currin currently serves as an international mediator, helping to develop truth 
commissions around the globe, currently in Northern Ireland and the Basque conflict zone. 
In 2002, Tshidiso Motasi, the young son of Richard and Irene, enlisted as a plaintiff in a 
class-action suit filed in the Eastern District Court of New York, against a multiplicity of 
international companies headquartered in the United States, companies that, the lawsuit alleged, 
dealt in the “key industries of oil, armaments, banking, transportation, technology, and mining,” 
industries did business with the Apartheid regime. They were thus, in the argumentative terms of 
the lawsuit, “so integrally connected to the abuses that apartheid would not have occurred in the 
same way without their participation.” The claim, filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act, a statute 
that allows foreign citizens to seek resolution and damages within US courts for human rights 
violations committed outside of the US in violation of the Law of Nations, alleged that 
“[d]efendants acted with deliberate indifference to the well-being of the African population and 
knew or should have known that their conduct endangered the lives of black South Africans. The 
defendants’ conduct also satisfies the principles of third party liability which were imposed on 
corporate participants in crimes against humanity by the Nuremburg Tribunal.”117 The lawsuit 
alleged sought to establish the degree of international complicity with the human rights 
violations committed under apartheid, and to do so under the rubric of existing international law 
established by the globally recognizable frame of the post-Holocaust atrocity models of justice. 
Yet equally so, it sought to hold the international community responsible for its “extraordinary 
level of self-delusion, or the deliberate denial of reality,” a plaint that speaks not only to the 
global dimension of perpetration, in the eyes of the victims, but also to the way in which the 
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reality of apartheid remained criminally, a fiction for the international community.118 It is 
fundamentally that fictionalization that the lawsuit finds criminal. As I write, the case is under 
review and deliberation by the United States Supreme Court; the decision rendered about it will 
be inducted as a Federal precedent that will impact and decide the fates of all future cases for 
which this precedent may serve as a figure. In the description of the plaintiff Tshidiso Motasi 
that is rendered within the document, the facts of the case appear, culminating into the 
recognition of those facts provided by fiction: 
Tshidiso Motasi is the son of John and Penelope Moloke, who were murdered in 
their beds by the South African Police. Mr. Motasi was only 5 years old at the 
time. Three members of the SAP stormed into his home at 10pm and shot his 
father. His mother, who witnessed the slaying and saw the face of one of the 
killers, was shot in order to protect the identity of the killers. The police did not 
detect Mr. Motasi. Not knowing what to do, Mr.Motasi spent the night alone, 
crying, with the bodies of his murdered parents. Neighbors, who heard his cry the 
following morning and came to investigate, found Mr. Motasi with his parents’ 
bodies. John Miles chronicles Mr. Motasi’s story in the book Deafening 
Silence.119  
 
If fictions of the Motasi murders continue to circulate alongside the facts of the case within the 
form of the law, so too do the facts of the lawsuit continue to orbit as forms in a global afterlife 
of fictions. In 2004, Samuel L. Jackson and Juliette Binoche starred in a fictionalized rendering 
of Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull. Therein, in a short, dramatic, and emotional scene, a 
young black child named “Peter Makeba” encounters the man, a white former police officer, who 
killed his father.  He listens to the testimony of the officer, testimony that is unmistakably based 
on Van Vuuren’s amnesty hearing for Richard Motasi’s death. The fictionalized former officer, 
therein named “Van Deventer,” provides his “true” witness for the camera: 
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I started to strangle Mister Makeba. He struggled, violently. Sergeant Schempers 
smothered him with a pillow, over his face. Then I fired, four shots with my AK, 
through the pillow. There was blood and feathers everywhere. The woman was 
hiding under the bed. Sergeant Schempers killed her. He didn’t know the boy was 
there. He just stood there, looking at me. I could see his mother's body lying there. 
I pointed my gun right at him, I was going to shoot. He didn’t move, he just stood 
there, staring. I couldn’t do it, I defied an order. I can’t sleep. When I close my 
eyes all I see is him. I’ll look after him. I’ll pay his school fees. Please, let me do 
something. Please [on his knees].120 
 
“This scene,” said the film’s director, John Boorman, “about the little boy, here, some 
people have thought to be unbelievable, and yet this scene is probably the only hearing where 
what we’re seeing is exactly what happened… This one was almost exactly what happened.” He 
continues, “It's one of the cases where there was forgiveness.”121 In truth, the scene is more a 
fiction of reconciliation than a truth; it imagines exactly what didn’t happen in the aftermath of 
the TRC hearings. In 1997, four years before In My Country was released, the South African 
Broadcasting Commission had interviewed Tshidiso Motasi, who was then sixteen years old, 
about his memory of the murder ten years before. After describing what he remembered of the 
night of the murder, the SABC filmed a meeting it coordinated between Tshidiso Motasi and 
Paul Van Vuuren. The two men shook hands and sat down together at a table. In the recording, 
Van Vuuren speaks to Tshidiso. “Listen,” he says,  
Let me tell you, all the people tell you, "we must say sorry, we must say sorry. 
Are you sorry?" Now, just to say “I'm sorry” is, is an empty word. Do you know 
what I mean? It's the first time in my life--no, it's the third time in my life--that I 
meet you. But sorry--I don't even know you…If I look back at the whole of what 																																																								
120 In My Country. Dir. John Boorman, Sony Picture Classics, 2005, DVD. 
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happened, at apartheid, then I'm sorry about what happened to your parents. 
Because it was a waste...of human life. I'm sorry for that. I know that you're--you 
must hate me. I know if somebody took my parents I would feel maybe I would 
have been much more hateful than you. And I can't, really say how would I feel. I 
can just imagine how I would feel. 
 
The teen-aged Tshidiso responds: “As you told me, it is very hard for you to say you are sorry. 
But for me, it is…something very bad. And…I can't forgive you. I can't.”122  
In the fictional world of the cinema, a child-like Peter Makeba embraces his father’s 
humbled killer, in a scene described by the film’s director, John Boorman, as “a very moving 
moment.”  The two men reconcile. It is an iconic moment, saturated with metaphor and hope 
about the new South African nation. Therein, reconciliation is distilled into a single figure: a 
moment of skin-to-skin contact between two men, one black, one white. The court looms in the 
background, a memory of the legal system that sought to keep them in two different worlds. An 
image of a black orphan embracing the white killer of his parents resonated not only across the 
film, enabling an aesthetic coherence within the dramatic narrative, but also played to a global 
public seeking meaning from the South African story. Audiences around the world watch as two 
international celebrities negotiate the tough terrain of South African history ten years after the 
end of the apartheid era, watch as cinema recreates the formation of a new South African nation 
brought together under one truth about the past. 
Krog closes the file on the Motasi case with a question. “Between the bodies, the child 
Tshidiso remains,” she observes. “Which truth does he inherit?”123 In the version of the facts 
dramatized in fiction, the black orphan, a figure of a new generation born into the violence and 
the wreckage of the past, takes the white killer into his embrace as the two acknowledge that they 
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are bound together by the past that had separated them. Two formerly separate truths become 
one. In a theater of fictions, we may be watching a distinctly “literary trick” unfold on a very 
literal stage. The fabrication of this reconciliation, stylized in the name of cinematic narrative, 
appears, perhaps, as grotesque a fiction as the facts of this case themselves. Fictions may have 
ignited the engine of a reconciliation process in South Africa, but if we are to stay with the facts, 
true reconciliation may only be possible within the sphere of aesthetic invention.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Seeing Double in Indra Sinha’s Animal's People:  
Local Toxins, Global Toxicity and the Universal Bhopal 
 
 
In the first chapter of this project, I sketched out an image of Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 
character, Walter Campbell Jr. as a figure of uncanny doubling, a nexus that converges Campbell 
with Mother Night’s fictionalized portrait of Adolf Eichmann. Doubling the historical figure of 
Adolf Eichmann with the fictional character Campbell as a mirror image of the infamous Nazi 
villain, Mother Night oscillates between fictional and factual discourse in its attempt to locate an 
authentic representation of atrocity. Meanwhile, Arendt conflates factual testimony and fictional 
dramatization in her assessment of Eichamann’s testimony as authentic evidence for atrocity. 
The second chapter identified a cacophony between Antjie Krog’s impulse toward figuration and 
fictionality when treating the TRC testimony, and the reservations of so doing—by none other 
than a fictional double Krog creates as an interlocutor—who admonishes her for straying from 
the empirical truth of the evidence presented in the court.  
When the central characters of Mother Night and Country of My Skull meet their doubles, 
that moment of encounter causes a representational crisis. The encounter with one’s likeness may 
strain claims to the authenticity of the self; equations of likeness may cause structures of 
meaning and recognition to implode as much as such structures may stabilize them. This chapter, 
which considers Indra Sinha’s portrait of the 1984 Bhopal Gas Disaster in his 2004 novel 
Animal’s People, advances this line of thought in its frictional encounter between Bhopal and its 
own uncanny fictional double, Khaufpur. Sinha coins Khaufpur as a Hindi compound word that 
means simply “City of Fear” as a blanket term for modern atrocity writ large. The fictional 
construct of a “City of Fear” serves as a blank form that dislodges the city itself from its 
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coordinates in any one space or time, and serves as a universal signifier dislodged from any 
particular locality. Simultaneously, however, Animal’s People equally insists on its singularity, 
resisting the pull towards universalization; written as the “true” and singular testimony of a 
protagonist who refuses categorization or formal categories, the novel demands attention to the 
particular, the local, and the empirical facts of a specific disaster. Animal’s People may itself lie 
on a fault line between the impulse for the factual—documentary representation of Bhopal as a 
singular, local atrocity—and fictional representation, in which Bhopal stands for and acts as a 
conceptual metaphor for globalized atrocity. The friction between Bhopal and Khaufpur, 
between the space and its people, between the real city and its fictional double, balances the 
novel between scales of both the local and the global, the singular and the universal. That 
doubling lodges testimony between the tasks of “speaking truth,” documenting and evidencing 
an event as it really was, and fictional creation, imagining and re-presenting an event as it might 
have been experienced. In Animal’s People, both figures and facts make claims as evidence for 
atrocity.  
More broadly, the novel’s doubling takes place on the level of scale, weighing out not 
only specificity and factuality against abstraction and fictionality but also locality and globality. 
This is particularly significant, for the problem of conceptualizing and mapping atrocity here is 
tied to the peculiar character of the disaster itself, caught between its horrific local effects in 
Bhopal, and its diffuse global causes in American multinational corporate culture. This 
conceptual problem is itself doubled, as the disaster, broadcast around the world to play out in 
front of the public eye, becomes what legal scholar Jamie Cassels calls “history’s largest single 
international lawsuit.” 1 The legal pursuit that continues on, thirty years after “That Night,” may 																																																								
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replicate and reproduce a form of the disaster itself, and thus compose a second disaster and a 
second instance of intersecting spheres of local and global systems, aggregating into an atrocity 
that “wound its way around the world…[and] turned out to be a second catastrophe for the 
victims.”2 This situation of scale and doubling poses a challenge both for representation and for 
interpretation, a challenge that is moreover reflected and duplicated in the criticism on the novel 
Animal’s People and in the scholarship on Bhopal itself. For this reason, I consider how the 
problem that Animal’s People evokes in its concern about representing an atrocity caught 
between scales of localism and globalism, uniqueness and universality, raises new 
methodological challenges to literary studies itself, surfacing debates about not only the status of 
evidence within literature, but also about the value and application of literary methodologies, the 
value and aesthetic of evidence as understood and employed by these methodologies, and how 
these methodologies of reading enable us to—or perhaps block our ability to—read and interpret 
literary evidence in representations of atrocity. I thus close this chapter by situating the novel—
and the problem of representing this new form of atrocity—within the debate between close, 
localized readings of the novel, and “distant” readings of the novel as embedding an atrocity that 
extends beyond relational and representational means. 
I. The Likeness of Atrocity 
At the dead center of Indra Sinha’s 2007 novel Animal’s People is a moment of 
testimony at its limits, as the narrator, a character named “Animal,” a child badly disfigured by 
the local fallout of a disaster caused by an American corporation, provides a most intimate 
glimpse into an experience of atrocity. Delving into the terrible reality of the deadly factory 
explosion in Bhopal on December 2, 1984, the text gets as close as it may to describing this 
horrific experience to a global audience. Suddenly, however, the narrative perspective pulls away 																																																								
2 Ibid. 
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from this eye-witness testimony to resettle on an idealistic Western doctor, who has come to the 
site of disaster from afar to help the survivors living in the fallout of what the novel calls “That 
Night.” The narrative of the atrocity hangs in delicate balance between Animal’s intimate local 
perspective experience of a suffering that has been imprinted onto him, and that of a foreigner, 
an “Amrikan” intellectual who may ultimately “decide what’s to be said about this place” for the 
global public.3 Shifting between these two frames lies a question at the center of any literature of 
atrocity: “[w]hat must it have been like, that inferno?”4 How to describe the reality of living 
atrocity to those who can only read or hear about it, and how does like-ness, the structure of 
similitude, mediate, enable, or perhaps block that access? 
The text’s unanswered and unanswerable question of what it “must have been like, that 
inferno” is at the heart of political debates about the international community’s obligations in 
recognizing and responding to human rights violations. Demonstrating likeness, or calibrating 
the magnitude of an atrocity by showing its similarity to a previous atrocity, is critical to 
establishing an experience of mass suffering and violence as an atrocity. In an age of 
International Human Rights Accords, evidencing resemblance to international precedent, or 
demonstrating universality is what authenticates a violation as an atrocity, and thus what places 
the experience and its victims within the legislative purview of interventionist and reparative 
policies. However, transcribing a local event into universal terms for a global economy often 
comes at a high cost: as Animal’s narrative implies, there is a reductive quality to globalizing a 
unique experience of pain, converting it to a similitude that converts the individual “cries of the 
dying” into mass historical data, or into a likeness, a mere echo of an antecedent experience of 
horror.  																																																								
3 Indra Sinha, Animal’s People (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2007), 9. 
 
4 Ibid, 219. 
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The scene articulates a concern with how victim narratives in the Third World are 
understood and consumed by First World readers who may only know of atrocity through 
abstractions. While we are told that Elli, the American observer “feels horror,” that horror is 
followed by “the failure of her imagination…unable to imagine the cries of the dying, of those 
who lost their families in the stampede of panicking people…whose children’s hands had been 
ripped from theirs.”5 Elli’s knowledge is distant, a composite of research data. Here it is 
measured against Animal’s own closeness to the disaster. As the atrocity itself negotiates 
between global causes of disaster and local effects, the text engages these two modes of critical 
inquiry to scrutinize how each may make atrocity legible to a global public.  
One primary task of this chapter, then, is to scrutinize the way in which representing local 
atrocity for a global audience maneuvers between singularity and comparison. Focusing on 
Animal’s People, I examine how, in Sinha’s critique of the way in which the novel was depicted 
on the global stage, atrocity in Bhopal swerves between authenticating itself as atrocity by 
evidencing its universality, putting it within the legislative purview of international human rights 
jurisdiction, and simultaneously evidencing its uniqueness, thus taking it outside of the global 
economy. With the formalization of universal international human rights, atrocity becomes an 
increasingly international concern, subject to global assessment. I argue that with the rise of a 
universal model for recognizing and responding to human rights violations, near or far, anywhere 
and everywhere, the representation of atrocity adopts forms of comparison and similitudes as an 
aesthetic as well as a legal convention. Thus, the aim of this chapter is not only to explore 
Animal’s People as a representation that foregrounds the complexity of postcolonial 
representation in global law and universal human rights, but to also probe the way in which the 
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production of postcolonial fiction itself involves a complex negotiation between the global and 
the local.  
The novel’s protagonist, Animal, belongs to Khaufpur, a fictionalized double of Bhopal. 
What Animal cannot see from his local perch,it’s the fictional novel and in the city of Khaufpur, 
is that Khaufpur—and by extension, its citizens—is itself an abstracted figure for global disaster, 
what Sinha himself describes as “every place in which people have been poisoned and then 
abandoned.”6 Khaufpur is a lived reality for Sinha’s protagonist; to him, the city is as real as 
experience of disaster and suffering that remains deposited in his body decades after the event. 
Yet for Sinha, and for the text itself as a self-conscious literary fiction, a metafictional text about 
the universal experience of postcolonial suffering, Khaufpur is a figure, a metaphor that 
aggregates, and that necessarily abstracts, such suffering into a blank form that may represent a 
multiplicity of spaces around the globe. Examining this tension between Animal’s belief in the 
solidity of his singular world, and the author’s constellation of that singular locality out of a 
belief that Khaufpur “could be Seveso, Halabja, Minamata, Caracas or Sao Paulo,” I ask how 
comparative study—and in particular the literary techniques of metaphor, analogy, and 
similitudes—broadens or perhaps narrows the horizon of what we may know about the facts and 
the “reality” of individual atrocities on their own.7 
As an atrocity that may in fact be the result of a cacophony between local and global 
economies, the Bhopal Gas Disaster sits uneasily in the legislative frames established by the 
international community to recognize human rights violations. The kind of oscillations between 
localism and globalism, individualism and similitude, which I identify as concerns about the 
proper way to establish the significance and primacy of an atrocity in political, formal, and 																																																								
6 Indra Sinha, “Bhopal: A Novel Quest for Justice,” The Guardian, October 10, 2007. 
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representational terms, are also fundamentally instabilities in determinations about the 
possibilities for fiction as a space uniquely positioned to conceive of and give shape to an 
otherwise inconceivable reality of mass suffering. Herein, I provide some background to the 
current state of international human rights. I then characterize the relationship between the 
discourse of international human rights, as one that negotiates between universalisms and 
uniqueness, globalisms and localisms, and I show how this negotiation plays out in the aesthetics 
of representation. I then look at the construction and aesthetic of the Bhopal Industrial Disaster 
Animal’s People to show how it embodies and comments on these linkages as they uniquely 
converge in this atrocity, which is itself the product of globalized corporation gone terribly 
wrong. I show how that Bhopal itself gets caught between local and global spheres of legal 
representation and redress, and I argue that the text reproduces this conflict as a debate about 
how to represent international atrocities that occur in a local context such that they may become 
legible to a global audience. 
The structure of analogy in particular becomes fundamental to marking an event as an 
atrocity for the international community. Adopting the recognizable markings of internationally 
recognized atrocity may help to evidence and establish an event’s status as atrocity. As Mark 
Sanders points out, separate literatures of modern atrocity, written to describe a diverse array of 
experiences around the globe, may speak to one another as interlocutors, informing and 
providing mechanisms for representational articulation and thus “providing a form for dealing 
with [the] past.”8 However, claiming recognition through such similitude result in a double bind. 
While identifying likeness may enable interlocution, comparative equations inevitably set up a 
system of equivalences; representing an atrocity in terms of a previous one becomes a task that 																																																								
8 Mark Sanders, “Truth, Telling, Questioning: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Antjie Krog's Country of 
My Skull, and Literature after Apartheid,” Modern Fiction Studies 46.1 (2000): 13-41, 14. 
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involves proving an event “measures up,” that the suffering of its victims is sufficiently horrible. 
Thus Michael Rothberg calls for historians and critics to “think about the relationship between 
different social groups’ histories of victimization,” so as to prevent a “competition of victims” 
within a context of increasingly multicultural, international societies, a cacophony of voices 
clamoring against one another for recognition of each individual group’s experience of pain.9 
As a body of post-1945 body of literature becomes increasingly bound by representations 
of atrocity, representations that are made worldly both by their appeal to be read and recognized 
by an international community, and by the way in which they carry resonances across discrete 
localities, citing, referencing and exchanging content from elsewhere in order to articulate local 
suffering, literary representation may reproduce the political and legislative concerns about 
representation in an age of global atrocity and international human rights. Thus, the questions 
about how local suffering might be represented in the global sphere are tied to questions about 
literary production, distribution, and its appeal to mobilizing awareness and social justice. 
Sinha’s novel has become a touchstone for a postcolonial critique of the abstractions 
enabled by globalization. In what has become a landmark readings of Animal’s People, Rob 
Nixon proposes the term “slow violence” to describe  “such invisible, mutagenic theater…slow-
paced but open-ended, eluding the tidy closure, the narrative containment, imposed by the visual 
orthodoxies of victory and defeat.” The channels of transnational capital renders the links 
between the cause and the effect of such violence invisible, or very hard to trace at best, since 
causes frequently enact effects from a long geographical range, and the effects frequently only 
become visible long after the cause has put an effect into motion. Thus, the suffering caused by, 
and routed through, these channels can be difficult to identify as atrocity, since atrocity relies 																																																								
9 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2009), 2. 
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heavily on the idea of the perpetrator as cause, and the suffering as effect. Nixon, identifying 
Union Carbide’s activity in Bhopal as a form of slow violence, shows how such disaster tends to 
evade aesthetic, evidentiary, and legislative logics that would mark it as criminal. He thus sees 
Animal’s People as evocative of postcolonial attempts to seek alternative forms, outside of the 
reified modes of resolution provided by both conventional legal logic and conventional narrative 
logic in its representational attempt. Nixon’s argument presumes that the core feature of 
representing injury—substantiating victimhood, and compensating pain—is the showing causal 
coherence of narrative structure itself, within the clear representational visibility of cause and 
effect. Thus, when the causal relations that result in, and the conditions of atrocity, are 
themselves essentially occluded, attempts to provide the content of such atrocity with the 
conventions of narrative form fail.10 Along these lines, Liam O’Loughlin finds that the narrative 
form provided by NGOs, whose work outside of legal, national, and governmental frames he 
finds suspect, narrativize their work in terms of “distant suffering,” writing disaster as 
“spectacle.”11 Like Nixon, O’Laughlin argues that reportage from a distance—by NGOs, 
Western journalists, and international legislators—structures the narrative of a local place and 
puts it into global circuit; thus, the content of such reportage becomes immediately universalized, 
featuring primarily that content that can be identified across any specific locality. In a similar 
critical move, Anthony Carrigan finds the novel re-circulating classical references to tragedy 
(specifically, Aeschylus’s Oresteia) and to the formal conventions of the detective novel as a 
way to conceptualize eco-crime.12  																																																								
10 Rob Nixon, "Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque," Modern Fiction Studies 55.3 
(2009): 443-467. 
 
11 Liam O’Loughlin, "Negotiating Solidarity: Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People and the ‘NGO-ization’ of Postcolonial 
Narrative." Comparative American Studies 12.1-2 (2014):101. 
 
12 Anthony Carrigan, “Justice Is On Our Side? Animal’s People, Generic Hybridity, and Eco-Crime," The Journal of 
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Clearly, as this criticism shows, Animal’s People grapples with concern about how to 
situate suffering like that in Bhopal within a frame by which it may be measured, compared, and 
apprehended. Whether the frame is genre, geography, formal, or narrative, these analyses 
underscore the need for, and the challenges to, analyzing and representing—in aesthetic and in 
legal terms—the experience of Bhopal within a comparative framework. Such approaches 
foreground the novel’s attempts to situate its content within a form that would enable 
comparison, and the analyses that these approaches offer proceed to select a comparative 
approach that would put the text into a comparative mode, while simultaneously showing how 
the text negotiates the representational and material problems that make representing Bhopal 
difficult to so classify. Like the novel’s protagonist, these critical responses are concerned with 
the way that the narrative translates in and out of the immediate lived reality that the fiction 
describes. Yet despite the focus that these critics place on the novel’s literary engagement with 
form, genre, and an aesthetic of spectacle, the novel’s profound fictionality, which is in the 
foreground of the text, is never really addressed. While Nixon writes that the capacity to provide 
atrocity in Bhopal “visibility—intranationally and transnationally—lies at the heart of Sinha's 
fictional endeavor,” the novel’s engagement with fiction, and more specifically fictionality, is 
never really addressed.13  
 Yet the “reality” of suffering, and the way in which “distant suffering” tends to cast 
forms of suffering that are invisible or intangible as fictional—that is to say, not fully real, is 
precisely the point. Moreover, if, as O’Loughlin suggests, the global public is “not all-seeing, but 
radically compromised by their own geographical situation as distant viewers,” that reality is 
further compromised, for the reality of such suffering, as Loughlin observes, becomes a subset of 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Commonwealth Literature 47.2 (2012): 159-174. 
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data filed in a database of a “humanitarian project.” Or as Jesse Oak Taylor has written in his 
analysis of what he sees as the novel’s dynamic of “networked interconnection,” such suffering 
becomes a data point in an academic equation, to be analyzed by an array of discourses and 
projects. “Put simply, Taylor writes, “the question becomes not merely, "what does the novel 
represent?" but rather, "what does the novel actually do?"14 
Certainly, one thing that the novel “does” is resist the easy slide of stories of suffering 
into data points. Part of that strategy belongs to the difficult to classify “personhood” of the 
protagonist, Animal, who at once puts a “human” face to the “data” of suffering, and 
simultaneously resists the category of “personhood” that makes such suffering recognizable, and 
affective, for audiences. But if what concerns these critics is the question of what the novel 
actually does, and what it does in its negotiation between forms, between local and global 
contexts, and between discourses, then I would argue that the novel’s own fictionality ought to 
be central to an analysis of the novel. More specifically, the novel’s presentation of suffering as 
“real” within a fictional form is central to its concern with the way in which international 
engagement tends to diminish the “reality” of suffering in Bhopal, the metafictional structure of 
the novel is central to this question. In fact, the novel’s preoccupation with fictionality points 
toward the same issue as its engagement with comparison: in both cases, the reality of suffering 
is at stake. Those who have themselves been part of an experience of mass suffering, and who 
seek to demonstrate, reify, and supply meaning to that experience, may find that while such an 
experience can only be articulated through established forms, doing so is painfully reductive. It 
is, as Susan Sontag once wrote, “intolerable to have one’s own suffering twinned with somebody 
																																																								
14 Jesse Oak Taylor,  "Powers of Zero: Aggregation, Negation, and the Dimensions of Scale in Indra Sinha's 
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else’s.”15 Pain, Elaine Scarry, notes, is “the absolute split between one’s sense of one’s own 
reality and the reality of other persons.”16 The inability to express that pain and the resulting 
incommunicable quality of suffering result in the anguish of incommunicability, but following 
Scarry’s logic it is also what makes one “real,” what separates one’s unique individuality from 
falling into faceless generalization. Since one of the chief characteristics of modern atrocity in 
representation is its exceptional, unspeakable quality, a quality chiefly characterized by a claim 
to incommensurability, one that posits that an experience cannot be expressed in terms of 
existing currencies of language or form, having one’s experience atrocity “twinned” with another 
antecedent experience would necessarily seem to diminish the gravity of the plight. That is to 
say, the same process of equation and identification through likeness that enables articulation 
may equally render it mute; to learn that one’s unique experience of pain is common currency, 
belongs to another figure—or even worse, that one’s experience has already been prefigured—by 
the suffering of another group may mean losing the urgency and gravity that a narrative of pain 
demands from its audience. 
Thus, while comparative approaches may offer a type of legibility to the event of atrocity 
itself, it may paradoxically make the pain of those who have experienced atrocity less legible, 
less real, even fictional. How might we then understand the methodology of comparison itself as 
the fundamental premise for these analyses? How do the essential modes of comparison, modes 
typically classified as aesthetic and literary strategies, enable—or perhaps block—opportunities 
for comparison, and what are the consequences of comparative study, or claiming that an event, 
like Bhopal, challenges the structures of comparison? And what, if anything, can fiction, as a 
literary aesthetic, provide to a discourse of comparison that inheres in the concept of “real” 																																																								
15 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003), 113. 
 
16 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford UP, 1985), 4. 
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suffering and the practice of universal human rights? Animal’s People at once proposes forms of 
likeness as modes through which to provide answers to these questions, while at the same time 
voicing concerns that, in capitulating to available forms and antecedent categories for structuring 
meaning, may lead only to abstraction.   
II. The State and Study of International Atrocity  
The driving force behind the installment of universal human rights and its complement, 
the category “crimes against humanity,” which defined, in negative terms, the specific ways in 
which states could be criminally charged with violating those rights, was the specific criminal 
acts borne out by the Nazi state against civilians.  With the force of World War II propelling the 
international directive of the United Nations and its legislative considerations, this new 
international body of world leaders established the concept of “crimes against humanity.” As a 
concept radically premised on universal personhood, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948 bore out the conceptual premise of 
the most venerated of ethical traditions, the ethical maxim to “act only on that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,” Kant’s first 
Categorical Imperative.17 In ethical philosophy, Kant’s maxim rested on two premises of 
universalism. First, a belief in the idea of a hypothetical “ought” made possible by the idea of 
universal reason; “oughts,” in Kant’s ethical philosophy, derive from principles necessarily 
accepted by all rational persons. Second, the Categorical Imperative behaves as a determinant of 
ethical permissibility by holding an action up to the test of whether the actor, presumably in 
possession of a universalized rational consciousness, would will all other rational persons, 
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anywhere and everywhere, to also engage in that action. Of each action, the rational actor must 
ask: could this rule be instated as a universal law?  
Kant’s moral maxim was invented and outlined as a hypothetical. But the formalization 
of an international legal system, with binding duties and obligations for all member states, 
became a formal legal concept as the UN, a universal body of legislators responsible for 
overseeing and responding to the highest order of ethical concerns—human rights and their 
violation—was established. Building on the Enlightenment philosophy most associated with 
Kant, whose central ethical threshold was anchored in the universalizability of any given 
practice, any ideologically and ethically sound law had to be capable of extending to a global 
reach; for Kant, “because a…community widely prevails among the Earth’s peoples, a 
transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere.”18 Yet despite this 
Enlightenment heritage, the idea of a body regulating “crimes against humanity” also broke from 
any established or pre-existing international order: it initiated and for the first time formalized an 
international political identity of solidarity amongst complying national partners, one that had the 
right to intervene into the sovereignty of individual sovereign states. As an outcome of 
internationalized law and globalized policies of legislation about rights, codified human rights 
radically proposed that “human lives are human lives, near or far,” as Gary Bass put it in his 
2008 study of international humanitarian interventionism, Freedom’s Battle.19 In this context, 
comparability to the form of atrocity determined by the precedent of the Holocaust, within the 
sphere of international law and human rights protocols of 1948, became the chief frame by which 
atrocity was made legible, and could be governed by international response. In that immediate 
aftermath, policy makers and human rights advocates cautiously weighed out the universality of 																																																								
18 Ibid, 215. 
 
19 Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 22. 
	 182 
the Nazi brutalities against claims of its specificity so as to determine what principles to derive 
from it for the purpose of establishing useful and effective structures of international protocol 
and legislation that would recognize, standardize, and intervene into violations so as to stop state 
forces, governments, and actors from violating imperiled persons. 
Joseph Slaughter argues that law’s determination about which humans warrant 
protection, and thus what substantial victimhood they might be eligible to possess, acts to 
formalize a universal and essential form of “the human” as a category. The Human Rights law 
and the anti-Genocide conventions established in 1948, on the eve of the Nazi crimes, outlined 
the specific responsibilities of the international community to respond to atrocity by way of 
defining the essential rights of personhood as the same, across national boundaries, in perpetuity. 
In the process of so defining human rights in this way, the conventions that set out the essential 
conditions and qualities of human rights also implicitly mapped out the conditions under which 
human wrongs—violations of those rights—warranted international intervention.20 The 
universalization of human rights, codified by the UN’s declaration, worked not only to 
universalize the concept of “human lives,” but also to formalize and codify the image of atrocity, 
and to establish a method through which the evidence of human rights violations could be 
systematically recorded and evaluated. Identifying a universal form of atrocity allowed similar 
events previously processed by international law to inform responses to new instances of 
atrocity.21 
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21 Upendra Baxi qualifies “modern” human rights as distinct because it is marked by what he describes as “the 
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Establishing human rights as a global form, however, meant that such violations were 
more than universally recognizable; they were comparable. To that end, concern about the nature 
of precedent and comparison lies at the foundations of the scholarly, legal, and political debates 
about atrocity. Identifying a generic form of atrocity, and foregrounding the elements of atrocity 
that make it universally recognizable, allows parallels to events that have already been processed 
through forms of international law and public consciousness to inform and direct responses to 
specific instances of atrocity as they arise in new contexts. Moreover, as human rights violations 
increasingly become a matter of international concern and response, the aesthetic of atrocity 
involved in representations is increasingly compelled to qualify that experience in terms of the 
standards of atrocity gleaned from antecedent experiences of suffering by another people, in 
another place. Yet, paradoxically, when cast as an echo or a reflection of an existing form, the 
experience of extreme suffering loses the very “extreme” quality that would designate it as 
notable in the first place. In the context of international legislation, while identifying suffering 
within a preexisting form may enable those with legislative and responsive power to initiate 
response, identifying an atrocity as an echo of another antecedent atrocity may blunt its ability to 
shock the international community into action, and my dim the sense of urgency that such shock 
inspires.  
Thus, the attractiveness of comparison and the simultaneous demand for exclusivity, 
though diametrically opposed and seemingly mutually exclusive, are both responses that 
confront us with the limitations of our capacity to receive and respond to occurrences of atrocity 
in an international setting. In an age of globally networked human rights responders, both 
comparison and exclusivity are frequently, and often simultaneously, invoked in analysis of 																																																																																																																																																																																		
human rights issue, and the concern in the discourse human rights over form itself. See Upendra Baxi, “Voices of 
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atrocity. Samantha Power’s major study of American responses to genocide in A Problem From 
Hell points out that in the early 1940s, “witnesses to the terror knew that American readers 
would have difficulty processing such gruesomeness, so they scoured history for parallels to 
events that they believed had already been processed in the public mind.”22 Her project, 
however, argues that on the level of political intervention, comparative analysis often turns into 
filibuster: the definition of genocide, based on an antecedent, becomes a model so specified in 
form that it cannot recognize—or becomes a way for governments to avoid recognizing—
atrocity when it appears in an altered form, however slight the difference between precedent and 
the case at hand. 
The problem of comparison itself may be inherent to both legal and historical writing as 
much as it is a problem of language and form. Yehudah Bauer describes the basis of all historical 
writing as “this comparability of human experience,” for “[if] there are recognizable patterns in 
the unrolling of human history, then there is a point in examining them.23 For Bauer, all 
historical events are “concrete” and singular, for “they happen with particular people for 
particular reasons at particular times. They are not repeated exactly but approximately and with 
the same characteristics of particularity,” yet the importance of their study lies in the point that 
“that is exactly what makes them of universal significance. What happened before can happen 
again.”24 This key assumption is what allows for the production of adjudicative, legislative, and 
political forms.  
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Bauer’s historical argument and Power’s political analysis anchor atrocity in two 
competing and mutually exclusive poles: at one pole, the demand to be seen as a historically 
unique and experientially exceptional event, and at the other, a demand to be seen, to be 
understood, and to be weighted against other antecedent atrocities. The former offers a sense of 
primacy, reaffirms the sense of such experience as unique, and not simply a dim copy of another 
people’s experience. Since one of the major features of modern atrocity is precisely its 
exceptionality, part of claiming the status of modern atrocity lies in resisting analogy and form. 
Meanwhile, the latter works to stabilize and verify an experience of atrocity as atrocity by 
formally aligning itself and referentially marking itself in the terms established by other events, 
to which the experience may be paired—in other words, to establish itself in universal terms, 
specifically in order to make itself eligible for treatment, acknowledgement, and ultimately 
intervention by the international governments responsible for regulating and enforcing 
international human rights law. To the extent that an atrocity occurs in a place with a historically 
“minor history,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty calls it, the problem is compounded. For Chakrabarty, 
spaces of “minor history” have already been designated inferior to both the production and the 
representation of global history, the repositories (frequently located in the Global South) of 
effects instigated by spaces of “major history” (almost always located in the West) or spaces that 
incite, and then record, a narrative of history that becomes mainstream and that canonizes a 
standard worldview in which these spaces maintain central stature.25  
Thus, in the case of those who must already fight for inclusion and recognition in a 
narrative that places the West as its epicenter, the decision about whether to follow or to break 
with formal conventions in order to narrate is already fraught, negotiating between mimicry—																																																								
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representation as an echo or imitation of the form already produced and standardized by spaces 
of “major history”—and resistance to that form, which may result in either incoherence or 
subalternity.26 Moreover, an attempt to represent an atrocity visited upon a “minor history” group 
through a “major history” template, by reproducing the forms of representation forged in the 
West, may play into and reproduce a scheme whereby a “minor history” group’s atrocity 
becomes a minor atrocity. The tension between possessing a singular identity within a global 
context, and securing global membership may stretch representation to its limits, the pull to 
assume the legibility of a stable form strained tautly against the pull to assert an experience on 
one’s own terms. International human rights legislation, which operates under the assumption of 
international sameness (often without recognizing the historical legacy of uneven distribution of 
representation) may further complicate this duality. Thus, the battle between uniqueness and 
universalism in aesthetic representation often restages the struggle between assimilation and 
resistance on a political and cultural terrain.  
III. Scales of Atrocity  
In the wake of the disaster, Bhopal could not find such formal alignment with which to 
identify the industrial disaster visited upon it and the form of suffering that ensued resisted 
analogy to the figures rendered by previous atrocities. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, 
American lawyers trailed the parade of journalists, news reporters, and social advocates to 
Bhopal to record the testimony of survivors, to document the damage and suffering, and to begin 
to reconstruct the complicated path from visible abjection to multinational corporate channels. 
Observing the traditional modes of disaster reportage, media sought to treat this event within the 
known and available forms of disaster narratives, the major features of which include observable 
suffering, visible destruction, and clearly marked perpetrators, whose morally condemnable 																																																								
26 Ibid, 97. 
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actions could be shown to have a clear effect. To that end, reporters and forms of media 
documentation focused on recording and transmitting the damage that could be visibly 
apprehended by American consumers, highlighting the spectacular quality of disaster, and 
developing a narrative of suffering that could be easily tracked by viewers abroad, from the 
immediate cause (the malfunction at the factory) to the immediate effect (acute death and 
destruction). For such reporting, the capacity to trace a direct route and forge a coherent narrative 
of cause and effect is integral; the stronger the causal chain and the more concrete the visual 
evidence, the better for delivering the story to a global public that might have difficulty 
imagining the suffering on its own, or conceiving of how such a thing could unfold. 
In the arena of law, the ability to render an individual event in known and familiar forms 
of action is central to judicial procedure. Legal institutions maintain similar narrative 
requirements to those of the public arena. Thus, following the disaster, legal institutions in 
America, tasked with determining the culpability and the responsibility of corporate actors, 
attempted to place Bhopal within the terms of American compensation procedure, seeking a 
figure within that institutional history and its recorded and inscribed precedents through which 
disaster and its fallout in Bhopal could be made legible and its damage actionable. Following the 
traditional route of American tort law, American lawyers came to Bhopal equipped with the 
structure of tort procedure as their frame of reference for retributive justice. Like the basic tenets 
of reportage, tort law is contingent upon providing strong causal chains and producing direct 
narratives of cause and effect through which to track, and thus recognize and compensate, 
suffering. The primary concern of tort law involves calculating “probable cause,” that is to say, 
standards of evidence that may justify the belief that a crime has been committed, and that may 
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then enable a legal pursuit, and the potential for compensatory damages for the victim and 
punishment for the wrongdoer.  
The case faced problems of probable cause from the start, largely having to do with 
incoherent entanglements of local impact and global responsibility for it, as well as conflicts 
between adjudication within national and international legal systems. While the case initially was 
sent to American courts in New York for deliberation, under the argument that the American 
company Union Carbide was the nexus of “the web of companies under the financial control of 
the multinational…single economic group with common objectives” (the principle of 
“multinational enterprise liability”), Union Carbide argued successfully to have the case removed 
from American courts and sent to the Indian courts.27 The presiding Judge F. Keenan had ruled 
forum non conveniens—a legal term that signifies a disunity in time, space, and action, and 
which dismisses a suit on the basis that another court would better suited to hear the case—under 
the logic that the proper dispute was located in India, that the parties involved were in India, and 
that (among other things) “the connection between the American parent and the Indian operation 
was insufficient to remove the case to the United States.”28  
The ruling was massively impactful in framing the case, not only in terms of minimizing 
the role of globalization in producing the catastrophe, but also in setting as precedent a decision 
that fundamentally ruptured the unity of dramatic action within the narrative of the case, severing 
the causal chain of negligence between American global capital and the role of multinational 
corporations in perpetrating disaster. Equally so, both the multinational and corporate nature of 																																																								
27 A more cynical view of this decision proposes that the decision was based on the determination that litigating the 
case in U.S. courts would impose an unfair “heavy financial burden” on American taxpayers, leading Upendra Baxi 
to term the decision “Dow Jones Jurisprudence.” See Jamie Cassels, “Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and 
Catastrophic Law,” 324-325.  
 
28 Ibid, 325. 
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responsibility made it impossible to “pinpoint responsibility to a discrete unit or individual 
within the enterprise.” Like Eichmann in Jerusalem, legal ruling required both the identification 
of a “discrete unit or individual,” a responsible agent who could be held accountable for the 
crime; the lawyers prosecuting the case found that the Indian and American legal systems were 
not equipped to deal with violence as the consequence of abstract and mass responsibility.  
Judge Keenan’s decision was moreover one that was, as Cassels puts it “a local, highly 
American view of the disaster,” demonstrating the extent to which the “American view” 
represents a center of globalization.29 Keenan’s ruling not only, as Cassels points out “did not 
acknowledge or interrogate the power of multinationals and their role in the developing world,” 
but also took as its framing trope the slim bindings of American corporate civil litigation, steeped 
in the tradition of tort law, rather than the global tradition of international human rights law, 
which had already developed a precedent for prosecuting such multinational criminal liability—
one derived specifically from the accusations against corporations complicit with the Nazis, 
whose victims were the Jews of the Holocaust. Reframed as civil litigation, the Bhopal Gas 
Disaster could be seen as the unfortunate consequence of Union Carbide’s irresponsibility, surely 
a violation but not a crime.30 What allowed for this reframing was essentially a representation of 
the situation that severed the causal chain between corporate activity on the global scale, and the 
consequences felt acutely and exclusively on the local scale.  
Legal treatment and classification of the case thus changed the form of the event itself, 
pointing toward the suffering as evidence of gross negligence, but not as evidence of a crime. 
Insofar as the lack of response to the victims and the continued neglect multiplied the amount of 																																																								
29 Ibid. Emphasis, mine. 
 
30 It is worth noting that in light of the legacy of Bhopal, the United Nations and the OECD is developing new 
legislation for transnational standards of operation. See Cassels “Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and 
Catastrophic Law,” 333. 
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suffering and damage, and insofar as the unwilling to hold perpetrators criminally responsible, 
the categorization of the facts as merely unfortunately and benign became part of the narrative of 
the case. What made the case doubly horrible was not only the suffering—horrible on its own—
but the classification of the crime that caused it as simply not crime. Refusing to recognize the 
evidence as evidence for criminal perpetration multiplied the degree of disaster itself, both in 
form and in substantial and material consequence. As a consequence of the way the facts of the 
case were legally interpreted, the production of evidence allowed critical elements of fallout to 
unfold into ongoing disaster that continues and grows to this day. This element of continuity, 
caused by legal treatment of the case, adds to the representational challenges of the evidencing 
the event itself, obfuscating not only the direct relationship between cause and effect, but also (as 
with Eichmann) disrupting the unities of time, place, and action, erasing the visibility of motive 
and agent-driven plot. 
In his legal analysis of the event and its treatment within the juridical system, Cassels 
calls the Bhopal gas disaster “a disaster waiting to happen.” This characterization resonates first 
because, as Cassels explains, it registers the nature of human error and fallibility, combining this 
with the inevitable possibility of technical and equipment failure, given the poor safety standards 
and cost-cutting measures implemented the parent company, met with executive decisions to 
place the factory in a highly densely populated urban area that would result in massive 
misfortune visited upon the civilian population. Yet calling the event a “disaster waiting to 
happen” not only characterizes the logistical failures, but also encompasses the failure of legal 
structures in place to regulate and enforce safety regulations. The operations of the Bhopal 
factory run by Union Carbide existed in a gap space, in which local structures governing legal 
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regulations, and global structures for legislating proper operation were absent, opaque, or 
undefined. As Cassels puts it:  
[t]hus, what we see in Bhopal is an accident waiting to happen. The managerial, 
technological and legal conditions that combined to create Bhopal were as lethal 
as the chemicals that poured out of the plant. But leaving the explanation here 
would be partial, for each of the four failures…outlined above are related and also 
further explained in terms of the political economy of development in an age of 
globalization.31  
 
What Cassels outlines is the sense in which Bhopal represents, in legal, political, and legislative 
terms as well as narrative terms, at once a severe clash and a missed connection between 
localism and globalism. The nature of the “accidental’ may qualify this schism. 
But if the sense of “accident” may imply this element of impending disaster without 
intention to cause harm on the part of the actors, as the absence of legal and regulatory 
conditions, Cassels’s description immediately implies the law’s complicity in producing the 
disaster itself. Moreover, the event, caused by a clash or abyss between spheres of local and 
global, and enabled by regulatory failure is here described in the familiar idiom, as an “accident 
waiting to happen,” Here, Cassels’s idiom points to a fundamental dissonance in the structure of 
the case: how can the event be both an “accident,” an event inherently unintentional and 
unforeseeable given the structure of knowledge and the mechanics of intended activity, and at 
the same time “waiting to happen,” immanent, entirely foreseeable? The question is put to both 
content and form, for the concern over representation here is particularly dense in questions of 
causality, a structure of logic integral to both the facts of the events and to their aesthetic 
representation. If one way of establishing causality is through identifying an individual case in 
terms of existing precedents and forms, and understanding and explaining the nature and 
dynamics of one event in terms of precedent, and if this is applicable in the case of Bhopal, how 																																																								
31 Ibid, 318. 
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can either law or narrative qualify the negligence in Bhopal as anything but immanent to the 
conditions in place? Is not the disaster necessarily then a logical outcome of knowable 
conditions?  
We can perhaps rephrase Cassels in aesthetic terms: how can the structure of an event be 
entirely within a recognizable form, and entirely unrecognizable to any formal model? That is to 
say, when we look at Bhopal, do we find it “accidental,” without pattern, and thus integrally 
unforeseeable? Or is it rather “waiting to happen,” which is to say, identifiable within a pattern 
that predates it? This question is important, and will play in the attempts to represent the disaster, 
not only aesthetically, but also legally, in the pursuit of justice and compensation. Once again, 
the question weighs out whether or not there are grounds for comparison, or whether we are to 
consider and respond to the disaster as something empirically, representationally, and 
aesthetically new. 
IV. Formally and Legally Human 
The concept of “justice” and “compensation” are bound together, not only as terms of 
law but also in terms of law’s capacity to valuate evidence of suffering and damages and to 
compensate it appropriately. The toxic vapor that the Union Carbide factory, headquartered in 
the US, dispersed over the city of Bhopal on the night of December 2,1984 killed at more than 
three thousand people immediately. High levels of toxicity that remain in the environment as 
residue continue to inflict injury, suffering, and damages. More than thirty years later, children 
born in Bhopal and residents of the city continue to inherit the fallout of that disaster as 
congenital and as environmental disease; damage continues to be passed down through the 
generations through units as small as DNA, transferred from parent to child, and as large as the 
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geological resources of Bhopal themselves, for both the globe and the individual in Bhopal, the 
large and the small, carry traces of the disaster.32 
This sort of diffusive disaster, in which violence migrates through generations and 
unfolds in ways that exceed calculation, may also exceed the modes of commensurability offered 
by legal forms. One of the major concerns raised in Animal’s People is that in the case of 
redressing atrocity in Bhopal, all forms of law and legal appeals seemed to have failed.33 They 
failed to both establish substantial punitive criminal justice, and simultaneously, these legal 
appeals failed to confer substantial victimhood upon those who suffered and continue to suffer 
from injury caused by the event. This failure was caused, in part, by the way in which this case 
of industrial disaster exploded and surpassed existing legal paradigms for addressing atrocity, 
both within the Indian national context, the American legal system, and within the International 
Criminal Court system. Thus, the disaster shows major ruptures and inadequacies not only in the 
legal system but also in the very frames of law, and its capacity to be adequate to the task of 
mastering, organizing, containing, and narrating the crime. Because there are not clear formal 
provisions within recognizable legal narratives and precedents, such violence become a form of 
legal ineffability as well as remaining narratively unspeakable. 
The consequence of this formal collapse may be most severely felt when it comes to 
recognizing and redressing the legal subjectivity of victims. The process of classifying a case of 
atrocity as such under law confers not only judgment on the case, but also affirms the place of 
the victims within the collectivity provided with rights and protected under the law. Insofar as 																																																								
32 See Rob Nixon, "Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque." 
 
33 By “substantial,” I mean to suggest that the type of reparations awarded to victims to provide compensation for 
their losses, medical treatment for ailments and injuries caused by the disaster, are not commensurate to their 
suffering and inadequately proportional to the magnitude of their experience. In the case of punitive charges, the 
inadequate success in pursuing “substantial” criminal justice refers to the general refusal or failure of legal structures 
or ancillaries to secure criminal convictions and punishment for those responsible. 
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the international laws governing Human Rights served to codify “the human,” as Joseph 
Slaughter has argued, law’s determination about which humans warrant protection, and thus 
what substantial victimhood they might be eligible to possess, and how their pain and suffering 
might be redressed under the conditions of violation UNDHR sets out, acts to formalize a 
universal and essential form of “the human” as a category. It moreover concentrates the nature of 
the human as a specifically singular form, in which a set of categorically consistent traits, 
persuasions, and attributes provide a sense of both uniqueness and exceptionality to the category 
“humanity,” enfolded within a coherent and circumscribed container, and a sameness across the 
form as it exists throughout that which is contained within the category. That sameness of form, 
the exceptionality from other non-human forms, provides the basis of the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights.  
In the context of this discussion I have framed Animal’s People as a text principally 
concerned with negotiating between uniqueness and generalizability. That concern is staked to a 
question of how the aesthetics of generalizability, characterized primarily by possibilities of 
comparison and globalization, relates to the legislation that results from generalization, 
comparison, and universality—all critical to the concept of “the universal human” and implicit in 
human rights discourse. The infrastructure of Animal’s People is one that turns on such doubling, 
inversion, comparison, and the stability of the form as tautly strung between comparative and 
singular concepts of the human. In the two words that compose the novel’s title, Animal’s People 
registers the tension and oscillation between singularity and universality. This is intimately 
situated within the novel’s first person narrator himself. The first words uttered by Animal read 
“I used to be human once.”34 These words, registered into the “Tapes,” the transcribed 																																																								
34 Indra Sinha, Animal’s People, 1. 
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recordings of Animal’s narrative that will be themselves doubled, reproduced so as to travel from 
the singular site of the atrocity to circulate globally, are presuppositional; they imply a point in 
time at which “Animal” and “Human” belonged to the same category, existing undifferentiated. 
Animal’s difference, the narrative content implies, is located in Animal’s form, temporally 
marked as a previous point at which “people who knew [him[ when [he] was small say [he] 
walked on two feet just like a human being.”35 But if the first sentence of the novel declares a 
time at which Animal belonged to the universal category “human,” the second sentence qualifies 
and dislodges that sense of similitude: Animal walks on two feet “just like a human being.”  The 
image of Animal’s humanness is immediately undercut; it is his likeness or form that is human. If 
the first sentence unites Animal’s character as fully human in both form and content, the second 
immediately emends and modifies the unification of form and content under the sign of 
universality—the question Animal’s human-ness is split between some generalizable form, and 
some non-generalizability located in the realm of content.  
We are told several times throughout the novel that the protagonist, this Khaufpuri child 
whose body bears the physical pressures and effects of the Union Carbide disaster, is singular, 
that “[t]here’s only one Animal.” And by the end of the novel we learn that Animal will seek to 
stay singular, that he will turn away from a surgery that will rehabilitate him into the “upright” 
form of the human, because, in his logic, as “an upright human, [he] would be one of 
millions…Stay four-foot, [he’s] the one and only Animal.”36 The novel closes with the poetic 
couplet: 
																																																								
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid, 366. 
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I am Animal fierce and free 
in all the world there is none like me.37 
 
Clearly, the novel takes care to register the significance of the incomparable for form, the 
significance of remaining outside of form, and points to the way in which the universal concept 
of the human operates through inclusions and exclusions. More specifically, the novel points to 
the way in which comparability in this context requires an eradication of difference in order for 
the individual to achieve the status of universal personhood. Entering “the human,” in this 
environment, requires erasing the historical contingencies that have resulted in global 
unevenness—specifically the history of violence in the global South that led to deep exclusions 
of persons in the global South, for the profit of multinational corporations. Yet, in splitting off 
the singular “Animal” from “People,” the novel sets itself up, paradoxically, for an investigation 
into what makes Animal the not “People,” while simultaneously examining the categories of 
both “animal” and “people” as comparative categories, in order to understand why animal, who 
in the title is in possession of “People” does not himself possess personhood.  
In legal terms, civil procedure, or tort law, has as its focus the aim of alleviating the pain 
of the individual; in legal terms, it follows what is called the “making whole doctrine.” In 
contrast to criminal law, which is governed by the directive of punishment and the concern for 
restoring harm done to the collective society as a result of wrongdoing, tort law proposes that the 
individual can be restored through the plaintiff receiving “damages,” a term that fully suggests 
the wrongdoer’s restoration of effects caused by the actions named in the suit. More specifically, 
tort law takes seeks not only to redress a past of wrongdoing, but to overwrite it.38 Steven D. 
																																																								
37 Ibid. 
 
38 The case was instead tried under US tort law in terms of civil procedure. In that arena, Union Carbide agreed to 
settle outside of the courts and to pay $470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster, thus forfeiting 
criminal procedures. That forfeiture meant that the event would be framed within civil litigation, that the charges 
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Smith characterizes its purview as one in which, “the cardinal principle prescribes that injured 
plaintiffs should receive an amount necessary to make them "whole," that is, to restore them to 
the position they would have occupied but for the defendant's tortious conduct.”39 Criminal law 
is concerned primarily with punishment and fully cognizant of the crimes within its jurisdiction 
as essentially irreparable, would make no such claim to make “whole,” as Smith notes. But the 
direction that the Bhopal disaster took toward civil procedure proposed that law would, and 
could, repair the damage that had been done by Union Carbide’s acts. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
against Union Carbide by the plaintiffs would not be registered as criminal acts. Various arguments have been 
proposed as to why the case was tried first under civil procedure, rather than within the criminal courts. The 
structure of and rationale behind tort law vs. criminal law are fundamentally different.  Tort law is designed to 
alleviate the suffering of the victim as a primary goal by awarding damages; punishing the wrongdoer is secondary. 
For tort law, the focus is on the individual who has been wronged, and damages fall into the category of a) 
compensation for pain and suffering, b) compensation for losses and financial harm, and c) financial deterrence as 
punishment for the wrongdoer, to be awarded to the victim, in order to deter wrongdoers from repeating the defense. 
In contrast, criminal law aims to protect society from the wrongdoers. Its focus is not on the individual but on the 
collective; criminal law assumes that the wrong that has been done is a wrong to society at large, and the criminal 
act on immediate victims results in universal damage to the collective. Criminal punishment is designed to address 
deterrence through a combination of a) the Kantian thesis of retributive justice, or the “Intrinsic Desert Thesis,” 
against b) Bentham’s utilitarian conclusion that punishment ought to be meted out as needed to make things better 
for society “only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil”. In the case of Bhopal, tort law 
likely was the first priority because it offered immediate possibilities for alleviating suffering. A more cynical 
analysis would propose that American lawyers were keen to take the cases under tort law with the expectation of 
being awarded high contingency rates for representing the case successfully in a suit that would win high figures 
from Union Carbide. See James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1999); 
Jamie Cassels, “”The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons From Bhopal,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 29.1 (1991): 1-
51.  
 
It should be noted that civil procedure carries a much lower threshold for evidence and proof of argumentation than 
criminal law; criminal law may only convict in the absence of any and all reasonable doubt, while civil suits have a 
lower burden of proof. Given the dizzying labyrinth of causal chains in the Bhopal case, its distribution 
geographically and temporally, and the difficulty of pinpointing the radius of liability, civil procedure would have 
been a much safer primary strategy. Once the civil case was unsuccessfully tried, however, its failure seemed to 
show that the case could not meet even the civil suit’s lower threshold for proof, making it more difficult for the 
case to gain credible force as a criminal suit. 
 
39 Steven D. Smith, “The Critics and the ‘Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law.” 72 Cornell 
Law Review 72 (1986-1987): 765-798. 
 
Smith’s definition draws from the “Made Whole Doctrine,” the guiding principle in tort law. See also Nancer H.  
Ballard, "Holes in the Whole: Considerations on the Made Whole Doctrine and Its Applicability to Environmental 
Claims." Environmental Claims Journal 23.1 (2011): 30-49. 
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But as we know, Animal is not whole, and in the body of the text, his body will remain 
beyond repair, and will keep him, moreover, out of the “whole” of the human community around 
him. The twisting of Animal’s spine downward in perpetuity, then, forcing his posture into a 
four-legged animalistic imitation and separating him from the human community, is the force of 
a legal history, a decision by legal authorities not to mark the atrocity as atrocity, not to reify the 
violation of Animal’s rights as a violation of Human Rights. It is that legal determination, that 
“second catastrophe,” and not the atrocity on its own, that marks Animal’s body as a non-human 
body—an embodied form of evidence against law and a reminder of its failures.  
V. The Double Bond and the Double Bind 
As a novel about the destruction caused by multinational industry, and as a narrative that 
deals with the messy aftermath of global corporations operating in abstractions who are thus 
capable of evading local structures of responsibility, Animal’s People weighs out the costs of 
globalized exchange itself, the cost or transactions involved in the new transactional 
relationships between the local and the global.40 Of the unresolved questions that endure for 
international law, Bhopal requires us to confront the current system’s inability to trace and 
pinpoint evidence of negligence in causal chains like those of Union Carbide’s operations, from 
their global multinational structure to its local negligence. Questions about scaling the disaster 
representational terms have their counterparts in the arena of legal commensurability: how to 
locate the proper legal frame for prosecuting perpetrators and compensating victims, within the 
																																																								
40 To further advance the question of narrative worth in legal terminology, we might note that as the litigation settled 
into its final resolutions, Union Carbide’s stock price rose two dollars a share, a growth in value directly 
asymmetrically proportionate to the decrease in valuation of the life, devastation, and the victimhood of this affected 
by the disaster. If the question of narrative value asks what a story is worth, and what it may be exchanged for in 
narratological terms, the answer may lie in the unrecoverable costs to Bhopal that the legal structure denied in its 
judgment, a resolution that “confirm[ed] to the victims that their lives are considered cheap, and [that] license[s] a 
continuing double standard of industrial safety” See Jamie Cassels, “Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and 
Catastrophic Law,” 333. 
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entanglement of overlapping legal systems—American, Indian, and International—that may all 
lack the capacity to articulate, judge this event, or to recognize it as atrocity? As Sinha himself 
describes it, the tendency for justice in Bhopal to slip through the cracks and disjunctures 
between these systems of legality may indeed launch the event into a second invisibility; since 
all legal systems, local and international, are potential venues for redress, each system views 
Bhopal as the burden of the other. Animal’s People at once proposes forms of likeness as modes 
through which to provide answers to these questions, while at the same time voicing concerns 
that, in capitulating to available forms and antecedent categories for structuring meaning, may 
lead only to abstraction.   
On the one hand, universalism may allow an abstract and ephemeral form of violence like 
industrial disaster, a form of atrocity specifically problematized because of its “slow” quality, as 
Nixon calls it, to become empirically available and “real.” In the case of Bhopal, the “occluded 
relationships” (as Nixon calls them) are geopolitical, between perpetrator—in this case the global 
corporation Union Carbide, operated by US bureaucrats—and victim, the inhabitants of 
Bhopal.41 They are also temporal, between the event itself, the gas leak that occurred on the night 
of December 2 1984, and the fallout which continues to cause damage on the cellular level, as 
the high levels of toxicity remaining in the Bhopal environment continue to spawn massive 
disease, birth defects, and life impairment generations after the event itself. With the vast 
distances between cause and effect, victim and perpetrator, and with the invisible, intangible 
quality of the violence, the Union Carbide Gas Disaster lacks the coherence that would package 
it easily into a recognizable form of atrocity. As a type of atrocity that evades many of the 
narrative forms that signal its content as atrocity, attempts to recognize industrial disaster may 
benefit from such universalism, which widens the scope of what may be recognized as atrocity 																																																								
41 Rob Nixon “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque,” 444. 
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by abstracting it, rather than drawing from the specificity demanded of concrete historical 
models. Thus, universalism may help to form to an otherwise shapeless disaster, and may allow 
this form to be not only made portable and visible for a global public, but also visibly criminal 
and thus punishable under the rubrics of humanitarian law.  
On the other hand, universalism may launch a singular event into the very abstraction by 
which it admits it as atrocity, vacate the event of its content and reduce it to form alone, strip the 
victims of their individual experiences of pain. By highlighting the congruity between the form 
and a subordination of content to formal coherence, universalism may strain the link between the 
atrocity and the empirical reality of the suffering as victims experienced it. The type of 
epistemology to which universalism belongs foregrounds stylization of an event’s content over 
the substance of that content, abstracting and substituting conceptual metaphors for the stories 
that those who have suffered—and may continue to suffer—from these experiences may be 
telling about themselves. In the case of atrocity, and in particular in the case of the literary, 
intellectual, aesthetic, and scholarly engagement with its representational imaging, does 
comparative study broaden the horizon of what we may know about the facts and the “reality” of 
one atrocity, allowing us a better frame for reading its evidentiary residue? Or does it such 
recourse to comparison perhaps fix otherwise fluid experiences into an emblematic illustration of 
an explanatory thesis for political and legal programming? Finally, what does comparison 
actually authenticate about the experience?  
 Animal’s telling of his life’s story from this moment in which he cannot be made 
“whole,” to his decision ultimately to refuse the surgery that might reverse the damage and return 
him to “wholeness” intersects and criss-crosses with a partially formed second story of a 
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character who describes himself as Animal’s “Doubler.”42 That character is the Khã in the Jar, 
preserved fetuses aborted during That Night. The Khã speaks of “still fucking waiting to be 
born” and announces, “[d]ead I’m who never lived, wasn’t buried, waits to burn.”43 The two-
headed figure goes on to tell Animal: 
Doublers both, we’re. Two of me there’s two also of you…My two heads rise 
from one neck. From your hips, at the point where your back bends, rises a second 
you who’s straight, stands upright and tall. This second you’s there all the time, 
has been there all along, thinks speaks and acts, but it’s invisible—“44  
 
We find here the necessary postulate of tort law, the tantalizing possibility of a second self, a 
double “waiting to be born.” This form of law, doubled and embodied here in the form of the 
speaking fetus, “a second you’s there all the time,” postulates the idea of reversing time enabling 
the law through symbolic gesture to go back to “That Night” when Animal, a newborn, breathes 
the poison that bends him in half, and through doubling reverse that bending. 
The concept of Animal’s unique form is complicated by the novel’s recurring question 
about the degree to which he belongs to the category “people,” a concern particularly vexed in 
the legacy of legal paradigms developed to address international atrocity. We might return to the 
novel’s closing couplet: 
I am Animal fierce and free 
in all the world there is none like me.45 
 
We can observe that the content swerves toward singularity, Animal’s uniqueness rendering him 
unbound, or “free” from the social constructions that organize and synchronize human behavior 
to a set of codified and legalized forms. Yet the form itself suggests otherwise, the declaration of 																																																								
42 Indra Sinha, Animal’s People, 139. 
 
43 Ibid, 58, 139. 
 
44 Ibid, 139. 
 
45 Ibid, 366. 
	 202 
freedom and singularity at ends with the resonant intonation of the couplet, a tightly bound form 
that implicitly requires coupling, doubling, similitude. The singularity of unboundedness, what is 
“free,” and the singularity of individuality “me” serve as phonetic similitudes, ricocheting off 
one another; the “freedom” of individuality supplied by Animal’s posture, or the form of his 
body, sublimated into accordance supplied by the form of the poem. Animal may be unique 
because he strides on all fours rather than on the human two, but the sound pattern of the poetic 
meter pulls him back into the sphere of consonance supplied by poetic feet, the formal 
congruence of words and the alignment of sound. 
Just as the impulse to represent one form of unspeakable suffering in terms of an 
aggregate form or formal equivalence is part of the novel’s structure, so too does the novel seek 
to produce means by which to provide form and modes of articulation that may transmit 
instances of suffering beyond its own perspectival range. While Animal tells us of his 
experience, and provides the narrative with his point of view, it becomes clear that not only is his 
access to witnessing and understanding the nature of atrocity in the case of Bhopal highly 
mediated, but also that he is himself driven to deliver testimony as a key mediatory figure, 
speaking for those who have suffered without the capacity to speak of their fate. Animal’s 
testimony thus is itself pulled between the individual and the collective, on the one hand tethered 
to the specific narrative perspective that belongs to him, and the stories of the collective that he 
must now grasp and articulate by embedding them within his testimony. We hear this double 
vocalization perhaps most clearly in the moments of crisis and resolution in the novel; first, when 
Animal is in the greatest depth of remembrance that occurs during the novel, almost at the dead 
center of its pages, when the narration reaches outward to describe the event of the disaster that 
itself exists anterior to the novel’s frame. We hear it again at the end of the novel, as the 
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character “remember[s] the tape mashin in the wall” and decides that he “will tell this story…and 
that way…find out what the end should be.”46 What “the end should be” may be in a sense a 
“second story,” on that we learn exists from the beginning, but that remains untold. There 
significant stories, we learn from the “Editor’s Note” that have been left untranscribed, “long 
sections in which there is no speech, only sounds such as bicycle bells, birds, snatches of music 
and in one case several minutes of sustained and inexplicable laughter.” Words tell the story, but 
they cannot tell the whole story, for there remains the sound behind Animal’s voice, the sound of 
“dead Aliya’s voice calling…like she and the others who are no more came back to be with 
me…They’ve been here through every minute of this telling.”47 The silences and nonverbalized 
testimonies are thus hinted at and transmitted even as they are not transcribed, in echoes, in the 
body, and in signs that gesture toward things left unsaid within the globally circulating transcript 
of the narrative. Instead, the narrative recorded and reproduced in global circulation relies on 
figures (Animal’s body), lost objects (bicycle bells, snatches of music, the dead recalled but not 
reproduced), and, later on in the story, metonymies (references to Phuoc Tuy or Halabja, 
atrocities that bear likeness to Bhopal) all just out of the narrative’s range of articulation. What 
Animal acknowledges here, and what Sinha acknowledges in his writings on Bhopal, is that 
while Animal can testify to his experience, there are parts of his transmission that cannot be 
reproduced, places where the doubling stops, here rendered as the “dead Aliya’s voice…and the 
others who are no more.” Animal’s individual narrative is meant to invoke and in some cases 
stand for the aggregate sum that cannot be spoken or evidenced, other than through oblique 
references and refracted vocalizations structured by evocative similitude to his own articulations. 
																																																								
46 Ibid, 365. 
 
47 Ibid. 
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Yet the novel registers the extent to which these stories cannot be articulated, evidenced, and 
made real, even through forms of intimate likeness. 
VI. A Tale of Two Cities: The Construction of Khaufpur 
 Making Animal’s story real is one of the challenges of the narrative, a challenge 
underscored and complicated by the novel’s form as a fiction. In fact, in Animal’s People, 
negotiating between factuality and fictionality, conceptual and empirical forms, parallels the 
challenge of maneuvering between the global and the local. Describing the novel in the 2007 
Guardian article, Indra Sinha balances his description of Khaufpur, a fictionalized double for 
Bhopal, between a type of violence that he proposes to be metaphorical, one that exists in 
conceptual or theoretical space, and the empirical reality of Bhopal as a specific space, that 
exists as a specific occasion of atrocity. He writes that, 
Khaufpur shares things with, but is not, Bhopal…the novel is not 
'about' the Bhopal disaster or even the Khaufpur disaster, it is about 
people struggling to lead ordinary lives in the shadow of catastrophe. 
Khaufpur is every place in which people have been poisoned and then 
abandoned. It could be Seveso, Halabja, Minamata, Caracas or Sao 
Paulo. I did toy with the idea of setting the novel in a Brazilian favela, 
or a contaminated city in West Africa, but opted to stay in India, 
mainly because by this time Animal was talking to me incessantly, 
and with a strong Khaufpuri accent.48 
 
Allowing that Khaufpur “shares things with, but is not, Bhopal,” Sinha’s comment proposes a 
fictional space, Khaufpur, as a type of generic template. Fictionalization, a type of aesthetic 
stylization, then supplies a type of actuality to the experience of atrocity, suggesting that atrocity 
across contexts, time, and geographical space may share a common experience, that the 
aftermath of atrocity, the pain of remembrance, and the struggle of seeking redress may be 
interchangeable.  																																																								
48 Indra Sinha “A Novel Quest for Justice.” 
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In this way, Sinha suggests that atrocity “shares,” or exchanges its content. The term 
“shadow of catastrophe,” which Sinha uses to describe the universal experience of living in the 
fallout of disaster, implies not only the trace of fallout but also the trace of an outline—a form—
an abstraction that supplies a guiding layout for arranging and interpreting content. Form serves 
as a mode of assessing the possibility of negotiating a transaction between two different terms of 
an equation that may be compared.  
Sinha’s comment, however, is not just a comment about the use of analogy, or 
comparison of two terms, to identify and interpret the significance of each term, and in the case 
of atrocity, to establish the reality of one atrocity in terms of a second that shares its likeness. 
The thrust of the comparative logic that Sinha outlines is not just through analogous forms 
gathered from disparate spaces around the globe “Seveso, Halabja, Minamata, Caracas or San 
Paolo…a Brazilian favela…a city in West Africa,” that have experienced disaster, but the 
possibility of a virtual space, a fictional location in which the experience could be universalized 
so as to measure the sense of the experience—in Sinha’s words, what the experience of atrocity 
“could be.” 49  
That “could be” is a statement that rests on the idea of the “universal” as a condition 
forged through a specific type of literary imaginary, one that ironically settles on the singular city 
of Khaufpur, within the singular body of a singular victim, “Animal.” The “could be” space 
marbles the imaginative possibilities allowed by fiction and figuration, both of which belong to a 
type of imagining enabled by a necessary allowance on the conditional, the possible as 
constructed out of the known contents and conditions of the empirical world. The former 
(fiction) allows a text to draw from existing forms in creating something approximate enough to 
encompass multiple possible realities; meanwhile, the latter converges multiple existing realities 																																																								
49 Ibid. 
	 206 
through alliances formed by similarities newly proposed as primary and urgent traits for 
apprehension and assessment, features that emerge as essential qualities to the individual forms 
put into equation, and the governing factor in that equation, and foregrounded as essential 
qualities of the whole.  
For Sinha, imagining what could be, and identifying within Bhopal both figural and 
fictional possibility, become the conduit between him and Bhopal, and ultimately the structure 
for representing the city of Khaufpur in Animal’s People. More than a decade before he started 
writing Animal’s People, Sinha began a long term engagement working for Amnesty 
International to raise awareness of the Kurdish genocide by the Iraqi regime. On March 16, 1988, 
the Iraqi government deployed chemical weapons by air over the Kurdish town of Halabja, an 
experience that Sinha describes as a night where “birds had dropped from trees: dogs, cats, 
donkeys, and people had fallen and writhed, chocking before they died…A pale mist hung in the 
air, and where the wind took it everything died.”50  
Sinha’s referent for this description may have been the Kurdish city of Halabja in Iraq, 
but description of the experience resonates with Animal’s People portrait of Bhopal, therein 
rendered as the fictional Indian city Khaufpur.51 Khaufpur is unequivocally “about” Bhopal, but 
it is a version of Bhopal filtered through Halabja as a guiding form. As discrete events, Halabja 
and Bhopal share very few elements of an empirical historical reality; as terms of analogy, they 
recombine and share critical substance of composition. Sinha observes that, “[f]rom the 
beginning [he] was struck by horrific similarities in [the] account of ous raat, “that night,” as it 
																																																								
50 Indra Sinha, “"Chemicals for War and Chemicals for Peace: Poison Gas in Bhopal, India, and Halabja, Kurdistan, 
Iraq," Social Justice 41.1-2 (2015): 126. 
 
51 The Halabja attacks, perpetrated by Saddam Hussein, were officially recognized as a genocide in 2010. 
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was called in Bhopal, and kimyabarana helebce, as the Kurds called the massacre in Halabja.”52 
That intonation between ous raat and kimyabarana helbce is duplicated with Sinha’s discovery 
of two images, photographs that are “paired,” for Sinha, because they uncannily resemble one 
another, despite the geographical and contextual discontinuities.53  
Of the two cities, Sinha writes: 
There were uncanny parallels between what had happened in these two cities 
2,000 miles apart. First, the pictures. I have presented these images, Halabja first, 
Bhopal after, because that is the way I experienced them and felt the horror of 
recognition. I have seen dozens more that could be paired, including close-ups of 
dead children, and bodies strewn across roads and public places. To anyone who 
knows either story well, the paired images must seem particularly distressing, 
because they document history repeating itself. Someone should scour the 
Internet, track down the original photographers, and put together a study of death 
by exposure to chemicals. It would clarify a lot of things.54 
 
 																																																								
52 Ibid, 127. 
 
53 Sinha may have seen a figurative, rather than a factual, likeness linking Bhopal to Halabja, but establishing 
likeness through form leads down a curious path to factual contiguity. Once likeness is established through the logic 
of resemblance and logical consistency, connections that might remain otherwise oblique and tenuous seem to take 
on significance and shape, perhaps even a specifically causal trajectory. That is to say, two terms put into equation 
may at first beocme linked through resemblance; that logic of resemblance may subsequently reveal causal and 
material linkages. In fact, the global causes and actors responsible for Bhopal not only behaved like the actors and 
global causes responsible for Halabja, but were actually enabled as they were to act, and used the mechanisms and 
means for their actions by harnessing and mobilizing the agents and structures that caused the death and destruction 
in Halabja. As Sinha discovered, the atrocities are not simply structurally alike, they are causally and historically 
related. In an article he titled “Chemicals for War and Chemicals for Peace: Poison Gas in Bhopal, India, and 
Halabja, Kurdistan, Iraq” Sinha fleshed out these relationships. Whereas in 2007 Sinha had called on Halabja as a 
figure of likeness for Bhopal, the 2015 article explicitly tied the events together through factual linkages. The Dow 
Chemical corporation, which bought Union Carbide after Bhopal, sold Saddam Hussein’s government the $1.5 
million dollar store of pesticides that it would use to make chemical warfare agents to use on the civilian population 
in Halabja. The effect of the agents, as Dow knew from Bhopal, would be deadly: as Sinha notes “the pesticides in 
question were ‘highly toxic’ to humans and would cause death ‘from asphyxiation.” The link that Sinha may have 
originally drawn between Bhopal and Halabja may have been through an analogical model; yet once so associatively 
implicated through figurative syllogism, an uncanny causal relationship emerges and cannot be avoided: the events 
become mutually constitutive of one another, not only representationally but also ontologically.53 That is to say, 
while Halabja becomes the “accidental” catastrophe, a prism through which Sinha perceives and recognizes Bhopal, 
Bhopal itself serves to prefigure—indeed precipitate—the planned atrocity that would later occur in Halabja. An 
accidental resemblance, a doubling discovered by accident, becomes a syllogism of mutual implication whereby 
each not only constructs the other as representational objects in the world but indeed delivers and enables the events 
themselves. 
 
54 Ibid, 138. 
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Figure 1: Halabja 
 
Figure 2: Bhopal  
I have included the two photographs to which Sinha refers, in the order to which he refers to 
them, because they develop, for Sinha, not only a relationship of resemblance, but also, as he 
puts it, they together “clarif[y]…parts of a single design.”55 Taken alone, each photograph 
supplies a documentation events that cannot be made to signify. Together, however, the 
photographs not only chronicle the facts, but moreover superimpose narrative design onto them.  
That move, from “either story” to “single design” is the production of narrative beyond 
the facts; rather evidence becomes persuasive through the force of similitude. The phrase “that 
night” reinforces the photographic congruity; it capitalizes on the universality of “night,” while 
paradoxically pairing it with an utterly specific modifier, that. The interplay between the singular 
referent and the universal referents of the phrase “That Night” made to refer to both “nights,” 
Kurdistan in March of 1988, and Bhopal in December 1984, implies that recognition and 																																																								
55 Ibid, 139. 
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knowledge of one night is apprehension and knowledge of the other. Implicated in this way, both 
individual nights are framed by the logical demonstration of a global design. 
For visual congruence and recognizable similarity to become design, formal congruity 
needs serve as a synthesis for narrative production. The images are about the accuracy of 
metaphoricity, implying that visualization can itself “make us see” the implied congruities of the 
causal conditions, by showing us the similitude of the effects. Each image stabilizes and fortifies 
the structure of visual representation provided within each frame; what is not known or spoken 
about the generating conditions of the one story may be borrowed from the implied eyewitness 
testimony of the other. While each image individually represents a fact in a historical record of 
the event, when coupled each photograph becomes a concern not for historical accuracy or 
reflection of documentation, but as part of the search for a theoretical explanation about atrocity 
writ large. That is to say, put together these images provide evidence for an underlying 
generalization, or universal structure, an interconnection of problems that would provide 
robustness to a theoretical cosmology.56 Together, the point of evidence in the photographs is 
neither their truth nor falseness as representations of the event, but rather their currency as part of 
a broader narrative of atrocity, providing a universally legible form, immediately recognizable, 
for what the aftermath of atrocity looks like.  
Significantly, the content of the images themselves seem besides the point in Sinha’s 
article. The salient features of display and of analysis are wholly in their resemblance to one 
another, the “shock of recognition.” The four figures represented in the photographs are 
																																																								
56 “But suppose we thought of representation, not as a homogeneous field or grid of relationships governed by a 
single principle, but as a multidimensional and heterogeneous terrain, a collage or patchwork quilt assembled over 
time out of fragments…What lies “beyond” representation would thus be found “within” it (as the “black hole” of 
the image is found within the ekphrastic text) or along its margins.” See W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 419. 
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themselves somewhat beside the point. The images are captioned only “Halabja” and “Bhopal,” 
and described by Sinha as “distressing” because they show “history repeating itself.”57 The 
photographs speak for themselves, and if they are “particularly distressing,” as Sinha writes, they 
distress because of the “horror of recognition,” the recurrence of the form. That “horror” is 
outside of the content of the images themselves; rather, it is in the recognition of comparison. 
Whatever these images say to Sinha, they say because they are doubled. Paired, they have moved 
from the local instance to a global context. On their own, each image implies death, destruction, 
and trauma—surely atrocity in and of itself—and yet, that seems to be hardly the point. Rather, 
the point is the “study of death” that the images collectively supply, in which the exceptional 
becomes a precedent and prototype for inevitable comparison to succeeding events. If the term 
that night speaks to both images, converging them into a single narrative, it also implies 
something beyond what either image offers, a form of discourse that is itself imageless. “That 
night” may refer to Halabja or Bhopal interchangeably; the term refers to the form rather than to 
any individuated set of facts or content.  
In addition to gesturing toward innate likeness between the two instances of atrocity, the 
universalizing term that night possesses a fictive and figural presence rather than any 
particularity, and its ambiguity keeps as far away from the specific as possible, hesitating to 
transmit even the most basic of modifying language that might localize and concretize it. 
Elsewhere, Sinha writes about the images produced by atrocity that that “[t]he dead leave their 
own statement, and my photograph is their statement. It’s not their choice to give their statement 
in that fashion…But that’s the way…that…that’s the only alternative that’s left for them.”58 The 
																																																								
57 Ibid, 138. 
 
58 An early novel by Sinha inverts the relationship between Bhopal and Halabja. The novel, which takes place in 
virtual space in the early days of the internet, features references to the Halabja attacks, mentioned by name, which 
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images of the dead must be encountered metaphorically, as metaphors mediate between both the 
empirically specific and the universal, and between the objective and subjective. Taken together, 
the dual images propose one another as iconography, the basic principle of which implies 
similitude, conceptual globalism.   
In fact, pieces of the globe, real atrocities that have occurred elsewhere, continue to fall 
into the novel’s frame, focused on the fictional city of Khaufpur. In the narrative’s first few 
pages, before Animal begins to tell his story, the words “PHOC TUY” appear on the page. They 
do so in an inscription on a lighter belonging to the Australian journalist, an inscription that 
Animal mistakes as the journalist’s name. The American journalist’s name is not, of course 
“Phoc Tuy;” the name Phoc Tuy belongs to the region of Vietnam most heavily doused in Agent 
Orange, a region that remains highly toxic, to this day exposing current inhabitants to high levels 
of the chemicals, a charge that the US government continues to deny. Although the American 
journalist’s preoccupation with Khaufpur is never provided a background explanation, the 
reference imprinted on the lighter makes clear that the story of this region has traveled with him 
to Khaufpur, that it forms part of the conceptual and contextual frame with which he will process 
the narrative he attains from the inhabitants of Khaufpur. In a moment that plays out this sense of 
focalization and comprehension through likeness, the lighter becomes the object of transaction 
between the world travelling journalist and the local victim who will together create a composite 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
later serve as a figure of recognition for the protagonist, who later encounters Bhopal through a man who finds him 
on the interne, described as “a man with dark eyes who looks like an Indian Jesus,” who presents the narrator, a 
virtual double of Sinha himself, with a “recording…made in 1984 who was trying to tape a concert. By accident he 
ended up capturing the sounds of the greatest industrial tragedy in history. Bhopal has been called the Hiroshima of 
the chemical industry.” The equation to Hiroshima is significant; layered on top of the novel’s primary focus on 
Halabja, Bhopal emerges as a figure of Halabja, immediately figured as a term of equation in terms of two major 
disasters: Halabja and Hiroshima. The novel, moreover, includes an evocative description of Kristallnacht, the 
“Night of Broken Glass” that signifies the beginning of the Holocaust.” Significantly, the description of 
Kristallnacht ends with the Cryllic term “Noce nazivayetza Kristallnacht”—That night, Kristallnacht.  See Indra 
Sinha, The Cybergypsies: A True Tale of Lust, War, and Betrayal on the Electronic Frontier (New York: Viking 
Press, 1999), 344, 129. 
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of the story. It is that very lighter, which carries this inscription, that the “Jarnalis” trades with 
the novel’s narrator, Animal, in exchange for Animal’s agreement to tell the story of his 
experience living in the aftermath of atrocity. Animal’s interpretation of what the “Phoc Tuy” 
inscription signifies may be a misreading, but it directs Animal’s audience to read 
metonymically, outside of his story, and to reconfigure his text in terms of an antecedent atrocity 
that shares formal resemblance to his own. While Animal does not recognize the name “Phoc 
Tuy” as a signifier, the reality that it signifies is all too recognizable for the journalist who is 
encountering Animal and recording his story; children born in the Phoc Tuy region, which 
remains highly toxic, are—like Animal—documented to have severe physical disabilities, as 
well as mental disabilities. They develop extra fingers and toes, skin diseases, and exhibit 
proclivities toward developing a range of cancers, brain damage, and—not insignificantly for the 
concerns of likeness that draw this referent into the scope of narrative inhabited by Animal—
hernias, typically developed out of umbilical protrusions, that cause those affected to develop 
hunchbacks.59 Like the Khâ in the Jar, the reference to Phoc Tuy creates opaque “doublers,” 
“second you’s” who are in the text “waiting to be born, ”recognizable doubles who are “there all 
the time…invisible.”60 
As an invisible double, the journalist’s attempt to write about Khaufpur already bears 
traces of Agent Orange’s destruction before the journalist can even begin to describe the 
destruction of Khaufpur, importing Phoc Tuy as an antecedent atrocity from across the globe that 
cannot but become a guiding form for the novel—before Animal’s specific and local story can 
even begin. Immediately, the narrow scope of the journalist’s story—a story specific, one that we 
																																																								
59 Robin Denselow, “Agent Orange Blights Vietnam,” BBC News, December 3, 1998.  
 
60 Indra Sinha, Animal’s People, 139. 
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are told is exceptional—is mediated through a formal precedent, the narrative scope widened and 
put into other words, even as Animal insists on the story being “his words only.”61 The lighter 
quite literally serves as the narrative spark that ignites the narrative engine, putting into motion 
the story Animal will tell of the fallout of the gas disaster visited on his city by American 
industry. Like the inscription that appears on the lighter, this exchange between one local 
storyteller, Animal, and the global journalist itself is a mnemonic, recalling the structure of 
narrative as what Roland Barthes described as “legal tender, subject to contract.”62 What is 
Animal’s narrative worth, on the global market? In what ways does universalization change the 
value and the stakes of the narrative? The narrative setup implies that localization may possess 
value outside of that exchange, but narration must still enter into a universalized economy in 
order to possess value, without which it lies in danger of becoming a shadow image of itself. 
Vietnam and Agent Orange go on to reappear several times throughout the novel. 
References to Vietnam will resurface not only as a figure sparking Animal’s narrative memory, 
but will also appear within a memory, during the moment when Elli, that idealistic American 
doctor who takes on the quixotic task of opening a health clinic in Khaufpur, is called upon to 
recite recollections of her less than ideal childhood in America. Elli, telling the story of growing 
up in Coatesville, Pennsylvania to the Khaufpuri collective, describes an early encounter, with a 
man traumatized after decades working inside the “inferno” of the Pennsylvanian steel mines. 
																																																								
61 Ibid, 9. 
 
62 “Narrative: legal tender, subject to contract, economic stakes, in short, merchandise, barter which…can turn into 
haggling, no longer restricted to the publisher’s office but represented, en abyme, in the narrative…This is the 
question raised, perhaps, by every narrative. What should the narrative be exchanged for? What is the narrative 
“worth”?...by a dizzying device, narrative becomes the representation of the contract upon which it is 
based…narrating is the )economic) theory of narration: one does not narrate to “amuse,” to “instruct,” or to satisfy a 
certain anthropological function of meaning; one narrates in order to obtain by exchanging; and it is this exchange 
that is represented in the narrative itself: narrative is both product and production, merchandise and commerce, a 
stake and the bearer of the stake…” See Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), 
89.   
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Elli recalls the man’s description of the mines as “explosions of water heewhacking to steam as it 
hit red metal at two thousand degrees, a crane that sang like a helicopter turbine, a deep 
thumping compressor that reminded him of the whup-whup-whup of Hueys coming in low over 
jungle.”63 The description Elli offers belongs to the man’s trauma, but her sudden interjection 
that she “was a child when the Vietnam war ended” (a comment that is both out of narrative 
place, and also a geographical displacement) belies the sense in which she has converted the 
man’s suffering into her own recollections of the iconic features of Vietnam War reportage. 
Employing the vocabulary of “heewhacking” and the “whup-whup of Hueys,” Elli stylizes the 
man’s coal-mine experience, converting them into the more familiar and recognizable trauma of 
the Vietnam experience played out on American broadcast. The man’s recollections of hardship 
in Pennsylvania are recast as the sounds and sensations of the Vietnam War experience—
references that are built on comparisons and similitudes, and reference associations deeply 
anchored in the iconic reportage showing noisy helicopters grazing the jungle terrain.  
In the story Elli tells, she uses the iconography of Vietnam to focalize the inferno of the 
steel mines, using the frame of Vietnam to configure her own understanding of the “hell-hole” 
that her father must have experienced. But the story Elli tells cannot be separated from the frame 
narrative in which she tells it; Elli narrates this memory in Khaufpur, to an audience composed 
of Khafpuris. Elli’s imagination of Vietnam filters her interpretation of what might have been her 
father’s experience in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, but it that imagination filters multidirectionally. 
The figure of “inferno” that Elli builds in her interlocked conceptualization of the steel mills and 
Vietnam, becomes the architecture by which Elli may in turn imagine the “inferno” of “That 
Night” in Bhopal. While Elli is busy telling one story of her past, building an image of inferno as 
filtered through an American imagination of it, the novel itself is at work building an image of 																																																								
63 Indra Sinha, Animal’s People, 201. 
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destruction in Bhopal that makes use of the figuration Elli’s American perspective provides. 
Since, as we know, Elli is the “Amrikan” who, as Animal reminds us, must “imagine” the 
atrocity of That Night so as to ultimately decide “what is said about this place” by those who can 
only know if it through narrative, it quickly becomes clear that Elli’s comprehension of the 
inferno in Khaufpur, and the Khaufpuri understanding of their own situation, is meditated by 
iconography that aggregates in the weight of memory as it travels through global circuits of 
representation. And if memory, as Michael Rothberg has suggested, is truly multidirectional, the 
Bhopal inferno as represented in Sinha’s novel not only becomes inflected by the globally 
circulating narrative of destruction routed through Elli’s narration of inferno as steel-mining 
labor in Pennsylvania and American destruction in Vietnam, but also in turn inflects the 
figuration of, and significance of, these antecedent events, directing and newly constellating how 
we may understand them, and in which terms, as well as which circuits, they may be represented 
and addressed. If Vietnam produced some of the most enduring representational codes and 
politically charged climates of the 20th century, and if the labor and environmental destruction in 
American industry represent two points of reference that may be connected through 
representation, Bhopal becomes a third figure in this circuit, entering into a global exchange of 
representation as a carrier of such figurative modes for creating contiguity. Animal’s People not 
only draws from, but also puts into circulation a signifier of atrocity. The novel participates in 
the production of a world literature grounded in the representation and remembrance of 
“inferno,” a body of literature concretized as an aggregate figure of interlocking violence, 
suffering, and abjection from around the globe begins to pile up on the page. 
In what may be the most significant instance of this overlap, Animal finds himself alone 
in Elli’s office, surrounded by bookshelves. Elli has just presented Animal with the possibility of 
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a surgical procedure that would give him back his human form, and thus allow him to recover a 
universally “human” body. Stacked together, their bindings touching each other on the shelves 
are three books that stand out to Animal, described as follows: 
On the back of one I can make out the letters KHAUFPUR, on another’s written 
LUNG PATHOLOGY, a third says VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE.64 
 
Significantly, the portal that opens up the exchange between these two atrocities appears at a 
textual site, where books describing the realities and enduring afterlives of atrocities around the 
globe comingle. Here, in the American Doctor’s office, the text plays out a scene of 
weltliteratur, the advantages and disadvantages of comparative atrocity given textual form. The 
three bounded texts combine metonymically into a single image in Elli’s office, the reference to 
Vietnam and Khaufpur catalogued so as to make clear their contiguities and interdependences. 
Like Sinha, Elli’s knowledge of Khaufpur comes by way of these framing experiences, 
aggregating collectively to treat the Khaufpuri experience; in this way knowledge of the 
Khaufpuri experience depends on aggregation of antecedent information. Their combination 
suggests that Elli’s understanding of the contents bounded in the “Khaufpur” text derives from 
the “Veterans and Agent Orange.” But the text also provides that image through Animal’s eyes, a 
view through a character who does not understand and cannot explain the logic of these textual 
connections. Despite the text’s gesture toward a vision of Khaufpur within a global network of 
suffering, the character who bears the force of that suffering cannot see the global connections 
made precisely through his body.65 While the academics of atrocity swerve toward the universal, 
toward a comparative approach, we are reminded of the precariousness of Animal’s story as 
living testimony; bounded next to a text labeled “Veterans and Agent Orange,” it is always in 																																																								
64 Ibid, 137. 
 
65 Ibid, 247. 
 
	 217 
danger of becoming yet another book on a shelf, an abstract case study as more bounded cases of 
historical instances of atrocity pile up on an academic bookshelf.  
VII. The Limits of Likeness 
We might juxtapose this to the novel’s own retelling of “That Night” at the center of the 
text, a scene animated as a completely visceral experience that foregrounds the limits of knowing 
through likeness. As Animal prepares for the ritual fire walk of Ashura Mubarak, set in the 
middle of “Muharram,” the month of Shia mourning and remembrance, and a night at which 
Animal believes he will “surely die [amid] those cruel coals, [a] fire pit’s no fake.”66 he 
reflexively grasps for narrative doubles that figure this experience—the story of Elli’s father’s 
experience in the American coal mines that Animal can only imagine through Elli’s telling, the 
martyring of Hazrat Imam Hussein that stands at the bedrock of Khaufpurian culture. As he does 
so, the experience of the fire walk himself, in which he is immersed, vertiginously gives way to 
an experience he cannot remember but must retell. 
Like the initial exchange of the journalist’s lighter that sparks Animal’s story, the central 
moment is again figured as narrative alighted, as words going up in flames. As he begins to tell 
it, the narrative frames begin to collapse into one another; Animal’s view of the festival “from a 
firewalker’s shoulders” gives way to Elli’s eyes, “fixed on the pit of cokes being quickened by 
the bellows-men, strange eddies are playing under the red glow of the fire, her father in his hell 
hole, he had quietly faced such danger every day out of love for her.”67 But as Animal watches 
Elli, who is in the meantime watching the firewalkers and framing them in terms of her father’s 
“hell hole,” he suddenly remarks: 
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Then Eyes, it comes into my head with certainty what she is thinking. It’s of a 
different kind of fire, that Somraj had breathed, which had scoured his lungs and 
taken away his singer’s breath. What must it have been like, that inferno?”68 
 
The image suggested here is one not only of holocaust, total destruction by fire, but also of 
absolute consumption. That consumption is not only that of the atrocity itself but of words 
consuming and canceling out their own content, aggregating into a type of formal collapse 
caused by the very activity of narrative production. 
  As narrative frames and narrative perspectives give way to one another, exchanging 
something of their content at each point of reframing, Animal’s words become paired and 
doubled with words that are clearly not his. These words—set apart by italics—recombine with 
Animal’s narration, splicing into it language and utterances that belong to a second story of 
inferno. Once again, totalizing consumption by fire becomes not only the figure for absolute 
destruction but also a universal figure for destruction, a metonymy through which one atrocity 
can transfer and receive content from another. Like the PHOC TUY lighter, each narrative 
atrocity, recalled as both total destruction and as burnt sacrifice, ignites the other. Words from 
one narrative make porous the formal structures that enclose discrete content, until the coherence 
of each is interdependent on the content of the other. Amid exclamations of “Ya Hussein! Ya 
Hussein! Ya Hussein!,” refrains that recall the lamentation over the prophet’s martyrdom, the 
narrative postulates figures for capturing what “that inferno” must have been like, only to find 
that figures fail to give all but the most general sense of the event that is being recalled—flames 
at once kindle and destroy the meaning that they carry between narrative frames. In fact, the 
narrative takes a further step into the abyss of representation; in the midst of an event where 
Animal is himself at a representational abyss, perceiving himself about to die in the gulf of the 
fire-walk, the central image falls back into yet another frame, incorporating another form into its 																																																								
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aggregate representation of disaster. That form takes as its focal point the singer Somraj—a 
character who has lost his ability to articulate as a consequence of atrocity—as the critical 
pinpoint. The narrative pulls into its focus “a fire which…had scoured his lungs and taken away 
his singer’s breath,” layering this representational failure over Animal’s own narrative failure to 
speak the reality of atrocity at this point in the text. The chants of Ya Hussein!  are chants that 
reference specifically local, specifically Khaufpuri figure of antecedent suffering, one that 
perhaps much more closely conveys and provides a form for the lived reality of atrocity in 
Kaufpur—the interpretation of atrocity as those who suffer there experience it. It is a 
counterpoint to that distanced, universalizing, international model of suffering provided by 
international law. Amid the chants, tropes, and refrains of Ya Hussein! that supplement Somraj’s 
inability to chant—or, in another word, to trope—and Animal’s own narrative failure, we are 
given, through an antecedent local experience of suffering, a glimmer of how perhaps Animal 
may himself conceive of his suffering through local likenesses. 
 The focus on the limit of Somraj’s range or articulation, mediated through local frames of 
reference, is notable in particular because these are the three pages of narrative in which Animal 
descends into the depths of “that inferno.” The descent into the fire becomes metaphorical; as 
Animal viscerally relives the experience of “that night,” the narrative reproduces his experience 
by way of mediating frames of similitude that anything but visceral. Rather, the narrative 
framing channels the experience into a narrative perspective that is distinctly global and 
distanced. While Animal feels the force of “that night” as the fire on his body as he descends into 
the inferno, the narrative provides a descent into that very reference through abstracted 
focalizations, with Western frames of reference as figures of similitude derived from the West to 
conceptualize the inferno of “That Night.” Immediately after the lamentations for the prophet, 
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the narrative cuts away from Animal’s lived experience to Elli who, we are told “feels horror, 
also the failure of her imagination...She’s unable to imagine the cries of the dying, of those who 
lost their families in the stampede of panicking people…whose children’s hands had been ripped 
from theirs.”69 The narrative is very clear on the point that Elli is not only a Westerner outsider, 
suspiciously viewed by the Khaufpurian community as an “Amrikan” who, like the “Eyes” of the 
global public are to be viewed suspiciously, for they, rather than the inhabitants themselves, 
“decide what’s to be said about this place” but also a suspect narrator and focalizer.70 
At once counteracting this constant threat of appropriation, and at once foregrounding the 
importance of imagining that horror, the narrative seems to be very clearly setting its limits to 
what the global public can understand of that night through the type of likeness supplied by 
words, while simultaneously insisting on seeking such understanding through technologies of 
such equation. While likeness itself is constitutive of how the narrative sees itself, from the 
outset describing the terms of its engagement with the global public and its understanding of the 
global public itself as one in which “like breath on a cold day…become pictures of things and of 
people…a picture and [their] eyes settle on it like flies.” likeness here loses its grip and falls into 
the very frames of similitude it provides.71 
 However, this instance in which Elli is said to apprehend “the failure of her imagination” 
for that which she has not witnessed and for that which she lacks a frame of similitude, is 
immediately countered with a supreme act of imaginative framing provided by none other than 
Animal. Rather than remembering the experience of atrocity deposited very materially in his 
body, Animal, we suddenly realize, is at that instant himself imagining the horrors of that night; 																																																								
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we are suddenly made aware that he has no memories of “that night” that are his own. At once, 
we are made to understand that Animal, an infant at the time that the atrocity occurred, has no 
memory of that night, and can only reconstruct the event in terms of stories told to him about it, 
recombined with the residue of the experience that remains lodged in his body. Even as the 
suffering is Animal’s very real experience, the atrocity that belongs to him must be imagined; 
“that night” is a night that escapes his own memory, exists as an event that he only knows as a 
narrative through stories told to him, despite the way in which he carries its aftereffects in his 
body. If Animal is a witness to the event, he may only testify to it through the use of his own 
body as a portal through which to figure it; we read that: 
One woman there was who, knowing that she was dying…wrapped her newborn 
son in her shawl and laid him in a doorway hoping he’d be found by someone 
who would love him…Elli’s thinking that this woman was perhaps lucky not to 
have seen the furnace that melted her son’s spine, the hammer-blows that beat his 
humanity out of him.72 
 
Here, the discourse becomes most forceful in its insistence on the individual story, we are 
brought from the chaos of the “many stories,” the narrative tells us, the general inferno into the 
singularity of what happens to that “[on]e woman,” precisely our singular protagonist’s mother, 
the one figure other than Somraj who could have, perhaps, supplied the narrative a form of 
factual testimony that does not rely on fictions and imaginings. If Somraj cannot tell us the 
memories of what he has witnessed, here Animal must articulate precisely what he cannot 
remember, but through his own local frames of historical and mythological, rather than personal, 
memory. The narrative lens is almost obstinate in refusing to give Animal its sole authority over 
focalization and witness testimony; here his testimony is not only mediated by an imagination of 
what his mother might have recalled of her witness, “knowing that she was dying,” but also 
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further refracted by framing this primary mediation by a secondary mediation, through what 
“Elli’s thinking [about] this woman.” 
 In Elli’s case, wondering “what must [that night] have been like” means first absorbing 
the experience of “That Night” in terms of her own private pain, the known experience of her 
father’s nights in the mines, and then re-externalized as an imaginative projection so that she 
may reconstruct Animal’s experience. Animal, meanwhile, in this dizzying chaos of perspectival 
shifts, suddenly finds himself witnessing his own experience through what Elli imagines—or 
fails to imagine—of it. These layers of reading move flexibly through shifting scales—not only 
evaluative scales but also escalations of degree, zooming in and out of “That Night” as the 
immediate frame of reference. In this description, meaning is dialogical, between global 
imagining approached metonymically and metaphorically, and local imagining approached 
literally. In this moment of narrating the ‘horror” of That Night articulation and meaning lie 
between Elli’s global reading and Animal’s local; through two different modes that may 
ultimately be incompatible with one another.  
VIII. The Comparatives of Literature and Conclusions of Reading 
I have argued that Animal’s People represents as a narrative transaction between local 
and global, one that shows the limits of a universalized concept of “the human” for recognizing 
suffering. I have, moreover, argued that as much as Bhopal is a disaster caused by and 
represented as transactions between local and global, it is also a disaster that exposes the fault 
lines between universalization of local suffering for legal representation and response.  
I now want to think about how Animal’s People, as an aesthetic object, and in particular a 
literary object, is implicated in the very methods of literary analysis and methodological 
imperatives. In her 2007 essay, “Close Reading” Gayatri Spivak warns against the temptation to 
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substitute abstract and distant analysis for localized readings concentrated on the specifics of the 
individual.73 Investigating the way in which literary studies bears on the ethics of human rights in 
a period of globalization, Spivak scrutinizes the movement toward “Distant Reading,” a method 
of textual analysis pioneered by Franco Moretti, in which as he puts it:  
if…the  text itself disappears, well, it is one of those cases when one can 
justifiably say, Less is more…we must accept losing something. We always pay a 
price for theoretical knowledge: reality is infinitely rich; concepts are abstract, are 
poor. But it’s precisely this ‘poverty’ that makes it possible to handle them, and 
therefore to know.74 
 
Moretti further postulates that “the beauty of distant reading plus world literature [means that] 
you define a unit of analysis…and then follow its metamorphoses in a variety of environments—
until, ideally, all of literary history becomes a long chain of related experiments: a ‘dialogue 
between fact and fancy…between what could be true, and what is in fact the case’.”75 For 
Moretti, this means attending to the way in which individual texts become “data,” moving from 
close reading to ‘sampling; statistics; work with series; titles; concordances, incipits” —in 
general seeking to identify and extract abstract and global determinations while lessening the 
pressure on close reading, a methodology he further developed in his book Graphs, Maps, Trees: 
Abstract Models for Literary History.76 Therein, he persuasively argued for “Distant Reading,” 
as a model of literary analysis that does away with the formal concentration on close reading that 
characterized literary studies from structuralism to deconstruction. Rather than micro-reading, 
Moretti argues, an increasingly globalized circulation of texts calls for macro-level reading in 
order to assess and interpret weltliteratur. 																																																								
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The concept of “close reading” has been a staple of literary and textual studies since the 
1930s, when I.A. Richards introduced the methodology as a pedagogical practice for teaching 
poetry to his undergraduates at Cambridge. A foundational concept for New Criticism, close 
reading offered a methodological tool and strategy for interrogating texts by close scrutiny of 
individual units, interpreting those units with intense rigor and pressure before—or even entirely 
without—applying contextual mediation to what the text itself provided.77  Close reading as a 
practice proposed to do what the social sciences, the anthropological sciences, and the sweeping 
historiographical method could not: it attended to the local-level texture that almost always gets 
swept up in the broad sweeps of data-driven analysis, a rubric that inevitably subsumes 
individual voices and works toward accomplishing a frequently Western oriented concept and 
capitalist serving ambition of “global good.”  
For Spivak, the technique of attending to the very specific integral elements populating 
the text becomes a way of deferring to the singularity of the text, its unique composition, and its 
content, which cannot be paraphrased without, as it was once famously characterized, heresy. As 
a way to combat forms of globalization that, as Spivak puts it, “require uniformity and must 
therefore destroy linguistic and cultural specificity,” close reading becomes vital to keeping the 
text’s alterity, respecting its singularity and inassimilable difference.78 To that end, Spivak, 
shortly after Moretti unveiled his new method, proposed the term “Planetarity” as an alternative 
to globalization precisely because it does what Moretti’s methodology does not: it keeps the 
integrity of the individual figure, inconsumable alterity, the non-universal other rather than 
collapsing it into a claim involving a schematized reading of the universal whole. Close reading, 
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she argued therein, can maintain the singularity of the figure and its alterity while allowing 
literature to do the important work of transporting its ideas and imaginative content across 
boundaries of space and time. 
 When I.A. Richards first called for his close reading methodology as a practice of textual 
interpretation, he did so as an intervention specifically aimed at rethinking the use of figurative 
language in writing. Richards comments that a text, 
encourages attention to its literal sense up to the point, to be detected  by the 
reader's discretion, at  which liberty can serve the  aim of the poem better than 
fidelity to fact or strict coherence among fictions. It asks the reader to remember 
that its aims are varied and not always what he unreflectingly expects … The  
whole trouble of literalism is that the reader forgets that the  aim of the poem  
comes first, and is the sole justification of its means. We may quarrel, frequently 
we must, with the aim of the poem, but we have first to ascertain what it is. We 
cannot legitimately judge its means by external standards (such as accuracy of 
fact or logical coherence) which may have no relevance to its success in doing 
what it set out to do, or, if we like, in becoming what in the end it has become.79  
 
Three points are worth taking into account here: first, that Richards’s target in developing this 
methodology has to do with understanding how figuration functions in texts; second, that the 
methodology is called upon in the moment where the text has claims to both “fidelity to fact” 
and “coherence among fictions;” third, that close reading is a means by which a text’s meaning is 
understood to be singular and immanent, neither part of any system of meaning outside the text, 
nor answerable to any “external standards.” “The world” is pluralistic, “the text” is singular. The 
world is “literal,” exists in a state where signs correspond to their objects; the text is “figurative,” 
a space where words need not correspond to “facts” or “strict coherence among fictions.”  
 Taken to its logical extreme, to know a textual world in the way that close reading asks of 
it here would be to know it from inside that world, an impossibility for the readers of Animal’s 
People, one that the text makes clear even as it tantalizes with the testimony of a figure whose 																																																								
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perception is as close to ground zero as possible. Animal’s People will make just that point when, 
right in the opening pages, Animal demands the journalist to answer respond to the problem of 
knowing from the distance. “What am I to tell these eyes?” says Animal, “What can I say that 
they will understand? Have these thousands of eyes slept even one night in a place like this? Do 
these eyes shit on railway tracks? When was the last time these eyes had nothing to eat? These 
cuntish eyes, what do they know of our lives?”80 Animal continues, “How can foreigners at the 
world’s other end, who’ve never set foot in Khaufpur, decide what’s to be said about this 
place?”81 Animal’s protest here is not altogether unlike I.A. Richard’s own resistance to 
schematic reading, the type of reading practice that would first decide “what’s to be said,” and 
then find in the local what a globalized form has already circumscribed. Animal would most 
certainly agree with Gayatri Spivak who writes, in her essay on close reading that “[e]ven good 
globalization requires uniformity and must therefore destroy linguistic and cultural specificity. 
This damages human life and makes globalization unsustainable in terms of people”82  
On the one hand, Animal’s People cannot do away with globalized or distant reading. 
That sense of bondage to distant reading is self-consciously inherent to the frame provided by the 
“Editor’s Note,” a signal of the narrative’s global circulation, even if the content of that note 
insists otherwise, highlighting the sense that “the story is told entirely in the boy’s words as 
recorded on the tapes.” That self-consciousness about the inevitability of distant reading seems to 
be at the core of the narrative insistence on constantly refocusing Animal’s story through how he 
imagines the “Eyes” might see it, from their distance, and by insisting on the points of what 
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Animal cannot or will not say That consciousness is at the center of an assertion like the one 
Animal makes in a moment of heightened physical intimacy: “Eyes, I won’t translate, there’s not 
a language in this world can describe what’s in my soul.”83 On the other hand, the novel also 
allows itself not only the fantasy of closeness in its very terms of telling through Animal’s Eyes, 
but the utility of global comparison, a globalized commerce of exchangeable experiences of 
atrocity, in terms of its own narrative strategy for meaning making. So even as it insists on 
localism and singularity, the limits to what the Eyes can see of Khaufpur given that “[w]e know 
zilch about their lives, they know nothing about ours, that’s the problem,” and the exceptionality 
of the individual story, Animal will still comment that “Eyes, you should hear it, because the 
story of this one woman contains the tale of thousands.”84  
The context of Spivak’s warning against “distant reading” in her essay was the 2005 
conference on Human Rights convened at the CUNY Graduate Center, where she originally 
presented her argument as a talk. Even more than examining close reading as a method, Spivak’s 
remarks address the “double bind” implicit in Universal Human Rights, as a mode of 
internationally common language and literacy, a figure for the ambitions of an international legal 
system intent on global human uniformity. She asks, “Can we move within the double bind, 
needing to credit that singularity supplements universality, that difference neither belongs to nor 
divides the specifically universal declaration?”85  
Spivak’s essay broadly concentrates on the way in which Human Rights is itself caught 
up in this “double bind,” between the global and the local, a double bind that also manifests itself 																																																								
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on the level of law, between law’s singularity and global diversity. In this context, close reading 
represents a call for Human Rights legislation, as a universal form, to do its work through 
specific interpretive skills associated with the local space in which they have been invoked. 
Close reading represents attention to the “[i]rreducible idiom, singularity on the move” in 
opposition to plot summary, and works through what Spivak, following Derrida calls “un blanc 
tex-tuel”, a “textual blank [un blanc tex tuel], a necessarily indeterminate index of a future epoch 
of difference."86 Spivak’s comments draw attention to close reading as a method that refutes 
blunt summation, attends to she calls “irreducible idiom” and also one that allows for the 
possibility of the textual blank, a concept she sees as “hypertextual imagining,” or a link within 
the text, “to something that may turn up for a reader the writer cannot necessarily imagine.87  
The insights of this essay are particularly meaningful when one considers not only the 
development of a codified and international understanding of Human Rights as it developed 
post-1945 into what Derek Pendas calls a “legalist paradigm,” but also the rate of violations of 
perpetrated by actors who are multinational, often operating in local spaces in ways that 
necessarily obliterate the idiom, the local.88  
If the text remains guarded on its willingness to permit foreign “Eyes” to see of distant 
suffering, it guards perhaps even more closely what the “Eyes” can read, and thus reconstruct 
out of words on a page. In fact, a text appears at the center of a heated conversation about the 
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Khaufpuri people “suffering in silence” as the Kampani refuses to speak. There, we learn that 
Animal, our narrator, cannot himself read; that he himself cannot access the very medium of 
writing on the page, through which his story will travel in its global circulation to a worldly 
audience.89 An activist leader committed to teaching Animal literacy has brought Animal a small 
printed picture book about “That Night,” a composite of images and text, the victims rendered as 
stick figures on the page, imaged to illustrate the words besides them. Animal refuses it; “I won’t 
read this,” he says.90 Why does Animal reject this book, a sketch that replays, in a mirror-image, 
the narrative of very story he is telling? Appearing after pages of discourse on the American 
Kampani’s years of legal evasions, where “people suffer in silence,” the picture book, narrated 
and accompanied by wordless images, is effective. It juxtaposes Animal’s idiomatic narrative, a 
form of telling from the inside, with a distant image of that atrocity, to be consumed by those 
who will imagine it. The picture book, with its characters rendered in silhouette, doubles an 
experience that belongs to Animal and reproduces it as a curricularized history. The distanced 
form threatens to make Animal’s deeply personal testimony a mere shadow image of his own 
reality—it threatens to make Animal’s testimony a fiction. Thus while he gives it a “flick 
through,” he keeps the text at a distance, refuses to read it any closer than the most cursory of 
glances.  
“I know every one of them,” says Animal of the images.91 Animal rejects the picture book 
because he knows it; the shock of resemblance is in the literality of the images sketched in the 
text. Animal’s shock is in seeing his own narrative, his self-telling, overwritten by a form in 
which he has become the globally legible silhouette of a victim, his suffering displayed to the 																																																								
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world as a object of global disaster evacuated of character. In a text written to capture the 
attention of those for whom Bhopal could be disaster anywhere and everywhere, Animal has 
become obscenely the universal “human,” of universal human rights, a discourse that may 
ultimately only render him recognizable as a stick-figure in a picture book, a clichéd double of 
himself. The scene of recognition replays and inverts Sinha’s own shock at seeing atrocity 
doubled in images, may itself replay a mirror-image of that “horror of recognition,” the shock 
that Sinha himself records of his experience of recognizing the doubled image of Halabja 
reflected in Bhopal. Instead of apprehending two stories in one image, as Sinha does in 
converging the two photographs into one universal story through the resemblance of images, 
Animal seems to cleave the universalization of his one story, managing the distance between his 
individual, local story and its global circulation as a universal narrative.  
Thus, the novel catches a snare in the double helix of meaning, one strand composed of 
universalizing factuality, “data,” and another, that of individualistic narrative—pure fiction. That 
helix comes apart in the image of fictional Animal rejecting the wordless picture book, a bird’s 
eye view of the deeply human, deeply local narrative he knows with the painful intimacy of 
experience. The data-driven image put in front of Animal’s eyes might be the most uncanny 
double of the narrative Animal records for the foreign journalist, who coaxes Animal to tell his 
own story for a global audience that Animal calls “Eyes,” a term that measures the 
incompatibility between what his words can say, and what the “Eyes”— the global public—can 
imagine out of those words. Captured in the image of Animal rejecting the shadow image of own 
experience rendered in stark silhouette is a challenge to the models of universalizing knowledge, 
knowing through aggregate similitudes. The impulse to universalize testimony and to present a 
narrative of global atrocity in silhouettes, shadows whose evacuated forms may allow for 
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equations of congruence, may speak to a utopic desire for atrocity itself to appear in a clearly 
recognizable generic form, one that would fit the models that the legal concepts of atrocity have 
already figured. Held up against these legislative lenses that “flick through” painful narratives of 
atrocity from a distance without seeing—the ability to know distant suffering may in fact be the 
sole property of fiction.  
Animal’s People may itself lie on a fault line between the impulse for the factual—
documentary representation of Bhopal as a singular, local atrocity—and fictional representation, 
in which Bhopal stands for and acts as a conceptual metaphor for globalized atrocity. The 
friction between Bhopal and Khaufpur, between the space and its people, between the real city 
and its fictional double, balances the novel between the local and the global, the singular and the 
universal. While Khaufpur stands for a universalized concept of disaster rather than any specific 
occasion, Animal’s voice resists generalization and demands localization, asking how we might 
recognize the form of atrocity as “singular” prior to its categorization within the form—precisely 
by gesturing toward the mutually constitutive nature of both. That constitution takes place 
between factual and fictional configurations between a reality that may be unknowable, and a 
fiction of what—in Sinha’s words—the experience of atrocity “could be.” That “could be” rests 
on a type of literary imaginary that marbles the imaginative possibilities allowed by fiction and 
figuration, both of which belong to a type of imagining enabled by a necessary allowance on the 
conditional, the possible as constructed out of the known contents and conditions of the 
empirical world.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Textimony: Zong! and the  
Poetics of Evidence 
 
In my last chapter on Animal’s People, I showed how the appeal of a universally 
recognizable form for representing atrocity grated against a resistance to the globalizing pull of 
universality. I argued that the novel oscillated between universalism and individualism. I 
identified how Bhopal became a center of globalized atrocity, a stage on which an atrocity 
caused by global capital played out, and on which the form of the “universal human” balanced 
between global uniformity and singularity in the context of Human Rights. Moreover, I showed 
how the representation of atrocity in Bhopal was mediated through forms and templates of 
representation collected elsewhere. Those references and representations from a diversity of 
geopolitical contexts and geographical contexts spaces from around the globe, I argued, became 
a form of evidence to establish the reality of atrocity in the fictional city of “Khaufpur,” thus 
playing out the way in which figures of atrocity travel globally and circulate as evidence, through 
fictions and figurations. 
The broad trajectory of this project so far has been to trace a particular instability in the 
evidence of atrocity forward, in the wake of a 1945 code of human rights legislation and a 
universally recognizable form of atrocity established in the wake of the Holocaust. I proposed 
that demonstrating likeness to this form became a way for those who subsequently experienced 
mass suffering to authenticate that experience as atrocity, and that in these cases, likeness itself 
has become a mode of “proof,” a strategy of producing evidence for atrocity, particularly in 
cases where evidence lacks. In so doing, I have sought to show how subsequent events of 
atrocity after 1945 absorb and renegotiate these terms of representation in order to substantiate 
an appeal to the post-1945 international community for recognition and redress. But memory, as 
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Michael Rothberg reminds us, is “multidirectional,” and it is worth thinking about how the 
representational inventions and conventions established after the Holocaust, and on the European 
continent have changed and inflected the memory, the aesthetics, and the political stakes of the 
atrocities that precede it, and how engagement with these conventions by a geopolitically diverse 
group of spaces around the world have inflected and changed the direction of these conventions.1 
Here, I look at the transatlantic slave trade as an event of atrocity that preceded the legal 
conventions of human rights. I show how contemporary representations of the slave trade both 
engage and grapple with a contemporary moral code modeled on a rising tide of globalization 
and the accompanying discourse of universalism. I examine the way in which M. NourbeSe 
Philip’s Zong!, a 20th century text about a late eighteenth-century slave massacre, situates itself 
within a post-1945 environment of international law and human rights, and specifically 20th 
century concerns about evidence.  
I. Inter-Textimony 
My choice to focus on Philip’s poetry collection Zong! is motivated by its insistence on 
using connective memory and formal conventions developed in the wake of an aesthetic, 
interpretive, conceptual, and ethical mode introduced after 1945. Engaging these new lenses of 
interpretation, Zong! asserts a moral and legal claim to recognition and redress by adopting an 
aesthetic and formal code that places the Zong massacre within the framework of a specifically 
literary, specifically post-1945 understanding of atrocity. That is to say, in the context of the 
Zong massacre, in which the archival content and the substance of the event cannot properly 
signify, Philip turns to formal conventions and iconography—specifically iconography from the 
Jewish Holocaust—in order to articulate what the content retained within the archive of the slave 																																																								
1 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2009). 
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trade massacre itself cannot say. And, I want to argue, that articulation is particularly focalized 
and sharped by the text’s specific intertextual use of Holocaust-borne poetry in that engagement.  
Philip’s focus on the problem of witness, particularly the capacity of testimony to fully 
substantiate the reality of atrocity, belongs to a specific subset of aesthetic concerns directly 
related to a post-1945 body of literature concerned with the representation of atrocity. For this 
body of literature, while testimony can establish the facts of atrocity, the reality of atrocity 
exceeds that representation. So pronounced is this aesthetic tendency as to make it a recognizable 
form to the point of cliché, a touchstone of the genre, marking texts that employ this refrain as 
belonging to a certain body of literature, telling a story of a certain kind. Sarah Casteel observes 
that Caribbean postcolonial writings, and in particular its poetics contain literary references to 
the Holocaust, which come to develop a shared vocabulary. In Casteel’s analysis, these 
intertextual contact zones “reveal the centrality of analogical thought in intellectual formation 
and self-definition of Caribbean/diaspora writers who came of age during World War II and the 
decades immediately following.”2 For these writers, Castell explains, the Holocaust becomes a 
part of the Caribbean consciousness, central to confronting and articulating the logic of slavery 
and its continued legacy on the islands, a consciousness formed and solidified by the presence of 
Jewish communities cohabiting in these spaces.  
For Philip, the pronouncement of Holocaust literature as an aesthetic of suffering writ 
large is not only a discursive touchstone and iconography of atrocity; fictions and figurations of 
the Holocaust also lie at the foundations of her own consciousness about the history of African 
life under slavery. Reflecting back on her first encounter with the literature of atrocity, Philip 
writes, “I had read neither The Souls of Black Folk or Up From Slavery. There wasn’t a copy of 																																																								
2 Sarah Phillips Casteel, Calypso Jews: Jewishness in the Caribbean Literary Imagination (New York: Columbia 
UP, 2016), 2. 
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either at my library.”3 What, then, was in Philip’s library in Trinidad and Tobago? Leon Uris’s 
fictional novel, Exodus. Instead of reading books, historical or fictional, that recounted the 
fictional narratives of the Middle Passage, Philip read the story of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi 
persecution in an epic novel that recounted the passage of Jewish refugees from Europe.  
To that end, in the context of reading Zong! as a text concerned about questions of 
memory, evidence, and the legibility of a past of atrocity, one intertext is of particular note: an 
epigraph that reads “No one bears witness for the witness,” taken from Paul Celan’s iconic 
Holocaust-era poem “Aschenglorie” (Ash/Glory or Ash-Aureole). In a text like Zong!, which 
resists cliché, resists, formal categories, and resists the generic signposts that would enable the 
text to be read through familiar interpretive methods, Celan’s poem becomes an important 
reference point. For it contains not only one of the most well-known figures of post-Holocaust 
poetic expression, but the refrain has itself a cultural shorthand for a literary body marked as an 
“atrocity story.” Moreover, refrain cited by Philip is iconic, so much so as to have become a 
proper noun, instantly recognizable as a shorthand for the problem of representation in the 
context of atrocity—a claim about the limits of witness seems to bear witness to the problem of 
bearing witness.  
What does it mean to encounter one’s own history—unrepresented, perhaps 
unresentable—through an antecedent figure provided by another? In Philip’s essay, the 
Holocaust both provincializes the narrative of atrocity that she inhabits, and articulates it. The 
Holocaust, for Philip, becomes a site of figuration and comparison, but one that throws into 
question the efficacy and the consequences of comparative and figurative approaches to atrocity. 
More specifically, the text is concerned with how literature, a form dependent on modes of 
figuration such as metaphor, metonymy, and other modes of conceptual equation, negotiates the 																																																								
3 M. NourbeSe Philip, Showing Grit: Showboating North of the 44th Parallel (Toronto: Poui Publications, 1993), 84. 
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terms of comparison and imagining the reality of one atrocity via an antecedent occasion of it. In 
the case of representing one atrocity and substantiating its reality, figurations drawn from another 
iteration of it, becomes a form of proof.   
In my examination of Zong! and its engagement with questions of proof and witness, I 
look closely at the specific reference the text makes to the Holocaust, and how this textual 
insertion becomes an instance in which Zong! employs literary evidence from the world of texts 
to substantiate an atrocity in which empirical evidence lacks. I argue that a body of global 
literary fragments becomes a mode of verification, standing in for empirical evidence that fails to 
appear in the localized Zong! case. “Proof” subsequently emerges as a specifically literary 
concept, precisely because of its poetic quality. At the center of a literature of atrocity lies a 
concern about the limits of evidence and factuality, to secure certainty, to testify to the reality of 
atrocity. That uncertainty about the capacity of facts to prove the reality of such experience, I 
argue, leads texts to cross-reference and engage literary content as a form of evidence, 
intertextual citations serving as a form of proof for a reality that is understood to exceed the type 
of knowledge that facts and material evidence can provide. 
II. Competitive Memory 
Michael Rothberg’s aim in Multidirectional Memory is to provide a conceptual form for 
“the typically spiraling logic of memory production,” and to investigate in particular the shared 
economy of suffering and retribution within representational forms. Acknowledging the 
inevitability of comparison and cross-referencing, Rothberg proposes that in the context of 
globalization, a “multidirectional model helps keep all of these incommensurable risks and 
opportunities within the frame of justice.”4 Rothberg’s optimistic view of multidirectionality, as 																																																								
4 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 311. 
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a model for looking at the transactions that take place between discrete and disparate memories 
of suffering, squares with a view of globalization that carries something of the utopic mood in 
which the idea of universal human rights was coined, that thrust humans everywhere into a 
conceptual scheme of “we”-ness that, as Rothberg writes, “bind us to those whom we consider 
other…in which groups…actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with 
others.” He concludes that, “[m]emory’s anachronistic quality…its bringing together of the now 
and then, here and there—is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new 
worlds out of the materials of older ones.”5  
 Gayatri Spivak is less optimistic. She uses the description, “[ci]tations of citations, 
indefinitely” to describe the “international civil society” whose collectivity turns on a “self 
styled” sense of itself, acts as “custodian of rights for the entire world by a species of manifest 
destiny.”6 From the point of view of newly decolonized nations, or groups whose history has 
already been historically understood as “minor,” absorbing and reproducing already codified 
forms generated by antecedent experiences of suffering means taking on the risk of further 
occlusion of very real suffering that may still be ongoing. Past atrocities may provide figures and 
forms of similitude that serve to conceptualize and represent the “chant! Shout! And 
ululation…moan! Mutter! Howl!...the pure utterance” that has not yet been addressed and which 
requires recognition, but, as Plato warned, the metaphorical content of poetry renders unreliable 
evidence. Such poetic language deceives, he argues, because it is but imitation, a counterfeit 
copy of the real that threatens to turn the material world it references into concepts, leaving 
nothing stably “real.” 
																																																								
5 Ibid, 5. 
 
6 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline, 31. 
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The tradition of aesthetic interpretation has embraced the sharing of forms. Long before 
Rothberg proposed the capacious breadth of a multidirectional memory model for representing 
atrocity through shared figures, Aristotle considered poetic figuration a mode of proof, “pistis” a 
term that interchangeably means both “evidence” and “argumentation.” He characterized poetry, 
in its classical rhetorical mode, as a form of pistis that conflated evidence with logos and 
considered it one of the three classes of argumentative speech that could demonstrate the truth 
through quod erat demonstratum—Q.E.D.7 Later, Cicero would identify poetic performance as a 
conduit through which memory could conduct itself, to thus provide a clear picture of the past 
and through that vision, a direct source of navigation into the future.8 In an aesthetic tradition, 
figurative poetics not only expands the scope of what may be referenced by its contents, but also 
the modes of interpretation through which that content may be made meaningful. 
Legal and policy-based analysis has been more cautious. Samantha Power writes that 
“[d]espite broad public consensus that genocide should “never again” be allowed, and a good 
deal of triumphalism about the ascent of liberal democratic values, the last decade of the 
twentieth century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on record.”9 She points to 
moments in the second half of the 20th century where the Holocaust was invoked as an analogy, 
in political attempts to avert genocide in Bosnia, in Cambodia, in Iraq, in Kosovo, and in 
Rwanda. Repetition perhaps made a convincing aesthetic point, but that point failed to translate 
into effective policy; in consequence, the metaphor could not translate beyond concept, beyond 
																																																								
7 In fact, John Hollander notes that in translations of Aristotle’s work, the word “pistis” is interchangeably translated 
as both “proof” and “strategy,” a conflation that demonstrates the sense in which rhetorical strategy may be enlisted 
in the production of evidence. See John Hollander,“The Shadow of a Lie: Poetry, Lying, and the Truth of Fictions,” 
Social Resarch 63.3 (Fall 1996) 643-661.  
 
8 See John Hollander, The Work of Poetry (New York: Columbia UP, 1997), 181. 
 
9 Samantha Power, The Problem from Hell, 502. 
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words. While the poet, writer, and critic Cynthia Ozick writes about the “Moral Necessity of 
Metaphor: Rooting History in the Figure of Speech” she described metaphoricity in her essay as 
“the reciprocal agent, the universalizing force [that] makes possible the power to envision the 
stranger’s heart,” the success rate of political translation of that ethic in effect is unclear.10 
Memory and its sanctification in public space and law has honored the suffering of those in the 
past, and has provided, at different times, forms of recognition ranging from intervention, to 
representation, to restitution.  It has also led to more violence; memory is as frequently invoked 
as a call to retribution as to reconciliation. 
Philip’s book of poems attempts to destabilize the validity and evidentiary solidity of the 
historical narrative call into question the hermeneutic impulse to make the signs of language 
transmit stories. This turn to poetic form is not only a stance against narrative and the meaning-
making impulse intrinsic to narrative form, but also a stance that prompts language to maneuver 
between the universal and the singular, cliché and alterity. Philip’s poetry in Zong! is 
unquestionably singular and local; unlike Jahan Ramazani’s description of transnational poetics 
as “[n]ourished by poetry’s cross-national and ever mutating storage house of forms, techniques, 
genres, and images,” 11  Zong! subsists on and draws exclusively from a specific text, a two page 
court record  titled “Gregson v Gilbert,” a document that outlines a legal trial that was called, in 
the words of the judge who deliberated it, “a very uncommon case.”12 Philip describes the 
circumstances as follows: 
																																																								
10 Cynthia Ozick, “The Moral Necessity of Metaphor: Rooting History in Figure of Speech,” Harper’s Magazine, 
272.1632 (May 1986): 62-68. 
 
11 Jahan Ramzani, A Transnational Poetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 10. 
 
12 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong! As Told to the Author by Setaey Adumu Boateng (Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 2008), 
211. 
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In 1781, a fully provisioned ship, the Zong, captained by one Luke Collingwood, 
leaves the West Coast of Africa with a cargo of 470 slaves and sets sail for 
Jamaica. As is the custom, the cargo is fully insured. Instead of the customary six 
to nine weeks, this fateful trip will take some four months on account of 
navigational errors on the part of the captain. Some of the Zong’s cargo is lost 
through illness and lack of water; many others, by the order of the captain are 
destroyed…Upon the ship’s return to Liverpool, the ship’s owners, the Messrs 
Gregson, make a claim under maritime insurance law for the destroyed cargo, 
which the insurers, the Messrs Gilbert, refuse to pay. The ship’s owners begin 
legal action against their insurers to recover the loss. A jury finds the insurers 
liable and orders them to compensate the ship’s owners for their losses—their 
murdered slaves.13 
 
The logic of the court is simple: legal language and legal forms in 1781 have determined 
slaves to be cargo; law cannot think itself out of the forms that have preceded this case; thus this 
case must be read in terms of those existing codes that govern legal logic and judgment. Quid 
Erat Demonstratum. Therefore, the slaves are cargo, the insurers are liable, the captain and 
slavers, qua murderers, are owed their due in compensation. In response to the grotesque use of 
forms and precedent as a way to sanction and allow for this logical production, Philip’s text and 
abandons the very forms, techniques, genres, or imaging strategies that might serve as informing 
precedents or formally link her attempt to articulate the Zong! experience to other texts through 
such logic of resemblances.  
In this sense, Zong! seeks to achieve both singularity in content and uniqueness in form. 
Yet despite the ethic of singularity of origin and uniqueness in form that governs the text, Zong! 
splices in overly familiar—at times so familiar as to be clichéd—references and allusions to 
antecedent literary forms, such that Philip’s poetry is made to correspond with preexisting poetic 
forms, logics, and genres. That correspondence, between Zong!’s poetic inventions and 
canonized poetic references, put the text’s insistant localism (characterized by, among other 
things, Philip’s resolve to lock herself up in the Gregson v. Gilbert document, and more 																																																								
13 Ibid, 189. 
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specifically the text’s forceful attention to the singularity of its victims) into global impressions, 
thus routing Zong! into channels of a post-1945 circuit of a body of world literature drawn 
together and defined by an interest in human rights and featuring atrocity as a primary concern. 
In this sense, Zong! both draws on and from the coherence of these other texts rather than the 
material of the empirical and evidentiary world, reproducing content that appears in other literary 
forms and documents taken from the world of literature.  
The exchanges that take place between Zong!’s circumscribed sphere and the world of 
literature are particularly significant in the text’s own fixation on the relationship between poetic 
and documentary language. While poetic language exempts Philip’s text from the kinds of 
questions about evidence that a court of law might ask, in using this literary material as a way of 
suggesting possible interpretation, it proposes that literary texts may provide a form of evidence 
that is specifically figural and linguistic in character. Evidence belongs to an interpretive mode 
of thinking, a mode of thinking that allows facts to materialize into meaning. In Philip’s work, 
poetry becomes pistis in the way that Aristotle conceived it: as both proof and argumentation. 
Poetic language, drawing from the idea of pistis a rhetorical strategy that can be aimed at 
argumentation becomes, herein, pistis in its second meaning: as a form of evidence. In this way, 
the literary text itself becomes a type of evidence, in which linguistic and specifically poetic 
material may substantiate interpretation and meaning within Philip’s text.  
III. The Slave Trade, the Text, and The Making of the World 
No account of global atrocity and its circulation within world literature would be 
complete without confronting the transatlantic slave trade, since the intercontinental slave trade 
lies at the very foundations of what we now think of as “the world,” of globalization and the 
circulation of global capital. The slave trade stands as an archetype of both modern atrocity, and 
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later, as the abolitionist movement developed, became foundational for modern legal thinking 
about just how “universal” universal human rights might be. The Zong massacre, as an event that 
reveals the deep irreconcilabilities between moral and legal codes governing the nature of the 
human, and as an event that constellates globalization as a process complicit in producing the 
atrocity of the human slave trade with a simultaneously emerging discourse on universal human 
rights, stands as a dense figure of this archetype. 
  Ian Baucom places the abolitionist response to the Zong massacre at the beginning of 
liberal discourse on human rights. The confluence of mercantile capitalism, the increasing 
interconnectedness of previously discrete spaces on the globe by the development of routes and 
interactivity between populations, and a fomenting discourse on the importance of inalienable 
rights, which came to be understood as the inborn purview of each individual, constellated a new 
institutionalized legal mandate: to protect and maintain this ideal, as both an ethic and a legal 
materiality. As Baucom shows, the Zong massacre marked a sharp ideological turn, one that 
made the contradiction visible.14 The court’s decision to rule the massacre as a suit over 
destroyed property put on display the dissonance between the gruesome reality of the slave trade, 
and the limits of the law to reckon with its cruelty. A letter from Olaudah Equiano marks this 
shift; he reported the incident to the British abolitionist, Granville Sharp in 1783. Sharp, alarmed 
by the report, perhaps newly invigorated by Equiano’s characterization of the event as 
“inhuman,” then brought the case to the foreground of the British public eye, redefining what 
had been legally classified as a case for insurance compensation to a “mass atrocity,” as Michelle 
																																																								
14 Ian Baucom, Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History (Durham: Duke 
UP, 2005) 
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Faubert points out.15 Drawing from a newly discovered manuscript letter to the Lords 
Commissioner of the Admiralty written by Sharp, Faubert argues that the letter serves as a record 
of Sharp’s “efforts to demand justice for the murders committed aboard the Zong.”16 Sharp’s use 
of the terminology of both atrocity and justice mark a record a shift in thinking about the event as 
a human rights issue, providing new context for understanding the way in which the case, as it 
entered into an abolitionist discourse, framed and echoed shifts in thinking about black lives as a 
central and defining issue for thinking about the universality of human rights. Sharp’s address to 
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in 1787 begins as follows: 
  As the cognizance and right of enquiry concerning all Murders committed  
Aboard British Ships belongs properly to the Admiralty Department, I  
think it my Duty tolay before your Lordships two Manuscript Accounts  
wherein are stated from unquestionable authority the circumstances of a  
most inhuman and barbarous murder committed by Luke Collingwood the  
Master, Colonel James Kelsall, the Mate, and other persons, the Mariners  
or Crew of the Ship Zong or Zurg a Liverpool Trader freighted with  
Slaves &c from the Coast of Africa.17 
 
As Faubert points out, “Sharp’s calculated use of the word “murder—27 times in 15 pages—
changes the focus of the Zong case,” from a case primarily contextualized as a property claim, to 
a historical event subject to the review, interpretation, and moral evaluation of human rights 
law.”18 More specifically, the change in interpretive lens and conceptual scheme—signified by 
the invocation of the term “murder”—demonstrates a turn toward a moral claim, the inclusion 
within the historical record of the rights of the victims and their community to recognition and 
redress within a moral and a legal interpretative arena. In the emphatic language of murder, in 																																																								
15 Michelle Faubert, “Granville Sharp’s Manuscript Letter to the Admiralty on the Zong Massacre: A New 
Discovery in the British Library,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies, (2016): 2-3. 
 
16 Ibid, 2. 
 
17 Ibid, 10. 
 
18 Ibid. 
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calling the event a “most inhuman and barbarous murder,” we see the emergence of moral 
indignation that belongs to the vocabulary of ethics and human rights.  
IV. The Proof Is In the Poetry 
The problem of evidence in Zong! stands at the center of the scholarship it has generated; 
more or less, the critical response to the text has to do with the concerns about evidence that the 
text brings up. But the problem of evidence is also central to the way in which the bulk of that 
criticism skirts around actually dealing with the poetry included within Zong!, as literary 
evidence. That is to say, most critical analyses of Zong!, from Jenny Sharpe’s concentration on 
affect to Sarah Dowling’s analysis on Zong!’s relationship to the lyric form, generally agree that 
the poetic content of the text evokes problems about evidence. As historical event, particularly 
one that now stands out as an atrocity, the modes of evidence typically enlisted as proof of 
criminality either lack in substance or are so compromised by an ideological and legal paradigm 
that did not recognize its victims as human as to throw the concept of evidence into question all 
together.  
Yet the criticism itself has a hard time enlisting the poetry as evidence of a literary 
variety. Rather, this body of criticism depends on Philip’s critical content, which appears at the 
end of her text, as evidence of the scholarly argument that a given piece of criticism makes. The 
poetic content becomes auxiliary to the form itself; evident fact that may be noted as explication 
of Philip’s point, to be observed rather than engaged as the object of literary analysis. Since 
Philip’s own notes interpret the poetic content, her notes, rather than the poetry, become the 
evidence for critical analysis of the text, to be read and cited in an argument about the text. Thus, 
the kind of analysis (close reading) that literary scholarship typically calls proof for a critical 
argument loses its force as a methodology of defining, interpreting, and evaluating evidence.   
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Seeking to explore the text’s negotiation between inevitably reproducing the forms of the 
past complicit in, at once, enabling and hiding a violent reality, and the ethical impossibility of 
remaining silent about the past, even with the inevitability of misrepresentation, Anthony Reed 
writes that, 
[t]he familiarity of such ghastly stories at once generates and annuls their power, 
reducing them to the background of unthought knowledge and facts. The banality 
of an archive of slavery that fails to produce the names or testimonies of the dead 
threatens to make the event, a drowning at sea, disappear. In writing to bear 
witness to the 1781 murder of 133 kidnapped and unnamed Africans who were 
drowned with the expectation that insurance would cover the loss of capital, how 
does one avoid the comfort of cliché (which “humanizes” those whose humanity 
history has denied) or romance, the comfort that one knows the story in 
advance?”19  
 
He continues, 
 
in Philip’s serial poem the status of texts, invented ancestors, and the movements 
between speech, song, syllables and consonants takes on an additional resonance 
that “unsettles the lyrical subject” by tampering with it, rendering it as a voice “in 
process.” Philip describes it as “speaking over my own voice, interrupting and 
disrupting it, refusing to allow the voice, the solo voice, pride of place, centre 
page, centre stage.20  
 
 Reed’s reference to cliché concerns Zong!’s resistance to the familiar tropes that have 
become default, so familiar and naturalized as forms as to render the content itself, horrific as the 
facts may be, banal, the shock of them soothed by pre-formed conclusions about them that do not 
require conceptual or ethical reckoning. The implication is that the “cliché” makes the facts of 
the event, grotesque as they are, matter of fact, no longer endowed with affective potential. 
Affect, his argument suggests, is at odds with the blunting caused by the cliché. Since affect, as 
critics have noted, seems to be wholly the point of the text, cliché is what the text must 
overcome. This is Jenny Sharpe’s point in her analysis; Sharpe classifies of Zong! as a text that 																																																								
19 Anthony Reed, Freedom Time: The Poetics and Politics of Black Experimental Writing (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 2014), 47. 
 
20 Ibid, 50. 
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depends on affect and an attempt to extract the massacre from the a historical document that has 
banalized its horror, and from a literary form—narrative—that has become complicit in that 
neutralization. Similarly to Reed’s approach, she seeks to understand how Philip “unsettles” 
traditional forms, disrupting poetic traditions, like the lyrical subject to de-familiarize the event, 
and thus wrest it away from “banality of an archive of slavery,” with clichés about this archive 
that have become all too familiar, and have thus lost their ability to shock us with the horror of 
what has transpired. Her exploration of the text’s use of affect outlines how the text’s 
fragmentation of the court document turns away from the logical and meaning-making uses of 
language, and toward a use of language that evokes visceral and embodied responses, rather than 
the that of the logical, reasoning mind; in Sharpe’s words “an affective memory lacks the 
materiality of archival memory or the solidity of reconstructed lives, either real or imaginary, 
because its power lies elsewhere.”21 That affective strategy, she argues, enables the text to both 
“tell a story for which the evidence works against its telling,” and to resituate the event in terms 
of a specifically Caribbean, rather than Western, archive, thus wresting its memory out of the 
exclusive purview of culture in which the atrocity was perpetrated, and into one in which it can 
be properly recognized as atrocity and mourned. Sarah Dowling proposes the form of the lyric as 
an all-too-familiar form, a poetic platitude that too easily resolves the horror of content into a 
predictable form. She finds in Zong! a way to counter a “rhetoric of desire” grounded in the 
possessive drive of global capitol and substantiated by law. For Dowling, “the specificity and 
individuality of the Africans, the lyric personhood implied by their names, is annulled by the 
legal discourse in which ‘negroes’ are only ‘the evidence,’ not the victims.” Thus, Philip’s poetic 
rewriting counters “the legalistic and actuarial logic of the Gregson v. Gilbert source text negates 																																																								
21 Jenny Sharpe, “The Archive and Affective Memory in M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong!” Interventions: International 
Journal of Postcolonial Studies. July, 2013, 6. 
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the possibility of the slaves' personhood, and accordingly their names vanish, just like their 
bones.”22 
From Reed’s concern about the aesthetics of representation and the temptation of cliché, 
to Dowling’s analysis of Zong!’s attempt to foreground the personhood of the victims, part of the 
central, if often unarticulated motivation for the critical review of Philip’s work, is the way that it 
maneuvers between being a poem, and making the Zong massacre into an aesthetic object, and 
maintaining that the poetry has a documentary authority—a claim to an event’s singular and 
material reality—precisely as a work of art. Asking how testimony may remain a valid form of 
proof when a category of persons never were able to bear witness, their voices never entered into 
the historical or legal record, the text scrutinizes the authority of factual documentation and 
forms of language certified by structures of power as authentic. Seeking to belatedly represent 
the “truth” of the victim’s experience, the text turns away from forms that claim privileged 
access to a historical reality, which instead only preserve facts insofar as they belong to an 
ideological system designed by the perpetrators.   
If the idea of refuting documentary authority in favor of poetic evidence does not yet 
seem a radical maneuver, consider that scholars, critics, and writers alike have cautioned 
vigilance against porousness between the boundaries of fact and fabrication in the context of 
mass suffering, a warning that critics of the text heed when searching for clues in Philip’s 
explanation of the poetry, rather than the poetry itself. Philip may propose that her proof is in the 
poetry, but in the context of atrocity, scholars have cautioned against conflating aesthetic 
representation of atrocity with the facts of atrocity themselves. That caution is specific to events 																																																								
22 Sarah Dowling, “Persons and Voices: Sounding Impossible Bodies in M. NourbeSe Philip's Zong!,” Canadian 
Literature 210/211 (Autumn 2011): 50. 
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said to be so traumatic as to be beyond representation, for if an event is said to be rhetorically 
impossible to pass on, rhetoric is already complicit in inventing, betraying the “true” but 
unavailable reality for its imitation in language, a cheap copy that can be rendered into words. 
The idea that the facts of atrocity and the aesthetics of atrocity cannot be reconciled is based on 
the understanding that atrocity already stretches the tautly strung link between the factual 
credibility of representation and the indescribable character of the event itself, stylization 
threatens to pull it to the point of rupture and to furthermore displace the facts entirely. Thus, 
critics have widely observed that the major dilemma facing specifically literary representations 
of atrocity have been grounded what James E. Young has described as the “fear that the 
empirical link between [the] experiences and…narrative is lost in literary construction.”23 The 
more obviously fabricated or “made” the representation, the weaker that link.  
The question that Philip asks “What did, in fact, happen aboard the Zong? Can we, some 
two hundred years later, ever really know? Should we?” represents a variation on this concern.24 
The first of Philip’s questions, the one that asks “[wh]at did, in fact, happen aboard the Zong,” is 
a question about, well, facts. It invokes the call for that “materiality of the archive,” a call that 
would, presumably, bring conclusive certainty, the kind of conviction beyond reasonable doubt, 
that typically marks the satisfactory conclusion of a trail—or a satisfying narrative ending, one 
that will, as Peter Brooks points out “complete and elucidate whatever is put in motion at the 
start.”25 But if the first of Philip’s questions is about factual certainty beyond reasonable doubt, 
the second is a question that casts into doubt the very concept, and the ethics, of the certainty that 																																																								
23 James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988), 23. 
 
24 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong!,196. 
 
25 Peter Brooks, Enigmas of Identity (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011), 125 
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facts are understood to provide. Should, like “ought,” (as David Hume would remind us), 
belongs not to the language of factuality, but to a specific type of moral realism that presupposes 
a moral clause that supersedes any subjective or ethical claim about facts and their meaning, as 
evidence.26 The progression of Philip’s comment here goes from a question rooted in an 
empirical order, a question of a 1960s Adorno-like concern about the limits of knowledge and 
representation, to ending up at a question somewhat different, about the ethics of knowing and 
representing something that has to necessarily be imagined, about what it might mean to arrive at 
certainty through evidence. If the aim of legal narrative is to pursue all relevant facts so that their 
coherence may produce a semblance of the experience in question beyond reasonable doubt, 
there are some things, she suggests with that should, that we ought not to imagine, to allow 
aesthetic invention to remake. 
 Cliché, that overdrawn and too-familiar figure or phrase, compresses the content it 
signifies such that it is undertood to be beyond reasonable doubt. It concretizes meaning to the 
point of overdetermination. In a cliché, signs are signified anterior to, and external from, the 
surrounding content. The cliché lacks imagination—indeed, it forestalls imagining—because its 
system of meaning is utterly conventional, vapid, so certain and overly evidenced elsewhere as to 
make the meaning embedded within it beyond reasonable doubt. This is its power, but it is also 
what makes a cliché such a difficult challenge for representation. For although the signifying 
properties of a cliché appear self evident, the de facto quality of repetition the cheap copy that 
betrays the true, authentic original; the cliché trivializes by signaling its content as derivative. 
Reed’s broad concern, which other critics echo, is about the “dulling” affect of cliché. 
Identifying Zong! as a text that resists cliché, the critical focus of this scholarship is on the text’s 
strategic formal navigation outside of pre-existing forms, its determination to avoid clichéd 																																																								
26 See Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011). 
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poetic and narrative modes of representation, and its innovation in finding a way to “untell” the 
narrative of the Zong massacre outside of familiar—and clichéd—narrative forms—and to 
moreover (as Philip puts it) do so “in a language already contaminated, possibly irrevocably and 
fatally.”27  
But it is worth noting that at the outset of his argument, Reed grants that while clichés 
and the overfamiliarity with the grotesqueness of slave trade narratives “annuls their power, 
reducing them to the background of unthought knowledge and facts,” that same overfamiliarity 
generates that very same power. So then what, exactly, is its power? Could the “cliché,” the all-
too familiar trope, the figure whose conceptual significance relies on shorthand and well-worn 
figures for comprehension, be subverted, its reliance on the overproduction of mimesis made 
subversive? Can it too, like Sinha’s “shock of recognition,” enable the facts to be newly 
significant, the evidence of atrocity newly visible, through an over-production of and an over-
reliance on the logic of resemblance, cliché ad nauseum, in excess?  
One way to read Zong! is as itself a type of text that copies from a variety of original 
impressions, precisely in order to subvert them. In fact, Zong! is a text that becomes subversive 
in copying; the nature of cliché as a characteristic of the text is immanent to the form. The aim of 
the text is neither to add additional “factual” information to the archive of slavery or to its legal 
documentation, nor is it to extract or produce symbolic content from the historical facts. Rather, 
the text introduces an intertextual and multidirectional link to established preexisting forms in 
order to point to the impossibility of writing “the truth” about the event. It does so precisely by 
putting on display its dependence on preexisting forms and clichéd figures, and the impossibility 
of getting outside of them if one is to write about atrocity today.  
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Let us now be precise in what we mean when we invoke the idea of the “cliché.” The 
term cliché carris the sense of overuse, a term of conceptualization so global and unspecific that 
it comes to the point of being a vacant form, empty of and incapable of carrying any significant 
meaning about a particular. The cliché is form itself, a linguistic and conceptual cluster that has 
become so universally applicable that we glaze over its content. In a cliché, the content becomes 
redundant; so pronounced is the signature provided by the cliché’s form that the content, 
compacted and pre-signified, need not be engaged. To that end, invoked as a familiar form or a 
shorthand for a concept as difficult to apprehend as atrocity, deploying a cliché could function as 
a type of “screen memory” (as Freud would call it), establishing and ascribing a value or 
sensation of an experience without requiring the difficult work of grappling with its reality and 
short-circuiting the cognitive labor of imagining a discrete experience that may be difficult to 
understand.28  
On one level, the text seems to oppose this form of short-circuiting; after all, as Philip 
herself proposes, the very formal exercise embedded in writing Zong! is in its refusal to follow 
narrative formula, the types of structures readers tend to use to apprehend, interpret, and evaluate 
the contents of the page. As a strategy that may provide a glaze over difficult content, form 
becomes formula, allowing readers to anticipate and prepare themselves for the content 
structured within it, but also allowing readers to anticipate their own reactions to and 
assumptions about the text, and perhaps inducing, a set of predictable responses to what they 
ultimately encounter. Philip’s text accuses this very hermeneutic of enabling the Zong slavers to 
gloss over the pain and humanity of their victims, and of enabling the judges in the legal system 
who heard the evidence of the case to gloss over these qualities once more; so entrenched and 																																																								
28 I take the term “screen memory” from Freud, who defines it as an antecedent and definitive experience held 
within memory, through which subsequent experiences are synthesized and understood. See Sigmund Freud, 
"Screen Memories,” Standard Edition 3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1962), 301-320. 
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slick were the preset formulas of legal precedent and procedure that those judging it were able to 
overcome their concerns about the violence of the event and ultimately process its evidentiary 
content through the system of property law without reckoning with its grotesqueness. Zong! is 
concerned with the way in which telling the story of the Zong! massacre through the use of a 
familiar formula both allows readers to skip over its horror, and reproduces the very hermeneutic 
that enabled the violence in the first place.  
As Reed points out, there is, moreover, broad concern about the “banality of the archive 
of slavery,” the danger that the facts of slavery themselves fail to register their affect. He argues 
that the archives that document the slave trade typically “fail to produce the names or testimonies 
of the dead [which] threatens to make the event, a drowning at sea, disappear.”29 Moreover, the 
prevalence and frequency of such horrifying events in history allows what ought to horrify us 
rather become customary; Reed writes that “the familiarity of such ghastly stories at once 
generates and annuls their power, reducing them to the background of unthought knowledge and 
facts.”30 Judith Butler points to cases in which the horror that each successive repetition of a 
traumatic experience as a told story causes it to become “crystalized,” increasingly processed 
through narrative conventions until they resulted in the “rigidification and transformation of 
form.”31  
Thus, the stakes of narrative rigidification, especially to the point of cliché, is tethered to 
severe ethical consequences. If memories are so thoroughly concretized into a known form, that 																																																								
29 Anthony Reed, Freedom Time: The Poetics and Politics of Black Experimental Writing, 50. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31In the case of Primo Levi, Butler writes, “as he told these stories time and again, he no longer knew whether the 
story really correlated with a memory that he had—the repeatable story took on a life of its own, and his relation to 
the story was no longer the same as his relation to the memory…unmoored from the task of preserving memory.” 
See Judith Butler “Fiction and Solicitude: Ethics and the Conditions for Survival,” in Probing the Ethics of 
Holocaust Culture, ed. Claudio Fogu, Wolf Kansteiner, and Todd Presner (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2016), 381 
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form may cease to evidence the memory, instead rather reinforce the form alone, thus further 
submerging the content itself further in its formal container, concealing the brokenness and 
horror of the traumatic memory of the story by inhibiting possibilities of imagining it. Further, as 
Sinha’s charater, “Animal,” saw all too clearly, when a painful personal narrative becomes 
formalized, rendered into a form derived from elsewhere, the pain itself is in danger of becoming 
derivative; an echo rather than an articulation unto itself.  
At its essence, what makes a cliché a cliché is the predictability of its meaning, 
independent of context. This is tied to the essential universality of a cliché, its apartness from 
specific locality. The impression left by a cliché is identical, regardless of the substrate in which 
it impresses itself; it is a universal footprint that lacks regard for the local and individual content 
in which it is embedded. Of the cliché, Jonathan Culler writes that its meaning “is not located in 
the text itself but is the product of past semiotic and literary practice, and it is in perceiving 
a sign’s reference to this preexisting phrase or complex that the reader identiﬁes the sign as 
‘poetic.’ The apparently mimetic sign is seen as a transformation of past poetic discourse…[it] 
refer[s] to a pre-existing hypogram and [a] variant or transformation of a matrix.”32 In Culler’s 
view, a cliché represents a constellation of “common knowledge,” a form of knowledge shared 
by a collective that can thus be transmitted across the collective fully understood. It can be 
transmitted, meaning in tact and implicit, across that collective as commonly understood 
knowledge. If the knowledge that a phrase or figure carries may be commonly understood within 
a given context, then that context may be considered, de facto, a member of that collective’s 
shared metabolic system; equally, if a context belongs to a metabolic system, a phrase or figure 
can become universally understood, its meaning apparent and implied, within any text that is part 
of that system. Clichés compress, copy, carry, and echo meaning across a group of persons.  																																																								
32 Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981), 83. 
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Clichés may also compress, copy, carry, and echo meaning across a group of texts or a 
literary body. The etymological and material roots of the word “cliché” indeed derive from this 
sense of echo and copy, but those same roots simultaneously provide the term a second face that 
puts the term in opposition to itself, a historical lineage that suggestively lays out the cliché’s 
capacity to generate its force as an articulation, as well as annul it. In fact, the context originally 
denoted by the term “cliché” is the form of impression given by the textual world, the 
impressions of the printing press itself. The term emerges out of the very mode of producing text 
in its material form, a process that originally meant to result in the circulation and preservation of 
memory. The etymology of the term roots the idea of cliché lie in that very specific form of the 
print, with the production of individual impressions of printed content on the page. In its original 
meaning, the word cliché is co-emergent with the production of print media; it refers not to the 
conceptual scheme but rather (as the OED explains) to a late 18th century to early 19th century 
engraving or press, a type of “plate used for printing an image,” a technology typically used for 
providing copies of texts or proofs.33 One etymology proposes that the word “cliché” is 
onomatopoeic, that it derives from the click-click-clicking of the image and typesetting blocks 
when impressed during the printing process. The genealogy superimposes that the continuous 
clicking and clacking of impressions of the printing press, a continuous source of repetitions and 
impressions, onto the formal impressions made by the plates themselves.34  
As she describes it Philip “untells” the Zong narrative by inserting herself into the click-
click-clicking of the typesetting. She sets out on a process of cutting, pasting, and copying the 
impressions of the typesetter blocks as they imprinted the Gregson v. Gilbert decision into the 
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historical court records. The process foregrounding the dynamic interventions of the printing 
process itself, which at one point memorably alter the form and the content of the text, producing 
copies in excess, an event that Philip describes as follows: 
Having completed the first draft of one section I attempt to print it; the laser printer 
for no apparent reason prints the first two or three pages superimposed on each 
other—crumped, so to speak—so that the page becomes a dense landscape of text.35  
 
The anecdote of textual production Philip describes might serve as a mnemonic for the text itself, 
a text that, in the original sense of the term, makes use of cliché that manipulates the pre-existing 
impressions of the print. Philip describes the event as absolutely singular (she writes, “I have 
never been able to find a reason for it and my printer has not since done that with anything else I 
have written”), and yet the event is itself made significant and meaningful because of it is 
“crumped,” exploding with an excess of resonance such that the effect is explosive, inarticulate. 
Overlapping copies of content become meaningful, not by averting cliché but rather by 
subverting it, through an overproduction of copies.36  
Zong! is in fact a text whose fragile readability is dependent on copying. Its legibility 
emerges through a network of intertexts, including references taken from the poetry of Holocaust 
poet Paul Celan (among other literary precursors), critic Jacques Derrida, whose engagements 
with Celan’s work are responsible for some of his central theoretical claims about witnessing and 
atrocity, and of course the Gregson v. Gilbert court trial itself. This sort of legibility through 																																																								
35 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong!, 206. 
 
36 Two key critics are relevant here: first, Homi Bhabha and his landmark essay “Of Mimicry and Man;” second, 
Susan Sontag, who famously proposed that “the very logic of consumption itself…means to burn, to use up—and 
therefore to need to be replenished.” Observing that the proliferation of horrific images and their over-availability 
numbs our response to them, Sontag argues that horrific realities have themselves become “cliché…meta clichés out 
of unique objects, distinctive and vivid artifacts out of clichés.” This leads Sontag to argue that since it has become 
“less and less plausible to reflect upon our experiences according to the distinction…between copies and 
originals…it will require an ecology not only of real things but of images as well.” See Susan Sontag On 
Photography (New York: Picador Press, 1977), 170-180, and Homi K. Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The 
Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis 28 (Spring, 1984). 
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infusions of literary fragments (quotes inserted into the text from literary sources) and archival 
fragmentation (the splitting and dismembering of the Gregson v. Gilbert court case document) 
fosters a textual network in which both meaning and readability that depends on the 
presupposition of resonance through mimesis. Copying and pasting fragments of “world 
literature” becomes a method of resonance, of reproducing texts and proofs from other presses 
and plates as a means by which to articulate atrocity, and also as a responsive and conversant 
textual community.  
Zong! engages with a particular set of clichéd impressions from the European continent, 
and from a canonized Western discourse, which as Dipesh Chakrabarty describes it in 
Provincializing Europe, has come to represent “an imaginary figure that remains deeply 
embedded in some every day habits of thought” across the globe, since, as Chakrabarty continues 
it is “impossible to think of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and 
concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of 
Europe.”37 Impressing these clichéd terms into a text that strives to break from the conceptual 
frame that is contingent upon these embedded figures for meaning casts the text into a broader 
discourse of universalism, and positions it to reckon with the consequences of such a globalizing 
impulse, namely the challenge of retelling a specific and exceptional historical incident within a 
global economy of representation.  
V. Imaginative Communities: The World and the Text  
The text included within Zong! swings between reproduction of highly recognizable old 
material and new material that is difficult to decipher. That content also swerves between 
explanation and interpretation on the one hand, and deconstruction of previous coherent material 																																																								
37 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2002), 4. 
 
	 257 
on the other. The title references previous material that is both recognizable old material and 
material that is newly difficult to decipher: the infamous 1781 slave massacre. In Philip’s 
introduction to that material she begins with the sentence:  “There is no telling this story; it must 
be told,” a sentence that itself swerves between the impulse to interpret signs and the impulse to 
destroy signification. Her narration, interspersed with quotes from a court document that 
comprises the entirety of the records that evidence the event, continues, 
In 1781, a fully provisioned ship, the Zong, captained by one Luke Collingwood, 
leaves the West Coast of Africa with a cargo of 470 slaves and sets sail for 
Jamaica. As is the custom, the cargo is fully insured. Instead of the customary six 
to nine weeks, this fateful trip will take some four months on account of 
navigational errors on the part of the captain. Some of the Zong’s cargo is lost 
through illness and lack of water; many others, by the order of the captain are 
destroyed; “Sixty negroes died for want of water…and forty others…through 
thirst and frenzy…threw themselves into the sea and were drowned; and the 
master and mariners…were obliged to throw overboard 150 other 
negroes”…Upon the ship’s return to Liverpool, the ship’s owners, the Messrs 
Gregson, make a claim under maritime insurance law for the destroyed cargo, 
which the insurers, the Messrs Gilbert, refuse to pay. The ship’s owners begin 
legal action against their insurers to recover the loss. A jury finds the insurers 
liable and orders them to compensate the ship’s owners for their losses—their 
murdered slaves. The insurers, in turn, appeal the jury’s decision to the Court of 
King’s Bench, where Lord Mansfield, the Lord Chief Justice of England presides, 
as he would over many of the most significant cases related to slavery/ The three 
justices, Willes, Buller, and Mansfield, agree that a new trial should be held. The 
report of that decision, Gregson v. Gilbert, the formal name of the case more 
colloquially known as the Zong case, is the text I rely on to create the poems of 
Zong! To tell the story that must be told.38 
 
That story, as Philip “untells” it, is a story in which the reality of evidence is swallowed up by an 
epistemological system, within an epistemological climate of law that determines black persons 
as property. In the case tried before the law, evidence of a massacre was denied and not entered 
as legal evidence, and thus the event could not be articulated as anything but evidence of the 
slaver’s right to compensation. At the center of Philip’s gravity in Zong! is the epistemology of 																																																								
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evidence itself. In the case of Zong!, evidence bears a corrupt relationship to reality; if evidence 
is the mode by which logic unwinds the mysteries and opacities of the world, and is also the 
mode by which the law allots judgments of rightness and wrongness, evidence itself bears the 
mark of corruption, cannot be trusted to yield a version of the world as it really was. 
Unable to depend on material forms of evidence, Philip turns to imaginary and aesthetic 
forms of evidence to interpret the case. The context of Philip’s body of writing shows the 
development of such logic, even before her encounter with the Zong atrocity. “It is a testament to 
many things that my first exposure to racial tyranny and genocide was an imaginative one,” 
wrote Philip, in her 1993 article, “Black/ Jewish Relations.”39 Philip, writing retrospectively, 
recalls that in the context of growing up in Trinidad and Tobago, islands dense with the colonial 
history of African slavery and suffering, she was taught about the horrors of racial atrocity 
through the fictions of Leon Uris, whose novel, Exodus, recounts the suffering of European Jews 
under the Nazis. “I was outraged and upset at what had happened to the Jews,” Philip writes,  
“[i]n the silence surrounding my own history and my own memory, I took to 
myself the pain of what had happened to the Jewish people in Europe. Perhaps—I 
am sure that at some deeper level I knew what had happened to my own people 
(this knowledge, even if not spoken, is passed on, sometimes infinitely nuanced 
from one generation to another), and that I was on the journey to my own past 
albeit through a surrogate issue…I know the exposure to be a significant one 
because it continues to crop up in my own imaginative and poetic life.40 
 
In her poem, “St. Clair Avenue West,” cited in the essay, her speaker says  
 
and we were the B.C.D.s 
Basic Common Denominators 
silence divided by time 
one oppression by two realities 
the only remainder 																																																								
39 M. NourbeSe Philip, "Black-Jewish Relations." Border/Lines 29/30 (1993): 64-65. The essay is also reprinted in 
Philip’s book, Showing Grit.  
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one scrawny wrist 
tattooed blue with numbers 
and branded memories that balk at talk.41 
 
Philip’s encounter with the facts of the Holocaust takes place in fiction; her encounter with the 
history of atrocity to which she belongs takes place through a type of imagining in which the 
factual reality of her past cannot but be imagined through fictions of another. The poem works 
through the complex equation of this multilayered memory, in which fictions and figures pitch 
forward and backward through “one oppression by two realities,” converging the two histories as 
“B.C.D.s,” metaphorical equivalences, while reminding us of the “remainder,” the physicalities 
of suffering starkly imaged as irreducible to figural assimilation “one scrawny wrist/ tattooed 
blue with numbers” belonging to the Holocaust victim; the “branded memories that balk at talk,” 
evocative of the branding that marked the slaver’s impression onto the skin of slaves. Do the 
memories “balk at talk,” that is to say, do they resist language’s way of converging them? Are 
her memories of slavery “branded,” patented as the separate purview of this discrete history? Or 
do the markings on skin themselves a “brand,” a recognizable icon, a clichéd term registering a 
conglomerate concept of atrocity writ large? 
 For Philip, these questions about the possibility of accessing authentic forms memory, 
particularly memories that are deeply personal, are concerns about the nature of comparison and 
the impulse toward universalization. “Each group claims the uniqueness of their oppression—
and so it should be,” she writes.42 And yet, Philip describes encounter the facts of the slave trade 
and the suffering of her own group in the colonial past, as the shock of recognition in 
retroactively discovering her story, after reading Uris’s fictional text. No small part of that shock 
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is due to the distance put between her and her own heritage—the legacy of exploitation and 
abuse of her ancestors by Europe in Trinidad and Tobago—which can only come to her as routed 
through a specifically European history. In Philip’s sense of outrage that the European tragedy of 
Jewish suffering had come to occupy the imaginary landscape of a child growing up in Tobago 
and Trinidad, we are prompted to consider whether Holocaust memory has displaced the 
memory of suffering that took place in that space. The image of the young Philip growing up in 
Trinidad and Tobago, reading of Jewish refugees aboard the Exodus without access to the 
narrative of the slaves carried from the shores of the Caribbean to Europe, puts into sharp focus 
how the institutionalization of Uris’s text, circulating in the islands, has overwritten the suffering 
of those whose descendants now read of the Jewish holocaust, while the suffering of the Black 
holocaust remains unspoken. 
In this way, the value of literature and its figurative properties is tautly pulled in two 
opposite positions. On the one hand, the figurative technology supplied by literature compresses 
disparate and distant experiences and thus allows imaginative exchanges to take place. That 
compression ultimately provides a context and a form for Philip to figure her own articulation 
about the brutality of colonialism in West Indian History and the horror of the slave trade. On the 
other hand, that literature becomes what she calls “a testament to power…the oppressive weight 
of colonial power which attempts to create subjects in their own image…withhold[ing] your 
history in an attempt to control your thoughts.”43    
This equivocation about the circulation of literature and its imaginative capabilities make 
Philip’s consistent inclusion of literary references in Zong! complexly ambivalent. Each section 
of Zong! includes poetry dedicated to remembering and commemorating the individual deaths of 																																																								
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African slaves at the hands of white slavers. That poetry, cut from the legal text, simultaneously 
recalls the re-inscription of the victims. as property in the legal assessment of white judges. Yet, 
attempting to wrest the memory of the victims out of an overinscribed textual history, Philip 
paradoxically inserts into her text the voices of canonical literary figures—all of whom are, like 
the voices of those inscribed in the historical record “white, male, European.”44 These voices, 
moreover, enter into dialogue with the poetry that Philip creates in an attempt to get outside of 
the canon; these canonized literary voices take the form of intertextual dialogue and global 
exchanges, between Philip’s poems and a pastiche of literary references.  
In a theoretical approach to a literary dynamic that she calls “resonance,” Wai Chee 
Dimock proposes that literature’s “semantic webs, broadening, contracting, acquiring new 
overtones and inflections, bear witness to the advent and retreat of social norms,” and proposes a 
“theory of resonance” to describe texts and “objects that extend across time, across temporal gulf 
between language users.”45 Staunch historicism and strict approaches close reading, she argues, 
unhelpfully sequester a text wholly within the immediate context of its composition; these 
inveterate approaches ignores the dynamic way that literature travels, the way that such worldly 
literature not only engages figures and forms from elsewhere, but also contributes to a “web of 
meaning” in which words, figures, and forms increase in density as texts travel from their point 
of origin, “causing unexpected vibrations in unexpected places.”46  
By describing her theory of resonance as a situation in which venerated literary themes 
from one coordinate in the space and time continuum causing “unexpected vibrations in 
unexpected places,” Dimock implies that the traditional institutional groupings of literature and 																																																								
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traditional modes of interpretation (such as historicism), which separate and sequester scholarly 
investigation into national, temporal, and geographical bounds, miss other coherences by 
ignoring the ways in which texts themselves may themselves enlist content from outside these 
disciplinary containers.  
Resonance, and resistance to resonance is major feature of Zong!. The text features an 
ongoing circulation of literary references, epitaphs, and inscriptions that appear as prefatory 
material to each chapter of poetry in the text. “The Time is out of joint. O cursed spite/ That ever 
I was born to set it right!” says Shakespeare, via Hamlet, a quote that appears on the same page 
as a stanza from Dylan Thomas that reads “Though they go mad they shall be sane,/ Though they 
sink through the sea they shall rise again…”47 Put into conversation with one another, the 
speaker from Thomas’s poem and Shakespeare’s Hamlet converge. Dylan speaks prophetically, 
as if from the past, while Hamlet’s 16th century oath to “set it right” seems to converge with a 
present-tense perspective that parallels Philip’s own sense of duty to catalyze Thomas’s own 
oath, “Though they sink through the sea they shall rise again,” from the 1933 poem “And Death 
Shall Have No Dominion.” “The sea was not a mask,” speaks Wallace Stevens, across from 
Zong! #1, which in widely spaced letters spells out chattering and fragmented utterances of 
“water,” “goods,” and other onomatopoeic articulations.48 Philip’s poem, which appears above 
what Philip calls “footnotes” (names that Philip has imagined for dead of the Zong! massacre) 
proposes an articulation that could be the voices of the shocked slaves thrown into the water, or 
her own shock at the imagined recollection of what they might have experienced, a suggestion 
potently signaled by the reference to Stevens’s poem which begins with the stanza that appears 
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directly above the meter Philip uses as an epigraph, 
She sang beyond the genius of the sea. 
The water never formed to mind or voice, 
Like a body wholly body, fluttering 
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion 
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry, 
That was not ours although we understood, 
Inhuman, of the veritable ocean.  
Philip elsewhere describes her ability to image the dead to whom she refers as “footnotes” as 
“fleeting.” She says, “it’s almost as if you can’t pin them down, as if they’re ghosts.”49  
The epigraphs fleetingly mentioned appear as specters, as references that need to be 
reconstituted outside of the text, are impressions that need to be traced back to an antecedent 
press. Their visage dialogues with Philip’s own poems, and part of that dialogue requires the 
metonymic dynamism involved in reading multidirectionally. Philip’s text requires its readers to 
reshape on both ends, hers and the textual interlocutor in order to make meaning through a 
process of echoing, recombination, and dialogical reconstruction, marbling the content of the 
original source with its new significance as inserted within the form of Philip’s text. The material 
quoted acts like a sort of exegesis, putting the text into dynamic conversation with texts that act 
as secondary sources of a sort, put to work as contextualizing supplements that dialogue with the 
content of the poems.  
While the use of epigraphs to frame or provide reference marks for literary texts is far 
from uncommon, Philip’s use of literary content taken from this set of texts is uniquely 
significant, given the massacre’s vexed relationship to precedent. Thus this refashioning of 
antecedent content speaks to and from a particular subset of canonized texts broadly understood 
																																																								
49 Patricia Saunders, “Defending the Dead, Confronting the Archive,” Small Axe 12.2 (June 2008): 39. 
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as classics, voices that belong to classical definitions of world literature.50 In this sense, these 
external textual impressions speak both as literary language in dialogue with Philip’s own poetic 
content, but also as content that has achieved something of a documentary status. These contact 
points, between Philip’s poems and canonized literary references, document no less than the 
process of canonization itself, of creating a body of literature that stands as a record of what has 
traditionally counted as, and circulated as “literature.” These epigraphs are a specific kind of 
documentary evidence: they document the creation of a canon of world literature, the 
codification of a specific, European-dominated, collection of texts whose influence has 
circulated around the globe. They also recall the historical excisions from documentation 
reinforced by literary canonization; a canon composed of white, male, European voices tells a 
very limited tale while purporting to represent “the world,” across space and time. In cross-
referencing these canonized literary texts as she does, Philip launches her text into the orbit in 
which these text circulate. But she also requires these texts to orbit within hers; despite the poetic 
decision to “lock herself up” in the Gregson v. Gilbert document, Philip’s text seems to open up 
that hermetically closed circuit, to intertextual engagement, adding the Zong! narrative and her 
voice to that literary world.51 
In the context of this project, there is one particular point of interconnection worth noting, 
an intertextual, transhistorical, and culturally recombinant act of copying and pasting between 
atrocities. Right at the center of Zong!, Philip inserts the iconic final meter “No one bears witness 
for the witness,” excerpted from Paul Celan’s poem “Ashenglorie” (“Ash-Glory,” or sometimes 
																																																								
50 See David Damrosch. What is World Literature? (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). Damrosch proposes that view 
that in the context of globalization, “world literature” might be viewed as “all literary works that circulate beyond 
their culture of origin, either in translation or in the original language…a work only has an effective life as world 
literature whenever, and wherever, it is actively present within a literary system beyond that of its original culture.” 
 
51 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong!, 191. 
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translated as “Ash-Aureole”). Celan’s line is about testimony, it is about incomparability, and it 
is about the failure of evidence; here it is repurposed precisely as an act of evidence, of 
comparison, of witnessing.  
The reference to Celan’s “Aschenglorie” stands right at the outer limits of the chapter 
titled “Ratio.” As Philip explains, the legal term Ratio Decidendi, to which the title refers, is “the 
kernel of the legal principle at the heart of the decision,” a term that she opposes to Obiter Dicta, 
which is the legal material deemed irrelevant to the legal decision. Ratio Decidendi is defined in 
legal terms as “the material facts of the case plus the decision thereon.”52 In the ratio, the 
“material facts” of the case are codified and authorized as factual, and the case decision is 
similarly archived, from that point further preserved and referenced as precedent for use in future 
cases. The concept of legal “Ratio” stands for the interpretive activity of judgment, the 
movement from factuality of raw case materials to choices about how to assess, interpret, and 
judge that material and in so doing turn that material into a binding rule of law for use in future 
cases.53 In the center of a story that Philip tells us cannot be told, and at the outer limits of the 
chapter whose title references the idea of essential substance, what is supposed to be the most 
essential content of the case at hand, is the imprint of the Holocaust. Philip’s project to 
“cut[her]self off from the comfort and predictability of [her] language” turns to the predictability 
of Celan’s language, as an established referent signifying atrocity.54 In this way, Celan’s poem 
represents the movement of factuality to interpretation; it proposes a guide as for how to 
contextualize and frame the poems that appear across the page from it. Celan’s figure of 																																																								
52 A.L., Goodhart,  “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case” The Modern Law Review. Vol. 22 No. 2, (March 1959), 117-
226. 
53 See A. L. Goodhart, “The Ratio Decendi of a Case.”  
 
54 Ibid.  
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witnessing has, in a sense, become cliché, so fully and universally recognizable within literary 
contexts as a signifier of atrocity. It becomes a witness itself, for that which cannot be witnessed. 
It carries the predictability of a cliché because the event to which Celan’s poetic language refers 
has been so thoroughly institutionalized as “authentic” atrocity. Celan’s poetry has been so 
institutionally substantiated as a signifier of atrocity that the metonymic force of its appearance 
alone signifies the context of atrocity. 
VI. Witness for the Witness 
If Celan’s poem may represent a process of authentication, a reference to another atrocity 
that may countersign Zong!’s poetics as belonging to the literature of atrocity, then the 
“Aschenglorie” poem itself paradoxically stands on the verge of non-verifiability, the total 
collapse of witness. Celan’s poem inscribes the impression of atrocity by disavowing the 
capacity for the witness to leave an impression of atrocity. Composed of six unevenly split 
stanzas, which are again split into uneven metrical lines, the poem possesses a speaker, a clear 
“I” with a clear perspective, recalling to that “you” what that speaker has seen. The speaker is 
communicating to a “you,” who seems to have been present alongside the speaker’s experiences, 
so thoroughly part of the speaker’s experience that the speaker recounts a point under the “Tatar 
moon” that “I dug me into you and you.” The repetition of that “you” emphatically foregrounds 
the presence of that other, and the codependence on that other. It stands in stark contrast with the 
words that precede it, “I dug me.” That “me” is a strange repetition of the “I,” a repetition wholly 
unnecessary in the language of meaning-making, but a repetition of self-reference with a 
variation. It calls attention to the chasm between an “I,” the self as a subject, and a “me,” the self 
as an object. The poem is about the speaker’s attempt to impress something that is not quite an 
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“I,” but rather the form or impression of that self into that “you,” a you that infinitely regresses, 
an echo chamber onto which that “me” cannot leave a lasting inscription. 
Ash-Aureole behind 
your shaken knotted 
hands at the Threeways. 
 
Pontic Once-upon-a-time: here 
a drop 
on 
the drowned oarblade, 
deep 
in a petrified oath, 
it bubbles up. 
 
(On the plumblined 
breath cable, back then, 
higher than on high, 
between two pain knots, while 
the gleaming 
Tatar moon climbed up to us, 
I dug me into you and you.) 
 
Ash- 
aureole behind you 
Threeways- 
hands. 
 
Before you, the easterly 
dicethrow, frightful. 
 
No one 
bears witness for the 
witness55. 
The words of the poem’s final stanza, reprinted in Zong! appear elsewhere in Philip’s writing. 
She cites the poem and Celan her 2015 essay, “Drowning, Not Waving,” a non-fiction piece that 
recounts Philip’s memory of witnessing a man fall (or jump) to his death, dropping off a Toronto 
																																																								
55 Paul Celan, Paul Celan: Selections, ed. Pierre Joris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 105-106. 
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bridge onto the ice below.56 In Philip’s essay, she meditates on the memory of her witness, her 
place in a story that is not her own, but to which she belongs through the coincidence of 
witnessing this death, and her obligation to tell a story that is not hers and whose central causes 
and logics she cannot know. She asks how the bridge, a space that she crosses in her daily life, 
becomes a crossing at which the route she travels daily intersects with the persistent memory of 
this event.  
Almost immediately, however, the memory of the incident on the bridge becomes 
inscribed within a literary frame, in which references to literature and literary production cross 
and intersect. Philip writes, 
I choose to see odd correspondences and synchronicities: Ernest Hemingway 
walked this ravine when he lived in Toronto in the early ’20s, no doubt under this 
very bridge.” She goes on to note that “[i]n La Chute (The Fall) , Albert Camus, 
the Algerian Nobel laureate, has his protagonist, Clamence, crossing a bridge—
Pont Royal in Paris—to the Left Bank.... Clamence is a lawyer…I, too, am a 
lawyer. Clamence does not look back when he hears the sound 
of a body hitting the water, nor when he hears a cry, “repeated several times. ” 
There was no scream that winter’s day on the bridge. Only a thud. Clamence 
keeps walking; I turn back. “Too late, too far ,” Clamence thinks. He was out too 
far, I think later, and not waving but drowning. Clamence tells no one. My cries 
are addressed to no one...Looking down at the orange-draped stretcher, a 
policeman at my side taking notes, a thought rises swiftly and strongly to the 
surface of my consciousness: They will have to pull me kicking and screaming 
out of life . A more prosaic version, perhaps, of Dylan Thomas’s exhortation to 
“rage against the dying of the light.”57  
 
These literary references, which frame Philip’s memory in terms of antecedent literary moments 
																																																								
56 The essay evokes both the fraught final lines of Celan’s poem, and the fraught final moments of Celan’s death, a 
suicide. In 1970, right around the Jewish holiday of Passover, which celebrates the Jewish Exodus from Egypt 
through the Red Sea, Celan (in the terms of John Felstiner, his most well-known critic and biographer) “went from 
the bridge into the Seine, and, though a strong swimmer, drowned unobserved.” The title of the essay itself, 
“Drowning, Not Waving,” is itself a palindrome that inverts the title of a 1957 Stevie Smith poem “Not Waving But 
Drowning.” See M. NourbeSe Philip, “Drowning, Not Waving,” Room: Literature, Art, and Feminism Since 1975 
38.4 (2015-2016): 295-304. 
 
57 M. NourbeSe Philip “Drowning, Not Waving,” 303. 
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that bear an analogous form, culminate in an allusion to Celan.58 Philip, enlisting the same Celan 
reference that appears in Zong! asks:  
Who bears witness for the witness, Celan asks in the aftermath of the charnel 
house that Europe became for European Jews and other discounted minorities. 
Who bears witness for my witness? Do I bear witness for myself? Perhaps the 
ravine bears witness for me—absorbing the maelstrom of despair that must have 
been the reality for the man who fell to earth that morning in the ravine; obeying 
the law of gravity that always ends with a thud.59 
 
Philip’s reproduction of Celan’s poem, in the line “No one bears witness for the witness” subtly 
transforms the phrase to read “Who bears witness for the witness,” and this makes a world of 
difference to its meaning. Celan’s stanza is a statement; Philip’s reproduction a question. It is as 
if Philip is responding to the poem’s “No one bears witness for the witness” with the 
presupposition that someone must bear witness for the witness, even if the question itself is 
unanswerable. The slippage between no one and who implies a someone who has witnessed the 
poetry and is recalling it, as witness memory tends to do, imperfectly—as part of one’s own 
story, one that, as Philip writes, “absorbe[s] the maelstrom of despair that must have been the 
reality for the man who fell to earth that morning in the ravine. The mis-rendered quote suggests 
the extent to which this particular line from Celan has taken on an existence separate from the 
poem itself, demonstrates how that line in isolation has entered into the lingua franca of poetry as 
																																																								
58 Interestingly, Celan’s suicide, his death drowning after jumping of a bridge into the Seine, never itself appears in 
Philip’s writing, despite its clear resonance. The nature and specifics of Celan’s suicide might have been the most 
perfect analogy to Philip’s witness; yet the material reality of Celan’s death is absent from Philip’s text, despite the 
multitude of citations of analogous happenings (the facts of Hemingway’s daily rituals, the fictional suicide 
witnessed by Camus’s protagonist). What appears of Celan is not the facts of his death—an almost perfect figure for 
Philip’s witness—but the poetic figure about witness he provides. Moreover, in Philip’s witness, the reference to the 
“man who fell to earth that morning in the ravine” is split; the scene she has witnessed recalls at once the man who 
has jumped off the Toronto bridge to his death that morning, the central character about whom Philip’s story 
revolves; the figure of Celan, the man who has jumped off the bridge, who remains a story untold and yet 
everywhere present; and Celan’s poem about witness, which is reproduced as a highly recognizable figure of 
witnessing in which the key element of the design, the determined No one bears witness for the witness, has been 
fundamentally altered to Philip’s question: Who? 
 
59 Ibid. 
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a cliché of a sort. “No one bears witness for the witness” seems to circulate outside of its poetic 
context, reproduced in repetitions as a cultural touchstone no longer anchored in its original 
poetic context, even as traces of Celan’s own historical context—the Holocaust—remain 
attached to it.  
The alteration, from Celan’s asserted “No one” to Philip’s question “Who,” relocates the 
center of gravity in the statement; if witness, for Celan, is a point of division, circumscribing the 
witness within an enclosed sphere of memory out of which testimony may not be translated, in 
Philip’s formulation, memory becomes metonymic, transmitted not only to persons but to 
things—the ravine, Philip herself, textual references and figures. So too does the poetry become 
a vessel of metonymic transmission; like the ravine, the figural concept of witnessing articulated 
Celan’s poetry becomes metonymically linked to the falling man and to Philip’s own concept of 
memory and witness, even as the very literal reality of Celan’s suicide—the falling man itself—
falls out of the essay. The answer, in a sense, to Philip’s question “Who bears witness for the 
witness?” is Celan bears witness for the witness. Or, rather, his poetry bears that witness. The 
poem becomes a receptacle for Philip’s witness, shaping, figuring, and retaining the memory of 
the figure of the drowned man and her witnessing of his death. Philip transforms the poem in her 
memory of it; the poem transforms Philip’s memory and provides form for her witness. 
In Zong!, Celan’s poetics are again altered, this time in form rather than content. Therein, 
Philip compresses Celan’s final stanza to one line, as if to delete all divisions and stopgaps so 
that the two utterances of “witness” in the stanza themselves become metonymically linked, 
ushering the entirety of the poem’s stanza into a one-breath utterance. In Celan’s original poem, 
the refrain is split along three lines, so that the first line and the final line share the same 
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allotment of syllables, broken up by a line of five iambic meters, appearing visually almost as a 
palindrome, aurally a second echo to the middle verse: 
No one 
Bears witness for the 
witness. 
In the original German, the split is even more severe: Niemand/ zeugt für den/ Zeugen, the last 
two lines a rhyming couplet; while zeugen repeats itself in two forms of the verb, the second 
iteration Zeugen the subject noun (witness) creates a rhyming pair with für den (for the 
[witness]), the resonant preposition displaces the verb zeugt, the act of witnessing itself. In fact, 
the double “witness” in its original German echoes the split between “I” and “me” in the 
preceding stanza, providing a corollary to the line in an earlier stanza, “I dug me into you and 
you.” In the German, the act of witnessing stands rhythmically alone, uncoupled even from its 
subject, who is rhythmically distanced from the verb zeugt, the act of witnessing itself. In 
translation, the final six syllables repeat, carry the same stress, can almost be read with the same 
meaning backward and forward.  
 Zong!’s compression of the poem’s original two line split into one warrants scrutiny. 
Celan’s poem, impressed into the heart of Zong’s “untelling,” represents a nesting narrative (or a 
nesting non-narrative), of sorts. Celan’s iconic poem foregrounds the tension between the 
singularity of the witness experience as a private and individual experience, and the public 
sphere that inevitably greets the witness when bearing witness. Testimony, says Derrida, 
“remains irreducibly heterogeneous to proof,” by which he means to say that testimony is only 
necessary when material evidence is insufficient, and only relevant as proof at the points where 
the witness adds information that is not available elsewhere. What makes a witness crucial to 
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proof is precisely the fact that there is nothing and no one else that can corroborate the facts that 
a witness testimony provides.60  
Bearing witness, in contradistinction, is the process of creating witnesses by proxy; those 
who hear the testimony of the witness become witnesses to the witness; it is that bearing witness 
to the witness that allows testimony to enter into the sphere of proof, to become evidence. 
Celan’s poem moves multidirectionally in two ways: back and forth “Before you,” as Celan 
writes, between the private and the public spheres of witnessing; and back and forth between the 
past moment of witnessing, and “Before you,” the present moment of bearing witness as 
testimony, in front of the public, in front of the public you. The idea that no one bears witness for 
the witness is the gamble, the “dicethrow,” that the witness takes of being believed by an 
audience that take the testimony on the credibility of the witness’s words, metonymic traces of 
private experience entered into the public realm, alone.  
In Celan, writes Derrida, we “watch him give himself over to the inscription of invisible, 
perhaps unreadable…repetitions of singular, unique, unrepeatable events—unwiederhollbar is 
his word.”61 Derrida’s larger point is focused on Celan’s provocation of ineffability, 
unwiederhollbar, for Derrida, seems to suggest the singularity of Celan’s experience, such that it 
remains outside of the commerce within which language trades signs for recognizable signifiers. 
Replicability, in this case, would mean the quality of words to be able to reproduce a signified 
that would be resonant, and equivalent in value, between the witness, and those who witness the 
testimony told by the witness. But Derrida’s focus on unwiederhollbar—irreplicability—is 
																																																								
60 Jacques Derrida, Without Alibi ed. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000), 11. 
61 Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth For Paul Celan” in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. 
Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham UP, 2005), 2. 
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exactly in opposition to Celan’s actual poetry, a poetics that depends on, and is precisely 
constructed out of repetition, a poetics in which the major stresses in the poems fall on exactly 
the words that are repeated, that gain in tension, not through singularity but because they produce 
copies of themselves. 
As a closing stanza, the final refrain of Ash/Glory stands alone, a singular form, speaks to 
the five stanzas that appear before it in a tone that bears first toward the pole of factuality. It then 
loops back to the pole of metaphor, each word both testifying to an empirical reality and 
simultaneously to a figurative meaning. The stanza is an ending about the end of testimony.62 As 
a line of closure to the poem, the term “witness” marks the limit of the poem’s compulsive 
repetition, a limit to language’s capacity to recreate experience through the imaginative work of 
figuration, which may repeat and reproduce, if not the reality of the experience its likeness in 
figurative language. It is not only the endpoint of witness, but the point at which language stops, 
a final repetition after which speech ends and the blank page begins. Language, in this copying 
mode, does what Celan says that art does: the word “witness” itself “makes another appearance, 
unchanged, although the times are totally different.” While the first “witness” is wrapped in 
language, he second echo of the word appears on its own, punctuated by a single period, a full 
stop emphasizing its solitude. While the words “No one bears witness for the witness” articulate 
a definitive finitude, the six final steps of the poem loop, creating a circular repetition, in which 
the figure of the witness is looped into the form of witnessing itself. The repetition burns the 
poem’s own metrical feet, canceling itself out until it leaves only the loop, a reproduction that 
can go no further, feeds only into itself, a near perfect palindrome. Letters form language 
																																																								
62 Celan’s most prominent translator and critic, John Felstiner, notes that the German, the literal“ ‘Zeugen’ 
(“witness”) can also stand as figural, for “procreation,” sharing its sexual origin with “bear witness” and “testify,” 
which originates in “testes,” or reproduction. See John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew. 
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arrangements that may be read backwards and forward, or near-palindromes, repetitions with 
slight variations. 
 On the page opposite the Celan epigraph, the first lines of Ratio reproduce this looping. 
The poem features repetitive rhymes, looped over rhyming near-misses and recursions; directly 
across from Celan’s “No one bears witness for the witness.”63 lies the formation: 
all round       
 slap 
    her slap slap   
       
  of 
sail there           
 was only  
     when not       
    if & ashes 
   to     seal this act    
      of 
            skin of 
sin64 
The poem on the page reads, in fact, like a “round” “slap/ her slap slap,” which appears almost 
exactly in line with the “witness for the witness” opposing it echoing not only the repetition of 
the final words, but the violent word “slap,” which echoes itself an image of the shock of violent 
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64 Ibid,101. 
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impact conjuring, through the force of the word, the force of the impression of the hand on the 
skin, an image reinforced in the line “skin of sin,” which lies on the page, in line with the “all 
round” at the beginning.  
A reference to a “skin of sin,” foregrounds the racial signification of violence which; read 
perhaps in the voice of the “her” slapped, we are given a momentary image of the type of 
violence experienced by what Philip calls the “meager” slave girls aboard the ship, en route to 
“sail there,” a term that floats on the other side of the page, initiating a wavelike formation of 
words in what Philip calls “tidal movements,” which, she proposes becomes a fugal form of 
“[r]epetition [that] drives the event and memory simultaneously.”65 With the s of slap, slap, and 
sail hissing their continuity, arranged as if to speak of an ongoing and circuitous current of 
violence upon the culminating phrase, “skin of sin.” Read from the point of view of the 
“strongest ‘voices’” in the text, who for Philip “appears to be white, male, and European,” “slap/ 
her slap slap,” followed by the declaration “skin of sin” becomes a commanding declaration and 
a pronouncement, one that, alongside the intermediating term “seal this act,” becomes a term of 
moral judgment inscribed, sealed—that is to say, embossed—and countersigned.66 The sound 
that the language makes itself is that of repetition, of repeated assonances that loop the words 
into one antoher. 
Later on, at the bottom center, another arrangement reads: 
   tale   told 
    old 
     tale  
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and another: 
      deal my elation 
     seal 
      deal67  
As with the “skin of sin,” the section of poem is composed through permutations of 
letters that repeat and recombine—the “told” taking its alliterative initial t from “tale,” ultimately 
mutating into the word the “old” that appears below it. In this poetic arrangement, there is the 
sense of recursion. In this recursion, the arbitrary nature of signs, in which random assortments 
of letters somehow compose meaningful language, butts up against the sensation that the letters 
are not arbitrary in the slightest, that the anagrams are not random products of a language in 
which signs are arbitrary, but rather that words anticipate, and bear connections to, the words 
composed out of them until letters seem anything but randomly selected. What seems to justify 
the choice of the words that appear in the formation is a type of interconnection with a preceding 
term, through repetition with a variation in the arrangement of the letters in the word, or the 
space of the word on the page. The inter-animation of the words in the poem derives from that 
repetition, and through tracing the permutation of an antecedent word to its later recombinant 
configurations. 
The logic of the poem on this page parallels the logic of the poem’s relationship to the 
Celan inscription directly across it, on the page facing it. Like the “No one/bears witness for 
the/witness,” “deal my elation/seal /deal” works through looping, a type of organization that 
points to the poem’s own inwardness as a source. When Celan writes that “No one/bears witness 
for the/witness,” there is a sense in which he makes the claim that there is a degree of meaning 
that cannot be carried outside of the poem; urn-like, the poem produces and hermetically seals 																																																								
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and contains whatever meaning it makes, which can neither be fully evoked outside of the 
language of the poem, nor transferred out of it. If the poem itself witnesses, the poem is itself, 
perhaps, a witness to the experience; this urn like-nature of the poetic form reinforces the 
speaker’s assertion that to paraphrase witness, or to transfer it, is a form of heresy. Philip’s “deal 
my elation/seal/deal” operates on the same principle; a “seal” marks both an impression and a 
form of closure and containment: the poetics of language impress and seclude the content into 
the form, its legibility a product of the poem cross-referencing its own terminology, each word 
drawing meaning from the poem’s own internal structure and content. 
Celan’s poem serves as an instructional introduction, prefacing Philip’s poetry with 
information about how to read the content that follows. The use of Celan’s poem as an epigraph 
to her “untelling” of a historical event is dense with instructions for the reader. First, it suggests 
that the audience encountering the poem meditate on the significance of Celan’s circumstances 
of writing for the poem: we are implicitly told through the contiguous arrangements of Celan’s 
poem with Zong!’s poetics that the poems to come bear a relationship to Celan’s experience as a 
witness to the Holocaust. At the same time, it implies that the collapse of witness described by 
the poem is the same collapse that makes “telling” impossible, requires an “untelling.” The 
epigraph, which makes Celan’s poem an interlocutor to Philip’s finally also implicates poetry 
itself as a way of negotiating this narrative collapse, for Celan’s suggestive turn to poetry as a 
mode of speaking of this narrative collapse, echoed by Philip’s own, move the center of gravity 
in witness away from the idea of an objective “truth,” and toward an evaluation of veracity that is 
determined by an aesthetic community. The discourse itself, with its tropes and signifying 
modes, becomes the collective through which evidence of atrocity may be measured and 
interpreted.  
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The sense of the self-containment and self-referential composition implied by the poems 
is put into sharp focus, then, when they are made interlocutors by the metonymy of the text on 
the page, as it appears back to back. Both poems end in a statement that suggests the containment 
of content within the confines of the poem’s discrete form, but both simultaneously seem to 
require content from outside the poem as the necessary grounds for locution. Philip turns to 
Celan’s poem, while Celan turns to a “plubmlined breath cable,” which connects the speaker to a 
“you,” a figure hovering at the other side of the cable just as Celan’s poem hovers on the other 
side of Philip’s page. Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub read this reference to a “you” in 
classical psychoanalytic terms, as the receiver of traumatic testimony, whose presence as a 
listener enables the witness to assemble narrative meaning out of the incoherence of the 
traumatic events of the past, thus allowing the witness to reassemble coherence and repair the 
trauma. In other words, the presence of a “you” to whom witness testimony has to be explained, 
brings the traumatic witness back into the realm of explicability, an understanding of trauma and 
of the experience of atrocity that proposes narration, and more precisely narrative coherence, as 
the remedy for healing a traumatic past.68 
As interlocutors, I am not sure that Celan and Philip’s poetry work together quite this 
way, and to quite these ends. Felman and Laub’s theory is based on the idea that trauma results 
when a witness possesses a set of facts about a traumatic experience, but then cannot assemble 
those facts into a coherent and stable narrative that contains them and composes a cohesive 
reality. But both of the poems are less concerned with facts than with figures, and less concerned 
with the coherence of past events, the old tale told, than what we have seen before: a sort shock 																																																								
68 See Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History (New York: Routledge, Inc., 1992), 25-49. 
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of recognition, the sameness of an antecedent and over-familiar figure, forged elsewhere, 
mirrored back. Philip’s poem displays, in a trail of words that take on a wave-like form,  
tale   told 
          old 
           tale  
a figure with a split referent. In the context of Zong’s poetry, the wave of words could be read to 
articulate the “old tale” of the Gregson v Gilbert court case, or the very form of narrative itself, 
washing over a submerged and unspoken, perhaps unspeakable experience. Across the page from 
this figure, Celan’s own, a reference to the Holocaust, also appears as a “tale…told/old/tale.” In a 
sense then, Celan’s poem gains meaning in its repetition and reproduction, not in spite of but 
because of its status of a cliché within the pages of Philip’s text, which becomes evidence for 
Celan’s articulation just as much as Celan’s poem becomes evidence enlisted by Philip’s text.  
VII. Breath Cables 
Celan’s final line in “Aschenglorie” is consistently read in ways that interpret the idea of 
witnessing in “No one bears witness for the witness,” as the pain and anguish of a testimonial 
desire that is impossible to fulfill in the case of unspeakable atrocity.69 The assertion about 
witnessing is a non-figurative, highly literal statement for Celan. Indeed, the case of the 
Holocaust, as with the Zong massacre “[n]o one was supposed to be left to bear witness.” This is 
what Richard Glazar testified during the tribunals held by the international court; the Nazis 
aimed to eliminate all would-be-witnesses who could testify to the perspective of the victims.70 
																																																								
69 See, for example, John Felstiner in Paul Celan: Poet, Surivor, Jew; Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub in 
Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. 
 
70 Quoted in Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub in Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History, 226. 
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This is what Philip mourns as the impossibility of “truly know[ing]” what happened aboard the 
Zong.71 Felman and Laub speak of “the burden of witness,” which carries the deep and urgent 
desire to transmit testimony across a void, to unshoulder the burden of singularity, of 
remembering alone. In the context of atrocity, they argue, the idea of interlocution was essential, 
and yet impossible for in an environment in which the literal reality of a narrative testimony 
given by the witness cannot correspond with the literal and material reality of those who hear 
it.72 The repetition of both “witness” and “you” foregrounds the precarious relationship not only 
between speaker and interlocutor, but also the way in which the experience of atrocity 
jeopardizes kinship ties, to which the poem alludes: 
(On the plumblined 
breath cable, back then, 
higher than on high, 
between two pain knots, while 
the gleaming 
Tatar moon climbed up to us, 
I dug me into you and you.) 
 
For if collective memory is what sustains kinship ties, rupturing the “breath cable” between 
witness and interlocutor results not only in divisions in collective memory, but also divisions in 
terms of the collective itself. No one can bear witness for the witness, Celan seems to be saying, 
because the witness is shut within his or her own closed circuit of language, which is why 
perhaps the entire stanza appears as a parenthetical, a self enclosed image. The parenthetical 
enclosure is the only point in the poem at Celan gives us an image of human interaction, the “I” 
and the “you” connected with verbs, as if such engagement must happen within its own poetic 																																																								
71 Taken in more philosophical terms, within the context of atrocity, the desire to transmit one’s testimony is driven 
by the burden of knowing such testimony is unique, urgent in its singularity; yet that very uniqueness which drives 
the urge to tell is also inevitably what causes the failure of speaking that witness, for the belief in that solitary 
uniqueness of witness is precisely what causes meaning to remain out of reach for those who hear this testimony. 
Felstiner characterizes the line as Celan “at his bleakest.” John Felstiner, Paul Celan: The Strain of Jewishness,” 
Commentary (Apr 1, 1985): 55. 
 
72 Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub in Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. 
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enclosure. We are given at the center of the poem an image of that precarious connection, 
imaged as though a dream, before the poem sounds its final judgment, “No one bears witness for 
the witness.”  
 Although Celan’s voice as poet cannot determinatively be made synonymous with that of 
the speaker in the poem, we can observe that like the “I” of the poem who utters those words, 
Celan was a witness who seemed to believe in the impossibility of re-presenting whatever 
atrocity he had witnessed, that there was something in his testimony, some evidence essential to 
the key design of his experience, that he could not pass on. There is something that Celan’s poem 
cannot transmit in its poetic language, the language of the poem itself tells us that language holds 
something back from bearing forward. Imprinted into Philip’s text, the poetic language by a 
witness that submits evidence for ineffability, the impossibility of language to signify and 
evidence the very atrocity it signifies becomes paradoxically responsible for articulating and 
evidencing another atrocity with no witnesses. 
The last footnote in Zong! belongs to the title poem of She Tries Her Tongue. Philip 
reads: 
 “…I write: 
    When silence is 
Abdication of word   tongue and lip 
Ashes of once in what was 
…Silence 
Song  Word  Speech 
Might I…like Philomela…sing 
        continue 
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         over 
               into 
…pure utterance 
The poem is filled with ellipses, and blank spaces between words, spaces that one might, using 
Celan’s term, call “turns of breath,” “Atem/Wende.” At three points in the poem, the text contains 
a slight excess of blank space, an extra space between words, a space beyond the normal 
grammatical gaps that are there to delimit one word from another and to give discrete words 
discrete meanings. There are prolonged gaps, inverted impressions in the second line where the 
letters give over their space to the blank page, between “Abdication of word  tongue,” and again 
twice more in the fifth, in “Song  Word  Speech.” It is as if Philip has, in “Abdication of word,” 
left a gap for the “silence in [her] own history and [her] own memory,” one that here is not filled 
in by “what happened to the Jews,” but rather of “…pure utterance” yet to come, as it does in the 
last line, or, as Philip describes to Saunders, one “cluster of words…seeking the space or the 
silence above.”73 The elliptical grammar in the last line of the paragraph before the poem, and in 
the poem’s final line presuppose a prior utterance, something just off the page that has 
precipitated the content on it. The link between Zong! and the poem is contextually clear: Zong! 
continues the poem’s preoccupation with silence, with spaces of memory that cannot be filled 
with language or meaning-making content. The tenuous, halting, elliptical character of Philip’s 
antecedent poem clearly speaks to the altered situation of language in Zong!, which does not 
wish to suggest a “key design” that may be unlocked by the interpretive act of reading.  
Since the poem reproduced in the text of Zong! belongs to Philip’s collection She Tries 
Her Tongue, the last line of the poem as it appears in Zong! carries a footnote, listed in the text as 																																																								
73 Patricia Saunders, "Defending the Dead, Confronting the Archive: A Conversation with M. Nourbese Philip," 72. 
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footnote 47).74 It is as if Philip, who has a few pages earlier described her decision to place 
“ghostly footnotes floating below the text,” a textual decision that she describes as 
“acknowledgement—someone else was here before,” has left a trail of footprints that leads 
outside the text.75 Indeed, Philip herself has been there before—the reference is literary evidence 
of a reality created in her own antecedent poetic work, here refigured as a resource of established 
realities from which to draw.76 There is something in that footnote, an obiter dicta to an external 
impression Philip’s work outside of the text, that not only allows her to articulate something 
within Zong! but to contextualize it as a form of citation, a way of referencing content that 
already carries factual substance. Philip’s footnote to her own text establishes it as part of the 
body of other texts circulating within it. It is as if she has written the poem into a code of case 
precedents composed of sources that a specifically literary community has codified as true, to 
write that process of literary verification into the body of world literature converging in her text. 
Between the elliptical grammar and the phrase “…I write” and the footnote “47,” the poem calls 
attention not only to silences, spaces in which neither language nor documentation exist, but also 
to the act of writing, of creating language and the act of documentation itself. The poem is 
literary content, but it is also a record of textual production and circulation, a record 
documenting the way in which writing emerges, circulates, and orbits in the external world, and 
within the text, the way it both is closed and opened to the world and to a world of words outside 
of its own form.   
In Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “great dark book… written in languages of the past,” new 
																																																								
74 M.  NourbeSe Philip, Zong!, 207.  
 
75 Ibid, 200. 
 
76 See M. NourbeSe Philip, She Tries Her Tongue: Her Silence Softly Breaks (Charlottetown: Ragweed Press, 1989), 
98. 
	 284 
kinship ties develop in the form of a world literature.77That those kinship ties can be imagined as 
perhaps only poetry, with its tendency toward density and compression of language can, 
developing on a 
plumblined breath cable, back then, 
higher than on high, 
between two pain knots 
 
speaks to the globalization of atrocity, the sense that the collapse of witness, a disconnection 
between interlocutors, may be what directly binds that great dark book together. It is less clear 
whether the same interlocution and resonance that binds together the world inside the text binds 
together the world outside of it. Celan’s poem and Philip’s poetics may on their own be about 
stories that cannot be told, but they do seem to tell us something by seeking out a “you” at the 
other end of the wordless connection of a breath cable, as Celan might say, between the pain 
knots. 
VIII. Epilogue: Clues and Quotations, Citations of Citations  
On the back of a page that bears the chapter title “Ventus,” across from a page of jumbled 
sentence fragments of varying typescripts arranged into language poetry in M. NourbeSe Philip’s 
2008 text Zong!, there is a quote from Thomas More that reads “The Poet is the detective and the 
detective a poet.” The reference appears again in Philip’s “Notanda” section. “And that’s what I 
feel like—a detective sifting the evidence, trying to remove the veil hiding the facts,” Philip 
writes in Zong!, attempting to describe her task as author, and in so doing attributing the quote to 
a book by More titled Original Selves.78 
  More’s words placed here become both a textual clue to deciphering “Ventus’s” poetics 																																																								
77 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 178. 
78 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong!, 196. 
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and a claim about poetry itself. One of the inferences we are prompted toward by the quote has 
to do with the rationale for quoting the reference: in selecting and arranging More’s words, the 
text builds a channel of communication between More, his historical personage, and his words 
and Zong!, the historical context, and its poetics. The other inference has to do with the rationale 
of the quote itself, which equates the literary work of poetry with the detective’s epistemology. 
In the most basic sense, the detective investigates and solves crimes, working within the frame of 
the law to read the evidence of the world and to decipher it, identifying a deliberate design out of 
seemingly arbitrary signs. This, says Philip, citing More as her evidence, is what poets do too: 
they collect and arrange into a cohesion that which the untrained eye cannot so constellate, 
inventing order out of chaos in order to reveal what was hidden in plain sight. The text offers 
More’s words as a “clue” to deciphering the poetry in the chapter—the quote implies as much. 
The poet, after all, is a detective and the detective a poet. We are told, in Ventus, to look out, as 
literary readers, for clues in the poetry, and to look at poetry as though it were clues. Zong! is 
itself a poetics of clues, of enigmas caused, and deferred, by questions of evidence. Presumably, 
including Thomas More’s words within the bindings of Zong! is intended to provide a type of 
“clue,” the discourse of a man known for his ethics inserted into the text so as to offer 
commentary on the poetic contents that would not themselves yield meaning from the noisiness 
they scattered across the pages of the text.  
But the 16th century humanist Thomas More never could have written those words. In 
fact, the term “detective” originated almost three hundred years after More would have spoken 
it.79 And Thomas More never published a book under the title Original Selves. I called the 
																																																								
79 As per the Oxford English Dictionary. Incidentally, the first record of the term appears in an 1843 issue of a 
publication titled “Chambers’s Journal,” known both for its commitment to reporting on social problems and 
inducing social reforms, and for blending that reportage with serialized fiction corresponding to the factual topics it 
covered, particularly cases of legal relevance. In Chambers’s Journal, the author describes how  “intelligent men 
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publishers to after failing to track down the title from Philip’s footnote. They confirmed that no 
text such as the one referenced in Zong! and attributed to More existed. They disavowed my 
claim that they had published the title—the quote that the text attributed to More bore no trace 
beyond Philip’s text, no footprints beyond Philip’s footnote in Zong! Curious, I wrote to the 
author herself. After corresponding with Philip, I learned that the footnote was a misprint, a 
misrendered copy of the original—false evidence. The footnote was intended to cite an author 
named Thomas Moore, who had indeed written a book title Original Selves, which Houghton 
Mifflin had indeed published.  
So, there, in the body of Zong! are words with no trace, a citation that hangs between 
historical reality and poetic invention, a footnote that burns its own footprint, textual evidence 
that cannot be tracked back to any original self. Evidence of what, exactly? In a text that 
foregrounds the ethics and aesthetics of evidence in a case of atrocity, and which is principally 
concerned with the extent to which evidence, as an epistemological category, may be used to 
substantiate the reality of an event of atrocity that had been fundamentally obscured, as an 
atrocity, by evidence, what would it mean for the author to place “imaginary” evidence as a clue 
to unlocking her poetry?  
Philip claims that the story of what happened aboard the Zong cannot be known. She 
asks, “What did, in fact, happen on the Zong? Can we, some two hundred years later, ever really 
know? Should we?” According to the text, “[a]lthough we are presented with the ‘complete’ text 
of the case, the reader does not ever know it, since the complete story does not exist. It never did. 
All that remains are the legal texts and documents of those who were themselves intimately 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
have been recently selected to form a body called the ‘detective police’...at times the detective policeman attires 
himself in the dress of ordinary individuals.” See the OED, “Detective.” 
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connected to, and involved in, a system that permitted the murder of the Africans on board the 
Zong”80  
Some two hundred years after the evidence of what did, in fact, happen on the Zong 
disappeared, and some one hundred and fifty years after the first detective was inscribed as a 
figure on the page, Philip turned to literature to track evidence that could not be found with the 
most scrupulous of magnifying glasses, facts without an empirical tether. In response to my 
query, she wrote back to me:  
Ivan Illic talks about the "mysterium iniquitatem" - the mystery of evil, which is 
referenced in Notanda. I think it fascinating that Thomas Moore and Original Self 
morph into Original Mind and Thomas More, the latter whose independence of 
mind and spirit in the face of Kingly power led to his death. (Interestingly, his 
work Utopia, although radical in many ways, allows for each household to have 
two slaves.) I find it fascinating that the quotation demanded of you the skills of a 
detective and poet, and that I, the “author" of the work, also authored a false clue 
so to speak.  How does Self become Mind — was I perhaps saying that regarding 
that horrific experience there was, indeed, no original Self — only matter (as in 
human-become-thing) mattered?  And perhaps when Self is denied, Mind becomes 
witness — Witness — to the erasure of evidence that indeed matter does matter — 
as in human-becoming-Self.81  
 
Like Arendt in Jerusalem, Philip wanted to see into the mystery of evil, to trace the footprints of 
the past so as to find clues in world history that would reveal the space in which a world court 
and world history might ethically and authentically meet. She wanted to seek in world literature 
what world history kept hidden—and yet her very own attempt—and mine—to pin down sources 
only yield evidence of facts deferred, pushed back further into the recesses of literary invention.
																																																								
80 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong! 196. 
 
81 “Letter from M. NourbeSe Philip to Deb Donig, February 9, 2016.” 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Lore Segal’s short story “The Reverse Bug,” published in The New Yorker in May of 
1989, a group of American immigrants are gathered together in a college classroom for a course 
on “Conversational English for Adults.”1 The immigrant students include one young woman, 
Gertie Gruner from Austria, a middle-aged man Japanese man named Matsue, Ahmed the Turk, 
an Armenian doctor, Izmira, from Cyprus, Juan the Basque, Eduardo the Spaniard, and Paulino, 
a young man from Bolivia.  “Tell us a story,” says Ilka, the instructor, to her students, hoping to 
engage them in practicing their new language. “Tell the class how you came to America.”2 
Grouped together inside this classroom at “Concordance University” (a name evoking a 
sense of harmony and agreement, which is exactly at odds with the plot that will unfold on its 
premises), located in a college town in Connecticut, the story of how this diverse body of 
students came to America is invariably bound up with the history of atrocity. Each student has 
left his or her homeland and mother tongue to come to out of conflict to the United States. The 
students scattered across the classroom are a veritable United Nations in miniature. Gertie, from 
Vienna, has escaped “before come the Nazis and put [me] in concentration camp” (an utterance 
to which Ilka, relentlessly correcting her student’s English responds “In ‘the’ or ‘a’ concentration 
camp,” the modification, an insistence on the definite article “the or a” that only underscores 
and ironizes language’s insistence on the singular and definitive when properly speaking the 
experience).3 Izmira, the Armenian from Cyprus will not sit near Ahmed, the Turk; Juan, the 
																																																								
1 Lore Segal, “The Reverse Bug,” The New Yorker, May 1, 1989, 34.  
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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Basque, must sit at opposite ends of the room from Eduardo, the Spaniard. Paulino, from war-
torn Bolivia and the son of a war criminal, sits alone, in isolation from the rest of the 
international student body of refugees gathered in the classroom collective. He refers 
compulsively to the mysterious disappearance of his father, who we later learn is a Nazi war 
criminal hiding out in South America, at the hands of the American consulate. Matsue has come 
to the US from Japan via Munich, leaving his family in Hiroshima to work with German 
engineers to soundproof the gas chambers, so that the screams inside could not be heard outside. 
After returning to Hiroshima and recording the sounds of screaming heard in the city during the 
bombing, he is now working, he tells the class in broken English, on what he cryptically calls 
“the reverse bug,” a device that allows “those outside…to relay into a room what those inside 
would prefer not to have to hear.”4  
From this diversity of spaces on the globe, these students bring with them their stories of 
diaspora, of exile and arrival. The instructor has turned the English classroom into a forum in 
which the English language is the common ground for establishing a global community. It is 
through speaking in the newly learned English language that these diverse narratives come into 
contact with one another in a mischmasch der kenntnisse, intersect with one another, recombine, 
gain and lose coherence, their respective knowledges and forms becoming both harmonic and 
cacophonous in recombination.5 The individual stories, each experience singular and historically, 
culturally, and geographically independent, begin to forge connections and contingencies upon 
one another, intercepting and interweaving. Individual fragments of narrative from around the 
																																																								
4 Ibid, 36. 
 
5 I refer again to Gayatri Spivak, who, following Marx, uses the term “mischmasch der kenntnisse” to describe the 
“jumble of knowledges” that occurs when global discourses collide. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Who Claims 
Alterity?,” An Aesthetic Education in an Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012), 60. 
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world fuse into a global strand of suffering until they overwhelm one another and become pure, 
uncontrollable sound.  
But as the storytelling process in the classroom begins, the coherence of the developing 
international and intersubjective narrative devolves and a cacophony erupts, each student 
interrupting the other with his or her unique narrative of pain, demanding to speak, to be heard. 
Overwhelmed by the discordance that the class in conversational English has wrought, the 
instructor, Ilka (who, like Gertie has come to the America after fleeing the Nazis), abruptly ends 
the class. As the students scatter, each into his or her own direction, she reminds them that they 
are to reconvene for a prestigious upcoming symposium to be held on the campus. The 
University, we learn, has scheduled a conference on the theme of “Should there be a statute of 
limitations on genocide?” to take place the next day in the university’s “New Theatre”—a 
spectacle that will be followed, the narrative cheekily tells us, by “a wine and cheese reception.”6  
If the first scene of the story takes place in the English language classroom, the second 
scene of the story moves the dramatic action onto the space of the stage, where a spectacle is 
scheduled to unfold. Scholars from Germany, Israel, South America, and the United States have 
been convened to publicly debate the nature of legal and moral judgment in the case of genocide, 
the ensuing discourse a public performance intended to play out in front of the university 
audience. The students, each of whom has experienced atrocity first hand, are to be the audience 
for the academic discussion who will play back their own first-hand experiences to them by 
distant readers, where they will see their stories reconfigured into a curriculized and distanced 
form. 
The arc of the narrative is telling: we begin the story with a pedagogical purpose; we end 
with the world of aesthetic itself as the moral grounds for a very dubious learning experience. 																																																								
6 Lore Segal, The Reverse Bug, 34. 
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Then, set on the stage, this second act prompts a scene that parallels and replays the dramatic 
action of the first act, the English language students and their articulations of personal narratives 
replaced with a collection of dignitaries from around the world gathered to opine on how to 
abstract, to theorize—and in a sense, how to rationalize atrocity—to put a coherent form of it up 
in front of the law for international judgment. The symposium convenor, English Professor 
Leslie Shakespeare, a tongue in cheek character naming that foregrounds (among other things) 
the degree to which the discourse of atrocity is governed and mediated by aesthetic orchestration, 
opens the discussion by framing the conversation between poetic and legal forms of justice. To 
the academic audience gathered, he asks why, beyond the expectations drawn from poetry, “do 
we all get these feelings of moral malaise when wrong goes unpunished and right goes 
unrewarded?”7  
Before the symposium may begin, however, it is interrupted by a mysterious noise, a 
shrieking emerging out of the microphone. “It became impossible not to know,” the narrative 
reads, that the sounds were “somebody yelling. Somewhere there was a person, and the person 
was screaming.” Unable to locate the origins of the scream or to silence it, the academic inquiry 
is cancelled, the convenors and audience driven from the auditorium. We learn that the sound is 
the contents of Matsue’s recordings, the “screams of Dachau and…Hiroshima,” and that the 
screams of Dachau and Hiroshima are indistinguishable—not only from one another, but from 
the screams of Paulino’s father, the perpetrator who has also suffered and whose articulation of 
pain competes with the articulations of the victims, all together demanding individual and 
singular recognition—all fused into one discordant and indecipherable shriek.8 Unable to locate 
																																																								
7 Ibid, 37. 
 
8 Ibid, 39. 
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or to dismantle the cause of the discord, Concordance University is forced to dismantle the 
theatre entirely, and to drive its wreckage, still shrieking, out of Connecticut and across the 
country, shipping the ruins out West to Arizona, where “they buried the thing fifteen feet under, 
well away from the highway, and let the desert howl.”9  
Ilka and the students in her class are fragmented doubles of Segal herself, who fled 
Austria as a child and came to England through the Kindertransport, then spent several years in 
the Dominican Republic as atrocities engineered by Trujillo abounded, before arriving in New 
York—right as the United Nations, led by the United States, launched the Korean War, in what 
became  one of the first tests of the UN’s mandate since its inception in 1945. Segal’s short story 
hovers between enlisting the very factual reality of her experience, and the very figural 
symbolism of fiction. Negotiating between historical and figural truths, the story puts in sharp, 
parodical focus the hopes and the efforts of my project, which drives me, as it does Leslie 
Shakespeare, with the “need to understand how the scream of Dachau is a different scream from 
the scream of Hiroshima,” and how these screams are “selfsame.”10  
In the scope of this project, I have gathered the screams of the Nazi victims together with 
the screams of the victims of industrial disaster in Bhopal, with the “chant! Shout! And 
ululation…moan! Mutter! Howl!...the pure utterance” of the murdered slaves thrown into the sea 
from the the Zong! slave ship, and the “deafening silence” of the Motasis in South Africa. 
Gathered together under the rubric of very real atrocity whose essential qualities may perhaps 
only be evidenced by figural and fictional invention, and their attempts, through interlocution, to 
communicate such reality through fictional terms and figural language, these narratives of pain 
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jostle with one another for space, for primacy, for singularity, even while they converse and draw 
from one another. At times, the cocoon of academic discourse and rational inquiry, the formal 
analysis and evaluation, seems an attempt to get rid of a figurative “reverse bug,” which 
threatens, as we know, to “relay into a room what those inside would prefer not to have to 
hear.”11 Academia may just be such a cocoon, a room into which those who study and discourse 
about atrocity may retreat to aesthetic and philosophical criticism so that we may evaluate the 
sounds of the suffering without actually having to hear them. 
The howls that interrupt Leslie Shakespeare’s symposium also tear a hole in the 
otherwise rational narrative of Segal’s story, interrupting the flow of plot with their dissonance. 
The story is about ideas and the attempt to realize ideals of justice. It is about the attempt to place 
atrocity within a discourse of reason, in which reality is made available as evidence for legal 
procedure and worldly justice. And it is about the “reality” of that suffering within the context of 
distant and academic readings by persons who can only imagine such experience through 
abstractions. In fact, the forum, and the sharp mention of a “wine and cheese reception” 
following it, highlights the sense in which the content of the forum on atrocity, a discussion of 
such severe and piquant moral problem about pain, is banalized rather than honored by the 
academic form in which it is put.  
The contrast between content—the topic of atrocity—and form—the academic forum—is 
effective in juxtaposition, for it highlights the uneasy relationship between critical analysis of 
atrocity, and the object of atrocity itself. The story, like the forum, is an attempt to narrativize the 
“facts” of atrocity, to provide the content of such painful suffering a rational form, to contain and 
to sequester it within the well-wrought urn of academic inquiry and interpretation. But the voice 
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will not stand for these containers; the shrieks insist on inhabiting the world, circulating outside 
that which can be contained by story or discourse. 
Both the Concordance University forum and the story to which it belongs are attempts to 
understand the nature and representation of atrocity in order to determine its status under the law, 
the nature of comparative suffering within the context of mass brutality, the rationalization of 
evil and pain—and yet, in the middle of attempts to understand and to provide a narrative frame 
for an experience of mass pain, the pain itself intrudes onto the stage, demanding attention. This 
howling, this terrible unstoppable, unintelligible, and discordant utterance that defies both the 
content and the form of articulate speech, tears right through the rational and academic 
discussion that tries to frame, figure, and interpret it. 
 In Segal’s story, the cacophony that results from the deliberation on atrocity’s aesthetic 
leads to an economy of comparison that quickly, and seemingly inevitably turns competitive. 
That comparison takes place at the site of the academy, between the English classroom and the 
New Theatre. The recorded screaming is both pure evidence of atrocity and purely aesthetic. It is 
telling that when discourse encounters this aesthetics of evidence, both the pure white noise that 
results as the student stories disrupt one another, and the disruptive shrieking from atrocities past, 
the two cannot cohere.  
I conclude with this story to open questions about the nature and the efficacy of the 
academic theatre and the classroom as it uses comparative means for examining the nature of 
atrocity. In attempting to formulate an overarching global standard for evaluating atrocity, 
through which to interpret both the event of atrocity and the aesthetic in which such events are 
formed and contained, perhaps the most critical aspect of our inquiry that we need to address is 
the method and the rationale for creating and for using such a global standard. Within the sphere 
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of representation, multidirectional memory may offer an ethical mode of consciousness, but can 
that model translate outside of representation? Has a metaphorical pairing of Holocaust memory 
with the memory of the slave trade enabled the world to say “never again” to ongoing violence 
against either group in the present? Has the presence of a Holocaust museum in the National 
Mall in Washington DC engendered understanding and tolerance toward minorities in the United 
States, or has it taken the place of what might have been a representation of the institution of 
slavery, of the Native American Genocide, or of the history of American Internment Camps? Has 
the representation allowed for resonance, or has it relegated these histories to footnote and 
imitation? Certainly, the representation of atrocity is political, with ethical and political stakes 
attached to its aesthetic. Yet the translation from representation within a world literature or a 
global representational code of atrocity to political representation of those across the world who 
suffer from it is unclear. There is the danger that an atrocity represented in the terms of an 
antecedent atrocity and conceptualized through the metaphorical terms may in fact not endow the 
former with the sheen of the “real.” Rather, figurative representation of an experience of 
suffering—an experience that may already be difficult to imagine and to evidence in factual 
terms—may result in both experiences becoming metaphorical for an audience that must imagine 
such distant suffering.  
In speaking on the topic of “The New International,” Gayatri Spivak describes a concept 
she calls teleopoiesis as “one of the shocks to the idea of belonging in a collectivity described as 
a “community of those without community.”12 In this context, teleopoiesis appears as a “textual 
figure” that “makes a constant and risk-taking effort to affect the distant in a poiesis or 
																																																								
12 Spivak use of the term follows Derrida’s coinage of it. 
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imaginative remaking, without guarantees.”13 Spivak, in speaking of teleopoiesis, refers to a 
mode of aesthetic production, but in the context of global atrocity and a body of global literature, 
the title of her text is worth noting: she called her essay “A Note on the New International.” She 
imagines the work of teleopoiesis—a term that combines the term teleo (completion or ending) 
with poeisis (making)—as work committed to “indefinite citation of citations, altered…until the 
‘author’ is hardly recognizable.”14 The “making” in teleopoiesis refers to a form of production 
characterized through reversals and loops, so that an original poetic citation and subsequent 
reconfigurations of that citation in other contexts become part of the same whole.  
In conceptualizing teleopoiesis, Spivak argues for a telos rooted in and overseen by a 
hermeneutic mode derived from poetic interpretation. A reading practice and literary 
hermeneutic rooted in the idea of a “new comparative literature,” teleopoiesis proposes reading 
texts as though they inherently address a future text that would recognize and receive them, as 
though they anticipate an other form or culture. Reading a work in this way means “imagining 
yourself, really letting yourself be imagined (experience the impossibility) without guarantees, 
by and in another culture, perhaps.”15 In making an argument for a reading practice that would 
reimagine the conceptual structure of comparative literature, Spivak anchors the politics of 
reading in the politics of questioning the political history of universalization through which a 
distinctly European understanding of “the human” comes to posture as universal in the discourse 
of human rights. She argues that the idea of “the human” in universal human rights, as well as 
considerations of what violates that universal human, derive from a clichéd Western idiom which 
																																																								
13 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia UP, 2003), 31. 
 
14 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “A Note on the New International,” Parallax  7 (2001): 13-14 
. 
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline 52. 
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non-Western humans must reproduce in form. Spivak’s term is meant to serve as a 
counterbalance to the type of globalization forged through law. Citing “the madness of a 
declaration of human rights—necessarily bending curvature into droiture—straightness, rights, 
uprightness,” she argues that international law and tribunals must learn from below, bending to 
accommodate experiences that do not cohere with clichéd concepts of human rights or “the 
human.”16  
Comparative memory need not end up as a zero-sum game, in which representations 
must compete with one another for articulation and must either submit to being a copy of another 
form—or, conversely, demand recognition on its own terms as exceptional and inassimilable 
within a global context. But memories, especially when the discourse of memory studies 
encounters and fuses with the politics of exceptionality that aggregate and pool around the 
representation of atrocity, can become competitive. A politics of memory is apparent from the 
early days of the memory studies discourse produced by the academic growth of “Genocide 
Studies.” “The assertion that the Holocaust is unique—like the claim that it is singularly 
incomprehensible or unrepresentable—is, in practice, deeply offensive,” wrote Peter Novick in 
1998. “What else can all of this possibly mean except ‘your catastrophe, unlike ours, is ordinary; 
unlike ours is comprehensible; unlike ours is representable.”17  
Put into the context of global history and politics, the claim that the Holocaust, as an 
archetypal atrocity, is exceptional—exceptional within a history of suffering and violence, much 
of which took place in the Global South—is a claim that reinforces the exceptional character of 
the West. Put into the context of global poetics and a universal ethical code, the claim that the 
suffering of the Holocaust is somehow so exceptional to be beyond or outside of aesthetic 																																																								
16 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “A Note on the New International,” 15. 
 
17 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: First Mariner Books, 2000), 9. 
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representational modes is a claim about the universality of the Holocaust. It is tethered to the 
idea of a global form of atrocity, a globally enforceable legal code, and a fixed reference point to 
which all “realities” of atrocity must appeal. A reference point, however, may come a deference 
point; in a comparative economy of memory, in which the “reality” or the empirical singularity 
of an experience of suffering must prove its “reality” as an incident of suffering and as a case 
that warrants a moral claim, the material experience of suffering may face the threat of itself 
becoming less real than figure, impression, or a mimetic repetition of another form—in short, a 
cliché.   
 Put into the context of a global aesthetic of literature about atrocity, the claim of 
exceptionality has induced, and has been reinforced by a representational claim about the 
ineffability of extreme atrocity, that it is beyond language or evidence. Michael Rothberg and 
Neil Levi write that the application of the terms “unthinkable” and “unimaginable” to the events 
of the Holocaust is unique; indeed, they write, these claims to ineffability have become 
“Holocaust clichés, as likely to block reflection as to encourage it.”18  
Meanwhile, Elie has Wiesel argued that the power of the Holocaust to affect human 
rights was its influence on the production of modes for comparison across a diverse geographical 
and geopolitical topography, namely through portable figures and forms. “Negro quarters are 
called ghettos,” he wrote, “Hiroshima is explained by Auschwitz; Vietnam is described in terms 
which were used one generation ago.”19 Whether the stakes are linguistic or aesthetic, legal, 
those of human rights, pedagogical, theoretical, or ethical, we need to better understand how and 
with what effect figuration moves when applied to atrocity, how comparative methods work, and 																																																								
18 Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg, "Auschwitz and the Remains of Theory: Toward an Ethics of the 
Borderland," Symploke 11.1 (2003): 25. 
 
19 See Annette Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 2006), 103. 
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how, once put into comparative modes, texts from this diverse geopolitical grouping reference 
one another in interacting as they do, without eliding over the way that these sites of atrocity 
reckon with, and dynamically respond to, diverse contexts against the backdrop of uniform 
human rights. In Bloodlands, Snyder writes that, [o]ur contemporary culture takes for granted 
that memory prevents murder. If people died in such large numbers, it is tempting to think they 
must have died for something of transcendent value, which can be revealed. Developed, and 
preserved in the right sort of political remembrance. The transcendent then turns out to be the 
national.”20 If atrocity is understood as “transcendent,” understood as the purview of 
cosmological or metaphysical causes and effects, evidence of atrocity is not a form of factuality 
that belongs to the court of logical proof, but rather a form of moral proof. How we respond to it 
becomes evidence of who and what we understand ourselves to be. 
While the Holocaust shocked the moral consciousness and sensibility of white 
Europeans and Americans into claiming disbelief and unspeakability, for Black communities, 
particularly African American communities, the Holocaust was less an archetype than a 
repetition of an all-too-well-known experience of suffering, repetition with a difference. “White 
people were, and are, astounded by the holocaust in Germany,” wrote the poet, playwright, and 
essayist, James Baldwin, in a 1962 New Yorker article he titled “Letter From a Region in My 
Mind”—published months before the New Yorker would begin carrying Arendt’s reports on the 
Eichmann trial. He continues, 
They did not know that they could act that way. But I very much doubt whether 
black people were astounded—at least, in the same way. For my part, the fate of 
the Jews, and the world’s indifference to it, frightened me very much. I could not 
but feel, in those sorrowful years, that this human indifference, concerning which 
I knew so much already, would be my portion on the day that the United States 
decided to murder its Negroes systematically instead of little by little and catch-
as-catch-can. I was, of course, authoritatively assured that what had happened to 																																																								
20 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Betweeen Stalin and Hitler (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 202. 
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the Jews in Germany could not happen to the Negroes in America, but I thought, 
bleakly, that the German Jews had probably believed similar counselors.21 
 
Kierkegaard, writes Peter Brooks, find that "repetition and recollection are the same movement, 
only in opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas 
repetition properly is repeated forwards,"22 In Baldwin’s writing, the fate of the Jews is both 
repetition and recollection. For the Black community, it is recollection; the Nazi Holocaust, and 
the world’s indifference to it, does not astound him; the knowledge that such a “civilized” culture 
such as Germany was capable of perpetrating such violence and brutality fails to astound the lack 
community because the Jewish experience at the hand of Germans has an all-too-familiar 
preexisting figure, in the experience of Black people. For Baldwin, both the paradox of white 
“civilized” violence, and the irony of white civilization’s “shock” at such violence, is trite, 
cliché. Yet for Baldwin the Holocaust incites alarm because it is also repetition; a prefiguration 
for a mass-murder of Black people to come, at the hands of the United States government, in the 
distinct form of the suffering of German Jews. In Baldwin’s essay, the Holocaust is both figured 
by the past experience of Black people, and simultaneously a figure through which to anticipate a 
visceral possible future for Black people in the United States. The two terms of analogy, 
European Jews and Black Americans, exist in a loop, a reminder, as Brooks writes, that “we 
cannot really move ahead until we have understood that still enigmatic past, yet ever pushing us 
forward, since revelation, tied to the past, belongs to the future”23  
 In 1951, a decade before Baldwin published his New Yorker article, the poet and 
playwright Ossie Davis, who had started to gain note as a civil rights activist, joined William L. 
																																																								
21 James Baldwin, “Letter from a Region in My Mind,” New Yorker, November 17, 1962. 
 
22 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992), 124. 
23 Ibid, 124-125. 
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Patterson to publish, through the forum of the Civil Rights Congress, a pamphlet titled “We 
Charge Genocide.”24 The subtitle of the pamphlet declared it to be “The Historic Petition to the 
United Nations for Relief From a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro 
People.” Invoking the 1945 United Nations Human Rights Charter and the definition of genocide 
coined by Raphael Lempkin (the Jewish lawyer who forged the term, both to describe the Jewish 
Holocaust at the hands of the Nazis, and to formalize the crime as a precedent for international 
law to figure and assess future events as genocide with the hopes that it would induce response 
by the international community) the pamphlet introduces its case with the claim that: 
The Hitler crimes, of awful magnitude, beginning as they did against the heroic 
Jewish people, finally drenched the world in blood, and left a record of maimed 
and tortured bodies and devastated areas such as mankind had never seen before. 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, who now sits in the United States Supreme Court 
bench, described this holocaust to the world in the powerful language with which 
he opened the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders. Every word he voiced against 
the monstrous Nazi beast applies with equal weight, we believe, to those who are 
guilty of the crimes herein set forth. Here we present the documented crimes. 
 
In 1951, the petition was presented for review by the international committee, “[a]ddressed,” a 
foreward from William Patterson reads, “to the United Nations [and] submitted to that body in 
Paris, France at the Palais Chaillot where the Fifth Session of the General Assembly had 
gathered.” Simultaneously, the actor and political activist Paul Robeson—who had been active in 
the writing of the petition, led a delegation to the New York United Nations offices, to present 
the Secretary General of the UN with copies.25  
The petition was unsuccessful, not only in its ex post facto charge, but also in establishing 
the crime as an analog. Ex post facto laws (included in the Nuremberg protocols and Article 11, 
																																																								
24 William Patterson, We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief From a Crime of 
the United States Government Against the Negro People (New York: International Publishers, 1970). 
 
25 Ibid, vii. 
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paragraph 2 of the Human Rights Charter) denied attempts to retroactively apply a legal decision 
to an antecedent event. The specification ensured that crimes against humanity committed before 
the formalization of the UN’s legal code prohibiting them would not be prosecuted. Meanwhile, 
the figurative potential offered by the new model for identifying Human Rights violations was 
almost immediately blunted. 
In the middle of the drafting process for Article 6 of the 1945 London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which defined “Crimes Against Humanity,” the 
text underwent some important and puzzling changes. According to one widely held theory about 
changes made to the drafts, the article was written and carefully phrased so as to forestall any 
claim by the African American community to charge the United States or the Colonial powers in 
Europe with genocide. The clause in Article 6 (c), the part of Article 6 that deals with the charge 
of “Crimes Against Humanity,” leveraged against the Nazis, was originally disconnected from 
the charge of war crimes, making the Nazi brutality a separate charge from the crimes 
perpetrated during the war. This meant that human rights violations before the war, or in times of 
peace, could be prosecuted separately from human violations during the war.26 For those who 
argue this reading and who back this theory about deliberation behind the scenes during the 
revisions, Judge Robert Jackson (who represented the American contingency and its interests), 
was worried about the precedent of crimes against humanity having implications on American’s 
																																																								
26 Lawrence Douglas dissents from this point of view, citing a source who grammatical change was more due to “the 
usual bunch of incompetents” than to any substantive reason. Beth Schaack, however, finds that “it has been 
acknowledged that there is a “nagging doubt…that something more substantive was going on.” See Lawrence 
Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale UP, 
2001), 54; Beth Van Schaack “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,” Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 37 (1998-1999), 803. 
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treatment of Blacks, a concern that led Jackson to focus the Nuremberg trials on war crimes 
rather than make the trial about minority mistreatment.27 The article reads as follows: 
Art. 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof 
for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the 
interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
organizations, committed any of the following crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) ' Crimes against peace: ' namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) ' War crimes: ' namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to Wave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing 
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) ' Crimes against humanity.- ' namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such 
plan.28 
 
 In the original English and French drafts submitted for review by the United Nations, a 
semicolon punctured the first charge, appearing after the word “war” in clause (c). But the final 
text, which follows the text of the Russian draft, makes small but significant change to the text of 
																																																								
27 See, for example, Beth Van Schaack “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence.”  
 
28 Article 6 (b), Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement of August 8, 1945, 
between France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of 
America, and the U. S. S. R.; Cmd. 6668. See “Article 6: Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 
August 1945,” reproduced by the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
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Article 6. The draft changed that semicolon to a comma.29 That grammatical alteration makes the 
second phrase, which describes “' Crimes against humanity,” dependent on the first part of the 
clause, which stipulates that a state can only be charged with crimes against humanity if those 
crimes connected with other crimes (that is, if the charged crimes against humanity are parasitic 
to the primary crime outlined in Article 6, specifically a war crime).30 As a result, “It was… 
necessary for the prosecution at Nuremberg to show that any alleged crime against humanity was 
committed in connection with one of the other crimes of Germany in order to secure a 
conviction; this was the view of the Tribunal in its judgment, as a result of which it found very 
few acts to be crimes against humanity if they were committed before September 1, 1939,” 
explains Sydney L. Goldenberg, in his 1971 article “Crimes Against Humanity 1945-1970: A 
Study in the Making and Unmaking of International Criminal Law.”31    
																																																								
29 The significance and import of the alteration made by the grammatical shift was recognized from the start. In 
1947, George Schwarzenberger wrote, suggestively, that [t]he fact that, in the American and English texts, the semi-
colon was replaced by a comma, and the French text still further modified-and all with the solemnity of a Protocol-
suggests that at least one of the signatories to the original Agreement felt strongly about having admitted, perhaps 
unwittingly, the existence of a crime against humanity which consists in the violation of minimum standards 
regarding the treatment of human beings anywhere…. Either criminal responsibility exists for all forms of the abuse 
of national sovereignty with regard to individuals, such as extermination, enslavement or deportation of civilian 
populations, or such behaviour is covered in peacetime by the conception of exclusively domestic jurisdiction. Then 
such deeds involve international responsibility only if practiced against populations of occupied territories in time of 
war and then amounting to war crimes in the technical sense. By their Protocol of October 6th, 1945 the signatories 
apparently wished to guard themselves against a possible interpretation of the Charter in the former sense. By doing 
so, they made it impossible to argue that the emasculated type of crime against humanity which survived their joint 
efforts was anything but the creation of the Charter.” See George Schwarzenberger, “The Judgment of Nuremberg,” 
Tulane Law Review XII.3 (March, 1947): 352-357. 
 
30 The amendment to Article 6 made Crimes Against Humanity limited the scope of the article to crimes committed 
in times of war, eliminating the possibility of charging crimes outlined in Article 6 that occurred during times of 
peace. Raphael Lemkin, who had coined the term “genocide” and had been the primary contributor to and advocate 
for the writing and adoption of the genocide conventions, was very upset with the distinction. In an unpublished 
memoir, cited by Perry S. Bechky, Lemkin quotes Lemkin, who writes that ““For years, I tried to establish genocide 
as [an] international crime both in time of war and peace, and what I obtained in Nuremberg was fragmentary 
treatment of the problem,” destructively limiting the possibilities for recognizing, outlawing, and responding to 
genocide to “an advance of 10 or 20 percent.” See Perry S. Bechky, "Lemkin's Situation: Toward A Rhetorical 
Understanding of Genocide,” Brooklyn Law Review 77. 2 (2012): 580. 
 
31 Sydney L. Goldenberg, “Crimes Against Humanity 1945-1970: A Study in the Making and Unmaking of 
International Criminal Law,” W. Ontario L. Rev. 1 (1971): 6. 
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Intentional or not, the semantic change served a second and significant purpose. The 
definition of “Crimes Against Humanity,” as it was originally drafted in the English and the 
French versions of the text, was immediately recognizable to Americans who read it; Americans 
who knew anything of their own history of atrocities—as the American judges participating in 
the drafting process surely did—saw the resemblance between what the UN was proposing to 
label “crimes against humanity,” and the violent experience of African Americans, an experience 
frequently endorsed, enabled, and legalized in the long history of the United States. Slavery, and 
the continued experience of African Americans at the hands of the US Government and on US 
territory bore too close of an analogy to the “crimes against humanity” clause that the article 
aimed to make criminal in so qualifying the crimes modeled on the Nazi brutalities. In the 
creation of this new universally recognizable law, which was to criminally treat what was 
supposed to be the worst violence and brutality that the world had witnessed, Judge Jackson saw 
the uncanny resemblance the past of many former imperial states and entities that had 
participated in previous pasts of violence, specifically slavery—chiefly among them the United 
States.  
That is to say, in the definition of “Crimes Against Humanity” drafted in 1945 and 
modeled with the Nazi crimes in mind, legal authorities at Nuremberg experienced what we 
might call a shock of recognition; the Nazi crimes, and the laws that would make them 
permanently and universally criminal, pertained to the very governments of which they were a 
part, and which they represented. The analogy prompted an effort to amend the text, which 
culminated in the ratification of the Russian draft, with its semantic shift. The grammar of the 
article, as it stands, links all of the crimes against humanity charged at Nuremberg to the war, 
and specifically to Hitler’s aggression in starting the war, a specification that guaranteed that the 
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trials at Nuremberg would not serve as a figure for some of the more egregious violence against 
the Black community globally, or the Native American and the African American communities 
in the United States pre-WWII, violence that bore too close of an analogy to the American acts 
of violence and brutality against these communities. The carefully worded and deliberately 
selected semantics of the final and agreed-upon text aimed to ensure that what was done before 
1939 could not be proven as Crimes Against Humanity under the new officially and globally 
applicable standard code. In carving the UN’s legal definition of Crimes Against Humanity out 
of the figure of the Holocaust, the figure of slavery had to be erased from the heart of the legal 
document.  
The United Nations determination of Crimes Against Humanity was ostensibly oriented 
toward the future, anticipating and, the hope was, preempting human rights abuses to come. It 
was also pointedly oriented in the opposite direction, toward the past. The figure of the 
Holocaust was said to represent a new crime, such that a new legal category and protocol was 
necessary. But as the authors of the United Nations charter knew too well, the figure of the 
Holocaust was not dangerously without antecedent figure, but rather dangerously prefigured, The 
figure of the Holocaust inscribed within international law bears the negative form of the slave 
trade; the comma two forms of human rights abuses looped together, wordlessly joined as 
inversions of one another at the comma. 
Davis and Patterson were joined in their charge by a camaraderie of thinkers and activists 
who, even if they had been unfamiliar with the specifics of the clause, would have known the 
futility of the suit as a legal enterprise. Their aim, then, (as they put it), was to:  
present the documented crimes of federal, state and municipal governments in the 
United States of America, the dominant nation in the United Nations, against 
15,000,000 of its own nationals-the Negro people of the United States. These 
crimes are of the gravest concern to mankind. The General Assembly of the 
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United Nations, by reason of the United Nations Charter and the Genocide 
Convent ion, itself is invested with power to receive this indictment and act on 
it…Our evidence is admittedly incomplete. It is our hope that the United Nations 
will complete it. Much of the evidence, particularly of violence, gained from the 
files of Negro newspapers, from the labor press, the annual reports of Negro 
societies and established Negro yearbooks. A list is appended. But by far the 
majority of Negro murders are never recorded, never known except to the 
perpetrators and the bereaved survivors of the victims. Negro men and women 
leave their homes and are never seen again. Sometimes weeks later their bodies, 
or bodies thought to be theirs, often horribly mutilated, are found in the woods or 
washed up on the shore of a river or lake. This is a well-known pattern of 
American culture. In many sections of the country police do not even bother to 
record the murder of Negroes. Most white newspapers have a policy of not 
publishing anything concerning murders of Negroes or assaults upon them. These 
unrecorded deaths are the rule rather than the exception-thus evidence, though 
voluminous, is scanty when compared to the actuality.32 
 
“The evidence,” according to the document, “is scanty when compared to the actuality:” the 
reality is too extreme for the proof.  The document, which contains about 280 pages of text, 
outlines its evidence in over 100 of those pages—devoting roughly a third of the text to 
establishing proof. Despite its ample chronicle of citations, the “Evidence” section of the text 
stipulates that, 
although our evidence voluminously details the crimes of genocide suffered by the 
Negro people, it falls far short of adequately presenting reality. The crimes 
presented are only those experienced by some of the petitioners and that marked 
minority of crimes committed which happened to receive mention in Negro 
yearbooks, the Negro press or the labor press. The vast majority of such crimes are 
never recorded. This widespread failure to record crimes against the Negro people 
is in itself an index to genocide.33   
 
Substantiating the “facts” of the genocide for the United Nations to review, that is, furnishing a 
legal argument with substantive proof, was not the point. The point was to establish the actuality, 
which includes not only the crimes but the “widespread failure to record the crimes.” By 
presenting the evidence as evidence of a crime whose criminality was established by the law 
																																																								
32 William L. Patterson We Charge Genocide, 9. 
 
33 Ibid, 57. 
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after the crimes had occurred, the authors of this document sought to establish proof not only of 
its claim of genocide’s reality, part of which was itself “[t]his widespread failure to record [the] 
crimes.” Paradoxically, nowhere was that failure more profound and more astute than in the very 
legal premise to which the claim appealed. The claim bears its witness in front of a court that has 
erased witness, gestures toward a dead metaphor at the center of the UN’s production of a 
universal human rights protocol.  
We, living seventy years after Davis and Patterson filed their plaint, know that the United 
Nations never determined that the institution of slavery in the United States, nor the global slave 
trade that took place in the transatlantic context, constituted a legally recognizable charge of 
genocide. Retrospectively, we see that the case for the suffering of Black people across centuries 
never was proven in the international court. No amount of evidence could prove the case, even if 
it were all entirely true. The clause in Article 6 ensured, as it was intended to ensure, that 
whatever evidence could be collected as proof, and however extensive and concrete such 
evidence might be, the retroactive claim could not legally substantiate the reality of the crimes, 
in legal form.  
The Crimes Against Humanity clause drafted in 1945 built a new model for identifying 
and apprehending Crimes Against Humanity, whenever and wherever they might appear in the 
form given by the Holocaust. The tribunal that wrote and ratified it to govern the terrain of 
international law and universal human rights forged that figure by sublimating an antecedent 
form, that of the slave trade, whose similitude was perhaps too recognizable, too much of a 
likeness for law or the new world order—or global capital—to bear. Yet while Article 6, the 
foundational determination of Crimes Against Humanity that the Holocaust inducts, is built on a 
legal forgetting of the “tale…told/old/tale” of the atrocities of slavery, its form is an unspoken 
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center, a comma, a grammatical indication for both pause and jointure, at the core of the human 
rights charter. It is precisely that “tale…told/old/tale” that articulates, that structures, and that 
marks a point of coincidence between the two coordinate points in a history of global violence, 
the history of slavery, and the history of the Holocaust. That point of juncture is marked by the 
articulation of one history, and the disarticulation of the other, and that point, at which the 
memory of the Holocaust has to overwrite the memory of the slave trade in order for the Crimes 
Against Humanity clause to be inscribed, is what is embedded within the grammar of the Crimes 
Against Humanity clause. An act of legal remembering modeled on Holocaust-like violence and 
oriented toward recognizing future repetitions of it, created through a splitting-off of dis-
remembering of the violence of slavery that preceded the Holocaust model. That is to say, if the 
UN definition of Crimes Against Humanity of Human Rights, and the terms of their violation, is 
understood as the foundational model introduced by the experience of the Holocaust, it is 
structured by, respondent to, and written against the foreseeable claim by the descendants of 
Black slaves against the countries that committed atrocities against them.  
 I am making the case that Article 6 bears witness not only to the Holocaust, that it uses 
the evidence from and the figure of the Holocaust to manufacture a legal model for future events, 
but that it also evidences, in ways that are unspoken—gestured toward with the absence of 
language and the presence of a comma (a grammatical turn of breath)—the figure of the slave 
trade. If Celan’s poem, and the Holocaust as a referent, is the “tale…told/old/tale” in Philip’s 
“untelling” of the legal Gregson v. Gilbert court case, the slave trade and its body of copious 
evidence is the “tale…told/old/tale” that haunts the United Nations definition of Human Rights. 
In a sense, the United Nations Charter, in laying out its protocol governing Universal Human 
Rights in the wake of the Holocaust, has to “untell” antecedent the story of the slave trade in 
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order to speak its anticipatory model, its legal figure of international human rights post-1945. 
A comma erases a history of violence in a legal document, telling one story while erasing 
another. Comparative discourse, legislation built on models of experience, and figurative 
strategies may enable articulation, recognition, and response; it may also overwrite and disfigure 
accounts and claims to representation. In effect, the success of the UN’s legal framework, which 
was developed to use comparison and figuration as a mode of prognostication, diagnosis, and 
cure for crimes against humanity, has been uneven. While the critical consensus on the 
globalization of human rights in literature proposes that the “world novel” and a “world code” of 
human rights inform one another’s evolution, my study marks moments that invert this claim: a 
“world code” of human rights pressures texts and experiences engaged in this discourse to mark 
themselves as singular, and shows moments in which they resist comparative analysis, even 
while they embed comparisons within their textual bodies. That resistance is present, not in spite 
of but because of their reliance on figuration, analogy, metaphor, and tropology.  
Moreover, I find that when an atrocity occurs in a place with a “minor history,” the 
problem multiplies. In the postcolonial contexts included in my research, blankly applying 
comparative and universal methods for evaluating redress developed by the West often ignores 
suffering in spaces that have already been marginalized. Procedures of comparison frequently 
pass over the same populations which international legislative bodies and forms of world 
governance already tend to ignore, thus creating a politics of exclusion in which a select cohort 
certifies the forms and instances of suffering that matter. In so doing, these procedures make 
routes to potential compensation even more difficult for those on the margins. Thus, 
comparison’s attempt at an all-inclusive approach to redressing human rights violation ultimately 
	 311 
reasserts the uneven geopolitical hierarchy in which some lives, particularly those in India and 
the Global South, are less valuable than those in the West. 
The conclusion of Segal’s parable ends with Concordance University finally ridding itself 
of the howling. The narrative reads: 
The superfund granted Concordance an allowance, for scream disposal, and the 
dismembered stage of the New Theatre was loaded onto a flatbed truck and driven 
west. The population along Route 90 and all the way down to Arizona came out 
into the street, eyes squeezed together, heads pulled back and down into 
shoulders. They buried the thing fifteen feet under, well away from the highway, 
and let the desert howl.34  
 
The direct implication here is that the narrative provides is that Concordance University has rid 
itself of its discord, that it is no longer forced to hear the sounds of suffering that it “know[s] 
goes on whether we are hearing it or not” (39). But displacing the howling does not cause them 
to stop howling; they will go on even when we turn our ears away from them, even if we can 
maintain our distance to them. In closing out the plot with a slow drive out West to the Arizona 
desert to “let the desert howl,” the narrative itself wordlessly evokes an antecedent atrocity never 
mentioned as content within its form. The image of the howling from Dachau and from 
Hiroshima, and from around the globe, now buried in the American desert, mixes with the silent 
presence of the Native American genocide never mentioned, a memory of atrocity that lies there 
too. There is no textual evidence for this new concordance, between the shrieks of the reverse 
bug and the silence of the desert, but perhaps that enjambment at the end of the text, the point 
that stands at its outer limit at the margins of the plot and at the boundary of the nation, is itself 
the central aesthetic of the story. 
 
 
 																																																								
34 Lore Segal The Reverse Bug, 40. 
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